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Abstract
This thesis is a study of the theological relationship between divine mercy and 
judgment in the attribute formula of Exodus 34:6-7 and in three of its “echoes” (Numbers 
14:18, Isaiah 53:4-12 with 54:7-10, and Nahum 1:3). The primary scholarly interlocutor 
for this study is Walter Brueggemann. In his Theology o f the Old Testament, Brueggemann 
offers an alternative interpretation of how mercy and judgment are related in these texts. 
Against Brueggemann, this study defends the view that in Ex 34:6-7 and these three 
echoes, divine mercy and judgment are not only mutually compatible but also are 
integrated with one another. I reach this conclusion by means of an exegesis of the above 
four texts that is canonical, theological, and contextual.
The introduction Chapter 1 includes a survey of relevant scholarly literature, an 
analysis of relevant aspects of Brueggemann’s work, and a statement of the canonical 
method employed in the thesis. Chapter 2 provides a theological exegesis of Exodus 34:6- 
7 in the context of Exodus 32-34. Chapters 3-5 offer theological exegesis of the three 
echo-texts noted above. Chapter 6 offers a conclusion, summarising the argument and 
making some final observations.
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Notes on Style
I first wish to make the following observations about the manner in which I cite 
sources in this study:
1. I identify sources in footnotes that include the surname of the author, the date of 
publication, and, if necessary, the page numbers cited (e.g. Fretheim 1991: 18, 78- 
80). In main text of the document, I use the first name or first initials of an author 
the first time I refer to him or her in a chapter. In the footnotes I use the first name 
or initials of an author only when a chapter contains citations to more than one 
author with the same surname. Full citations are given in the list of “Sources Cited” 
at the end of the thesis.
2. Exceptions to the above stated form occur when more information is needed to 
specify a source. For example, since there are multiple sets and volumes of 
commentaries published under the name of John Calvin in 1950,1 supply additional 
information in parentheses: Calvin 1950 {Minor Prophets vol. 3): 36; similarly for 
other multi-volume sources: e.g., Barthélémy 1982 (vol. 2): 546.
3. Another exception occurs in regard to Walter Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old 
Testament. Since some sections of this study refer to this book extensively and 
repeatedly, I often refer to this work with in-text parentheses containing the page 
number(s) only. Since it differs from the usual pattern of citation, I announce my 
use of this form of citation by means of an explanatory footnote.
Several other matters of style are worth mentioning briefly:
1. All translations of the Hebrew text are my own unless otherwise noted.
2. Except for some quotations, I normally refer to the Tetragrammaton as “the L orD .”
Vll
C h apter  1:
In tr o d u c t io n
1. The Thesis Summarized
1.1. The Problem Addressed in This Thesis
Scholars have long noted that Exodus 34:6-7 provides one of the most important 
affirmations about the character of the Ldrd^ in the Old Testament/ In the last fifty years, 
various scholars have discussed a significant number of “echoes” (i.e. quotations, parallels, 
or allusions)^ of Ex 34:6-7 found elsewhere in the Old Testament."  ^ Until recent years, 
however, interpretations of these texts have not engaged extensively with the theological 
issues of these texts, especially the relationship between divine mercy and divine judgment. 
Sections of Walter Brueggemann’s 1997 Theology of the Old Testament began to fill this 
theological lacuna by offering a more extensive theological interpretation of Ex 34:6-7 and 
several of its echoes. Yet Brueggemann’s interpretation largely misconstrues the meaning 
and theological significance of the “formula” found in Ex 34:6-7 and several of its echoes. 
Further theological reflection on these crucial texts is necessary.
In this thesis, I offer a new interpretation of the theological meaning and function of 
Ex 34:6-7 and three of its echoes through a contextual-theological exegesis of them. My 
interpretation of these four texts focuses on the relationship between mercy and judgment 
within the L orD’s character and acts. After the biblical text itself, my primary dialogue 
partner will be Brueggemann.
‘ By the term “the L ord”  (in all capital letters) I refer to mn] in this thesis. I will use the traditional rendering 
of nin’ “the L ord” instead of the modern reconstruction “Yahweh,” except when describing or quoting other 
scholars, such as Brueggemann.
 ^As a Christian scholar, I will employ the term Old Testament instead of “Hebrew Bible” or other 
alternatives. See Seitz 1998: 61-74. (For full citations of all the sources cited in the main text or the notes, 
see the Bibliography.)
 ^See the definitions for “formula” and “echoes” given in 1.3 below.
In the last 50 years, the following studies are the most important: Scharbert 1957, Dentan 1963, Fishbane 
1985, Gowan 1994, and Brueggemann 1997. The following sources are also helpful: Childs 1974, 
Spieckermann 2000, and Trible 1978: 4f. Gowan (1994: 287) and Spieckermann (2000: 309) also cite other 
sources.
1.2. Statement of the Thesis To Be Defended and a Plan for Its Defence
The main claim that I wish to defend in this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
When rightly understood in their literary and theological contexts. Ex 34:6-7 and three o f 
its echoes (Num 14:18, Is 53-54, and Nah 1:3) consistently present the L o r d 's  mercy and 
judgment as unified (non-contradictory), mutually-dependent (inter-related and 
inseparable), and constant aspects of the L o r d 's  character.
This claim can be analysed into two sub-claims, the first about the formula in 
Ex 34:6-7 itself and the second about the relationship between the formula and its three 
echoes.
1. The “two halves” of the formula (Ex 34:6-7a and 7b) do not stand in 
contradiction to each other, nor are they theologically separable from each other. 
Rather, the L orD’s mercy is integrated with the L o rD ’s judgment (acts of 
punishment) and vice versa.
2. The basic theological content of the formula about God’s mercy and judgment 
remains continuous throughout its varied applications in its echoes. Thus, the 
L orD’s mercy and judgment remain integrated in the echoes. Some echoes 
emphasize the “mercy-side” of the formula more, and others emphasize the 
“judgment-side” more, but the echoes do not set up mercy as either 
contradictory or separate from judgment, or vice versa.
I will defend these sub-claims as follows. In Chapter 2 ,1 will do a contextual- 
theological exegesis of Ex 34:6-7 which will provide an initial demonstration of sub­
claim 1. In Chapters 3-5,1 will do a contextual-theological exegesis of an echo or a cluster 
of echoes, addressing the issues of the extent, function, and theology of each echo or echo- 
cluster.^ These chapters will demonstrate sub-claim 2 and will offer further support to
 ^In more detail, these chapters will do the following: (1) Determine the precise extent o f the echo, what is and 
is not repeated of the formula, including issues of textual criticism; (2) Determine the function of the echo in 
its literary and theological context; and, (3) Determine how the theology o f mercy and judgment is advanced 
and clarified by an assessment of the extent and function o f the echo, and make explicit the distinctive 
contribution that each echo makes to a biblical theology of divine mercy and judgment.
claim 1. Then, in Chapter 6 ,1 will sum up the findings of the previous chapters, relating 
the conclusions of each of the chapters to one another in an attempt to move toward a more 
comprehensive biblical understanding of divine mercy and judgment.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will take up several further introductory tasks: 
providing some definitions of key terms (subsection 1.3), discussing the scope of the thesis 
in relation to previous scholarship (section 2), offering a critical summary of the relevant 
contributions of Walter Brueggemann (section 3), and presenting an explanation of the 
methodology employed here (section 4). These introductoiy tasks will provide the 
necessary background for the argument undertaken in the rest of the thesis.
1.3. Some Definitions: Formula, Echo, and Related Terms
I will now explain several key terms used in this thesis. First, the term “formula” or 
“attribute formula” is used to refer to the text in Ex 34:6-7 which proclaims the character of 
the L orD . The formula as a “base text” or “mother text” is distinguished from its “echoes” 
or intertextual appearances which, from a canonical perspective, are identifiable reuses of 
the formula.^ In other words, in the canonical order, the three echo texts follow the base 
text in Exodus. In the final form of the canon, the echo texts are set in the context of later 
episodes in Israel’s history.’
® At this point, one might object to my choice of Ex 34:6-7 as the base text for the echo texts. That is, one 
might argue that if I am interested in canonical order, I should chose Ex 20:5-7 as the base text since it occurs 
before Ex 34:6-7. While I am not in principle opposed to treating Ex 20 as the base text, to do so would not 
be fitting for this study for at least two reasons: (1) The echoes I have chosen have language that more 
specifically parallels the language used in Ex 34 than the language in Ex 20; and, (2) Ex 34:6-7 is a fuller and 
more complete statement of God’s attributes, including those of mercy and judgment. It is thus more fitting as 
a text which I can compare theologically with other texts (like the echoes) treating similar themes.
’ By speaking of “a canonical perspective” and “the canonical order,” I am not making any claims about the 
chronological order in which the texts in question were written, edited, or redacted. See 4.2.3 for a further 
explanation and defence of this perspective.
The echoes of the formula stand in a continuum in terms of their degree of literary 
(verbal and syntactical) and thematic correspondence to the formula. Accordingly, I will 
sometimes distinguish between “strong” or “faint” echoes to assign them a relative location 
in that continuum. By a “strong echo,” I mean a phrase or series of words that contain a 
high degree of literary (verbal and syntactical) and thematic correspondence to the divine 
attributes in Ex 34:6-7.
By a “faint echo,” I refer to terms or phrases in the literary context of strong echoes 
that thematically correspond to the formula. Unlike a strong echo, a faint echo involves 
only such features as thematic correspondence. It is not an exact repetition of any of the 
literary or verbal features of the formula.®
A “contextual echo” is another variant of a faint echo. A contextual echo is a 
certain term that occurs in the literary context of the formula that recurs in the literary 
context of the echoes. Contextual echoes are sometimes found within the immediate 
context of a passage (e.g. between Ex 33:19 and Ex 34:6-7 in the context of Ex 32-34; see 
Chapter 2). They can also be found within the larger context (or larger unit) of a passage, 
such as a book or a collection of books.^ On the largest scope, there are intertextual 
connections or parallels in various parts of the canon that illuminate the theological 
meaning and function of the terms that refer to the divine attributes in the formula and in 
the echoes.
® See 4.2.3 for further discussion of thematic echoes.
 ^E.g., the thematic links between the various wilderness passages in the Pentateuch mentioned in Chapter 3; 
or, the thematic and terminological links between passages within Deutero-Isaiah mentioned in Chapter 4. 
Sailhamer defines this phenomenon as inner-textuality: the “inner-linkage” or inner coherence of larger units 
of text, such as a whole biblical book or even a collection o f books like the Pentateuch (1995: 209ff).
The main passages that I consider in detail in Chapters 3-5 are all instances of 
strong echoes. Some of these strong echoes (such as Num 14:18) are arguably cases of 
“allusion.” An “allusion” is an intentional reference to an earlier text or a quotation of the 
text for a specific theological or rhetorical purpose. Yet my thesis does not depend upon 
strong echoes being quotations or allusions.Further, the strong echoes I consider in my 
thesis are not cases of exegesis, i.e. later intentional attempts to explain the meaning of the 
formula. They are simply intentional or unintentional reuses of the formula in a canonically 
later context." Thus the intertextual relationship between the formula and the echoes 
treated in this thesis involves an asymmetrical relationship of priority between the formula 
and the echoes based upon obvious canonical order.”
2. The Scope of the Thesis and Its Relationship to Previous Scholarship
2.1. A General Statement of the Scope of the Thesis
The determination of the scope of the thesis entails my answer to two main 
questions. First, there is the “quantitative” question as to how many passages I would 
consider in the thesis. Secondly, there is the “qualitative” question as to how I would treat 
each passage. The short answer to the more complex qualitative question of how I would
See the similar but more elaborate definition of “allusion” given by Sommer 1998: 10-15. Note that my 
broader definition of an echo does not contrast with an allusion but includes it (cf. Sommer’s narrower 
definition of an echo on 15-17; cf. 29ff). Thus, I do not claim that my reuses or echoes are definitively 
allusions, since this requires potentially speculative claims about the dating o f various texts or about authorial 
intention. Besides, it is not difficult to imagine that some of the echoes treated in this study are unintentional. 
It is commonplace for people in any time and culture to use certain stock phrases instinctively without 
knowing where they come from. This would be what I regard as an unintentional use or reuse of a phrase.
See subsection 4.2.3 for further discussion on the issue o f intertextuality and the related issue of intentionality. 
” See Sommer 1998: 17f, 23ff. I concur fully with Sommer’s point that what authors like Fishbane refer to as 
inner-biblical exegesis (or even Midrash) is usually not strictly exegesis but rather a reuse of other texts, i.e. 
allusions or echoes (23). Exegesis or Midrash is more typical for post-biblical literature.
”  The texts treated in this thesis occur in the same order in the Hebrew Bible and the Christian Old Testament 
canons.
treat the selected texts is that I will do a canonical “contextual-theological” exegesis of 
each passage. This approach is more fully described in my discussion of methodology in 
section 4 below. Thus, I will only treat the quantitative question now.
The quantitative question is a matter of deciding which echoes of Ex 34:6-7 in the 
Old Testament I would consider. Nahum M. Sama recognises nine quotations of the 
formula: Num 14:18; 1er 32:18; Joel 2:13; Jon 4:2; Nah 1:3; Pss 86:15; 103:8; 145:8;
Neh 9:17.^  ^ Sama lists five other possibilities (which may often fit the category of “faint” 
echoes): Pss. 111:4; 112:4; 116:5; Neh 9:31; 2 Chron 30:9.^ "^  According to Donald Gowan, 
“there are quotations of [Ex 34:6-7] or echoes of it in at least twenty-five other passages, 
including law, historical narrative, prayers and prophetic texts,” but Gowan does not 
provide a list of these texts.^^ Among the many viable examples of echoes of Ex 34:6-7 in 
the Old Testament, I decided to consider three strong echoes: Num 14:18, the cluster of 
echoes in Isa 53:5-12 and 54:7-10, and Nah 1:3.
There are two main reasons for this selection of echoes. First, these echoes are 
particularly helpful in illustrating the relationship between God’s mercy and judgment 
across different genres and contexts. Secondly, these three echoes are among the most 
important passages that have been used by Walter Brueggemann to argue for the 
contradictory nature of divine character, which I intend to refute in this thesis.
Brueggemann does not provide explicit reasons for the use of these texts. But the reason he 
uses them appears to be that he can argue his thesis of the “disjunctive” character of God 
(explained in section 3) more easily with these texts than with others. Therefore, if my case
” Sama 1991:262 (n.7)
Sarna 1991: 262 (n.7)
Gowan 1994: 235. He also acknowledges, “commentators say very little about it.’
for the integration of divine mercy and judgment can be made with these three texts, then it 
can arguably be made much more easily with the other echoes of Ex 34:6-7 (such as those 
found in the Psalms).
In addition to a chapter on each of these three selected echo-passages (Chapters 3- 
5), the thesis includes three other chapters within its scope. This introductory chapter 
includes the definitions, methods, and theological assumptions at work in the remaining 
chapters. It also provides a critical overview of Brueggemann’s work (section 3), which 
will allow me to focus on his treatment of specific passages in later chapters.
In Chapter 2, a discussion of Ex 34:6-7 provides a basis for the remaining chapters 
of the thesis; later chapters make frequent comparisons to the findings of Chapter 2 in an 
effort to discern the ways in which the formula-echo relationship is marked by either 
continuity or discontinuity.
In my concluding chapter (Chapter 6), I summarize what I have found in each 
chapter and briefly discuss some implications for a biblical theology of mercy and 
judgment.
2.2. The Scope of the Thesis in Relation to Previous Scholarship
I will now comment on how I will limit my attention to scholarly literature that is 
relevant to my thesis. First, I will concentrate on literature that is directly related to the 
interpretation of Ex 34:6-7 or the three echoes I have chosen. Secondly, among 
commentaries on these four texts, I will draw mostly from theologically-oriented 
commentaries in the last forty years. My study will not attempt to repeat what these 
commentators have already accomplished, but pursue further the task of theological 
interpretation, with an emphasis on divine mercy and judgment. Thirdly, I will interact
frequently, and often critically, with Brueggemann’s extensive theological use of Ex 34:6-7 
and its echoes in his Theology of the Old Testament (see section 3).
This restriction of scope in respect to scholarly literature has two implications.
First, this thesis does not aim to summarize or comment on the great amount of material 
that biblical or systematic theologians have dealt with under the topic of mercy and 
judgment. (This is the case even with respect to Walter Brueggemann, my main 
interlocutor.) That said I intend that this thesis will be a relevant resource for the works of 
biblical or systematic theology on the nature of divine mercy and judgment. Secondly, this 
thesis interacts only infrequently with the growing literature on biblical intertextuality.^^ I 
will cite writers who treat the issue of biblical intertextuality only when they are making 
relevant comments on Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes.
2.3. A Historical Survey of Scholarship Related to the Formula and Its Echoes
In connection with the scope of the thesis just defined, I will now clarify what has 
and has not yet received sufficient scholarly attention in respect to the theology of mercy 
and judgment in the formula and its echoes. I will undertake this brief survey in more or 
less historical or chronological order. I will move through three main periods of 
interpretation of Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes: the pre-critical period, the critical period, and the 
post-critical (or late critical) period."
Since Renée Bloch (1957) began commenting on inner-biblical midrash, there has been great interest in 
how the Bible reuses and interprets itself. I will not analyse the recent post-modern literary fascination with 
intertextuality or its possible relevance to biblical interpretation.
”  “Critical” is used as parallel to “modem,” although “critical” is more precise (in relation to biblical studies). 
For a similar usage of the term, see the works of Childs.
2.3.1. Traditional Pre-Critical Theological Interpretation
I begin with the pre-critical period. Although interaction with such pre-critical 
interpreters is not an important part of this thesis, I refer to them sporadically. Since pre- 
critical interpretation is marked by much diversity, I will not attempt to generalise. Rather, 
I will limit my comments to two interpreters of specific relevance to my thesis: the Jewish 
scholar Rashi (1040-1105) and the Protestant Reformer Jean Calvin (1509-1564).*^ I 
choose Rashi and Calvin, because their emphasis on the “literal sense” of Scripture makes 
their approach relatively more acceptable in a contemporary interpretative context.
Rashi and Calvin uphold the view that the L orD is both gracious and merciful and 
judging and punishing. Rashi and Calvin see that mercy and judgment could be interpreted 
as contradictory and each provides a plausible solution to the possible contradiction 
between mercy and judgment. For Rashi, all of the divine attributes in Ex 34:6-7 are best 
viewed as attributes of mercy, which is similar to the view developed and defended in this 
thesis." In Calvin’s interpretation of Ex 34:6-7, mercy and judgment are distributed 
according to the status of their human recipients; boundless mercy is for the elect and 
repentant, while judgment is reserved for the reprobate and unrepentant.^® In Ex 34:6-7, 
God first declares the boundless mercy, and lest the unrepentant presume upon divine 
generosity, God gives a stem warning about divine retribution. Either way, the relationship 
between God’s mercy and judgment is not problematic to them.
”  For Rashi’s emphasis on literal or peshat interpretation, see Sailhamer 1995: 135 and Bray 1996: 139. For 
Calvin’s emphasis on the literal sense (which for him did not mean “literalism” or exclusion of figurai 
readings), see Bray 1996: 202 and Hans W. Frei 1974: 20-37.
”  Rashi on Ex 34:6-7.
Yet Calvin elsewhere (1950 {Moses vol. 3]: 367-368) talks about divine judgment as a means of discipline 
for God’s people.
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The positive aspect of these pre-critical scholars is their methodological tendency to 
read the final form of the text as a coherent theological witness. The inadequate part of 
their work is that it does not fully and adequately explicate the details of the text and how 
the text itself adjudicates the relationship between mercy and judgment.
2.3.2. Modern Critical Scholarship
From the modem critical period, which extends roughly from the 18^  ^century to 
certain scholars in the present, I will restrict my attention to relevant works in the last forty 
years. On biblical scholarship, I will first treat the studies of Ex 34:6-7, then tum to the 
studies of the echoes of this text, and then tum to a modem biblical theologian.^’
(1) Comments on Ex 34:6-7 (usually found in commentaries on Exodus) have 
focused on a wide variety of higher-critical or historical issues and have not treated 
sufficiently the theological issues in it. For example, Martin Moth’s only comment on 
Ex 34:6-7 is: “We have here an addition which is made up of customary, stereotyped 
phrases.”^^  John Van Seters’ brief form-critical analysis of Ex 34:6-7 judges this text to be 
the Yah wist’s “compilation of liturgical statements that relate to the theme of divine 
forgiveness and divine judgement.”^^  Postulating that the verses are a compilation of 
phrases from other sources may explain why there is an apparent tension between the two 
parts of the formula, but it does not actually deal theologically with that apparent tension.^'’
Despite organising my survey in this way, it is difficult to fiilly separate treatments of Ex 34:6-7 from 
treatments of its echoes, since scholars often speak about one in the course of discussing the other. That said, 
my organisation refers to whatever topic (Ex 34 or its echoes) is the primary concern of a given piece of 
scholarship.
“ Noth 1962: 261.
Van Seters, 1994: 351. His discussion o f 34:6-7 focuses on showing how the text may or may not be 
regarded as “Deuteronomistic and part of a Deuteronomistic redaction” (345-351).
^ Besides Noth and van Seters, this postulation is made by Dentan 1963: 35 and KraSovec 1999:114f. 
Krasovec, however, is also “post-critical” and “theological” in his comments.
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(2) As for the echoes of Ex 34:6-7 in the Old Testament, it appears that significant 
attention (as a topic in its own right) has been given to them only in the last fifty years. The 
full-length articles by Josef Scharbert (1957) and Robert Dentan (1963) are exemplary of 
the form-critical and larger historical-critical approaches, being concerned with questions 
of form, composition, and tradition history of the formula in its various reuses. In general, 
these accounts do not significantly advance the theological discussion. That said,
Scharbert’s form-critical study does engage the issue of the theological continuity of the 
echoes with the formula.^^
(3) More substantive theological treatments of the relationship of divine mercy and 
judgment are found in the work of “critical” biblical theologian Walther Eichrodt (1890- 
1978).^  ^ In Eichrodt’s treatment of Israel’s “affirmations about the divine activity,” 
Eichrodt considers the L orD’s hesed, which he regards as closely connected to berith as an 
expression of God’s constant care for his covenant people.^^ In this context, Eichrodt 
makes a helpful comment that supports my argument in this thesis: “Nor does this 
constancy [of the divine succour in hesed\ exclude the punishment of sinners; rather it is 
evinced precisely in the fact that punishment is used to restore the disrupted covenant 
relationship.” *^ Other aspects of Eichrodt’s work sometimes go in directions that qualify
^  Scharbert’s 1957 article shows that the various parallels or echoes of the formula in Ex 34:6-7 maintain 
basic continuity in theological content with the formula, despite variations in form and setting. He shows that 
the echoes draw out the theological content pregnant in the formula.
Eichrodt 1961 and 1967. Eichrodt’s stated goal for Old Testament Theology is “to present the religion of 
which the record are to be found in the Old Testament,” a position which is open to critique (see Seitz 2001 
(Figured): 24f). However, Eichrodt does attend fruitfully to the theological issues of the text without undue 
focus on historical issues. See Sailhamer 1995: 107f.
”  Eichrodt 1961:233.
Eichrodt 1961: 233 and 1967: 475. Eichrodt here cites three passages relevant to my thesis in support of 
this view: Ex 34:7, Ex 33:5, and Num 14:20ff. See also Eichrodt’s reference to Ex 34:7 and Num 14:18 in his 
comments on collective retribution (1967: 175). However, Eichrodt nowhere discusses Ex 34:6-7 and its 
echoes in any detail in his theology.
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this statement of the unity of divine constancy of hesed and punishment, but this seems to 
represent the main force of his view.
In respect to my project in this thesis, critical scholarship has left a lacuna that 
needs to be filled. Critical scholarship often served to advance contextual, theological 
exegesis of the formula and its echoes by observing various details in these texts and their 
contexts that the pre-critical interpreters had not noticed. Yet even at its theological best 
(perhaps in Eichrodt), it failed to attend in detail to significant theological issues found in 
Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes, including the relationship between the mercy and judgment of the 
L orD.^^
2.3.3. Towards a Post-Critical, Canonical Theological Approach
I will now tum to those writers who have helped to shape the post-critical,^® 
canonical theological approach I take in this thesis (see section 4). Some of these writers 
would not necessarily regard themselves as “post-critical.”
Among the first and most influential “canonical” theological interpreters of the Old 
Testament is Brevard S. Childs. Since the 1970’s, Childs has put forth his version of a 
canonical approach to biblical exegesis and theology—an approach that will be largely
At this juncture, I will add a word about von Rad (1901-1971) and why I do not consider his work here.
Von Rad focused on the dynamic history of various theological traditions within Israel. Such an approach 
involves very different methodological assumptions than mine (see section 4 below). For a fairly critical 
reading o f von Rad, see Seitz 1998; 28-40.
In addition, von Rad says very little about God’s character, and virtually nothing about Ex 34:6-7 and its 
echoes in his Old Testament Theology. His sole references to Ex 34:6 are in volume I, where he sees it as a 
theological “interpretation o f the name” Yahweh (181) and as evidence that the name Yahweh gave Israel “the 
assurance o f being able at all times to reach his heart” (183).
By post-critical, I do not necessarily mean a complete abandonment of critical issues or efforts. By post- 
critical, I include both (a) those modes of scholarship that employ critical approaches with a view to a 
theological reading of the text and (b) those modes of scholarship that minimize the importance of critical 
approaches in theological interpretation.
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followed in this thesis (see section 4 below). Although not extensive, Childs makes a 
helpful comment on Ex 34:6-7. Referring to the “judgment-side” of the formula in 
Ex 34:7b, he correctly says, “The manifestation of God’s will as righteousness does not 
undercut his attribute of mercy, but rather sustains it.” ’^ Childs does not develop or defend 
this view any further, but I will take the opportunity of doing so in my discussions of the 
theology of God’s mercy and judgment in this thesis.
In his commentary on Exodus (1991), Terence Fretheim shares a view of the 
integration of mercy and judgment similar to what is defended in this thesis, though he does 
not develop this view in detail.^^ Also, some of Fretheim’s observations are helpful in 
clarifying the method used in this study.
Donald E. Gowan’s work Theology in Exodus: Biblical Theology in the Form of a 
Commentary (1994) discusses the theology of reconciliation and other theological issues in 
Ex 32-34.^^ Specifically, Gowan relates some important terms in Ex 34:6-7 to the larger 
issue of the relationship between mercy and judgment.^'’
The massive v^ork Reward, Punishment and Forgiveness (1999), by Joze Krasovec, 
which is a compilation of much of his previous work, is instructive in both method and 
theology. While Krasovec frequently relies on higher-critical results and methods, he 
emphasizes a canonical and literary approach to biblical texts that is agreeable to the
3' Childs 1992: 373. He continues, “The divine intent for Israel is not a people at rest unless it is within a city 
of righteousness.” Moberly, who employs a methodological approach similar to that of Childs, comes to a 
similar conclusion in his narrative-theological reading of Ex 32-34 in his At the Mountain o f  God (1983). He 
says, “the point is not that the people experience either wrath or mercy, but that both wrath and mercy are in 
the character of God though it is his mercy which is ultimately predominant in his dealings with his people” 
(87). He does not comment further on the relation between mercy and judgment.
Fretheim spends only one page on the formula (1991: 302).
Gowan 1994: x-xi.
Gowan 1994: 236-238. Gowan draws attention to some works that provide a detailed discussion of the 
important words found in the formula, such as Knierim 1965 and Sakenfeld 1978.
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approach adopted in this thesis/^ In addition, when he briefly treats Ex 34:6-7 and other 
echoes (such as Num 14:18) he comes to conclusions similar to mine regarding the 
compatibility of forgiveness and punishment (or mercy and judgment).
The literary and canonical emphases that emerged in recent scholarship positively 
advanced the theological interpretation of Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes. However, there is still 
a need for a more thorough literary, theological study of Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes that 
attends to the literary details, coherence, and purposefulness of the final form of the text. 
Such a work is needed also in response to post-critical theological works that represent 
more negative developments in theological interpretation, such as Walter Brueggemann’s 
1997 work. I will devote the next section of this chapter to a summary of aspects of 
Brueggemann’s position that are relevant to this thesis. As I do so, I will indicate where I 
am critical of Brueggemann’s position.
3. An Initial Summary and Critique of Relevant Features of 
Walter’s Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old Testamenf^
Brueggemann is well positioned to be my primary interlocutor in this thesis, 
because in his Theology of the Old Testament (1997) he gives sustained attention to 
Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes as a crucial locus for his discussion of the character of God. He 
presents his fresh statement of Old Testament theology (including his treatment of Ex 34:6- 
7 and its echoes) in the model of a courtroom in which “testimony,” “dispute,” and 
“advocacy” (see his subtitle) are all given. As such, his theology tends to emphasize the 
diversity of the views of God in the Old Testament. He places sustained emphasis on the
See Krasovec's introduction (1999), especially pages 8-15.
The pattern for citations of Brueggemann’s Theology o f the Old Testament in this section of this chapter 
(section 3) will be a page number in parentheses, either in the main text or in the footnotes.
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pluralistic “testimony” or “rhetoric” of the biblical text (and its interpreters), which 
distinguishes Brueggemann’s biblical theological approach from that of his forebears.
Brueggemann’s pluralistic approach is set against the misplaced and potentially 
oppressive emphases on ontology or the history behind the text.^  ^ Accordingly, he aims to 
deconstruct the claims and assumptions of earlier forms of biblical interpretation and 
theology. Such a deconstructive task is essential for Brueggemann’s concern to bring about 
(a certain kind of) social-political justice through biblical theology. Brueggemann states,
“It is important to accent that something like ‘God’s preferential option for the poor’ is 
deeply rooted in Israel’s testimony, so deeply rooted as to be characteristic and definitional 
for Israel’s speech about God” (144). The advocacy of social justice is a key that helps to 
unlock the rationale of his overall approach (namely, social justice). Brueggemann’s 
Theology o f the Old Testament is structured and organised so as to complete his 
deconstructive task to create a view of God that will serve the advocacy of social justice. 
Thus, the core testimony (Part I) reaches the (provisional) conclusion that two 
incomparable and contradictory features mark God’s character: sovereign, punitive power 
(which Brueggemann often calls “self-regard”) and loving solidarity with his people. The 
contradiction between divine fidelity and divine judgment is at the heart of who God is.
The counter testimony (Part H) reinforces the disjunctive rendering of God by claiming that 
Yahweh is marked by hiddenness, ambiguity, and unreliability. The result is that he has a
Thus, Partrick Miller, in his forward to a collection of Brueggemann’s essays, says: “In the problem that 
arose out of Gerhard von Rad’s work as to whether what matters is Israel’s testimony or some historical 
reality behind it, Brueggemann had cut the Gordian knot by arguing that testimony is reality” (Miller 2000: 
ix). I should add, however, that Miller prefaces this claim with the comment that it is “a common misreading 
of his work” to regard Brueggemann as denying ontological claims about God; Brueggemann has simply 
“ventured to set aside” such claims (ix). It is not clear that Miller has adequately grappled with how radical 
Brueggemann’s claims are. To “cut the Gordian knot” is not a positive thing.
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theological pluralism marked by the ongoing disputation of two main testimonies (the core 
and the counter). For Brueggemann, the character of Yahweh is left unsettled, a result that 
he thinks is appropriately unsettling for the interpreter. The deep root of this unsettling 
state of affairs is that the core testimony itself presents us with a “disjunctive rendering of 
Yahweh,” a dualistic, self-contradictory view of the character of God. In either of the 
testimonies, the traditional view of God (of unity and constancy) is deconstructed.
I will close this introductory section on Brueggemann by noting how he relates to 
the works of other interpreters of the Old Testament. Brueggemann’s approach to Old 
Testament theology involves an eclectic use of the interpretative approaches of other 
thinkers. Therefore it is difficult to regard Brueggemann as representative of a “school,” 
but I can indicate the following about Brueggemann’s scholarly “associations.” 
Brueggemann shares with much recent literary interpretation a concern with the literary and 
especially rhetorical features of the final form of the text. He is not concerned with the 
prehistory or historical-cultural background of the text.^  ^ Brueggemann would be aligned 
with those rhetorical critics who move beyond the rhetorical features of the text to consider 
how those features are received or even constituted by contemporary readers (reader- 
response and deconstructionism).^^ Accordingly, Brueggemann emphasizes with most
For example, Brueggemann rightly regards von Rad’s tradition-historical approach as speculative (This is 
striking in light of Brueggemann’s past work in tradition-history; see Brueggemann and Wolff 1975). Yet 
Brueggemann follows von Rad’s assumptions that the Old Testament is marked by irreconcilable theological 
diversity.
This stands in some contrast to the preoccupation of early rhetorical criticism with the text itself and the 
artistry involved in its composition (see Muilenberg 1969). Trible contrasts those rhetorical critics concerned 
with “the art of composition’’ (like Muilenberg) and those concerned with “the art of persuasion’’ including 
reader response (1994: 32-48). Gillingham comments on rhetorical criticism and reader-response criticism, 
and the connections between them (1998: 182ff). Brueggemann says that he is moving beyond Muilenberg 
but in a way that is faithful to what “Muilenburg understood intuitively’’ (Brueggemann 1997: 59f). My view 
is that Brueggemann’s recent work is actually largely unfaithful to Muilenberg’s understanding of rhetorical 
criticism and that this is regrettable.
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“post-modem” interpreters that the biblical text lacks any stable or determinate meaning 
and that largely the reader supplies any meaning/^ Brueggemann encourages contemporary 
readers to join in the imaginative process of interpreting the text in a way that leads to 
social justice—an advocacy that he shares with various “liberationist” and “ideological” 
modes of interpretation. Brueggemann also shares with a wide group of scholars the belief 
that the biblical text is inherently and inescapably theological and that therefore exegesis 
rightly includes doing theology.
3.1. Brueggemann’s Hermeneutical Presuppositions
In this subsection, I will briefly identify five hermeneutical presuppositions of 
Brueggemann’s Theology. By “hermeneutical presuppositions,” I refer to the basic 
assumptions that he has in interpreting the biblical text. As is arguably true of 
hermeneutics in general, this subsection is concerned with the interrelationships between 
four main factors: the text, the reality (or referent to which the text refers), the author, and 
the reader (or interpreter). It is to be noted that Brueggemann does not make all of the 
following presuppositions explicit. I will cite his explicit views wherever possible.
(1) There is Brueggemann’s basic presupposition about the relationship of the text 
to the reality of God, namely, that the God to whom one has access exists inside the text 
and not outside it; as such, the rhetoric embodied in the text constitutes the reality o f God. 
Brueggemann therefore believes that biblical theology ought to relinquish all “ontological” 
claims about God, that is, all claims about the text-independent reality of God."^ ^
Longman refers to the prevalence of this view of meaning among contemporary proponents of a literary 
approach to biblical interpretation, despite methodological diversity (1997: 107). This is evident in the way 
Carr, whose methodological proclivities are quite different from Brueggemann, also regards Scripture as an 
“untamable text of an untamable God” (Carr 2000).
Brueggemann also wishes to relinquish historical claims about the “history” to which the text refers, 
although this is not as relevant for the theological (and basically non-historical) concerns of this thesis. The
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Brueggemann wants biblical theology to stick rather exclusively to the rhetoric, to what the 
text or its readers say about the reality of God. Yet, at times Brueggemann claims that there 
is no God of Israel apart from the text (itself an ontological claim) or that the rhetoric or 
utterance of the text creates, originates, or constitutes the reality of this God."*^ ^
I agree with Brueggemann that there is no way that biblical theologians can have 
reliable epistemological access to the biblical God apart from the text of the Bible. Further, 
I agree that the focus on the canonical text rather than the events behind the text is more 
theologically fruitful. However, I disagree with Brueggemann insofar as he denies or 
diminishes the text-independent reality of God, or claims that the text creates the reality of 
God."^  ^ Such claims essentially deny that the text has any real (not simply imagined) 
capacity for theological description or reference."^ It may be that Brueggemann is speaking
move away from ontology and history toward rhetoric and utterance constitutes Brueggemann’s rejection of 
pre-modern and modem forms of “foundationalism” and his acceptance of a form of a “non-foundationalist” 
or “post-modern” approach to texts and their interpretation.
Consider the following passages, which I quote at length: “Speech leads reality in the Old Testament.
Speech constitutes reality, and who God turns out to be in Israel depends on the utterance of the Israelites or, 
derivatively, the utterance of the text.. .  .Brevard Childs writes, in his canonical approach, about ‘the reality 
of God’ behind the text itself. In terms of Old Testament theology, however one must ask. What reality? 
Where behind? It is clear that such an approach derives its judgments from somewhere else, from an 
essentialist tradition, claims about God not to be entertained in the Old Testament text itself.” (65)
“I insist that it is characteristic of the Old Testament, and characteristically Jewish, that God is given to 
us (and exists as God ‘exists’) only by the dangerous practice of rhetoric. Therefore in doing Old Testament 
theology I must be careful not to import essentialist claims that are not authorised by this particular and 
peculiar rhetoric. /  shall insist, as consistently as I can, that the God o f Old Testametfit theology as such lives 
in, with, and under the rhetorical enterprise o f this text, and no where else and in no other way. This 
rhetorical enterprise operates with ontological assumptions, but these assumptions are open to dispute and 
revision in the ongoing rhetorical enterprise of Israel” (66; italics his).
Brueggemann urges that one should drop all metaphysical or ontological claims partly because the history 
of interpretation shows that the church sometimes made false and misleading metaphysical or ontological 
claims about God (106). I suggest what is needed is a revision (rather than omission) of classical ideas about 
God.
Brueggemann specifically denies that biblical language about God is descriptive. After stating that 
“metaphor [is] the central element in Israel’s articulation of Yahweh” (70), Brueggemann says: “Metaphor is 
yet another case in point indicating that Israel’s theological rhetoric is at its best evocative and not 
descriptive.” However, the notion that metaphor lacks descriptive capacity is questionable. Moreover, 
Brueggemann is wrong to judge theological “descriptive” interpretations as “idolatrous” efforts to domesticate 
God (see page 70). Surely theological description in general does not need to fall into this category.
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provocatively here and not literally. Whether or not that is the case, an “anti-realist” view 
of the text-God relationship often appears to negatively influence Brueggemann’s 
interpretation of Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes. An “anti-realist” view stands in contrast to a 
more traditional view (see section 4) that the God-talk of the biblical text typically stands in 
a relationship of “analogy” to the reality of God, so that the text refers to God truly and 
adequately, but not in a literalistic manner."^  ^ Brueggemann explicitly denounces any form 
of domestication of Yahweh. Yet ironically, Brueggemann’s notion that “utterance 
constitutes reality,” in principle, domesticates God within human imagination and 
utterance.
(2) A second and closely related hermeneutical presupposition in Brueggemann’s 
work is that one ought to understand the biblical text primarily as a testimony” to 
Yahweh-focused views o f reality. My response to this presupposition is mixed. Testimony 
or witness to God is a good way to speak about the theological dimension of the Bible."^  ^
Testimony is a good term for expressing the committed (fiduciary), self-involving (not 
disinterested) advocacy in which the biblical writers (and their interpreters) are involved.
Yet Brueggemann defines and uses the category of “testimony” or “witness” in a 
problematic way. To begin with, Brueggemann’s use of the language of “testimony” tends 
toward anti-realism, which is not surprising in view of his opinion on the text’s relationship 
to the reality of God. Brueggemann often states that the biblical writers’ testimony—the
especially if one believes the “description” is based not on human imaginative efforts, but on divine 
revelation.
This view is shared in different forms by much of pre-modern Christian Theology (e.g. Aquinas) and finds 
recent expression in Karl Barth. Hunsinger’s exposition of Barth’s “hermeneutical realism” (1987) is 
instructive in showing how Barth avoids both “literalism” (which affirms a literal, one-to-one correspondence 
between biblical language and the reality of God) and “expressivism” (which affirms that biblical language 
expresses emotive and imaginative human responses to God rather than any cognitive truths about God). 
Brueggemann frequently seems to be in danger of “expressivism,” while my view seems close to Barth’s.
Lindbeck (1999) explains how both Karl Barth and Brevard Childs employ the category of witness.
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master-category for all their rhetoric—actually creates (or “leads,” “constitutes” or 
“enacts”) the reality to which it testifies."^  ^ The result is that God’s testimony-independent 
reality is questioned, and the God of the Bible is in danger of being a mere imaginative 
projection of those giving testimony.
In addition, such use of the term “testimony” tends to be reductionistic, ignoring the 
different levels of voices in the text, which the testimony of Israel already distinguished for 
the reader."^  ^ While Brueggemann claims that he is concerned with letting the text speak on 
its own terms, he often fails to do so. For example, the testimony of Israel in Ex 32-34 sets 
apart Ex 34:6-7 as the divine speech in the context of theophany. Yet Brueggemann often 
treats Ex 34:6-7 only as a compilation of mere human theological testimony."^^
(3) A third hermeneutical presupposition of Brueggemann’s method is that the 
biblical theologian, as a reader or interpreter, is engaged in a process o f imaginative 
testifying similar to that o f the Israelites who first gave imaginative testimonies in the 
process o f writing and redacting Scripture. The interpreter is not a neutral observer who 
simply uncovers and describes the objective theological meaning of the text. Rather, the 
interpreter is a participant who imaginatively enters into the ongoing process of Israel’s 
testimony and counter- (or cross-) testimony. Indeed, he speaks of interpretation as being
Brueggemann develops the analogy of the courtroom drama in an effort to describe the testimony of Israel. 
“[I]t is futile for the court to speculate behind the testimony.. . .  when the witness utters testimony, the 
testimony is a public presentation that shapes, enjoins, or constitutes reality. In this sense, the testimony is 
originary: it causes to be, in the courtroom, what was not until this utterance” (121). Another case of anti­
realism!
Brueggemann shows awareness of the potential danger o f his approach being reductionistic in an essay in 
which he takes a retrospective look at his 1997 work (1998: 310): “It may be that the notion [of testimony] is 
reductionistic, because one can, I am sure, claim that not everything is testimony.”
Fretheim argues that Brueggemann neglects the importance of a text’s point of view: “In drawing upon 
Israel’s testimonies to God Brueggemann makes no important distinction between Israel’s speech about God 
and the word spoken by God to Israel; this is surprising given his emphasis on the word and its rhetorical 
shaping” (Fretheim 1998: 35).
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undertaken in a “dramatic mode” in which one joins the Israelites in the various roles of the 
courtroom drama portrayed in Scripture (cf. 69f).
I recognise with Brueggemann that there is no such thing as a neutral interpreter and 
agree that neutrality would not even be a proper ideal for the theological interpreter. I agree 
that imagination is required for us to enter into “the strange new world within the Bible” (to 
borrow a phrase from Karl Barth).^ ® However, imagination is required not because an 
interpreter must “create” the reality to which the Bible testifies, but simply because an 
interpreter needs to use imagination to recognise this reality. I disagree with 
Brueggemann’s tendency to regard the act of interpretation in highly imaginative, open- 
ended, and dramatic manner. God is not to be domesticated by human imaginings. 
Brueggemann’s hermeneutical presuppositions open the door to domestication of God, 
ironically, in the name of deconstructing domesticated notions of God.^^
(4) A fourth hermeneutical presupposition of Brueggemann is that both the biblical 
text and its interpretations are thoroughly pluralistic?^ Thus, Brueggemann interprets the 
Bible’s account of a particular subject—say, the character of God—in a way that expects 
multiple, and sometimes contradictory, view points. The plurality of the views of God is a 
feature found not only in the canon of Scripture (a remnant of Israel’s internal theological 
disputations), but perhaps more obviously in the ongoing interpretative disputes today.^^
A title of an address in Karl Barth 1957: 28.
One could add here that, despite the fact that absolute objectivity or pure neutrality is an illusion, it is 
possible to have “relative objectivity” in interpretation (see Barr 1982: 185ff; cf. Green 2002).
See his reference to “the irascibly pluralistic character of the text” (64). He says, “The canon itself is an 
exercise in adjudication,” and this is a process, which “applies not only to this or that subject, but to the very
character of Yahweh, the God of Israel Yahweh, in the life of the text, is pulled this way and that by the
adjudicating rhetoric of Israel” (64).
^ It is sometimes difficult to distinguish these two aspects of pluralism (the ancient and the contemporary) in 
Brueggemann’s work, since he understands the present day interpreter to be entering into disputes that started 
in ancient Israel. Though the disputes have altered their faces, the disputes have not yet ceased. Also, one 
sometimes wonders whether Brueggemann takes contemporary pluralism (whether in overall metanarratives
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Brueggemann does not regard pluralism as implying that “anything goes” or that 
interpreters are confronted with a myriad of limitless options” (718). Rather, interpreters 
are faced with only a few, often only two, “conflicting perspectives” which persist in an 
ongoing, unsettled dispute or dialectic (718; cf. 7 Iff). Indeed, Brueggemann consistently 
sees the text in terms of a theological dialectic in which two views are in conflict, one often 
being the “main” view of the text, and one being a “subversive” or deconstructive view that 
Brueggemann wants to emphasize. Brueggemann thus is not really a consistent pluralist. 
He ultimately has a certain settled view and a settled agenda (a commitment to his version 
of “justice”) that is served by his various dialectics.^"^
I agree that the canonical text is marked by pluralism, but in the texts examined in 
this thesis, the pluralism is not nearly as radical or unsettled as Brueggemann suggests.
This thesis will show Brueggemann’s claims for both textual and interpretative pluralism in 
relation to Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes are overstated. The theological pluralism in the Old 
Testament is complemented by an equally striking theological convergence or unity, and 
theological unity should not be overlooked by contemporary theological interpretation.^^ It 
seems the great plurality of interpretation is due as much to the academy’s passion for 
novelty and inventive scholarship as it is to honest disagreement rooted in the inherent 
difficulty and density of the biblical material. Pluralism in interpretation can draw out a 
richness of textual meaning that cannot be reduced to singularity. However, pluralism 
sought for its own sake can serve to confuse and obfuscate the plain sense of the text.
or particular interpretation) and reads it into the biblical text. After all, he assumes that a mode of 
interpretation must be congruent with the cultural context (see below).
See Levenson 2000.
See Rendtorff (1994: 7f) and subsection 4.2.1 of this chapter.
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(5) A fifth and final interpretative presupposition is that the theory and practice of 
biblical theology must be congruent with the contemporary cultural context in which it is 
developed. This presupposition is based upon a more general presupposition, namely: “[/]« 
every period o f the discipline, the questions, methods, and possibilities in which study is 
cast arise from the sociointellectual climate in which the work must be done''' (11; italics 
mine). Thus, Brueggemann urges the idiom of testimony and disputation between 
testimonies (746; cf. 727).^^
For Brueggemann, the contemporary (Western) context of biblical interpretation 
includes three main groups: the basically secular majority in society, the Christian 
community, and the Jewish community. Brueggemann seems to regard these three groups 
as equal partners in an ongoing interpretative dispute or conversation. Brueggemann 
regards his own work as faithfully reflecting the contemporary intellectual milieu. 
Brueggemann also regards his work as “Christian” in basic biases (i.e. he says he cannot 
help but read the Old Testament “towards the New Testament”). He also strives to be 
“Jewish” in character in his desire to overcome the long-running supercessionism and anti- 
Semitism that have marked Christian biblical scholarship. I will now turn to some relevant 
aspects of Brueggemann’s relationship to these three groups.
The presupposition regarding the “normative” significance of the contemporary 
Western intellectual milieu is basic to all the other presuppositions I have already outlined. 
Because contemporary culture is focused on rhetoric (often to the point of being
He opposes liberal rationalism and scholastic conservatism as failing to maintain this unsettled and 
unsettling idiom (747).
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“anti-realist”), so should contemporary biblical theology and interpretation be focused on 
rhetoric.B ecause contemporary culture is pluralistic and dialectical, so should biblical 
theology (or even the text itself) be pluralistic and dialectical.
Brueggemann’s relationship to the adjective “Christian” is ambiguous, perhaps 
intentionally so. Brueggemann recognises that Christianity is his “tradition” and that 
Christian presuppositions will inevitably influence him. Yet he also desires to avoid the 
“fideistic” or “ecclesial” modes of interpretation, which he views as “authoritarian” or even 
“oppressive.”^^  He favours certain (apparently Enlightenment-based) notions of free 
inquiry and a “healthy” measure of scepticism or doubt.^^
Brueggemann rightly desires to attend to the Jewish community as a witness to the 
truth alongside the Christian community (745). However, he wants to go beyond that to 
pursue an approach to biblical theology that he regards as “Jewish” in many of its key 
features. Brueggemann counts his reflection on the Holocaust, use of deconstruction, 
dialectic, “Midrash,” and even Freudian psychoanalysis as evidence of the “Jewish” 
character of his work (see 3.3 below). Many Jewish scholars, however, would find 
objectionable the identification of some of these features as “Jewish.” ®^ Moreover, I would
At times, Brueggemann seems to reverse tactics by using a seemingly universal claim to say what should be 
done in the contemporary situation, as when he says: “our post-modern situation . . .  must make a major and 
intentional investment in the practice of rhetoric,/or the shape of reality finally depends on the power of 
speech'" (71; italics mine). More subtly, he says: “The interpretive crisis and possibility of the church now is 
that it is discovering that the Enlightenment is not its natural habitat. Therefore the church is having to 
relearn its own way of reading” (14; italics mine). Brueggemann here appears to be saying that the 
Enlightenment is an inherently “unnatural” habitat for the church.
He does not say why “fideistic” necessarily means “oppressive,” even if this has been the case at times in 
the past. Brueggemann rightly speaks of the importance of understanding the biblical God as a “relational” 
God and the reader as a communal reader. However, he does not appear to draw out the implications o f these 
observations.
How this relates to statements like the following is unclear: “Every reading in important ways is fideistic 
and confessional, including those readings that reject the theological claim of the text.” (52)
® See Levenson 2000.
25
point out that a Christian interpreter does not need to strive to be “Jewish” (as if that were 
possible) in order to show respect to Jewish interpreters and to draw from their 
interpretative insights.^^
3.2. Brueggemann’s Methodology
I will now comment on Brueggemann’s methodology—the concrete rules that 
govern the way that Brueggemann does biblical theology. There are five such rules, which 
are inter-related with and sometimes expressions of his hermeneutical assumptions.^^ Here 
I will consider what Brueggemann says about such rules and what is evident in his actual 
practice, recognising that these two may not always agree.
(1) Brueggemann offers the general rule that the biblical theologian should take the 
text “on its own termsT^^ Among the most important implications of this rule is that the 
proper object of interpretation is the text in its final canonical form, rather than the text’s 
pre-history. In this respect, Brueggemann shares much in conunon with canonical-critical 
theological interpreters such as Childs.^"  ^ Taking the text seriously as the object of 
theological inquiry involves exegesis of particular texts in all their detailed rhetorical and 
literary complexity (53ff). So far, I stand in agreement with Brueggemann.
Thus, I will draw freely and respectfully from Jewish commentators like Rashi, Sama, and Jacob Milgrom 
in this thesis.
I recognise others might call methodological rules (3.2) hermeneutical assumptions (3.1), and vice versa.
Brueggemann makes this assertion (in different ways) many times in his book. See especially his comments 
made in the course of his appreciative survey o f Muilenberg’s approach to rhetorical criticism (53ff). 
Brueggemann himself studied under Muilenberg, but in my view, takes the “rhetorical approach” in a 
significantly different (and less text-focused) direction. Specifically, Brueggemann tends to shift the emphasis 
from the “canonical text” (as an authority in which canonical form and normative theological content are 
inseparable) to a “canonical interpreter” (Childs 1992: 7 Iff; cf. Brueggemann 1991: 119-142).
^  In fact, Brueggemann’s basic approach in theory is even more exclusively focused on the final form of the 
text than Childs’s approach. Unlike Childs, Brueggemann generally does not devote space to diachronic 
matters. In this respect, I tend to follow the approach o f Brueggemann over Childs, even though my overall 
sympathies lie more with Childs’ mode of theological interpretation.
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Difficulties arise, however, in how Brueggemann defines and carries out the 
interpretation of Scripture. First of all, Brueggemann defines interpretation as “readiness to 
give full and imaginative expression to the claims of the text itself’ (104; cf. 58). As such, 
interpretation is often anything but an assent to “the claims of the text itself.”
Secondly, there is a gap between Brueggemann’s interpretative practice and his 
claim to focus on the final form of the text. While Brueggemann explicitly rejects 
historical-critical strategies and speculation as theologically unfruitful, his typically 
dualistic interpretation of the text appears either to presuppose or reproduce the conclusions 
of such an approach. That is, Brueggemann’s interpretative practice (especially of the 
formula and its echoes) tends to presuppose that a text is essentially made up of different 
theological “sources” or perspectives. In addition, as source-critics had done,
Brueggemann conceives of these perspectives as being at odds with each other, often 
failing to consider the possible complementarity or convergence among plural 
perspectives.*"  ^ Thus, in his interpretation of divine character as witnessed in Ex 34:6-7 and 
its echoes, Brueggemann has, in effect, taken typical higher-critical or tradition historical 
perspectives on these texts to their logical theological conclusions.^^
For Brueggemann, the canon is unable to arbitrate disputations even on the most 
central theological matters. For Brueggemann, “Israel offers odd, incidental, concrete, 
episodic case studies” in striving to interpret its God (206), but nothing like an overall
“  For example, he states as a given that “the Old Testament in its final form is a product of and a response to 
the Babylonian exile”(74). This statement may well be true, but Brueggemann’s method does not appear to 
allow him to make such “historical” comments.
“  See Rendtorffs “Canonical Interpretation” for a contrast between higher-critical approaches to the 
canonical approach (1993: 7-12).
See Seitz 2001 {Figured)'. 26f for a similar assessment of Brueggemann. Seitz points to the connection 
between the atomistic and disjunctive tendencies of Brueggemann’s earlier tradition-historical work 
(Brueggemann and Wolff 1975) and his recent work in Old Testament theology.
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unified, coherent construal of God’s character.^® Thus, Brueggemann fails to pay attention 
to those features of the text that tend towards theological unity, generalisation, or closure. 
Brueggemann has a right to emphasize some theological features of the text and ignore 
others. The problem is that Brueggemann does so in a manner that sometimes seriously 
distorts the theological witness of the biblical text.
(2) One aspect of taking the text on its own terms is that one ought to interpret a 
text in and according to its literary context.^^ Accordingly, Brueggemann agrees with 
James Barr’s methodological rule that ""words can only be understood in the context o f 
their usage in sentences” Brueggemann generally fulfils it in his interpretative practice.
The problem is that to say that the sentence is the interpretative context of words or 
phrases does not go far enough. Literary context includes larger literary units, including 
the place of sentences in pericopes and larger sections, a book, groups of books, and 
ultimately the whole canon of Scripture (which for the Christian includes the New 
Testament). In his Theology of the Old Testament, Brueggemann gives insufficient 
attention to the methodological importance of context in the larger sense. Only 
occasionally does he show sensitivity to context on the supra-sentence level, either in 
theory or in practice.^®
Brueggemann’s approach is frequently marked by a definite tendency towards 
“atomism” or “proof-texting”—i.e. taking an element in the text out of its larger context in
This would fit with his hermeneutical assumption about plurality or dialectic in the text, as described above. 
Again, Brueggemann calls this unsettledness “Jewish,” against a supposedly “Christian” drive for 
“settledness” (80ff). This kind of generalisation is a personal judgment of Brueggemann’s and would be 
objectionable to many Christians and Jews.
For my purposes, I will concentrate (like Brueggemann) on literary context, leaving historical or cultural 
context aside (see 4.2 below).
™ Only occasionally does Brueggemann pay attention to supra-sentence context, when such an attention can 
reinforce his interpretation.
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order to support a particular (often unconventional, neglected, or “deconstructive”) 
theological point/^ Brueggemann rarely discusses a passage in a way that articulates in 
detail what that passage means in its literary context, how it functions there in light of the 
larger argument of a literary unit, a book, or the canon
Perhaps even more revealing is Brueggemann’s discussion of the positive role of a 
“Midrashic” style of interpretation in biblical theology. The following quotations are 
examples of what Brueggemann assigns to the “work of Midrash”:
(a) To focus on the ill-fitting element and to extrapolate surpluses of meaning that 
lie well beyond the explicit articulation of the text (325).
(b) To expose what is hidden in the text, which might be an embarrassment to the 
main claim of the text (325).
(c) To exercise enormous interpretative imagination, so as to give visibility and 
emphasis to precisely what is nearly invisible or pointedly de-emphasized in the text 
(326; my italics).
When I couple these characterisations of Midrash^^ with Brueggemann’s own desire 
to regard Midrash as a kind of “analogue” for the theology of the Old Testament (326), I
For a similar criticism of Brueggemann’s approach, based upon his earlier work The Bible and Post-modern 
Imagination (1993), see Hart 1997. Hart questions whether Brueggemann’s privileging particular ‘little texts’ 
is really the same as “allowing them to speak with their own voice” (203). For Hart, to “isolate a ‘little text’ 
from its wider textual context and allow it to speak with its ‘own’ (possibly scandalous and offensive) voice” 
may be an arbitrary decision that could “do violence to the larger textual wholes” of the canon of Scripture.
He continues, “There is a serious danger of such a strategy resulting in a levelling o f all bits of texts so far as 
their significance is concerned, and the development o f a new form of ‘proof-texting’ which manages to 
justify just about anything ‘from the Bible.’” Finally, Hart points out, “If a particular text is not informed and 
restrained by its wider biblical context then it will certainly be informed by some other context or set of 
factors” (203). See also Seitz 2001 {Figured): 26f.
Of course, it is possible that Brueggemann is sensitive to the context o f the passages he cites without 
showing his readers how he is doing so. In other words, he may have done contextual homework on these 
passages before making his theological assertions. It is also possible that he has not done so, and this seems 
the more likely possibility because of his theoretical comments (especially about Midrash) and the nature of 
his sometimes cavalier treatment of texts like Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes.
The accuracy of Brueggemann’s portrayal of Midrash is questionable. For example, traditional Midrash (in 
its early stages) probably did not regard any part of the biblical canon as finally inconsistent with other parts 
of it (on this see Bray 1996: 57). Regardless of the accuracy of his portrayal of Midrash, there are differences 
between traditional Midrash and Brueggemann’s own interpretative approach. The difference includes 
Brueggemann’s observation that Midrash “is interested in every detail o f the text” and his more selective 
concern “with speech about Yahweh” (326).
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see that Brueggemann is intentionally being non-contextual for what he regards as a 
higher cause. He takes it as admirable to side-step what the context stresses (explicitly or 
implicitly) as the “main claim” of the text in favour of what may be “pointedly de­
emphasized in the text.”
In the end, Brueggemann’s initial desire to be “contextual” (at least to treat words in 
the context of sentences) gives way to an approach to biblical theology that is “non- 
contextual” or “anti-contextual.” His “non-contextual” approach includes the practice of 
emphasizing any alleged “ill-fitting particularities”’'* in the text even when the larger 
context de-emphasizes or harmonizes them. His tendency to emphasize what,the text de- 
emphasizes is underlined in the next hermeneutical rule to which Brueggemann adheres.
(3) The third methodological rule that I identify in Brueggemann’s work is the 
notion that one should be suspicious o f the surface reading o f a text. Brueggemann appeals 
to Freudian psychoanalysis for this methodological rule. Brueggemann says, “Freud’s 
assumption is that a surface articulation or representation of reality is to be treated with 
great suspicion and not to be taken at face value” (327). Adopting Freud’s theory about 
repression as “a practice of pervasive deception” (327), the “surface presentation” of the 
text is seen as deceptive. Interpretation therefore consists in disclosing and emancipating 
“what is repressed, hidden, denied, and ill-fitting” (327; cf. my comments on Midrash 
above). This “hermeneutic of suspicion,” also important to ideological or liberationist
To be sure, Brueggemann is right in saying that what appears to be “dissonance, or the 
surface irregularity in the articulation of Yahweh . . .  is not to be explained away literarily or historically, but 
is indeed a theological datum” (326). Yet what Brueggemann treats as “surface irregularity” often is, upon 
closer inspection, not really “ill-fitting particularity” at all. In such cases, features of the text are made to be 
ill-fitting in Brueggemann’s atomistic treatment of words or terms or sentences, which disregards the larger 
literary and theological context. This is reminiscent of his earlier tradition-historical work (see Brueggemann 
and Wolff 1975; cf. Seitz 2001 [Figured): 26f).
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interpretation (e.g. Marxist and feminist readings), is important to Brueggemann’s 
reflections on the character of the God of Israel.
Brueggemann uses Freudian psychoanalysis as a tool in his programme of 
“deconstructing” any hegemonic claims of the biblical text or its interpreters. Traditional 
Christian and Jewish conceptions of God are deconstructed, and Yahweh’s “unsettled 
interior life” (328) is thus retrieved for Brueggemann. God is ultimately seen as potentially 
“abusive,” e.g. as responsible for the Holocaust.’^
Besides unrestrained anthropomorphism, such an approach involves a more general 
imposition of modem categories onto the biblical text and its world. More specifically, it 
involves the danger of imposing onto the biblical God psychoanalytic categories that were 
designed for sinful and dysfunctional humans. Brueggemann may attempt to justify such a 
hermeneutical imposition by saying that it is “contemporary” or even “Jewish,”’  ^but this is 
inadequate.”
Furthermore, Brueggemann’s claim that an interpreter needs to push beyond the 
“surface presentation” of the text itself undercuts certain aspects of his approach. For 
example, many of Bmeggemann’s claims about God’s self-contradictory or disjunctive 
character rely on surface readings or the “surface presentation” of biblical texts such as
Brueggemann (329) says that the Holocaust “happened well beyond the horizon o f the text” (he cites 
Richard L. Rubenstein in support of this claim). One danger of attributing the Holocaust to Yahweh and using 
it as evidence for divine injustice is that it can detract from efforts to deal with the obvious human cause of the 
Holocaust: the sin of anti-Semitism (whether Christian or pagan). The proper response to the Holocaust is not 
blame-shifting from humanity to God, but radical repentance.
Brueggemann justifies his appeal to psychoanalysis by claiming that it is “a thoroughly Jewish enterprise 
and is much informed by midrashic practice” (327). In this, he follows Susan A. Handelman’s suggestion in 
The Slayers of Moses: The Emergence of Rabbinic Interpretation in Modem Literary Theory (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1982).
Brueggemann wrongly assumes that if something is “Jewish” that it automatically stands in continuity with 
the Old Testament, and is thus helpful to interpreting it. Ironically, Brueggemann’s claim to be doing 
something that is “Jewish” and thus “biblical” can render him unable to read the text at face value and 
according to its own rhetoric.
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Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes. A properly “deep” reading of these texts involves careful 
attention to all the features of its literary context and actually undermines his reading, 
leading to a more coherent (rather than disjunctive or dualistic) view of God’s character. 
Thus, I can agree with Brueggemann that it is important to probe beneath the surface 
reading of a text. However, this should be done without the “suspicion” encouraged by 
psychoanalysis. Reading the text on its own terms certainly does not encourage the reader 
to be suspicious of the main emphasis of the text in favour of what the text de-emphasizes 
or leaves unsaid.
(4) Another methodological rule for Brueggemann is that biblical theology should 
always emphasize particulars over generalities and should always move from the 
particular to the general and not vice versa. This rule is related to his tendency to focus on 
“ill fitting particularities” in the text. I will show how this tendency works itself out in the 
main contours of his Theology of the Old Testament.
Brueggemann unfolds the core testimony of Israel by a kind of “grammatical” 
analysis of the characteristic sentences of Israel’s testimony about Yahweh. Thus, 
Brueggemann moves from verbs (verbal sentences) to adjectives (“Yahweh’s Characteristic 
Markings”) to nouns (“Yahweh as Constant”). The order of presentation is significant. 
Brueggemann begins with what he regards as primary or most basic within Israel’s core 
testimony towards what is secondary or less basic. Thus, the more concrete verbal 
sentences describing the specific acts of Yahweh are considered the foundational and 
deepest strata of Israel’s testimony. In contrast, the more general and abstract adjectival 
and nominal formulations are seen as attempts to reflect on the more basic verbal sentences 
(230). The specific and concrete precede that which is more general and abstract.
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One difficulty with the rule of prioritising particulars is that it rather arbitrarily and 
indiscriminately renders as provisional and derivative all the “abstract” theological 
generalisations of the Old Testament. There is no compelling reason internal to the biblical 
text to prioritise the particular over the general. There is probably no internal reason to 
prioritise the general over the particular either—at least as a universal rule. Rather, biblical 
theology should allow biblical generalisations about God and particular descriptions of 
God’s acts to enter into a mutually-interpretative relationship, placing the priority wherever 
a given passage and its context emphasize. In this thesis I hope to exemplify this more 
balanced approach in the relationship between the generalisations of Ex 34:6-7 and its 
echoes and the particularities of their contexts.’^
(5) Brueggemann also tends to follow the rule (whether explicitly or implicitly) that 
biblical theology ought to highlight bipolarities and dialectical relationships in the text.
I have already alluded to Brueggemann’s tendency to “bipolarise” under my discussion of 
his assumption of “pluralism” (see 3.2 above), but I can further explain his procedure for 
doing “dialectical” biblical theology.’^
“Dialectic,” the interplay of opposition between one view and another, is central to 
the process of deconstructing any theological views in the text or in society that are 
dominant or hegemonic.^*  ^ Put differently, deconstruction is “thoroughly dialectical”
The generalisations given in the biblical text need to be distinguished from the interpreters’ provisional 
attempts to generalise what they find in the biblical text.
For Brueggemann, to be dialectical is a way of undertaking the “deconstruction” promoted by post-modern 
French philosopher Jacques Derrida (329ff). All truth-claims, certainly any allegedly universal and absolute 
claims about the character of Yahweh, are to be deconstructed in an ongoing process of dialectic and 
disputation. Yet Brueggemann, claiming to follow Derrida, points to an exception: there is one claim that 
cannot and ought not be deconstructed, namely, justice (331; cf. 740).
For Brueggemann, a position of hegemony renders a view problematic, irrespective of any other merits it 
might have. But, that a view has been dominant (i.e. popular) does not necessarily mean that it was 
oppressive, let alone false.
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(331)/* In an illuminating footnote, Brueggemann observes that a dialectical- 
deconstructive manoeuvre finds an analogy in “the sailing imagery of tacking,” a procedure 
in which one changes the direction of the ship repeatedly so as to follow a zigzag course/^ 
First, one affirms a claim; then one opposes it by means of a counter-claim, showing that 
the original claim is provisional and destructible. Then one does the same to the counter­
claim by means of another counter-claim, and so on.
This dialectical “tacking” manoeuvre is evident throughout Brueggemann’s work on 
both macro and micro levels. In other words, Brueggemann’s programme of 
deconstruction is marked by dialectic strategies both in the overall organisation of his work 
and in the specific theological claims he makes in reading particular texts. On the macro- 
organisational level, there is the dialectic of the core-testimony and the counter­
testimony—the main dialectic of his Theology o f the Old Testament. Thus, Brueggemann 
first lays out what he takes to be Israel’s characteristic claims in the core testimony, which 
correspond largely to what he thinks the text itself emphasizes when understood according 
to its own terms (i.e. its main or dominant voice). Then he voices the claims of the 
counter-testimony, which he thinks deconstruct or subvert the core testimony.^^
In this respect Brueggemann clearly draws from post-modern literary and philosophical deconstructionism, 
as represented by Derrida, and the biblical scholars that follow him (329ff). Longman notes that 
deconstructionist analysis is (ironically) predictable in form: the deconstructionist interpreter always looks for 
“an aporia, or basic contradiction” in a text and then uses this to show forth (or even celebrate) indeterminacy 
of the text’s meaning (Longmann 1997:106). This observation has obvious application to Brueggemann’s 
dialectical approach, in which the most fundamental contradiction is found in the disjunctive character of the 
God of Israel.
He continues, “Blumenthal sees the critique and affirmation o f God as manoeuvres similar to tacking, both 
of which are necessary to serious biblical faith” (Brueggemann, 331, footnote 24). He cites David 
Blumenthal, Facing the Abusing God (1993).
In overall effect, Brueggemann tends to give more weight or emphasis to the deconstructive counter­
testimony (the “unsolicited” and “embodied” testimonies tend to reinforce the counter testimony). In his own 
description:
Yahweh and Israel’s irrevocable commitment to justice [requires] that all false starts on the part of 
Yahweh be problematized, critiqued, and subverted. These false starts may occur in overstated self-
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There is another aspect of the macro-level dialectical strategy in Brueggemann, 
which is more immediately relevant to my thesis. Within the core testimony itself, there is 
dialectic between two views of God, the disjunction between (negative) sovereignty and 
(positive) solidarity. This dialectic makes Brueggemann’s version of the core testimony 
“unstable” and (conveniently) opens it to the critique of the counter testimony and other 
testimonies. Thus, the “counter-testimony” is already included in Israel’s core testimony. 
What Brueggemann presents as counter- and unsolicited-testimonies are already grounded 
in the core testimony. The counter- and unsolicited-testimonies simply serve to reinforce 
and emphasize the “negative part” of the core testimony. '^*
There is also dialectical deconstruction on a micro-level. In any given text 
discussed, Brueggemann imposes dialectic. Thus, in a given text, God is just and unjust; 
God is for Israel and uncompromisingly for himself; God can be trusted and unreliable;
God is sovereign and impotent; God is present and absent. My comments throughout the 
thesis on Brueggemann’s interpretations of various texts provide examples of his use of 
micro-dialectical strategy. His micro-dialectical strategy serves his overall presentation of 
the Bible and the biblical God as being marked by “profound disjunction” and thus unstable 
and susceptible to deconstruction.
aggrandising sovereignty, or in self-indulgent pathos that gives in too much to the beloved [as in core 
testimony]. In good deconstructive fashion, Israel refuses to leave Yahweh alone, because Yahweh has 
not yet got it right. And Israel’s cross-examination [thus counter-testimony] attends to that work vis-à- 
vis Yahweh (331; my interpretative interjection in the brackets).
This description only makes sense when one exchanges “Israel” (and perhaps “Yahweh”) with 
Brueggemann’s own idiosyncratic theological views!
It is also noteworthy that much of the exegetical material in his counter-testimony is already present or 
assumed in the “negative utterance” of the core testimony, which seems to be a great set-up for making the 
counter-testimony reinforce (rather than make problematic) the core testimony. In this way, the new 
testimonies (the “constructions” that deconstruct) do not in effect “become problematic” as Brueggemann says 
they should (331) but rather authorise the core-testimony in all its instability.
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(6) Lastly, Brueggemann observes the rule that biblical interpretation and biblical 
theology ought to promote and be guided by the goal o f socio-political justice. This point 
requires the consideration of several issues that are close to the heart of Brueggemann’s 
work and of my response to it, I begin with several questions of clarification.
The first question to be asked is this: what kind of justice does Brueggemann wish 
to advocate? Brueggemann defines justice in terms of preferential concern for the poor and 
oppressed. More specifically, it is a kind of distributive justice that calls for the 
redistribution of the wealth and power of the “haves” to the “have-nots” (736ff). 
Accordingly, he says “this passion for justice stands as a revolutionary, subversive 
challenge to Jews and to Christians, and to every alternative meta-narrative” (740).
Secondly, what does Brueggemann say about the importance of such distributive 
justice for his own version of Old Testament theology? In the fifth and final part of his 
book, Brueggemann makes plain that distributive socio-political justice is the central 
advocacy of his book, the main contemporary “cause” for which his book is written. 
Brueggemann states, “Theological interpreters of the Old Testament at the end of the 
twentieth century must, in my judgment, pay primal attention to this irreducible claim of 
justice” (740).*  ^ This claim, says Brueggemann, is what the “Mosaic revolution” first 
articulated and thinkers like Jacques Derrida are restating in our time. Brueggemann 
further states that Yahweh is generally a promoter or a servant of distributive justice— 
either by standing in solidarity with the poor and oppressed and actively delivering them, or
Earlier in the book, Brueggemann qualified the relation of his work to the advocacy of justice: “I do not 
suggest that an Old Testament theology should be in the service of such a revolutionary struggle”( 113). He 
continues that Old Testament theology “cannot, however, be indifferent to that context of interpretation,” i.e. 
from global power issues and the struggle for justice.
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by using sovereign power to inflict violent punishments on the enemies of justice. This is 
what the core testimony’s disjunctive rendering of God emphasizes.
However, there are exceptions to Yahweh as a promoter of justice, as the counter­
testimony emphasizes. Brueggemann thinks Yahweh is at times “unjust”—either with an 
unlimited violence (as he thinks is witnessed in Nahum) or with an incriminating inactivity 
(as witnessed in Israel’s complaints) (221). God fails the test of theodicy for Job and for 
the victims of the Holocaust. Thus, Brueggemann boldly states:
Justice is held up as ultimate, and Yahweh as an agent of justice is 
critiqued for failure of justice. That is, Israel is aware that there is more to 
Yahweh than justice: there is holiness and downright capricious 
irascibility.. . .  In the tradition of Job (and of Derrida), I suggest, Yahweh 
is held to justice, and if Yahweh cannot subscribe to this earthly passion, 
then the claims of heaven must be deconstructed (740).
The biblical text and the character of Yahweh are dialectical and deconstructible for 
Brueggemann, subject to being tested by justice as he conceives it (735ff and 33 If). 
Brueggemann believes that employing justice as the ultimate, non-dialectical, irreducible 
and indestructible criterion of Old Testament theology allows him to escape a situation in 
which the process of theological dialectic becomes “an endlessly exhausting enterprise that 
is bottomless in its negative force” (331).
Lastly, what evidence is there in Bmeggemann’s interpretative practice for the 
importance of distributive justice? Bmeggemann says that his affirmation of pluralism and 
his methodological use of dialectic and deconstmction are ways to establish justice, 
because they deny and deconstmct the claims of metanarratives or absolute tmth claims 
that under-gird and legitimatise unjust and oppressive social systems. Accordingly, if one 
begins with the assumption that Bmeggemann is writing a theology of the Old Testament 
for the purpose of promoting his view of distributive justice, then many features of his
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approach and their inter-relationship, that would otherwise seem arbitrary, begin to make 
sense. The disputatious testimonies of the biblical text itself are, in and of themselves, seen 
as examples of such acts of deconstruction. His unstable and destabilising account of 
disjunctive rendering of Yahweh serves to rule out any social systems that would use an 
unquestioned dominant view of God to underwrite their policies as “divinely given” and to 
potentially justify their injustice. Brueggemann’s appeals to Midrash, Freudian 
psychoanalysis, and Marxism are meant to serve, at least in part, his disjunctive rendering 
of Yahweh.®® Insofar as Brueggemann’s approach is an ordered whole, it appears to be 
ordered by and directed towards the promotion of social justice by means of an unruly and 
irascible God. Brueggemann’s sometimes unruly and always unpredictable Yahweh can 
serve the purpose of “scaring” people into conformity with the demands of distributive
• 87justice.
I have thus shown how Brueggemann understands justice and how important it is in 
guiding his method of interpreting the Old Testament. My discussion on divine forgiving 
and punitive actions portrayed in the context of Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes clarify the nature 
of divine justice, although not all questions about justice will be addressed or answered in 
this thesis.
4. Methodology: Canonical-Contextual-Theological Exegesis
In this section I will discuss the interpretative method I will employ in this thesis. I 
can summarize this method by saying that I will do an exegesis that is defined by three
®® Of course, the legitimacy of the links that Brueggemann makes between justice and these various practices 
or features of his work may be questioned, but these are the kind of links that he wishes to make.
This is Fretheim’s concern with the “hardened” form of sovereignty that marks Brueggemann’s God (1998: 
34).
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adjectives: canonical, contextual, and theological. The first term is the most basic and 
determinative of the three, because the canonical approach which I adopt here yields the 
understanding of what it means for my exegesis to be contextual and theological.
In referring to my approach as canonical, I draw from Brevard Childs, Christopher 
R. Seitz, and others who have advocated this approach to biblical interpretation and 
theology.^^ Since canonical interpretation has taken a variety of forms, I must clarify how I 
understand it. A canonical approach implies the following three distinctives. First, the 
only text that is relevant for theological exegesis is the final form of the text. This is so, 
because “revelation in the Old Testament cannot be abstracted from the form of witness 
that the historical community of Israel gave it.”^^  Furthermore, since the final form of 
Scripture is the only form of the text that we have today, it is the only form of the text that 
does not involve undue speculation. Secondly, Scripture in its final canonical form is 
theologically relevant and normative for the believing Jew or Christian.^** Scripture is not a 
purely historical or literary document, but a body of theological and religious writings that 
have been received by the believing community as normative. The nature of the canonical 
writings and traditional manner of reception implies a certain manner of reading them. 
Third, canonical interpretation of a text is carried out within the context of the whole
®® See my related comments and citations in section 2.3.3. Other proponents of a broadly canonical approach 
are Rendtorff (1993 and 1994) and Sanders (1972 and 1984). While I draw some helpful methodological 
points from Rendtorff (later in this section), I draw primarily from Childs’ version of the canonical approach, 
especially as modified by Provan (1997) and Seitz (1998 and other sources). I also have considered other 
criticisms of Child’s approach, such as those by Barr (1983: 75-104, 130-71). I disagree with most of Barr’s 
criticisms of Childs, which Provan has largely refuted.
Gowan 1994: xi, commenting on Brevard Childs’ advocacy of theology.
See especially the various works of Brevard Childs on these and other reasons for focusing on the canonical 
text. Moberly also offers several good literary and theological arguments for giving priority to the final form 
ofthe text (1983: 22ff).
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collection of biblical books that are regarded as a canon. What is said in one part of the 
canon is theologically relevant to interpretation of other parts of the canon.
Beyond these three characteristics of the canonical approach, the approach taken in 
this thesis is not a highly-defined method. Rather, this approach is a self-consciously 
flexible and eclectic approach to interpretation. This is partly due the fact that there is no 
settled system of canonical interpretation in contemporary biblical scholarship.^* In 
addition, the methodological eclecticism employed in this thesis draws from the distinct 
insights and methods of two different “sub-disciplines” within biblical studies that are 
relevant to canonical interpretation, namely, (1) the field of theological biblical 
interpretation and (2) the study of biblical intertextuality. It will become evident later that 
the manner in which I draw from these growing areas of research and writing is to give 
priority to the former. That is, I will investigate and refer to the phenomenon of biblical 
intertextuality not as an end in itself, but as what serves the theological exegesis of the 
canonical text. In addition, I will speak about both theological issues and intertextual 
issues in a way that is contextual.
Thus, out of a canonical approach as defined above, rises a commitment to exegesis 
that is both contextual and theological. I will explain what this means in three sub-sections. 
First, I will explain what I mean by canonical exegesis that is contextual and theological 
(4.1). Secondly, I will address my emphasis on the theological coherence of the canon, 
including an explanation of how certain phenomena of intertextuality relate to the issue of 
theological coherence (4.2). Lastly, I will address how my interpretative approach is 
marked by both theological realism and confessional commitment (4.3).
See Sanders (1972 and 1984), Childs (1992 and 1997), Rendtorff (1993 and 1994), Sailhamer (1995), 
Provan (1997), Seitz (1998), Miller (in his preface to Brueggemann 2000), and McConville (2001).
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4.1. “Contextual and Theological Exegesis”
4.1.1. “Contextual Exegesis”
A literary and canonical approach implies contextual exegesis. A contextual 
exegesis pays close attention to the literary and canonical context of the text (in this case, 
Ex 34:6-7 or one of its echoes), rather than to historical-critical or diachronic context.^^ As 
such, my understanding of contextual exegesis draws from the literary approaches to 
interpretation that have emerged in the last several decades, especially those that are 
oriented to understanding the text itself (rather than to the reader)
There are various levels of literary context: a sentence (the only level with which 
Brueggemann deals seriously in theory and practice), a paragraph or a unit, a book, a 
collection of books, and the whole of Old Testament canon. '^* The contextual exegesis of 
the text pays attention to the various levels of literary context to discern “literary” and 
“rhetorical” patterns in them. In so doing, a contextual exegesis also discerns theological 
patterns that tie the various levels of literary context (e.g. covenants in Genesis and Exodus 
reveal divine purpose for redemption). Theological patterns in turn provide a theological
I move further away from the diachronic approach than Childs, because I regard the historical-critical issues 
as generally irrelevant for theological exegesis or biblical theology (see Seitz 1998: 1 If, 99, and passim). I 
focus on the text’s own presentation of its “situation” (see below). In this regard, I come closer to the practice 
of Gowan (1994) and Fretheim (1991) in their theological commentaries on Exodus.
Longman (1987) offers a helpful account of the various “literary” (rather than “historical”) approaches in 
biblical scholarship that emerged in the 70’s and has “exploded” in the subsequent decades. Trible (1994) 
provides an excellent account of “rhetorical criticism” (see especially her treatment in Chapter 2 of 
Muilenberg and his legacy). This thesis is sympathetic with the textually-based literary or rhetorical 
approach. Yet I have serious reservations about the deconstructionist and reader-response modes of literary 
or “rhetorical” criticism with which Brueggemann seems to have aligned himself.
“Discourse analysis” or “structural analysis” (to be distinguished from “structuralism”) has laid special 
attention to the structural features of literary context that extend beyond the sentence level (see Dorsey 1999). 
My consideration of Ex 34:6-7 in Chapter 2, for example, will involve the following levels of literary, 
canonical context: words (“steadfast-love”) within a phrase (“steadfast love to thousands . . . ”), a sentence 
(34:6-7), a pericope (33:12-34:9), a section (Ex 32-34), a book (Exodus), a collection of books 
(Pentateuch/Torah), and the Old Testament canon.
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context in which to interpret the various levels of context (e.g. the breach of the covenant in 
Ex 32 and its renewal in Ex 34:10ff) and the text (e.g. Ex 34:6-7) in the context thus 
understood. The literary context thus includes theological contextj the largely coherent 
theological patterns found within Scripture.
There are three features of literary context that are most relevant to my thesis. They 
are genre (and form), voice, and situation (setting and plot). A brief word on each of these 
is in order.^^
My work presupposes the importance of correctly identifying the genre or form of 
the literary context in which the formula or echo is found. The unique feature of each text 
receives the exegetical (grammatical, syntactical, literary) attention appropriate to its genre. 
It is also important to identity the form  of the more specific literary designation of the 
formula or echo. The form (e.g. Ex 34:6-7 as a divinely revealed theological 
generalization) is closely related to its content (list of divine attributes) and its unique 
function (a decisive solution to the problem of reconciliation between God and Israel).^^ I 
could make similar claims about the distinctive content, form, and function of the various 
echoes of the formula, as I will show in this dissertation.
The question of voice refers to who is speaking and to how they are speaking in the 
text. For the formula, one key question is whether the speaker that the narrator presents is 
divine or human. In Ex 34:6-7, the narrator would have the reader recognise God as the
I will footnote how Brueggemann’s work fails to attend to these features. See Fretheim’s critique of 
Brueggemann in this regard (1998: 35f).
^  Childs argues from the principles of form criticism that form and function are interdependent factors (1972: 
51). I accept this and add “content” as a further factor, especially relevant in such theological texts as this 
one. Accordingly, the “meaning” of a text is bound to its form, and “meaning always contains a theological 
dimension” (Trible 1994: 26f).
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speaker, speaking in the first person.^^ While an interpreter has access to the voice of L orD 
only through the testimony of Israel, Israel’s testimony would have the interpreter read 
Ex 34:6-7 as divine self-revelation. Insofar as the other echoes quote or reuse the formula, 
then, the echoes continue to affirm the statements about who God is as revealed in 
Ex 34:6-7. The correct identification is important for correctly adjudicating any competing 
theological voices within a text (e.g. God’s or a prophet’s theological affirmations vs. 
Israel’s sinful perspective).
The situation is the setting of a particular text. The setting the text itself assumes is 
straightforward in narratives like Ex 32-34 and Num 13-14. For example, the canon 
presents the narrative of Num 13-14 as an event that takes place chronologically after 
Ex 32-34. The settings of the texts of Isaiah and Nahum are discerned through the canon’s 
presentation of the text and the text’s references to its own situation. A text’s setting is 
primarily defined by such a canonically and textually defined “situation.” For example, the 
canon presents the text of Isa 53-54 as “a prophetic word of promise offered to Israel by the 
eighth-century prophet, Isaiah of Jerusalem.”^^  Likewise, the book of Nahum speaks to the 
situation of coming judgment on Nineveh for its oppression. Thus, Isaiah and Nahum will 
be interpreted with such canonical “settings” in mind. Some important questions related to
Brueggemann’s exegesis fails to make such distinctions and reduces all textual voices to the testimonies of 
Israel. The voice of Israel and the voice of God are blurred together, without clear internal distinction of the 
voices within Israel’s testimony.
Childs 1979: 325. Childs also points out that while historical critical scholarship argued that Isaiah 40ff 
was “originally addressed to Hebrew exiles in Babylon by an unnamed exilic prophet during the sixth century 
. . .  the attempt to reconstruct [the original context] as a basis for exegesis has proven so unsatisfactory and 
hypothetical.” The question of authorship and the date of composition—whether it is “Isaiah of Jerusalem” or 
“Isaiah of Babylon”—does not impinge upon the theological issues discussed in Chapter 4.
43
the situation are: Is it an individual or group situation? Who is the individual or group? Is 
it a time of peace or crisis ?^ ^
The “situation,” then, is the narrative setting, situation, or event described by the 
biblical text i t s e l f I approach the “situation” through the literary, canonical setting, or 
situation. Therefore, I do not try to distinguish the narrated account of the text from 
allegedly “real” historical context. Hence, I give priority to internal “situational” data given 
by the text over the external data compiled by historical-critical research. Giving priority to 
internal data, however, does not prohibit me from occasionally making an effort to relate 
the internal references to setting to external historical references (as in the estimation of 
historical setting for the oracle of Nahum 1 in Chapter 5). External historical endeavour 
does not carry any independent significance for theology.
In my thesis, theological concerns remain consistently primary. The contextual 
exegesis is not an end in itself. Rather, the literary or rhetorical patterns of the text are 
regarded as tools for discerning the text’s theological meaning.
4.1.2, “Theological Exegesis”
Since the biblical texts with which I am concerned are basically theological in 
character,^®  ^exegesis is “theological.” Doing theological exegesis involves two
^  Brueggemann is often to be commended for attending to key features of the situation in his exegesis of 
Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes. However, he sometimes leaves out crucial elements in his analysis of the situation, 
such as a due consideration of the events of human sins that precede the L o r d ’s acts of forgiveness or 
punishment.
The nature of what might be called the Bible’s “historical witness,” to the extent that there is one, varies 
greatly according to genre. This will be evident in the different ways I treat historical context in two 
Pentateuchal narratives (in Chapters 2 and 3) and in two very different kinds of prophetic oracles (in Chapters 
4 and 5). It is sometimes difficult to know in regard to some narrative genres whether or not a text aims to be 
“historical” or not (as with Job or Jonah), but my method allows me to take the text’s clues as to its “situation” 
seriously, without attempting to relate them definitively to extra-biblical historical data. The “historical 
situation” of a text given by its literary context can illuminate its intended theological meaning, even if one 
does not have extra-biblical reasons to regard it as historical.
It is possible that all biblical texts are theological; see Knierim 1995: 60f; 67.
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approaches: doing exegesis for the service o f theology, and doing theology for the service 
of exegesis.
(1) Theological exegesis focusing on certain exegetical issues to the exclusion of 
others for the purpose of focusing on the theological issues imbedded in the text. Some 
aspects of exegesis, the grammar (philology, syntax) and (literary) context, are important 
exegetical tools that aid theological reading of the text. However, the “historical-critical” 
agenda largely is dead-ended theologically,*®  ^since it overly limits the notion of biblical 
meaning and interpretation.*®  ^ The theological significance of the text sometimes goes 
beyond what either the original author or original readers would have understood, 
transcending the horizon of a single historical period.*®"* Thus, I will assume with Walter 
Moberly that a theological reading of the Bible ought to be “taken as meaningful in itself” 
even when it involves laying aside questions of the origins and composition of the 
material.*®^
As such, theological exegesis does not contradict the basic principles of 
grammatical-contextual exegesis; i.e. the text is interpreted in keeping with its clearly 
known features of setting (or “situation”), grammatical structures and literary context. 
Yet, theological exegesis and the various non-theological modes of interpretation
See Seitz 1998: 1 If, 99 and passim. I do not wish to dismiss historical-critical issues as insignificant for 
all scholarly or interpretative purposes, but simply for mine.
Cf. Childs 1974: ixf, where he stresses the need for a broader conception of exegesis than that which has 
prevailed in the modern period.
In addition, the theological meaning and significance of a passage often is best understood in its overall 
canonical context, a larger understanding of context than what has typically prevailed in the theory and 
practice of historical-grammatical exegesis.
Moberly 1983: 21. The attempt to uncover the “original” grammatical-historical sense according to the 
authorial intention and original hearer often involves a good amount of speculation, since there is no neutral 
or objective standpoint from which one may undertake such exegesis and the relevant data is often few and far 
between (see Childs 1974: xiii).
Thus, contextual-theological exegesis utilizes grammatical-contextual exegesis, which recognises the 
temporal ordering within and between the texts as the canon presents them.
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(rhetorical criticism, structural analysis, and intertextuality) are properly seen as inseparable 
and interrelated elements of the unified process of interpretation. More specifically, my 
use of various “non-theological” methods concentrates on how they can shed light on the 
meaning o f the final canonical form of the biblical text, which typically has a theological 
dimension. The theological meaning of a text is therefore either a part of or an extension of 
the “plain” or “literal” sense of the text rather than being contradictory to it.
Thus, contextual-theological exegesis differs from those dogmatic or confessional 
versions of theological exegesis that take biblical texts out of context and use them as a 
springboard for concerns that are not evident in the text.*®^  In my view, an emphasis on 
literary context does not need to work against, but rather highlight, literary or theological 
unity and coherence (within a given text, between texts, or within the canon as a whole). 
This point is important, because an emphasis on context is often regarded as yielding 
increased evidence for the diversity and even contradiction within the Old Testament’s 
theological witness.*®^
(2) Theological exegesis seeks to attend to and accurately describe the key 
theological ideas that the text’s own concerns and composition serve to highlight and 
clarify. Theological exegesis also assumes and emphasizes that the canonical text is 
marked by overall theological coherence and is organised in a way that emphasizes certain 
theological truths. Thus, theological exegesis (or simply exegesis) stands in a relationship
There is a sense in which my approach to biblical interpretation is “confessional” (4.3.1). Yet my 
approach is distinct from the traditional dogmatic or confessional approach in that I do not strive to bring the 
text to bear on concerns that are not “its own.”
Gowan’s work on Exodus (1994), like mine, aims to (a) stress theological unity (ix) and (b) be contextual 
(xi). Gowan’s concept of “context” extends beyond mine since it includes non-canonical literature and 
tradition (xiff). See 4.2 below for my more extensive considerations of textual and theological unity and 
coherence.
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of mutual influence with Old Testament (biblical) theology.*®  ^ Biblical theology should be 
grounded as much as possible in exegesis. And exegesis is to some extent based on certain 
biblical theological commitments. There is a kind of hermeneutical circle at work in which 
one must go from the general (biblical-theological assumptions) to the particular (exegesis 
of a specific passage) and from the particular back to the general.**® That said, this study is 
concerned primarily with theological exegesis of particular passages.
4,2. Coherence in the Study of Biblical Texts
4.2.1. Drawing Attention to Coherence
Various expressions of modem “historical-critical” or diachronic approach to 
interpretation often have drawn attention to the theological diversity and theological 
contradiction that exist within the text.'" In sharp contrast, the pre-critical approach tends 
to “harmonize” such diversity into a relatively unified viewpoint (coherence). To some 
extent, certain recent literary models of interpretation (e.g. discourse analysis, narrative 
analysis, and rhetorical criticism) have retrieved the pre-critical emphasis on the coherence 
of biblical texts as literary wholes and the intertextual relationships between various 
biblical texts (including those of differing genres). However, other literary modes of 
interpretation, such as those with deconstmctionist sympathies (including Bmeggemann)
See Knierim for a brief, but helpful explanation of the distinction between biblical exegesis (which he 
thinks is inevitably theological in character) and biblical theology (Knierim, 2000: 21-25). Insofar as I do 
“theology” it is biblical theology; and insofar as I do exegesis, it always includes a theological component. I 
will not refer to the post-biblical historical development or contemporary application o f theological ideas 
(unlike Gowan 1994: x-xviii).
See Sailhamer 1995: 18. Childs helpfully describes biblical theology as “an ancillary discipline that better 
serves in equipping the exegete for the real task of interpreting the biblical text itself’ (2001: xii).
" 'in  fact, the predominant and often uncritical tendency of people doing exegesis that claims to be 
“contextual” is to emphasize the diversity and tensions that exist within the biblical text. The manner in which 
I do contextual interpretation resists this tendency.
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have counter-balanced the tendency to emphasize coherence by laying a strong emphasis on 
diversity, contradiction, incoherence, and incommensurability.**^
In this thesis I wish to follow the literary approaches to the study of the Old 
Testament that emphasize coherence of biblical texts.**  ^ The approach taken here will be 
“post-critical” in that it attempts to avoid the “pre-critical” error of facile theological 
harmonisation of texts, which was often coupled with inattention to the distinct contexts of 
texts.**"* Thus, I will strive to employ the tools of modem biblical study to do careful 
contextual exegesis of a given passage (e.g. paying attention to its genre, voice, stmcture, 
and situation). I will strive to avoid imposing harmony or unity on the text if it is not there. 
I will not omit attention to glaring disharmony if it is there. That said, I would emphasize a 
unified or coherent theological perspective that the literary features of the context draws 
out. Also, in contrast to some recent literary approaches, I will focus on theological rather 
than purely literary harmony, though I will often take cues from the literary to establish the 
theological.
That the post-modern deconstructive approach is more radical is evident, for example, when critical 
scholarship’s relatively “conservative” and “harmonizing” tendency with respect to the character of God 
(Fretheim 1984: 17ff) is compared with Brueggemann’s radical approach.
See RendtorfPs positive comments about the potential o f using pre-critical Midrashic sources precisely 
because of their capacity to relate and unite texts that modern scholars would not think of relating (1993:
22h). Moberly indicates that practitioners of recent literary methods tend to look for unity in the final form of 
the text, in contrast to those who use diachronic methods (1983: 22ff).
Note that Calvin specifically entitled his commentaries on the Pentateuch Commentary on the Last Four 
Books of Moses, Arranged in the Form o f a Harmony. In this way he broke from his usual (and more 
promising) book-by-book commentary format in the interests of theological harmonisation. I do not assume 
that Calvin or other pre-critical commentators consistently fell into the error of artificial external 
harmonisation. Sometimes they helpfully point out uniting features of the text (not reading into the text) that 
are neglected by modern interpreters.
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There are three different levels or kinds of theological coherence that I am 
concerned to emphasize.**^ (These three levels of coherence correspond to three different 
levels of the literary context of an individual text, whether it is the formula or an echo).
(1) There is the intratextual coherence or harmony within a particular text (the formula 
or an echo).
(2) There is the intertextual or canonical coherence between (a) the formula’s 
theological witness (regarding God’s mercy and judgment) and (b) each echo’s 
theological witness.
(3) There is the contextual coherence between (a) the theological witness of a small 
literary unit of a text (e.g. Ex 34:6-7) and (b) the larger literary context in which it is 
found (e.g. Ex 32-34 and possibly larger units).
My effort to discern intratextual, intertextual, and contextual coherence in the Old 
Testament involves three important methodological strategies, which I will explain in 
the remainder of this subsection: (1) giving attention to the literary form of “theological 
generalization,” (2) using “intertextual” modes of theological interpretation, and (3) 
attending carefully to the question of what constitutes a theological contradiction.
4.2.2. The Form of a “Theological Generalization”
Especially since the development of form-criticism. Old Testament scholars have 
given great attention, often profitably, to the various forms or genres of the Old Testament 
literature.**® I follow the scholarly emphasis on the “form” insofar as it is important for 
correctly identifying the “form” of Ex 34:6-7 and two of its echoes treated in this thesis 
(Num 14:8 and Nah 1:2-3). Following Fretheim, I identify their form as
See Sailhamer (1995: 205ff).
The series The Forms o f the Old Testament Literature, edited by Knierim and Tucker (for volume 1, see 
Coates 1983), represents a recent development and application of the form-critical approach. As with the 
methodology employed in this series, I usually begin with a structural analysis of a larger unit before I treat 
smaller texts and lay a general emphasis on literary context and genre.
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“generalization.”**^  More specifically, these texts are theological generalizations, because 
they make affirmations about the character of God.**^
The very nature and function of a generalization in the Old Testament canon are to 
provide a basically coherent theological testimony—in the case of Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes, 
a stable articulation of the character of God. The very process of canonisation would have 
rejected blatant contradictory generalizations on central issues such as the character of the 
L orD.**® These factors are significant for the theological coherence between these texts. 
Their common form points in the direction of reading these texts in a similar way, except 
where other contextual considerations require otherwise.*^® Thus, unless exegetical factors 
urge me to think otherwise, the/orm of these texts inclines me to regard them as providing 
a stable theological meaning or content.
That said, I must note that Isa 53:5-12 (“servant song”) and 54:7-10 (“divine 
oracle”) do not share the same form of “theological generalization” with the formula and 
other echoes. Rather, the Isaiah echo-clusters represent applications of various terms of the 
formula first to the Servant (53:5-12) and then to the L ord (54:7-10). While Isaiah’s echo-
Fretheim 1997: 16-18 (cf. 1991: 302 and 1984: 251). Childs lends direct support to Fretheim’s claims 
about generalising genres in the Old Testament (1992: 354ff). Also, Krasovec speaks of the formula in 
Ex 34:6-7 as “a generally accepted principle” (1999: 544; cf. 599) and elsewhere speaks of how “basic 
theological maxims did not change with the transmutation of traditions” (3). For more indirect support of this 
approach in regard to the formula and its echoes, see Scharbert 1957: 149-150.
Brueggemann generally fails to attend to these “form-critical” designations and their significance. 
"’ Goldingay 1987:26ff.
Fretheim (1997) sheds light on a properly contextual approach to the interpretation o f these 
generalizations. He rightly regards them as standing in a complementary and inter-dependant relationship to 
another main theological form of the Old Testament, namely, story or narrative (see the citations in the 
previous footnote). By attending to generalizations about the abiding features of God’s character and God’s 
particular actions as portrayed in stories, one arrives at a clear biblical understanding o f what God is like. 
Since the narrative genre forms the literary context for at least the text in Ex 34 and the echo in Num 14 (the 
context for the echoes in Is 53-54 and Nah 1 also contain “narrative” elements portraying what God does), I 
will be able to show the mutually-interpretative relationship between generalization and story in my exegetical 
practice.
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clusters are different in form, the texts share many of the same items of vocabulary with the 
formula, establishing a striking intertextual relationship with the formula. The theological 
coherence between Isaiah’s texts and the formula can be established on the basis of a 
specific relationship of intertextuality and other exegetical factors.
4.2.3. The Appeal to Intertextuality
In this thesis, I will participate in what might be called a post-critical retrieval of the 
pre-modem tendency to appeal to intertextuality in theological interpretation. By 
intertextuality, I refer specifically to biblical intertextuality, i.e. to the phenomenon of 
echoes, allusions, quotations, parallels, and reuses within the Bible itself.*^* I began to 
define some of these terms above (section 1.3), and I will now more fully elaborate on the 
manner in which I will appeal to these intertextual phenomena in this thesis. I focus my 
attention in this study on echoes, i.e. intentional or unintentional reuses of the formula in 
canonically later contexts. (See footnote 10.) As noted earlier, the intertextual relationship 
of the formula to the echoes treated in this thesis involves an asymmetrical relationship of 
priority between the formula and the echoes based upon canonical order. (See footnote 11.) 
This definition of intertextuality befits: (1) my choice to employ a canonical methodology 
that recognises the significance of canonical order and priority between texts, and (2) my 
choice to investigate the intertextual and theological issue of whether the canonically later 
texts reuse earlier texts in a theologically consistent manner.
Thus the specific intertextual phenomena I refer to in this thesis are distinct from 
other possible varieties of intertextual phenomena and therefore imply a certain way of 
using the terms “intertextual” and “intertextuality.” Since the method of interpretation
Sailhamer defines intertextuality as “the study of links between and among texts,” rather than the study of 
links within texts, which is called intratextuality (1995: 213).
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employed in this thesis is canonical, the understanding of intertextuality is necessarily 
shaped by a canonical approach to the text. This has implications for three issues: (1) the 
issue of intentionality, (2) the issue of priority, and (3) the issue of coherence.
(1) I am concerned with intertextuality in the sense of traceable instances of either 
intentional or unintentional reuses. Thus I do not require echoes to be the biblical author’s 
intentional reuses of texts that came first historically.*^^ Rather, I am referring to traceable 
instances of intertextuality that are either intentional or unintentional reuses.
One could object to this position by saying that my employment of the word “reuse” 
connotes authorial intentionality and related temporal or historical priority, i.e. it connotes a 
conscious reuse of a pre-existing text with a specific purpose in mind. Although that may 
be the most typical connotation of the word “reuse,” it is not necessary to use it strictly in 
this manner. By “reuse” I refer to the occurrence (or use) of canonically earlier texts in 
canonically later texts. If one still wishes to speak of “intentionality” in canonical context, 
it is, in the words of Brevard Childs, “a ‘canonical intentionality,’ which is coextensive 
with the meaning of the biblical text.”"^  In other words, the canonical placement of one 
text earlier than other texts that “repeat” it is hermeneutically significant in understanding 
their relationship and meaning.' '^* Specifically, texts like Ex 34:6-7 that occur in the 
narratives of the Pentateuch or Torah are earlier in the canon because they are considered 
foundational for what comes later. In canonical context, echo texts occurring in the 
prophets are meant to draw on the foundational authority of texts that they echo from the
Sailhamer's definition of intertextuality does not include unintentional reuses, for he sees unintentional 
reuses as distorting the (author’s intended) meaning of the text (1995: 213). See the similar perspective that 
guides the methodology of the intertextual studies of Isaiah by Wiley (1997) and Sommer (1998).
Childs 1979: 79.
The shapers and editors of the canon placed texts in a particular order for reasons that are discernable in 
the text itself (not in probing the history behind the text).
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Torah. This gives the formula text a canonical priority over its echoes without requiring 
claims of historical or temporal priority, or authorial intentionality.
Thus I am focusing on a kind of intertextuality that stands between stricter and 
looser understandings of intertextuality, that is, between one that requires intentionality and 
one that places all texts on essentially the same level (no priority). As noted, some scholars 
wish to restrict biblical intertextuality strictly to relationships between earlier texts and 
intentional reuses of those texts. Such scholars could object to my approach to echoes by 
saying that allowing echoes to include unintentional reuses yields too many possible 
instances of intertextuality and is in danger of making intertextual phenomena untraceable. 
Put differently, without discerning authorial intention, one opens the door to endless claims 
of intertextuality based on subjective impressions. However, in response to this objection, I 
wish to point out that several objective factors guide my own identifications of intertextual 
phenomena. The strong echoes I study in this thesis require both literary and thematic 
correspondence to the base text. There is objectivity inherent in the discernment of an echo 
based on this criterion. Quotation, parallels, or other reproductions of vocabulary and 
syntax cannot simply be “made up.” Even my identifications of weak (thematic) echoes are 
not merely subjective or arbitrary choices. To illustrate, identification of a thematic echo 
requires that it thematically correspond to the verbal features of the formula. It also 
requires the repetition of a complex and determinate pattern or situation in the literary- 
theological context of the echo. For example, the context of each of the echoes treated in 
this thesis is marked by the following three-fold situation: a group of people has sinned, 
divine judgment has either been threatened or exercised in response to that sin, and the 
l o r d ’s merciful character or action is understood as lessening or governing that
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judgment. The echoes treated in this thesis are therefore discerned by means of objective 
criteria.
Further, there are fewer potential pitfalls in working with a broader definition of 
intertextuality than working with a strict one. Definitions that restrict cases of 
intertextuality to those that can be shown to be intentional are extremely difficult to 
employ. They face the difficulty of discerning a biblical author’s intention, a task which is 
complicated by the editing and redaction evident in many biblical texts as well as the 
process of canonization.Furthermore, an “intention-oriented” definition risks missing a 
number of connections between texts that are highly theologically significant, but not likely 
intentional."®
(2) Although I do not wish to restrict my understanding of intertextual relationships 
to intentional ones, I do want to restrict it to relationships between texts that involve the 
priority of one text over another."’ To be more specific, I understand this priority as 
temporal, but only in the sense of the canonical books’ order (and their narrative world), 
rather than in historical terms that require making judgments on dating, authorship, and 
intentionality. Again, I am interested in tracing relationships between a text that occurs 
earlier in the canon (the formula) and other texts that occur later in the canon (the echoes). 
Therefore, my use of intertextuality stands in contrast to those definitions of intertextuality
Childs states that “basic to the canonical process is that those responsible for the actual editing of the text 
did their best to obscure their own identity” (Childs 1979: 78). This is just one factor that makes it difficult to 
speak of a specifically discernable authorial or editorial intention behind a certain echo— at least if that means 
anything other than the meaning of the text in its literary and canonical context.
"® It is difficult to give a general definition of intertextuality that can sort out valid from invalid claims. Thus, 
any claims of intertextuality need to be sorted out on a case-by-case basis, according to the specific 
interpretative aims of a scholar,
"’ Fishbane 1985, Sharbert 1957, Trible 1978, and Krasovec 1999 all recognise the priority of Ex 34:6-7 and 
the dependency or derivative character of later texts.
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that refer to intertextual relationships across biblical texts regardless of priority."® Even 
more obviously, the intertextuality in this thesis is different from the highly generalized and 
untraceable relations of intertextuality that postmodern literary theory ascribes to all human 
texts and language.
(3) My view of intertextuality is also related to the question of the coherence of 
biblical texts with one another. In the pre-modem world, intertextual relationships between 
parallel texts were often used to confirm and demonstrate the internal theological coherence 
of Scripture. Yet, in recent critical and post-critical retrieval of concern for biblical 
intertextuality, many scholars emphasise the internal diversity of Scripture."® Accordingly, 
those drawing attention to intertextuality often focus on how later biblical texts expand, 
transform, or contradict the meaning of earlier texts."'
However, some scholars have emphasized the coherence of intertextual texts. 
Various synchronic modes of interpretation (including canonical approaches and some 
versions of literary and rhetorical criticism) have emphasized that the final form of the text 
shows evidence of a kind of interconnectivity between texts that stresses theological
For example, see Dozemann’s treatment of how two texts interpret each other (Dozemann 1989).
Soulen and Soulen point to two main kinds of intertextuality in their Handbook o f  Biblical Criticism: “As 
employed in contemporary literary theory and biblical studies, the term intertextuality ranges in reference 
from a general (and essentially untraceable) characteristic of all language to specific (and traceable) 
phenomena of language use” (2001: 87; cf. 88). The formula and echo relationships I refer to in this study are 
examples of the second kind of intertextuality, a specific and traceable phenomena.
'®® Postmodern literary theory also has a related emphasis on the indeterminacy of the meaning of biblical 
texts, which renders claims of coherence problematic. The diverse contexts of various texts, and the diversity 
of the interpreters coming from diverse literary-social contexts “provide the text with an inexhaustible number 
of potential and therefore indefinite meanings” (Soulen and Soulen 2001: 87).
'®' See Brueggemann 1997, Trible 1978, and, to some extent, Fishbane 1985. Among recent scholars of 
biblical intertextuality (especially Fishbane 1985), there has been a moderate stress on theological coherence.
I believe this stress has often not been taken far enough or has been too hastily limited. Thus, Fishbane often 
believes that biblical writers were open to interpreting earlier biblical texts rather freely and without concern 
in being consistent with the literal sense of the base text. In particular, he sees an intertextual incoherence 
between Ex 34:6-7 and Nah 1:3 which I treat as intertextually coherent (e.g., 1985: 528ff, 536).
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coherence. The intertextual phenomena that I study in this thesis tend to confirm the 
appropriateness of this emphasis. In this thesis I will show that the intertextual 
relationships between Exodus 34:6-7 and three of its echoes (i.e. a relationship between a 
text and its intentional or unintentional reuses or parallels) are marked by intertextual 
theological coherence (one of three forms of coherence discussed above). At least in this 
case, intertextuality within the Old Testament canon leads to a consistent or coherent 
theological witness about God’s mercy and judgment, although I do not assume that this is 
always the case in respect to other texts and other theological issues.
What does this imply about my method of interpreting intertextual phenomena? I 
will employ pre-modem methods of interpretation only in a highly qualified way, giving far 
more attention to context. Yet, with pre-modem scholarship, I will retrieve something of 
the value of linking texts theologically with a view to their coherence. As such, my use of 
the forms of intertextuality mentioned within my theological exegesis can be understood as 
a “canonical” version of the classical Protestant hermeneutical mle that “Scripture 
interprets Scripture,” especially when this mle is formulated in terms of letting the clearer
Towner’s 1982 article on Rabbinic methods of interpretation stresses how the ancient Rabbis assumed that 
Scripture was completely consistent with itself (112). See also Rendtorff 1993: 22ff, on how such Rabbinic 
modes of interpretation may, with qualification, be fruitfully appropriated today.
In greater continuity with my view of the formula-echo relationship is the work of Krasovec, noted 
earlier. While he recognises change and diversity in the “reuse” (or, in his words, “exegesis”) of earlier texts 
he says: “It is striking that the basic theological maxims did not change with the transmutation of traditions” 
(1999: 3). Later, KraSovec refers specifically to the formula of Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes or repetitions: “It is 
obvious that the formula reflects a traditional belief about the essence of the divine character, and this is a 
central tenant of faith within the Old and New Testaments” (544; cf. 599).
For example, I do not follow the early Rabbinic practice of inter-relating any texts that share the same 
word. Noticing the presence of the same word or words in different texts may be a helpful starting point for 
the consideration of whether they possess a significant intertextual theological relationship. However, other 
factors of correspondence would need to be uncovered before such a relationship is asserted.
56
passages interpret the less clear passages.* "^* I call this a “canonical version” of this rule 
because I believe that the very process of canonization tended to eliminate theologically 
incompatible texts. Instead of an indefinite range of diversity or indeterminacy, there was a 
recognized and circumscribed range of theological meaning that was considered 
appropriate for canonicity (whether by religious leaders, editors, or redactors).
Accordingly, the reader’s job is not only to detect the diversity of texts implicit through 
contextual interpretation but to detect the coherence imbedded in the canonical text—even 
in relationships between texts found in diverse books or contexts. Again, the location of 
intertextual coherence of meaning is not first in the reader’s mind, which is secondarily 
imposed on the text. Rather, the intertextual coherence of meaning is latent in the 
canonical text, and it is then discerned by the careful reader. The canonical approach I 
advocate, then, attends to the unity and coherence of intertextual relationships in the text, 
yet without ignoring the diversity of these texts or possibility that meaning may emerge, 
expand, or change as one text draws on another."® The understanding that some biblical 
intertextual relationships are marked by such coherence or continuity in meaning is
Traditionally, the mutually-interpreting passages were drawn from the entire Christian canon. I am not 
opposed to this in principle, but in this thesis I will restrict myself to intertextuality occurring within the canon 
of the Old Testament.
"® Although I wish to emphasize the dependence of later texts on earlier canonical texts, I recognize that in 
the canon the intertextual relationship is not strictly linear, with the earlier informing the later texts. There is a 
sense in which the meaning of the earlier texts are informed or enriched by later texts. Hays makes this point 
forcefully. He defines intertextuality as “the imbedding of fragments of an earlier text within a later one” in 
which later texts “depend on and transform the earlier” text (1989: 14). Hays goes on to make comments 
about Paul that would not apply directly to the writers of the echo-texts treated in this thesis, however: “Paul 
reads with imaginative freedom,” wherein lies “the explosive revisionary possibilities” in “treating Scripture 
as a generative source for his own metaphorical poiesis” (1989: 45).
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confirmed by the work of other scholars who have developed categories to account for such 
instances."®
4.2.4. The Question of “Theological Contradiction” in the Bible
I have noted at several points above how the interpretative approach of this thesis 
will emphasize the theological coherence of the texts I will consider. This raises the 
question of how I will handle the apparent theological contradictions in the Old Testament. 
In respect to Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes I will consider, the main question is whether there is 
a contradiction between the divine mercy and judgment in these texts. The question is 
whether an emphasis on theological unity or coherence overlooks genuine contradictions in 
favour of an a priori understanding that the text must be coherent in all cases.
To begin to address this question, I will point to the several distinct senses in which 
scholars commonly speak of “contradictions” in the Old Testament. John Goldingay notes 
four kinds of contradiction: formal, contextual, substantial, and fundamental.*^^ He defines 
Si formal contradiction as a “difference at the level of words that is not a difference at the 
level of substance.”*^  ^ A contextual contradiction is “a difference reflecting the variety in 
circumstances which different statements address” but in which one cannot say what the 
two speakers would say if they were confronting similar circumstances.*^® A substantial 
contradiction “involves a true divergence in viewpoint on the part of speakers whose 
disagreement is neither merely verbal [i.e. formal] nor merely contextual.”*"*® Such
"® Besides Krasovec (1999), Fitzmeyer (1961) identifies four types of quotations, in one of which (literal or 
historical category) the quotation is made without change in meaning, and in another (eschatological) there is 
no change in meaning, but rather a change in function,
"’ Goldingay 1987: 15-25.
"® Goldingay 1987: 16. Goldingay gives the example of the biblical language of God changing his mind and 
not changing his mind.
Goldingay 1987: 19.
Goldingay 1987: 21.
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contradictions involve two speakers who perceive and assess the same situation differently. 
Finally, Si fundamental contradiction is a “disagreement which is a matter of substance and 
which indicates a basic disharmony” at the level of one’s ethical and religious 
worldview.*"**
The question is which of these contradictions occur in the formula and in between 
the formula and its echoes. Brueggemann (1997) appears to agree that the Old Testament 
consistently displays a Yahweh-centred worldview (in opposition to other rival 
worldviews) and, in that sense, may avoid fundamental contradiction. Brueggemann’s 
thesis of a disjunctive or contradictory rendering of Yahweh (based on his interpretation of 
Ex 34:6-7 and several of its echoes), however, implies that there are substantial 
contradictions at work between different “sides” of Yahweh. Phyllis Trible also appears to 
affirm that there are substantial contradictions between the formula and its various echoes. 
She comments that various hermeneutical moves are made in the echoes of the formula: 
“compression, displacement, additions, omissions, and irony.”*"*^ So far I agree with 
Trible. However, Trible goes on to assert: "’What [Ex 34:6-7] says on one occasion, it 
denies on another. Thus scripture in itself yields multiple interpretations of itself.”*"*^ 
Brueggemann would concur with Trible’s view and does in fact interpret the texts in 
question in a manner that would result in substantial contradictions.
In principle, I am not closed off to the possibility of contradictions occurring in the 
Bible; only actual exegesis can definitively determine what kind of contradictions are
Goldingay 1987: 24.
Trible 1978: 4. Trible does not treat the relevant passages in detail, as Brueggemann does.
143 Trible 1978: 4.
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there.*"*"* Yet, my “canonical” understanding of the Old Testament and its theological 
authority lead me to hold the assumption that there will be none of what Goldingay calls 
fundamental contradictions in the Old Testament. In other words, even where there are 
significant formal, contextual, or substantial contradictions, the biblical texts share a 
worldview centred on the L orD in opposition to other gods. This implies that any 
substantial contradictions in the Old Testament will not concern matters fundamental to 
this religious worldview. In my view, such fundamental matters would include aspects of 
the L orD’s character, including the basic elements of the relationship between the L orD’s 
mercy and judgment. Two completely different conceptions of the same L orD—say, an 
exclusively merciful God and an exclusively judging God—represent what appears to be a 
fundamental, and not only a substantial, contradiction.
My exegesis of Ex 34:6-7 and three of its echoes will suggest, while some formal 
and especially contextual “contradictions” are apparent in these passages, there are not any 
substantial or fundamental contradictions at work in them. I will not comment on whether 
this is true for other echoes of Ex 34:6-7 not treated in this thesis, but I will show that there 
are no substantial or fundamental contradictions in the echoes treated.
4.3. The Relationship of the Text to Its Referent and Its Interpreters
In this final subsection on method, I want to pick up two “loose ends” that have not 
yet been treated adequately. Instead of focusing on the text itself, I will now discuss two
Moberly (1983: 33) speaks of the possibility of intended theological paradox or contradiction in the Old 
Testament (an attempt to capture the rich mystery of God) as a possible explanation of apparent 
“contradiction.” This may be important for Ex 34:6f and other texts. See also Goldingay’s qualified 
affirmation of the appropriateness of looking for theological coherence in the Old Testament (1987: 25-28).
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aspects of the larger hermeneutical situation, namely, the interpreter (or reader) of the text, 
and the theological referent of the text.*"*®
4.3.1. The Relationship between Text and Its Interpreter, 
or the Role of Interpreter in Textual Interpretation
As already stated above, I join Brueggemann in rejecting the Enlightenment ideal of 
a neutral objectivity and detachment of the biblical interpreter. Some biases or 
interpretative perspectives, however, are more appropriate than others for the theological 
interpretation of the Old Testament. Along with Gowan, I believe that as a Christian 
interpreter a “hermeneutic of trust” is decidedly more appropriate than a “hermeneutic of 
suspicion” or scepticism.*"*® This conviction is supported by the observation that the Old 
Testament is written by people of faith and solicits the readers’ trust and allegiance to the 
God to whom it refers. The text therefore calls the reader to understand and evaluate 
Scripture from the perspective of faith. Truth is discerned, rather than created as a 
“readerly reality.”*"*^ The text also calls the interpreter to humbly submit herself to the truth 
of the text and to the God to which it refers.*"*^
For such reasons, theological interpretation taken up here is a “confessional” (rather 
than purely “descriptive”) approach.*"*® A confessional approach regards the church as the
I believe there are four main factors or aspects of the hermeneutical situation; the author/redactor, the text, 
the text’s referent, and the interpreter/reader. I will not give significant attention to the first o f these, mainly 
since I regard discussion of biblical author’s and redactors (and their intention) as often highly speculative and 
thus unfruitful for methodological consideration.
Gowan 1994: xiv.
On this point, I differ with Brueggemann. I also disagree with his tendency to reduce Scripture’s authority 
to human willingness to believe it to have such authority (1997: 206).
See the comments and example of Karl Barth on the interpretation and use of Scripture. Church 
Dogmatics 1/2: 715ff. Brueggemann considers Barth helpful in various respects but ultimately rejects him as 
falling into “fideism.”
Sailhamer writes: “According to the confessional approach, the task of Old Testament theology is to define 
the message o f Old Testament theology within the context o f one’s own personal faith” (1995: 169). This 
formulation of the confessional approach is correct to a point but is in danger of being rather subjective and
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primary interpretative community*®® (for the Jew it would appropriately be the 
synagogue*®*). Another hermeneutically significant, although secondary community— 
namely, the “academy” of biblical scholarship—also informs a confessional approach. 
Generally speaking, the claims of the church have priority over those of the academy— 
should the two come into conflict.*®  ^ The “confessional” element is qualified by the 
recognition that the canonical text and its normative theological witness have authority over 
the reader and her confessional communities. The text, not the interpreter or her 
communities, is canonical.*®^
In taking up such a confessional approach, I recognise that people of faith have 
often offered false or oppressive interpretations of the Bible throughout Christian history. 
This, however, does not mean that all confessional approaches are to be rejected. Rather, it 
indicates the need to come back to the canonical text on a continual basis and to resist and 
revise reductionistic or oppressive interpretations of it. It also indicates the need to pay 
attention to the genuine insights and methodological tools of other approaches (e.g. 
historical, liberationist, or literary). Thus a balance needs to be kept between the 
confessional and non-confessional elements of interpretation. Yet if a Christian is to do a
individualistic. It neglects reference to the confessional community to which the confessional interpreter 
belongs.
I belong to the broad Christian ecclesial tradition o f historic Protestantism, which is both evangelical and 
ecumenical. See Fackre (1993).
I agree with Gowan’s desire to treat Judaism (esp. Rabbinic Judaism) as a conversation partner who can 
lead the Christian to ever-new discoveries of the richness of the Old Testament (1994: xiff). Accordingly, I 
am sympathetic with Childs’ comments in the preface o f his new commentary on Isaiah, where he proposes a 
“fresh interpretative model that. . .  proves to be illuminating in rendering a rich and coherent interpretation of 
the text as sacred scripture of both church and synagogue^" (2001, xi; italics mine).
My approach stands in contrast to Brueggemann’s apparent desire to maintain an equal freedom from both 
ecclesial and academic claims (1997: 102-114,743f). To clarify, I leave open the possibility that ecclesial 
interpretative claims may be wrong and that an academic approach or claim may help to uncover the error of 
the church. Of course, often there is no obvious conflict between the ecclesial and academic.
Childs 1992: 7 Iff, where Childs critiques Brueggemann.
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Christian (rather than secular) biblical interpretation, the “faithful” canonical reading needs 
to take priority over the others
{
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4.3.2. The Relationship between the Text and the Referent:
The Reality of God and God’s Acts
In keeping with the hermeneutic of trust I have articulated above, I hold to a 
positive ontological (or metaphysical) belief about the relationship between the text and the 
reality of God. That is, trust in God and God’s self-revelation most naturally leads one to 
believe that many biblical texts, including Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes, not only express 
Israel’s rhetoric or Israel’s beliefs about God, but also genuinely refer to God. Against 
Brueggemann’s anti-realist rhetorical reductionism (see 3.2 above), the text makes real 
ontological claims about the text-independent reality of God. In espousing this realist 
ontological way of reading the Old Testament, I side with Childs and virtually all other 
interpreters before the advent of post-modemity. This view includes the notion that 
biblical texts are genuinely descriptive of the being, character, and acts of the L orD." ’ This 
relationship between the text and the reality of God calls for a textually-based method of
It seems that few if any scholars are genuinely “pluralistic” in the sense that their method equally 
emphasizes several approaches. Gillingham (1998) strives to be genuinely pluralistic in theory, but ends up 
prioritising the historical over the literary and theological. Brueggemann strives to be pluralistic, but reduces 
it to a dualistic reading that prioritises a socio-political and deconstructive approach over against the other 
options (see Levenson 2000 and my comments above).
Gottwald notes that it is virtually impossible for Brueggemann, or anyone else, to completely avoid making 
“ontological claims” and that such an avoidance would run contrary to the Old Testament’s own “proto­
ontology” (Gottwald 1998: 14ff, 19ff).
Brueggemann specifically faults Childs for referring to ‘“the reality of God’ behind the text itself’ (65).
But the language of the Old Testament itself confirms that the Israelites really believed that the L ord  existed 
independently of their rhetoric and that there was a realist relationship between their rhetoric (or their texts) 
and God’s self. Thus, aspects of Israel’s God-talk, such as the formula in Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes, are 
forever a resistance to the anti-realist, rhetorical approach o f Brueggemann. (I thank Christopher Seitz for his 
unpublished comments about these matters.)
"’ In saying that these texts are “genuinely descriptive” of God, I do not mean to imply that they are 
(necessarily) “literally descriptive.” I am sympathetic to the traditional understanding of God-talk as 
“analogy,” a middle way between “univocal” and “equivocal” language. This allows biblical language about 
God to still be meaningful and “reality depicting,” but with a due reverence for the unique mystery of God.
As noted in section 3.1 above, this view is comparable to that of Karl Barth, which Hunsinger (1987) calls 
“hermeneutical realism.”
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theological exegesis aimed at drawing out what the text says about God.
It is therefore my conviction that Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes constitute a reliable and 
coherent “ontological” affirmation about what God is like. This does not mean, however, 
that the text’s affirmations are to be taken in a literal manner, as one might take similar 
affirmations about human beings. The theological reason for this is that, according to the 
Old Testament, God is “holy” and thus “other” than humanity. The interpreter must be 
careful not to read human, sinful characteristics into divine characteristics. Yet one also 
finds implicit in the text a witness to a counterbalancing theme: God discloses himself to 
humanity in ways that humans can understand. This means that an interpreter can 
understand something of what God is like, although her understanding will always be 
incomplete and provisional. This is especially true where the terminologies of the attribute- 
formula are also used for humans in the Old Testament. An interpreter cannot read the text 
with an a priori conception of mercy, anger, forgiveness, punishment, judgment, or 
vengeance, and expect to grasp the nature of the God to which the text refers."® As far as 
the interpreter is concerned, the meaning of divine attributes must be derived from the 
text."^
I wish to close this chapter with a comment that clarifies the way in which the issue 
of “ontology” will bear on my argument in the remainder of the thesis. It will not impinge 
directly on my main argument about the meaning of the formula in Ex 34:6-7 and its 
echoes, an argument that could stand whether one took these texts simply as Israel’s non- 
ontological rhetoric or testimony about God (as Brueggemann does) or as Israel’s
"® This is, I fear, what Brueggemann and many others have done—in effect imaging God in terms more 
appropriate to imaging fallen humanity. Indeed, Brueggemann’s own programmatic emphasis on imagination 
gives him freedom and licence to do just that, and to neglect the textual and contextual clues that would point 
towards the uniqueness of the divine character and the relationship of mercy and judgment within that context.
The great emphasis I give to literary context (including proper genre-recognition, discernment of structure 
and so on) is encouraged by the belief that the text genuinely refers to God and mediates (or constitutes)
God’s self-revelation. Context can be understood as part of the (divinely) ordered arrangement of the text so 
as to emphasize and illuminate the message and meaning of a text.
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ontological testimony to the reality of God (as I do). Although I disagree with 
Brueggemann’s purely “rhetorical” way of understanding these texts, I will engage with 
him on exegetical grounds—specifically how one should interpret what Israel says about 
God’s acts and character in the biblical text, independent of the question of whether this 
talk of Israel actually refers to a God who is as Israel says he is. That said, in my own 
theological interpretation of these texts I will assume the legitimacy and superiority of such 
a realistic ontological way of understanding the force of the text. Therefore, I will treat the 
text straightforwardly as making real claims about a real God.
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C h apter  2:
Exodus 34:6-7
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 ^And he passed before Moses, proclaiming,
“The L ord, the L ord,^  a God compassionate and gracious, 
slow to anger, abounding in steadfast covenant love and faithfulness,  ^
 ^keeping steadfast covenant love to thousands of generations,^ 
forgiving iniquity, rebellion and sin.
Yet, not altogether clearing the guilty,'^
he visits the iniquity of the fathers upon the children
and the children’s children, to the third or fourth generations.”
The first “Lord” may be taken as the subject of the verb L X X  (and Num 14:18) has only one
“Lord” (Kupioç). Walker (1960: 277) suggests that YHWH is an Egyptian verbal form meaning I AM, 
proposing the translation “I am I AM” or “I am YAHWEH.” For Margaliot (1994: 49 ), “they are not a noun 
clause ( ‘The Lord is the L ord’),” nor an idem per idem. They are not “vocative, Moses calling the name of 
the Lord” or the L ord proclaiming his own name. Margaliot is also unwilling to amend the text after the 
LXX or Num 14; 18 “which read only one divine name.” Margaliot’s suggestion is to keep the two 
consecutive divine names and give the interpretation that they “indicate that there exists no division within 
his divinity”; “The God who is compassionate and gracious etc. is the same God who does not remit 
punishment.”
 ^LXX has adjectives TToXuéA,eoç Kal aA,rj9iy6g “merciful and truthful” for IDHand nOK. Gowan (1994: 
236) says there are places where the terms are “better translated as grace or mercy or kindness or loyalty,” but 
he does not supply the references.
 ^ “Generations” is added in view of the explicit “thousands of generations” in Deut 7:9. “Generations” also 
added after “third and fourth” for parallelism.
Literally, “acquitting not acquitting,” Additional textual and translational notes for Ex 34:6-7 are provided 
below in the exegetical section.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Overview of the Chapter and Its Argument
In this chapter, I will interpret Exodus 34:6-7, which, from a canonical perspective, 
is the “mother” text that is echoed in other parts of the Bible. I will interpret Ex 34:6-7 
theologically in its literary-theological context with the goal of understanding the following 
two main issues: (1) What can be said about the meaning of the divine attributes as found 
in Ex 34: 6-7 given the narrative context of Ex 32-34? (2) How do divine mercy and 
judgment relate to each other in this passage? As I answer these questions, I will engage 
with Walter Brueggemann.
In section I, I will first state the problem to be addressed. In section 2 ,1 will 
discuss the canonical, literary theological context of Ex 34:6-7. This will involve 
summarizing the relevant themes from the text’s canonical context (from Genesis 12-50 
and Exodus) and describing key aspects of its immediate narrative context in Ex 32-34.
I will highlight those elements that are especially important for my understanding of the 
divine attributes of Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes.
In section 3 ,1 will discuss several correspondences in Ex 33:12-34:5 that 
foreshadow and illuminate the meaning of the attributes of the L orD (Hiri’’) revealed in 
Ex 34:6-7. I will first examine the terminological correspondences within Ex 33:12-23 
along with the correspondences within and between the two self-revelations in Ex 33:19 
and 34:6-7. I will then show the theological significance of such correspondences. In the 
course of this section and the next, I will seek to correct the dichotomous conceptualisation 
of divine judgment and mercy or of divine sovereignty and freedom found in scholars like 
Brueggemann.
In section 4, by a phrase-by-phrase exegesis of Ex 34:6-7,1 will analyse the 
meaning of each attribute and its function in the narrative context of 32-34. Finally, in 
section 5 ,1 will conclude by summarizing the key points of this chapter.
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1.2. Problem Stated: Brueggemann on Exodus 34:6-7
Brueggemann starts with the assertion that Ex 34:6-7 is an accumulation of “Israel’s 
preferred adjectives for Yahweh” (215) (even though they are in fact a combination of 
adjectival and verbal forms). Brueggemann states that this is a generalisation or 
“normative statement” of God’s character “that depends on and gathers together the claims 
of the verbal recitals that are much more concrete” (216). This assertion about the eclectic 
and dependent nature of Ex 34:6-7 would appear to give Brueggemann a warrant to import 
the perceived meaning of certain terms (from other passages) to influence either positively 
or negatively the interpretation of the terms in a given text. The end result of this is that 
Brueggemann fails to allow the narrative context (32-34) of Ex 34:6-7 to significantly or 
primarily bear on its interpretation. I will now give a critical summary of his interpretation 
of Ex 34:6-7 and the echoes in question.
Brueggemann claims Ex 34:6-7 is a juxtaposition of two contradictory witnesses to 
God’s dual character, the positive merciful side (34:6-7a) and the negative judging side 
(7b). The positive side has to do with “Yahweh’s will to be related to Israel in faithful, 
generous, and reliable ways” (269f). The negative side is about a “God who will act 
abrasively to maintain sovereignty against any who challenge or disregard that 
sovereignty” (270). Brueggemann interprets one side at a time in isolation from the other. 
Thus, right from the outset, Brueggemann presupposes bipolarity or dualism in the text and 
of divine character and is not interested in exploring the possibility of a harmonious 
relationship between the so-called “two sides” of the formula.
Brueggemann posits what Goldingay might call “substantial contradiction”  ^
between the “two sides” of the formula. Thus, Brueggemann comments that the first half 
(34:6-7a) of the formula speaks of
Yahweh’s intense solidarity with and commitment to those to whom
Yahweh is bound. The generalizing adjectives assert, on the basis o f verbal
Goldingay 1987: 21.
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sentences o f testimony such as Psalm 136, that Yahweh’s life with Israel is 
marked by a fundamental, inalienable loyalty (217; italics mine).
The “second half of the formulation bears witness to something potentially wild, unruly, 
and dangerous in Yahweh’s life” (271). Especially in light of the echo in Nah 1:3, 
Brueggemann sees divine judgment as potentially being “undisciplined and well beyond 
the enactment of sanctions” (271). Here Brueggemann supports his view that there is a 
substantial contradiction within Ex 34:6-7 by drawing attention to other biblical passages 
that emphasize one or the other of the “two sides” of Yahweh. Brueggemann reads 34:6-7a 
in light of Ps 136 to support the “positive side” of Yahweh; he reads 34:7b in light of Nah 1 
to support the extremely “negative side” of Yahweh. Having done that, Brueggemann 
draws the conclusion that:
[7b] alerts Israel to the reality that Yahweh’s full character is not subsumed 
under Yahweh’s commitment to Israel in solidarity. There is something in 
Yahweh’s sovereign rule—Yahweh’s own self-seriousness—that is not 
compromised or conceded, even in the practice of solidarity (218).
That sovereignty is not subsumed under solidarity means that sovereignty and 
solidarity are “in profound tension with each other, and... finally they contradict each 
other” (227). “These two inclinations of Yahweh are not fully harmonized here [Ex 34:6- 
7], and perhaps never are anywhere in the Old Testament” (227).^ He then goes on to say, 
“if we take these statements as serious theological disclosures, then the tension or 
contradiction here voiced is present in the very life and character of Yahweh” {221) J
The reason for divine self-contradiction is to be found in conflicting interests that 
God has, for himself and for Israel, or put differently, self-interest and other-interest. Thus, 
Brueggemann says:
 ^Brueggemann elsewhere (1997: 270) makes an apparently contradictory claim: “On most occasions, the 
sovereign power and the gracious solidarity of Yahweh go nicely together. But when they do not, we arrive 
at Israel’s most acute awareness of Yahweh and Israel’s oddest theological testimony.” In either case, what is 
emphasized is divine sovereignty.
 ^While Brueggemann claims to steer clear away from ontological language, this sounds like an ontological 
statement and not merely a description of Israel’s rhetoric (see Chapter 1, subsections 3.1 and 4.3).
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The tension or contradiction is that Yahweh is for Israel (or more generally 
"for us," pro nobis) in fidelity, and at the same time Yahweh is intensely and 
fiercely for Yahweh's own self (227).
The never resolved inner conflict of Yahweh naturally means “there is a profound, 
unresolved ambiguity in Yahweh's life” (271).
As a consequence, in any moment of Yahweh's life with Israel, Yahweh has 
available more than one alternative response to Israel, and Israel is never 
fully, finally certain of Yahweh's inclination toward it (227).
Brueggemann says:
This means that Israel’s relationship with Yahweh is one of heavily freighted 
possibility, Yahweh may act in any circumstance in gracious fidelity, and 
often does. And Yahweh may act in any circumstance in ferocious 
sovereignty, and sometimes does, sometimes on behalf of Israel and sometimes 
against Israel. The affirmation of Yahweh’s sovereignty is endlessly unsettling 
and problematic (271; italics mine).
In Brueggemann, Yahweh’s sovereignty is equated with judgment and punishment 
(34:7b), and solidarity is equated with grace, love, forgiveness, and patience (34:6-7a). 
Punishment is construed as an act of God’s uncompromising sovereignty, arising out of 
excessive divine self-regard. Such punishment, it is thought, sometimes goes beyond the 
bounds of justice by expressing itself as uncontrolled vengeance. Forgiveness, by contrast, 
is an act of God’s solidarity with God’s people, arising out of God’s faithfulness and 
mercy. As such, forgiveness sometimes is understood as the complete removal of human 
responsibility before God that ignores the demands of God’s righteousness or justice.
Thus, Brueggemann insists that God’s mercy and judgment exist in extreme tension 
and are never satisfactorily harmonized (227). When they are resolved, it is in God’s 
righteousness. This seems to imply that God’s mercy and judgment are often expressed in 
unrighteousness, since Brueggemann claims that God’s mercy and judgment are never fully 
harmonized. Thus Brueggemann posits a view of God’s judgment that at times has nothing 
to do with God’s mercy as in Num 14 or Nah 1. At such a time, God is completely and 
solely consumed by what Brueggemann calls “Yahweh’s own self-seriousness” (218).
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Conversely, Yahweh is sometimes completely forgiving, failing to hold people accountable 
or to motivate them to live justly. In Ex 34, Yahweh is completely forgiving, and the threat 
of v.7b is not mobilised at all in that context. The psalms provide other examples in which 
the positive side of Yahweh’s character is celebrated or mobilised while the negative side is 
virtually ignored. In this way, Brueggemann claims the two contradictory “options are 
worked out in extremis in Israel’s narrative life” (225). Yahweh’s act (whether of mercy or 
judgment) can be arbitrary, unjust and undisciplined.
Certainly the formula itself already raises the question of how mercy and judgment 
relate to each other, and whether they are compatible. In Ex 34:6-7a, the mercy of God is 
abundantly emphasized. Then in v.7b there is a clear statement about the vengeance of 
God. It says, God will “not acquit the guilty altogether” but will “avenge the sins of the 
fathers.” On the face of it, there does seem to be a tension between two parts of the 
formula. However, it appears that Brueggemann’s effort to be sensitive to the diversity of 
the Old Testament’s view of God has led him to overstate this diversity and its 
implications. This is true in his treatment of Ex 34:6f and its echoes. Accordingly, he 
tends to overlook the biblical text’s own witness to the compatibility and integration of the 
various aspects of divine character. This is what I hope to show when I examine Ex 34:6-7 
closely in its context in 32-34, to which now I turn.
2. Canonical, Literary Theological Context of Exodus 34:6-7
2.1. Canonical Context of Genesis and Exodus
Childs has proposed the literary unity of the Pentateuch based on the canonical 
shaping and function of the Pentateuch.* In particular, Childs notes that there is a close tie
* Childs (1979: 128-135) adopts and summarizes Sanders’ point (19720): “the formation of a Pentateuch 
established the parameters o f Israel’s understanding of its faith as Torah. For the biblical editors the first five 
books constituted the grounds of Israel’s life under God and provided a critical norm of how the Mosaic 
tradition was to be understood by the covenant people. The fundamental theological understanding of God’s 
redemptive work through law and grace, promise and fulfilment, election and obedience was once for all 
established.” Childs also draws attention to Rendtorff s view (1977) that “The final form of the Pentateuch,
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between the book of Genesis (especially chapters 12-50) and the book of Exodus. As 
Childs states, the promise to the patriarchs is presented “in such a way as to point to the 
future.”  ^ Indeed, Exodus begins with the affirmation that the L orD has indeed fulfilled his 
promise of innumerable descendents (Ex 1:7, 9) and with the anticipation of the fulfilment 
of the promise of deliverance from the land of slavery and entry into the promised land 
(Gen 15:13-16; Ex 3:6-9). Thus, Genesis in its final form functions “as the introduction to 
the story of Israel which begins in Exodus.”*®
A canonical approach to Ex 34:6-7, then, takes seriously the patriarchal narratives 
of Genesis as a proper literary and theological context for the interpretation of Ex 34:6-7. 
This is so especially since Ex 32-34, the immediate context of Ex 34:6-7, repeatedly refers 
to the promise to the Patriarchs concerning the multiplication of descendants and the 
possession of a land (Ex 32:13, 34; 33:1-3; 34:11).
A canonical approach to Ex 34:6-7 also takes seriously the passage’s context 
provided by the book of Exodus. (1) The narratives of Israel’s oppression in and 
deliverance from Egypt function to give the exodus community a profound and indelible 
experience of the unique nature and power of the God of their ancestors (1:8-15:21). This 
is a God who is faithful and powerful to keep his promises. This is a God who has a 
supreme power over creation. This is a God who is above all gods (the gods of Egypt and 
of Pharaoh the god-king) and who will judge all gods and their worshippers. This is a God 
whose judgment has saving purposes. This is a God who desires worship not only from 
Abraham’s descendants, but also from all the earth from generations to generations. This is 
truly a unique God. To turn away from such a God would indeed be a fatal mistake.
which cannot be simply derived from the combination of literary sources, gives evidence of a canonical 
reading of the whole in its final state of editing. The various parts were more closely united by means of 
cross-references, either to the promises of the past or to an anticipation of the future.”
 ^Childs (1979: 130) points out, “the promise o f posterity and a land” is “the continuing thread which ties 
together the material.”
Childs 1979: 130. Indeed, “Genesis closes with the death of the last patriarch” (Childs 1979:129) who had 
migrated to Egypt with the seventy of his family (Gen 46-50); Exodus begins with the reminder of the last 
patriarch’s migration to Egypt and the indication that his family has become exceedingly numerous (Ex 1:7).
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(2) The narratives of the journey in the wilderness demonstrate how the unique God 
of Israel will uniquely test Israel’s heart through hardships such as hunger and thirst 
(15:22-17:7). In view of the L orD’s demonstration of his power and character in Egypt, the 
Israelites are tested to see if they will trust the L orD when there is a great need. Later at 
Sinai, in Moses’ forty-day absence (24:18; 32:1), the Israelites are (in effect) tested to see if 
they will remain faithful to the L orD .
(3) The narrative of the making of the covenant at Mt Sinai provides an 
understanding of God’s nature that reveals God’s grace. As Childs rightly stresses, the 
making of the covenant is placed between the narratives of Israel’s rebellion in the 
wilderness (Ex 15-17) and at Mt Sinai (Ex 32). Such a placement gives emphasis to divine 
grace. That the covenant is made not with an ideal Israel but with a rebellious one is a 
witness to the L orD’s unmatched love.** It is within that context that God makes demands 
for Israel’s covenantal love.
(4) The narrative of the making of the covenant at Mt Sinai provides another 
important aspect of the theological background for a theological exegesis of Ex 34:6-7: the 
role of divine holiness in relation to Israel’s identity and mission. In Ex 19, a holy God 
elects Israel as a holy nation and gives Israel the mission of being a kingdom of priests to 
other nations. The structure of the Sinai material (Ex 19-40) shows that Israel’s identity 
and mission are intricately related to obedience to covenant law and proper worship of 
God. The covenant law is integrated into the making of the covenant and the building of 
the tabernacle immediately follows the making of the covenant.*^ Israel’s rebellion at 
Sinai, which is placed between the instruction for the tabernacle (Ex 25-31) and the 
building of the tabernacle (35-40), therefore needs to be understood in relation to God’s 
holiness and Israel’s identity and mission given by a holy God.
"See Childs 1979: 175-176.
The covenant law and the instructions on the tabernacle show that through obedient life and proper worship 
of God, Israel can maintain the holiness that is imperative for fulfilling its mission to the nations.
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Some of these themes will be further developed in the exegetical section.
2.2. A Brief Structural Analysis of Exodus 32:1-34:28
A. The fall of Israel (32:1-6)
B. The effects of the fall (32:7-33; 11)
1. The L orD’s initial response and Moses’ intercession (32:7-14)
a. Destruction of Israel threatened (32:7-10)
b. Moses’ intercession (32:11-13)
c. The L orD’s change of mind (32:14)
2. Moses’ descent fromMt Sinai and various punishments (32:15-29)
a. Moses’ breaking of the tablets (32:15-19)
b. The Israelites’ drinking of the water with the powdered image (32:20-21)
c. The Levites’ zeal and death of 3000 Israelites (32:22-29)
3. Moses’ ascent to Mt Sinai and his unsuccessful intercession (32:30-34)
4. A plague and the command to leave Sinai without the L orD (32:35-33:6)
5. Moses and the Lord in the tent outside the camp (33:7-11)
C. The resolution of the incident (33:12-34:28)
1. Moses’ third intercession and the L ord’s promises to reveal his name (33:12-23)
2. Moses’ ascent to Mt Sinai and the L ord’s revelation of divine attributes (34:1-7)
3. The final intercession of Moses and the renewal of the covenant (34:8-28)
2.3. Brief Overview of Exodus 32:1-34:28
The narrative context, in which the divine self-revelation in Ex 3 4 :6 -7  is found, is 
the story of the golden calf and its aftermath in Ex 3 2 -3 4 . Terence E. Fretheim 
appropriately calls the story of these chapters “the fall story of Israel.”*^  Crucial themes in 
this narrative are not only divine mercy and self-revelation, but also the sin of Israel. 
Therefore, the understanding of the nature and significance of God’s revelation of mercy 
can be obtained only against the backdrop of an understanding of the nature, significance, 
and gravity of Israel’s sin. Brueggemann rightly recognises that Israel’s idolatry is an 
“unparalleled affront to the L ord,” *"* but he fails to interpret divine judgment and 
punishment in light o/Israel’s flagrant sin. To understand how divine mercy and 
punishment are actually related in Ex 3 4 :6 -7 , the grave reality of Israel’s sin must be fully 
integrated into the discussion of Ex 3 4 :6 -7 . I will do so in the following discussions.
Fretheim 1991: 279. Moberly (1983: 79) says, ‘The making of the calf may be described as Israel’s first
sin.
Brueggemann 1997: 216.
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Exodus 34:6-7 occurs at a moment of crisis in the history of Israel’s relationship 
with God. As the narrative relates, Israel has just made and worshipped the golden calf 
(Ex 32).*  ^ What precedes this rebellion in Exodus accentuates the gravity of Israel’s sin, 
namely, the L orD’s demonstration of his supremacy in power in Egypt: the astounding 
provision in the wilderness and the profound experience of seeing and hearing God in 
theophany in Mt Sinai.*® The Decalogue given by the L orD on Sinai further underscores 
Israel’s wilful rebellion. Israel emphatically violated the first two commandments by 
making and worshipping an idol.*  ^ The Israelites eagerly returned to the idolatry they once 
knew in Egypt.**
Israel thereby rejected the L orD , the covenant with the L ord, and their calling and 
mission to be the L ord’s “treasured possession” and “a kingdom of priests, a holy nation” 
(19:5-6). There was now “a complete rupture of the covenant relationship.”*®
In the second and third commandments of the Decalogue, the L ord promised that 
judgment and punishment would fall upon idolaters and abusers of the divine name. 
Accordingly, God now intends to destroy Israel for breaking the covenant in such a manner 
(32:10). But instead of taking immediate action, the L ord discloses his plans to Moses in 
Ex 32:7ff, which is consistent with the L ord’s character displayed in his interaction with 
Abraham.^® The L ord discloses his intention to destroy the Israelites who are “corrupted” 
(n n ^ , V.7) and “stiff-necked” (^HDTl^Dp, v.9). As Donald E. Gowan points out, the word 
“corrupted” is the one used to describe the earth and all “flesh” before the judgment by the
For a discussion on the nature of the golden calf as an idol, what it might represent or symbolise, see the 
detailed discussion in Moberly (1983: 46-48). See also Gowan 1994: 219-225.
See Greenberg 1960: 273ff for his discussion on the purpose of the theophany on Mt Sinai.
Moberly 1983: 49; Gowan 1994: 221.
Clements 1972: 205.
Gowan 1994: 218. Moses’ breaking of the tablets powerfully symbolises Israel’s breaking of the covenant, 
which is renewed by God in Ex 34. Cf. Hyatt 1971: 307.
The L o r d ’s “consultation” with Moses is consistent with the L o r d ’s election of Abraham and his 
descendants to be the instrument of God’s blessing to all nations (Gen 12:2-3). The L or d  desires to be in 
partnership with Israel or its representative, such as Moses. The facts of divine election o f and covenant with 
Abraham and his descendants seem to account for why Abraham is treated differently than Noah who is not 
consulted prior to the flood.
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flood/* The Israelites are also described as “a stiff-necked people” v.9)
for they made conscious choice to rebel against the L orD. Then the L orD tells Moses, “Let 
me alone” 0 ^  n n ’’3n)^^ so that “my anger may bum” CBX"!!!'])) against them in v.lO. 
The L orD threatens to destroy the entire wicked nation and proposes to “start over” with 
one righteous man Moses.^* But in response to Moses’ intercession,^"* God “repents” 
(0113^ 1, v.I4)^® of his threat to bring a total destmction on Israel.^® But this does not mean 
the sinners go entirely unpunished. Divine mercy to his covenant people nonetheless 
assumes the appropriateness of divine anger and its controlled expression in divine 
punishment upon them.^  ^ Thus the L orD partially punishes the nation both directly and 
indirectly.^* The L orD punishes the people indirectly through the zeal and sword of the 
Levites who kill 3000 people (v.26-29).^® Moses attempts to make atonement 
(DDnX^n i r n  v.30) for Israel but fails (v.30-35).^® The L orD responds with a
postponement of punishment^* and further discipline of Israel with a plague (v.34f.).^^
Gowan 1994: 222.
Gowan (1994: 223) points out, “The word is a hifil imperative of the root nuah, which means to let 
something lie in a place, to leave behind, to let something remain, to allow something to happen, or, in five 
occurrences, all in the imperative, to let someone alone.” Milgrom (1990: xxxix) insightfully remarks, “by 
asking Moses not to intercede, God as much as admits that prophetic intercession is effective” (v.l5). 
Milgrom adds that God even “seems to be hinting to Moses . . .  that he should intercede if he wants to save 
Israel.” Fretheim 1991: 284, comments that the phrase “may well refer to the isolation desired to suffer 
grief.”
^  Gowan 1994: 221.
Fretheim (1991:285) points out that Moses’ intercession involves “an appeal to God’s reasonableness,”
“an appeal to God’s reputation,” and “a reminder of God’s own promise.”
Hyatt (1971: 307) points out that OH] nifal means, ‘“change one’s mind or purpose.’ Not infrequently in 
the OT Yahweh is said to repent. See especially 1er 18:5-11, where it is said that Yahweh may ‘repent’ either 
of intended evil or of intended good, in response to the action of the people. . .  to their needs and to their 
attitudes and actions.” Fretheim (1991: 286) makes an important distinction between repentance as “the 
reversal of a direction taken or a decision made,” which God does, and repentance from sin, which is never 
associated with God in the Old Testament.
Gowan (1994: 222) remarks that God “will change his plans as a result of human intervention, and more 
than that; he indicates that he has subjected himself to some extent to the will o f Moses.”
Fretheim (1991: 287) draws an important contrast between divine patience displayed in not letting his 
anger “burn hot” (v. 10-11) and Moses’ impatience displayed in letting his anger “burn hot” and shattering the 
tablets (v. 19). Human impatience further emphasizes divine patience.
Moberly (1983: 59) rightly points out, “given the divine-human balance in the narrative, there need be no 
problem in the fact of judgment administered through both divine and human agency.”
This is to bring order to an anarchic people who are “running wild,” as Fretheim puts it (1991: 288),
For a more detailed discussion on Moses’ attempt to make atonement, see below (4.5).
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But the problem of Israel’s sin is not yet resolved. The reason is that there is no 
appropriate means of atonement (*133) for Israel’s sin. The atoning sacrificial system 
would not encompass this kind of outright rebellion against and rejection of the LoRo/^ In 
addition, the L orD did not accept Moses’ attempt at atonement as the one righteous man in 
Israel. Therefore, the destruction of Israel remains a real possibility; indeed, it is very 
likely.^ "*
Perhaps to avoid the neeü to destroy them, the L orD announces that he will 
withdraw his presence from Israel (33:3)^^ and send an “angel” v.2) ahead of
Israel instead. But this option is not entirely satisfactory either to God or Moses. Thus, 
the L orD takes the temporary measure of visibly moving and staying outside the camp of 
Israel to reconsider Israel’s future. A tent is pitched outside the camp, serving as a meeting 
place.^^ There Moses talks with the L orD “face to face” D'’3S, v.11), and the
It seem, that 32:34 is a postponement of punishment in view of the statement the L o r d  makes in Num 14 
(see below).
Milgrom (1990: xxxix) makes a comment that aptly applies here: Moses “can only avert punishment; he 
cannot expunge the sin. Sin remains suspended over the heads of the sinners, capable of exacting retribution 
at a future date. Thus Moses’ intercession mitigates or postpones the punishment, but it does not abolish it.”
Israel is later instructed to build the tabernacle along with its furnishings and ark. These holy things were 
to serve as (1) meeting places between God and Israel (or a priestly representative of Israel), (2) visual 
symbols of God’s continuous guidance of Israel into the promised land, and (3) means and places of 
atonement for sin. None of these holy things had yet been built in Ex 32-34. See Moberly 1983: 62;
Childs 1974: 537.
Moberly 1983: 76.
The motivation behind this decision is to preserve Israel rather than to further punish them.
Sarna (1991: 211) calls it a “merciful preventive measure.” Fretheim (1991: 294) rightly states, “God does 
not want to be confronted with an occasion to exercise the divine wrath. This is a marvellous picture of 
divine reluctance!” Davies (1967: 238) however, takes the announcement of divine presence as a part of 
punishment mentioned in 32:34. Davies suggests translating HQ nWlKl o f 33:5 as “I may know
what I am to make for you,” and suggests that “what I am to make” refers to the ark that is to substitute for 
the accompanying presence of the L o r d .
In Ex 14:19; 23:20; 32:34, “my angel” is identified with the L o r d , or with the L o r d ’s accompanying 
presence. Fretheim (1991: 293) rejects a uni vocal understanding o f the divine presence and suggests a 
distinction between different types of divine presence. He says, “At the two ends of a continuum are God’s 
general presence in the world and God’s intensified presence in theophany. Along that continuum are God’s 
accompanying presence with the people and God’s tabernacling presence.” Against this view,
Davies (1967: 239) suggests that the L ord  will still travel with Israel but outside the camp instead of among 
the people to show the L o r d ’s displeasure.
The “tent” is best understood as a private one, since the tabernacle has not yet been constructed at this point 
in the narrative.
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two enjoy close communion with each other. In this context, the LoRo raises the issue of 
bringing Israel into the promised land (Ex 33:12). Moses presses the L orD to accompany 
Israel to the promised land and guarantee it by the revelation of God’s “way” ('^D‘1*n, 
v.l3b) ** and “glory” (7 |lb3 , v.l8). God responds favourably to these requests, promising 
to accompany Israel to the land (“My presence ’’33 will go with you”—v.I4) and to show 
all of divine “goodness” ('’3^3“b 3 , v.I9). The L orD subsequently gives Moses a powerful 
self-revelation of the L orD’s character in Ex 34:6-7.^® Following the L orD’s self-revelation 
of his goodness, Moses makes his final intercession for Israel. And as Childs says, “the 
God who now makes himself known... as the God of mercy and judgment makes good his 
claim by forgiving his sinful people.”"*® Thus, the L orD grants reconciliation and renewal 
of the covenant (v.lOff).
Indeed the L orD , who is a compassionate and gracious God, is the only one who in  
his freedom can and does reconcile Israel to himself. The L ord reinstates Israel as God’s 
“inheritance” (1311^ 1131, v.9),"** renews the covenant with Israel (v.lO, 27), and 
appropriately warns against further apostasy."*  ^ Hence, the theological problem raised by 
the narrative of how God can be present with a sinful people without destroying them finds 
its resolution in the L ord’s self-revelation of his divine character (33:19; 34:6-7)."*^
Note that the Hebrew is singular.
The view reflected here is that the L ord  is the one who calls on the name of the L ord  and proclaims the 
“attributes” in 34:6-7 as a fulfilment of 33:19. The L o r d  himself calls upon the Name of the L ord  as an act 
of self-disclosure. So also Hyatt 1971: 322; Childs 1974: 611.
'’“Childs 1974:612.
The request, “See that this nation is your people,” is especially significant. Asking God to see Israel as the 
L o r d ’s people is essentially a prayer for the L ord  to give an unparalleled manifestation of grace by forgiving 
Israel’s sin.
When the L ord makes the covenant, he reiterates some fundamental laws that are principally for Israel’s 
future life with the L o r d . They are chosen and stated in view of Israel’s recent corruption in the worship of 
the golden calf. Hyatt (1971: 323), stresses that the L o r d  made the covenant with Moses, and only indirectly 
with Israel, since there is “nothing of a ceremony in which the people accept the covenant and its terms, as 
one finds in 24:3,7.”
Raitt (1991:45) understands Ex 34:6-7 as God “explaining how he deals with sin as a way of explaining 
his identity.” God deals with sin in a way that is congruent with his character.
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In the narrative context leading up to Ex 34:6-7,1 have pointed out some evidence 
of the compatibility and integration of divine attributes and actions found in 
Ex 34:6-7. I have shown that God’s mercy is displayed in sparing Israel from well- 
deserved destruction. This mercy is shown to be compatible with divine judgment in that 
divine mercy (relenting from destroying Israel) did not rule out punishment (through the 
Levites and plague). Thus, God punished Israel. But divine punishment carried out in the 
context of mercy meant that God’s punishment did not depart from divine patience and 
mercy, but was controlled and delimited by such divine attributes.
3. The Correspondence in and between Exodus 33:13-23 and 34:6-7 
and Its Theological Significance
In addition to the larger narrative witness to the compatibility and integration of 
divine attributes and action, there is a linguistic or verbal witness, which I will examine in 
this section. First, I will identify some parallel terms within the narrative of Ex 33:12-23 
that correspond to the divine attributes in Ex 34:6-7. I will discuss the theological 
implication of the semantic correspondences identified. Secondly, I will turn to the 
intertextual parallelisms between Ex 33:19 and 34:5-7. I will show how the intertextual 
parallelisms between these two passages serve as a guide to a correct theological 
interpretation of all of the divine attributes and the relationship between God’s mercy and 
God’s judgment in Ex 34:6-7."*"* Lastly, I will discuss the nature of divine freedom revealed 
in Ex 33:19. This provides a potential corrective to Brueggemann’s interpretation of the 
nature of divine sovereignty and freedom as a departure from the just legal bounds in 
punishment.
See Margaliot 1994: 47.
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3 .1 . Terminological Correspondences between the L o r d , and the L o r d ’s Glory,
Goodness, Way, Back, and Attributes
In the passage of Ex 33:12-23, there are two terms “glory” and “goodness” 0 1 3 3  
and 31ÈÛ) that correspond to the divine attributes as a whole, as shown in the chart below 
These correspondences point to the idea that the divine attributes of 34:6-7 are unified and 
altogether good (313). Accordingly, the correspondences show that the divine ways 
(^nni) of dealing with sinners are unified and altogether good.
Chart 1: The Lord s^ Self-Revelation and Concealment in Ex 33:13-22 and 34:6-7
a. Moses requests to know the Lord
T o know  the L orD’s “way” (33:13)
To know  the L orD (33:13)
To see the L ord’s “glory” (33:18)
There is correspondence between the three requests. To know the L ord’s 
“way” is to know the Lord . T o know the L ord is to see his “glory.”
b. The L o r d  responds in self-revelation
“all my goodness” passes (33:19)
“m y glory” passes (33:22)
“I” pass (33:22)
‘The L ord” passes (34:6)
There is again correspondence between “L ord ,” “I,” “my glory,” and “all my 
goodness,” which are interchangeable.
c. The L o rd  is revealed
The Divine attributes are proclaimed and revealed in audible, comprehensible words 
(34:6-7).
34:6-7 corresponds to and expresses in know able term s the following: 
the LoRD=I=my glory=all m y goodness 
34:6-7 corresponds to the Lord’s “back” that M oses “sees” (33:23).
In the following discussion of the terminological correspondences, I will refer to the above 
chart (Chart 1).
3.1.1. The L o r d ’s  Way=The LoRD=The Divine Attributes of Exodus 34:6-7
In 3 3 :1 2 -1 7 , wholly unsatisfied with the L ord’s command to lead the Israelites to 
the promised land, Moses urges the L ord himself to lead his people (3 3 :1 2 -1 7 ). But there 
are some lingering questions that need to be resolved before the L ord  leads his people who
Another significant noun in this passage that relates to the L o r d ’s self-revelation is “presence” (D‘*3S), 
which is widely recognised and therefore need not be treated here.
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have corrupted themselves. How will the L ord continue to be with corrupt Israel without 
being constantly provoked to destroy it? How will the L ord deal with human sin and bring 
reconciliation? In the context of Israel’s heinous sin, broken covenant, and Moses’ failed 
attempt at making atonement for Israel, only the L ord himself seems to hold the answer to 
these questions. But Moses does not know yet how the L ord will reconcile this corrupt and 
rebellious people to himself.
Moses therefore asks to know the “way” of the L ord (33:13). He asks,
“Let me know your way that I may understand you” NO "'DDlin).
Moses is probably asking for a means of knowing by experience (DH^) what the L ord is 
like in his character and acts."*^  This interpretation is self-evident, since Moses’ stated 
reason for wanting to know the L ord’s “way” is to know or understand who the L ord is
33:13). Moses will know the L ord  through none other than the revelation of what 
the L ord is like. If so, the “way” of the L ord corresponds to the L ord himself and to the 
attributes of the L ord in 34:6-7 (it also corresponds to the L ord’s “glory,” but for this point 
see the following subsection—see “a” of Chart I above). Divine attributes are distinctive 
divine patterns of action, which reveal what God is like. By knowing the divine attributes, 
Moses will know the L o rd’s “way.”
This interpretation finds further support in the L ord’s initial responses to Moses. 
The L ord’s responses jump ahead to what the L ord  will do as a result o/the accomplished 
reconciliation based on the revealed “way” of the L ord . Thus, the L ord  assures Moses in 
various ways that the L ord himself (“my presence,” ’’3£l, 33:14) will go with Moses and 
lead Israel (33:17).
The Hebrew is singular, as in 32:8, “They have quickly turned from the way (^ 11) that I commanded 
them.”
See Holladay 1988. In reference to the “way” (^ 11) mentioned in 32:8, Moberly (1983:49) rightly states, 
“The word derek in the OT characteristically refers to Yahweh’s commandments and the proclamation of his 
will which prescribes the way of life for his people.” It is in that sense the term is used in 32:8, but in 
33:13, the term is best understood as referring to the L o r d ’s character, from which comes his 
commandments that reflect his character.
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3.1.2. All My Goodness= My Glory=I=LoRD
After securing the L ord’s intention to accompany Israel to the land promised (and, 
by implication, to reconcile Israel to himself), Moses presses the L ord  with his desire to see 
the L ord’s “glory”: “Show me your glory” (*T|*in:p-n« X] 3 3 :1 8 ) . The hifil
imperative "'DX’i n  can be rendered “make me experience.”"** If so, together with the hifil 
17T in V.13, the hifil HXl points to Moses’ strong desire to experience and understand the 
L ord’s “glory.”
The question is what the exact referent of the “glory” (1133) is in the text. It 
seems the “glory” (1133) or “goodness” (313) refers to the L ord himself. This point is 
supported by the fact that “my glory” (3 3 :2 2 ), “all my goodness” (3 3 :1 9 ) , “I” (33:22),"*® 
and “the L ord” (34:5,6)®® are used interchangeably.®* The text says variously that “my 
glory,” “all my goodness,” “I,” or “the L ord” passes by Moses (see “b” of Chart 1 above). 
If so, in asking to see or experience (31^, 3 3 :1 3 ; 1X1, 3 3 :1 8 ) the L o rd’s “glory,” Moses is 
asking for the experience of the deepest and fullest revelation of the L ord.®^  It could be 
Moses’ way of requesting a guaranteeing sign,®® “a sign that God himself will truly dwell 
among them without judgment.”®"*
As the narrative shows, the L ord honours Moses’ request. Thus the L ord says, “all 
my goodness” C’313"^3, 3 3 :1 9 ) or “my glory” C’1 3 3 , 3 3 :2 2 )  will pass before Moses, and
Holladay 1988.
“I,” the subject of the verb
The “L o r d” that parallels “glory” and “goodness” refers both to the name (the Tetragrammaton) that is 
declared and to the L ord  who declares that name.
1 Sam 15:29 identifies the L o r d  with the glory; “And also the glory of Israel will not lie or repent; for he is 
not mortal, that he should repent.” Also, see Ps 106:20; Jer 2:11; Hos 4:7.
“Glory” may refer both to “God’s essential reality” that can be intellectually perceived and to “something 
visible and . . .  the supernatural effulgence that registers the intensity of God’s immanence” (Sama 1991: 
214). Thus, the L o r d ’s glory can be captured and communicated in words as in Ex 34:6-7 and at the same 
time can appear like “fire” (24:15-18). Against this view, Boyd (1960: 178) equates “goodness” with the 
“back” that is seen and “glory” with the “face” that cannot be seen.
As such, it would be similar to how Abraham asked for a sign and the L ord  solemnised the covenant with a 
covenant rite in Gen 17; see Hamilton (1990: 429) and Sarna (1989: 114). Burns (1983: 172) correctly says 
that the request for the “glory” is a “plea for assurance.”
‘^’Fretheim 1991:299.
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“my compassion and grace” will be revealed to him (33:19). But of the 
LoRo/goodness/glory that will be revealed to Moses, only the “back” (’’’inX ) will be 
shown, while the “face” (D*’3S) will be hidden (33:20). Though not in the deepest and 
fullest measure, the L ord will reveal himself to Moses as much as a mortal can experience 
and understand.®®
If my analysis thus far is right, then one can identify the referent of the 
anthropomorphic term “back” of the L ord (“my back,” "'inX, 33:20ff) that Moses is 
allowed to “see” (HXl) or experience and understand. Moses is told that of the 
glory/goodness/LoRD that passes by, he can “see” its “back.”®® What Moses “sees” of the 
glory/goodness/LoRD that passes by him is the divine name, the L ord, and his attributes that 
are proclaimed in 34:6-7.®*^  Thus, the “back” ("'HnX) of the Lord is the revealed character 
and way of the L ord.®* It is “a statement about what kind o f God this f / ’®® that is 
proclaimed and made understandable to a mortal. Accordingly, “my glory” and “all my 
goodness” can be understood as the summary terms for the L ord’s revealed attributes in 
34:6-7.®®
3.1.3. Theological Implications of the Correspondences:
All of the Divine Attributes as Manifestations of Glory and Goodness
The discussions above have theological implications. The terms glory and 
goodness refer to intrinsic, inalienable characteristics of the Lord, which are inseparable
Moberly (1983: 68) says the L ord  will give Moses “a deeper and fuller revelation of the character of 
Yahweh as a God whose very nature it is to be gracious and merciful.”
^  He is told that he cannot see the “face” (□‘’3S), for the “palm” (^3) will cover Moses.
As Sarna (1991: 214) rightly states, the intention to proclaim the name, the L o r d , parallels the L o r d ’s 
intention to reveal “all [his] goodness.” These intentions are fulfilled in 34:6-7. Thus, Sarna recognises a 
parallelism between “all my goodness,” the Tetragrammaton, and 34:6-7.
Since the “palm” (*]3) is what covers Moses, its referent is most likely the cloud that came down with the 
L o r d  and covers both Moses and the L ord  (cf. Ex 16:10). The “face” (D'’3S) of the L o r d  then can be 
interpreted as the aspects o f glory/goodness/LoRD that cannot be revealed or comprehended by mortals. 
Therefore, both what is hidden (the “face”) and what is revealed (the “back”) simultaneously refer to the 
glory/goodness/the L ord  that passes by Moses. For a temporal interpretation of these terms see 
Boyd 1960,179ff.
Fretheim 1991: 299.
^  Just as the divine name represents divine being and character (Ex 3:15; 34:6-7), so do the divine “glory” 
and “goodness.”
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from the L o r d . The L o r d ’s glory and goodness necessarily refer to th e  L ord  h im s e l f  m d  to 
the way the L o r d  is  and a c t s  as delineated in general terms in 34:6-7. Put differently, the 
L o r d ’s identity (who the L o r d  is), character (what the L o rd  is like), or pattern of action 
(how the L o r d  typically acts) revealed in 34:6-7 is the L o r d ’s glory and goodness.
The significant point is that glory or goodness refers to the whole revelation of God 
in 34:6-7 rather than to a particular part of it. The L ord’s glory is shown in all of the 
divine attributes; the attributes as a whole show the L ord’s glory. The L ord’ s goodness is 
likewise explicated in all of his divine attributes. Put differently, every attribute contained 
in 34:6-7 (whether of mercy or of retribution) is one of divine goodness.®* There are not 
two sides, one good and one bad, or one positive and one negative. If this is correct, then 
the whole self-revelation of the L ord in Ex 34:6-7 can be seen as a unified, integrated, 
coherent revelation of the L ord’s glory and goodness. Ex 34:6-7 does not represent a self­
contradictory, polarized statement about divine character. All divine attributes or all 
aspects o f God's way in Ex 34:6-7 are all strongly positive, all o f divine glory and 
altogether good!
The presence of these terminological correspondences and its significance alone do 
not exclude the possibility that Ex 34:6-7 presents a self-conflicting dualistic view of God. 
But it does say that the literary structures and features of the narrative running from 33:12 
to 34:7 ought to place the burden of proof on those (like Brueggemann) who would affirm 
such a position.
3.2. Correspondences between Exodus 33:19a, 33:19c, and 34:6-7
Apart from the terminological correspondences considered above, there are other 
semantic or terminological correspondences within and between Ex 33:19 and 34:6-7. This
Moberly (1983: 77) states, “The fact that at the supremely critical moment in Israel’s existence it is 
Yahweh’s ‘goodness’ rather than judgment which is brought to the fore is o f great theological importance.” 
My point is that the divine judgment is revealed here as part of divine “goodness.” But I agree with 
Moberly’s statement (1983: 87) that, “the point is not that the people experience either wrath or mercy, but 
that both wrath and mercy are in the character of God though it is his mercy which is ultimately predominant 
in his dealings with his people.”
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is so because Ex 33:19 is a kind of announcement or “preview” of the coming self­
revelation in 34:6-7. I will explain in detail the correspondences between the two passages. 
Then I will draw out some theological implications of such correspondences. In my 
discussion, I will refer to Chart 2 below.
Chart 2; Progressive Unfolding of the LORD’S Self-Revelation in Ex 33:19 & 34;6-7
a h  c
33:19a 33:19c 34:6-7
“all my goodness” = “I will be gracious to whom = A compassionate and
I will be gracious, and I will gracious God; slow to anger,
be compassionate on whom great in love and faithfulness,
I will be compassionate.” maintaining love, forgiving,
holding accountable and 
visiting sin.
b discloses a c fully discloses
both a and b
3.2.1. Correspondences between Exodus 33:19 and 34:6-7
(1) In 33:19, the essential meaning of “all my goodness” in 33:19a is
disclosed in the declaration in v.l9c (b discloses a): “I will be gracious to whom I will be 
gracious, and I will be compassionate on whom I will be compassionate”
( O n n x  i n x  n o x - n x  The essential content of aZZ God’s\  . . . . . .  . .  - ,  «' • • * . . .  I Y V “ * %* * ** Î
goodness is the L ord’s free will to show compassion and grace to whomsoever God 
chooses. Put differently, divine goodness is divine compassion and grace shown in divine 
freedom,^^ the meaning of which I will examine below.
Sarna (1991: 214) offers a literal translation, “1 will grant the grace that 1 will grant and show the 
compassion that 1 will show.” See Lundbom 1978: 193ff for his discussion that the L o r d  here is using the 
idem per idem to terminate the debate with Moses and to dispense his grace (see also Hyatt 1971: 317; 
Freedman 1960: 154). Margaliot (1994: 47) rightly raises a strong objection: “This is definitely not an idem 
per idem construction although it so appears to most commentators. In this context, such a meaning does not 
make sense. It is theologically as well as logically tautological.” Margaliot then suggests that “the correct 
translation, already found in the LXX and Vulgata,” makes “excellent sense, explaining the application of the 
divine attributes ‘gracious’ and ‘compassionate.’”
Sarna (1991: 214) recognises that 33:19c is a statement of divine attribute shown in divine freedom: “The 
exercise of God’s attributes is an act of pure volition on His part.” See also Gowan 1994: 234. Gowan sees 
33:19 also as a statement that emphasizes the surety of divine mercy.
8 6
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(2) What is promised in 33:19a and 33:19c is fulfilled in 34:6-7.®"* This means c  
(Chart 2) fully discloses both a  and b . It implies that a  (“all my goodness”) can be seen as 
a c o m p re h e n s iv e  te rm  for both b  (to be compassionate and gracious in freedom) and c (all 
of divine attributes).®® Likewise, b  can be seen as the n u tsh e ll e x p r e s s io n  of c, the fuller 
attributes in 34:6-7. Thus, the different aspects of God’s revealed nature in 34:6-7 can be 
seen as explicating not only divine goodness (33:19a), but also divine compassion and 
grace shown in freedom (or divine freedom to be compassionate and merciful; 33:I9c).®® 
This implies a mutually interpretative relationship between 33:19a, 33:19c, and 34:6-7, to 
which now I turn.
3.2.2. Theological Significance of the Correspondences
The strong parallel between the terms describing the L ord and the two divine self­
declarations in Ex 33:19 and 34:6-7 imply mutually interpretative relationships between all 
these ways of describing the Lord. Such a relationship serves as a guide to a correct 
theological interpretation of divine attributes and the relationship between God’s mercy 
and judgment in 34:6-7.®  ^ These literary correspondences yield two crucial insights for an 
understanding of the unified function of the attributes in 34:6-7.
(1) If 34:6-7 explains and is parallel to 33:19c, then it implies that a l l  the attributes 
of 34:6-7 should be interpreted as fully explicating or expressing the different aspects of 
th e  L o r d ’s  g r a c e  a n d  c o m p a s s io n  sh o w n  in freed o m .^ ^  One specific correspondence in 
vocabulary between the two passages provides an important hermeneutical key in this 
regard. In 33:19c, God says, “I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and I will be
See Childs 1974: 612; Burns 1983: 172; Margaliot 1994: 46.
See Margaliot 1994: 46.
^  The expression “I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious,. . . ” does not permit prioritising divine 
freedom above divine grace and compassion or vice versa. Divine freedom and divine grace (or compassion) 
are expressed as inseparable qualities in which one necessarily entails the other. That is, one cannot talk 
about divine grace and compassion apart from divine freedom, nor can one talk about divine freedom apart 
from divine grace and compassion. If one does, they no longer refer to the divine character.
See Margaliot 1994:47.
See Margaliot 1994: 47.
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compassionate to whom I will be compassionate.” Accordingly, the placement of the 
phrase “a compassionate and gracious God” (]13ni DIHl b x ) at the head of the whole 
series of divine attributes in 34:6-7 inclines me to interpret the phrase as a heading or 
leading term for the series of attributes that follow it. If this interpretation is correct, then 
this implies that the series of divine attributes explains what it means that the L ord is “a 
compassionate and gracious God.”®® Put differently, divine attributes of compassion and 
grace characterize the series of divine attributes. If this analysis is correct, then the entire 
formula can be seen as a disclosure of divine mercy (which includes divine justice that is 
tempered by divine mercy).
(2) Far from standing between the contradictory, irreconcilable options of freedom 
and mercy (as Brueggemann would have it), the L ord is a God with the freedom to be 
gracious and compassionate. The attributes of 34:6-7 as a whole show what it means for 
the L ord to be in freedom to be gracious and compassionate. The series of attributes in 
34:6-7 confirms the nature and workings of a compassionate and gracious God to be in 
freedom and the nature and workings of divine freedom to be compassionate and gracious. 
Since 33:I9c stands in a parallel relationship to 34:6-7, even the divine self-descriptions 
relating to justice and punishment in 34:7 are to be understood as aspects of God’s grace 
and compassion shown in freedom,*^ * even as justice and punishment are revealed as part of 
divine goodness.
Spieckermann (2000: 310), however, sees 1011 as the leading term: ‘There is no doubt that 1011 is the 
leading term within the formula” and “the formula of grace in Exod 34:7 is to be understood as an 
interpretation just of this term.” This seems unlikely in view of the fact that Ex 33:19 appears to summarize 
the whole formula in terms of “grace” and “mercy.” I suggest the text presents 1011 as an aspect of divine 
mercy and grace, which is the reverse of what Spieckermann is suggesting.
R. Abba B. Mammel said that the Tetragrammaton “refers to the Attribute of Mercy, as it is said. The L o r d ,  
the L o r d  (Adonai, Adonai) God merciful and gracious (Ex 34, 6)” {Exodus Rabbah, Shemot, III 6, as cited by 
Gowan 1994: 246).
The revelation of divine IjpB in the context of the Decalogue does not undercut IjpS as part of God’s 
goodness. Even in the Decalogue, God’s I p S  reflects God’s merciful measure to limit the punishment to the 
maximum of three or four generations. The chief difference between the Decalogue and the “attribute 
formula” as the context for lj?S is that the “attribute formula” IjlS  now can be understood in relationship to 
all of divine goodness.
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3.3. On Divine Freedom as Freedom To Be Gracious and Compassionate
At this point, I will give more focused attention to the nature of God’s freedom or 
sovereignty in Ex 33:19 and its implications for understanding the attributes in Ex 34. This 
is important because scholars like Brueggemann have interpreted divine sovereignty and 
freedom in terms of divine prerogative to punish. In particular, Brueggemann places God’s 
vengeance and punishment on the side of God’s freedom, separated from God’s mercy. 
Brueggemann thus views God’s punishment (as expressed in 34:7b) as sometimes going 
beyond sanctions or rules. But this kind of opinion is unwarranted by the parallel self­
revelations in 33:19 and 34:5-7. It is not appropriate to speak of divine punishment as an 
expression of divine freedom to depart from divine obligation to be faithful to his covenant 
partner Israel as Brueggemann would have it. Here are some reasons why.
(1) As Thomas M. Raitt points out, “Punishment is the logical and self-evident 
course of action in a covenant which features Stipulations and Curses . Accord ing  to the 
stipulations and consequences delineated in Ex 20:5, the “logical and self-evident” and 
entirely just course of action would be a destruction of Israel. Even an utter destruction of 
Israel would be entirely just and within the sanctions delineated in Ex 20:5.
What is **not part of the Sinai Covenant structure’’ as Raitt points out is 
forgiveness.^® “It is never guaranteed. Nothing locks God into forgiving or not forgiving. 
God never forgives any way but as a free decision.” Thus, based on God’s sovereign 
freedom to be compassionate and merciful, God forgives and withdraws “the logical and 
self-evident course of action” of destroying Israel at the time of odious national offence.^®
Seen from this angle, divine punishment of sin and sinners is a legal obligation the 
L ord has, and divine forgiveness is a divine alleviation of the legal obligation. The L ord 
exercises his sovereign freedom to show compassion and mercy.
Raitt 1991:47.
”  Raitt 1991: 47.
’'’ Raitt 1991: 47.
Raitt (1991:47) remarks that “God is the God of the covenant and he is also the God above the covenant.
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(2) There is no evidence in Ex 32-34 that divine punishment is ever unlimited or 
unjust, which Brueggemann suggests on the basis of the echo in Nah 1. Only the contrary 
is evident in the narrative context of Ex 32-34 and in the revelation of divine character.
The expression of freedom is found precisely in God’s choosing n o t  to destroy Israel when 
that is the strict legal requirement of the covenant terms. Thus, the crucial new revelation 
in 33:19 and 34:6-7 is that where human sin demands destruction and the covenant contract 
requires strict justice, God, in his sovereign power and freedom, grants life instead. Now, 
th a t  is an act of sovereign freedom! God’s freedom is e m p h a tic a l ly  n o t a  f r e e d o m  to  
p u n is h  u n ju s tly , b u t a  f r e e d o m  to  f o r g iv e  a n d  g r a n t  l ife  in  lie u  o f  th e  d e s tr u c tio n  
n e c e s s i ta te d  b y  s in ? ^  Therefore, appealing to God’s sovereign freedom in this context 
leads me to virtually the opposite point that Brueggemann is trying to make.^^ J. Lundbom 
rightly says that God is at times abrupt and “irrational in the way he dispenses his grace. 
His judgments meanwhile are accompanied by reasons and they are valid reasons.” *^ He 
adds that since “his love and faithfulness...originate with him they need no rationale.” ®^ I 
would add to Lundbom’s comment that there is ultimately a rationale for divine mercy. It 
can be found in God’s own merciful character and his saving purpose for his creation.
(3) Divine freedom to withhold deserved destruction and to dispense grace does not 
exclude but include the divine righteous will to punish, discipline, and purify God’s people. 
Thus, 33:19 and 34:6-7 also reveal that divine punishment will be carried out n o t o n ly
By new revelation, I do not imply that God has now become more merciful than before, but simply that 
God has, more than ever before, revealed what he is like at all times.
”  The freedom of which Brueggemann speaks implies that God departs from justly established sanctions or 
rules. In a sense, God supersedes such rules in his exercise of mercy, especially in God’s forgiving or 
carrying (NÎD]) human sin, but this is never expressed in arbitrary or uncharitable judgments. The passages in 
view univocally assert that punishment is never carried out in the kind of harsh or uncontrolled divine 
freedom to which Brueggemann refers. Most of the time, because of God’s mercy, the established maximum 
limit o f God’s just, intergenerational punishment (of three or four generations) is not reached.
Lundbom 1978: 200-201.
Lundbom 1978: 200-201.
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within the contractual boundaries that are just*® but also in divine freedom to show 
compassion and mercy. Thus, in 32-34, God carries out limited punishment within divine 
compassion and grace. Divine justice is tempered by divine mercy because God has the 
freedom to do so. In the divine freedom spoken of in Ex 33:19 and Ex 32-34, there is no 
evidence of God’s freedom being associated with God engaging in unjust punishment, 
“undisciplined and well beyond the enactment of sanctions” (271). Thus, there is no basis 
for suggesting the L ord is not always compassionate and gracious.
(4) What is supremely revealed in the passages 33:19 and 34:6-7 is that the divine 
acts of power and freedom are found within the overall context of divine compassion and 
mercy. Thus, in 33:19 God declares, “I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and I 
will be compassionate to whom I will be compassionate.” It is overwhelming mercy and 
compassion rather than overwhelming and boundless vengeance that God bestows as he 
pleases.
In the expression, “I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious...” divine freedom 
and sovereignty are defined by divine grace and compassion. Divine freedom and 
sovereignty, and divine grace and compassion are expressed as inseparable qualities in 
which one necessarily assumes and means the other. That is, one cannot talk about divine 
grace and compassion apart from divine freedom and sovereignty, nor can one talk about 
divine freedom and sovereignty apart from divine grace and compassion. If one does, she 
is no longer talking about divine character.
(5) God’s sovereign freedom is always in solidarity with God’s people. It is not, as 
Brueggemann says, opposed to God’s faithful love for Israel. God’s sovereign freedom is 
what serves God’s faithful commitment to Israel. Both sovereignty and solidarity are 
completely for the L ord and completely for God’s people simultaneously (rather than
Divine punishment will always be within the contractual boundaries that are just. God still reserves the 
right to punish to the maximum extent if that is what serves God’s overall merciful purposes for his creation. 
See below for the “built-in” mercy even in the maximum extent delineated in the covenant structure.
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sovereignty for God-self and solidarity for Israel). This means all of the divine attributes 
are always harmonized in divine freedom to be compassionate and gracious. This is a point 
that is confirmed in the detailed exegesis of Ex 34:6-7, to which I now turn.
4. A Contextual, Theological Exegesis of Exodus 34:6-7; All of Divine 
Attributes as Expressions of Divine Compassion and Grace
4.1. ‘‘Compassionate and Gracious”
Before I turn to the issue of how all the different attributes listed in 34:6-7 can be 
said to be expressions and applications of Q in i “compassionate and gracious,” I
will turn to God’s attributes of compassion and graciousness themselves. The terms 
Q in n  and ]1 3 n , in these particular adjectival forms, are usually translated “compassionate” 
and “gracious” respectively, used exclusively of God,^  ^ and mostly occur in the echoes of 
Ex 34:6-7.^^ The fact that they are used only of God limits understanding of the precise 
meaning and nature of those terms. But the derivatives of the same roots show the basic 
range of meaning of the terms. I can safely assume, however, that the adjectives, which are 
used only of God, carry a special weight by comparison with their derivatives, which are 
used of human relationships.^^
The derivatives of ]n suggest “to show favour,” “to act graciously.” The latter 
meaning conveys the concept of unconditional choice as 33:19c expresses. P.J. Harland 
says, “The verb ]3n has the sense of the bestowal of a kindness which could not rightfully 
be claimed.” "^^ stands in “contrast to lO n , which must be practised by both parties.”®^
81 An exception is the possible application of these two terms to “righteous” humanity in Ps 112:4: “Unto the 
upright light arises in the darkness; he is gracious and compassionate and righteous.”
In the echoes of Ex 34:6-7: 2 Ch 30:9; Neh 9:17,31; Pss 78:38; 86:15; 103:8; 111:4; 145:8; Joel 2:13;
Jon 4:2. In other passages: Deut 4:31 ; Ps 112:4.
Gowan 1994: 236.
Harland 1996:50, taking from David Noel Freedman and Jack R. Lundbom.
Harland 1996: 50.
92
“in  is a free gift, usually from a person in a superior to one in an inferior position, which is 
given only so long as the giver desires, and it may be withdrawn at any time.”^^
The derivatives of DFtn convey “deep love” rooted in a “natural” relationship, such 
as mother and child, even as the word “compassionate” and the word “womb” share the 
same root D n “ l. The etymological tie with the word “womb” may have semantic 
implications for the word “compassionate” in relation to the Lord.^^ It is especially so 
since the nation Israel is referred to as the L ord’s “firstborn child” (Ex 4:22). By 
implication, the L ord is the parent of Israel who brings it into being and cares for it. The 
term O in i therefore suggests a “^Mper-natural” tie between God and Israel, a powerful tie 
that cannot be broken. Drawing from Phyllis Trible, Brueggemann says, “a God who is 
compassionate has a quality something like mother love.”^^  That said, God’s compassion 
is incomparably greater than the greatest compassion of a human mother. Lastly, if 
“gracious” expresses an unconditional gift, “compassionate” expresses complementary 
reality of the unconditional or irrevocable commitment of God, first to his “firstborn child” 
Israel and then to all of his creation. Harland rightly points out that only God is said to be 
“gracious and compassionate,” “and he never seeks it of humans.”^^
While some basic indications of the meanings of the terms “compassionate” and 
“gracious” are discerned from their derivatives, the rich specificity of their meaning can 
only emerge from consideration of how they function in a given context as in Ex 34:6-7 in 
its literary context 32-34. This is so especially because these terms are used only of God 
and mostly in the echoes of 34:6-7—that is, unique to particular divine self-disclosure and 
its reaffirmation and recounting by God’s people. As I have already suggested, the fuller
Harland 1996:50.
Gowan (1994:236), however, correctly warns against “resexualization” o f God in the image of woman 
based on the fact that “compassionate” and “womb” share the same root. He says, “a great deal has been 
made of that recently, as an indication of feminine qualities in God. I think it is more important to recognize 
that this form is a unique word that is used only of God, neither masculine nor feminine, if I hope to avoid 
resexualizing the God that Israel struggled so hard to desexualize.”
Brueggemann 1997: 216.
Harland 1996: 50, taking from Freedman and Lundbom.
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meaning of those terms can only be discerned and appreciated once the rest of the divine 
attributes (and indeed all the echoes of the formula) are more fully considered. Thus, I will 
consider how further aspects of God’s self-revelation function to express God’s 
compassion and grace. Treating the various phrases in the order they appear in the 
formula, I will start with “slow to anger.”
4.2. “Slow to Anger”
As is evident in the narrative, God’s grace and compassion shown toward his sinful 
people are expressed in divine patience, articulated in the idiom usually
translated as “slow to a n g e r . T h e  etymological association of 'TjlK to which
Brueggemann draws attention helps to clarify the function of this idiom. Brueggemann 
suggests that its literal (etymological) meaning of the construct form
is “long of nostrils,” conveying the idea that divine anger takes a long time 
before it is expressed.^^ As such, this idiom aptly expresses God’s “patience” and 
“longsuffering” with sinners.^^ Accordingly, I will typically use “patience” as a kind of 
shorthand for D*]SX ^ IX.  I will show that these provisional observations are confirmed 
in the manner in which God moderates and controls his anger in the larger context.
The narrative of Ex 32-33 testifies to divine patience. (1) The L ord does not act on 
a sudden surge of anger (as humans might do)—not when Israel is carrying out its plans to 
make an idol nor when Israel is fully indulging in its idol worshipping revelry (Ex 32). 
Instead, the L o rd’s first act is to confide in Moses his frustration, anger, and intention to 
destroy the idolatrous Israel. The narrative suggests the L ord could let his anger bum to 
the point of destroying the people, but he does not let it bum yet; he is only talking about it
^ The phrase D’)SR is an idiom occurring thirteen times in the Old Testament, nine of which are in 
Ex 34:6 and its echoes.
Brueggemann 1997: 216.
Rashi comments that IjlR in Ex 34:6-7 implies that “He defers his anger and does not hasten to 
punish—it may be that the sinner will repent.” Likewise, Calvin (1950 [Moses, vol. 3]: 386) comments, “He 
patiently waits for those who have sinned, and invites them to repentance by His long-suffering.” He adds, 
“should God’s clemency be perverted into a licence for sin, it is added ‘will by no means clear.’”
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(32:10). Divine patience assumes (a) God’s severe “burning anger” (*^2X 32:12)
against idolaters, and (b) God’s self-control that is greater than the anger itself and 
therefore controls it. Divine patience affords Moses the chance to intercede on behalf of 
Israel.
(2) Divine patience is displayed even in the manner God punishes Israel. Thus the 
L ord partially punishes the nation through the Levites who kill three thousand people by  
the sword. In addition, the L ord postpones much of his punishment, hinting at an eventual 
destruction of the sinners (perhaps fulfilled in Num 14ff—see Chapter 3): “Whoever sinned 
against me I will blot out of my book.... When the day comes for punishment, I will 
punish them for their sin” (32:34). But for now, the L ord afflicts the nation with a 
plague.^^ In all this, divine patience assures that the jealous God’s burning anger will not 
be sudden and will not be “out of control.” In other words, the statement that God is “slow 
to anger” entails that he does not suddenly act upon all-consuming wrath?^
(3) God is also patient in the way he reaches the final resolution for Israel’s sin. 
After bringing a limited measure of punishment, the L ord temporarily withholds his 
presence from Israel’s camp (33:7ff). During this time Moses and the L ord interact in an 
intimate friendship, which provides a firm foundation for Moses’ request for reconciliation
Hyatt (1971: 312) says, “literally, ‘And the L o r d  smote the people.’ Yahweh’s smiting usually means 
sending a plague (cf. 12:23,27; Jos. 24:5; Isa. 19:22).” The exact nature of the plague cannot be determined, 
but the plague has been linked to the “the drinking of the powdered image in water.” Hyatt 1971: 308, 312. 
Moberly (1983: 59) suggests that the plague is the immediate fulfilment of the previous verse, concluding the 
L o r d ’s “immediate response to Israel’s sin.” It may be that the plague is “the immediate” but partial 
fulfilment, and the future and more complete punishment is administered in Num 14. This is Rashi’s 
understanding; the verse speaks of a deferred punishment (Rashi on Ex 32:34). Numbers 14 states that Israel 
is punished for their present sin and for all their previous sins, which would include their sin in worshipping 
the golden calf. Thus, Gowan (1994:228) correctly observes that it is unlikely that Israel saw the plague of 
V.35 as the fulfilment of v.34. Hyatt (1971: 311) says, “The sentence may reflect the fall o f the northern 
kingdom of Israel in 721 B.C., which was interpreted as resulting from Israel’s sins, including the worship of 
the golden calves of Dan and Bethel erected by Jeroboam (2 Kg. 17:7-18, especially verse 6).” Exodus 
Rabbah says, “Had Israel waited for Moses and not perpetrated that act, there would have been no exile, 
neither would the Angel of Death have had any power over them” (XXXII: 1; cf. XLIII.2, as cited by Gowan 
1994:221).
Most definitely in the eschaton, as all the eschatological prophecies would indicate, all evil will be 
ultimately judged and eliminated from God’s kingdom.
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and the L ord’s affirmative response to Moses. In divine patience, the L ord allows his 
compassion and grace to work out a concrete and lasting solution for the problems of 
Israel’s sin and rebellion.
The L ord is patient with this “stiff-necked” people and even extends his great 
steadfast love and faithfulness to them. Thus, instead of “cutting o ff’ the nation of Israel, 
the L ord in patience either withholds the punishment, or limits the punishment, or 
postpones the punishment (Ex 32-33). As Nahum Sama has pointed out, “Divine 
forbearance does not mean that sinners can expect wholly to escape the consequences of 
their misdeeds.”^^  Rather it means that God will govern his righteous anger with patience, 
self-control, timeliness, and purposefulness. The L ord in his patience also brings out a 
lasting, life-affirming solution to the problem of sin.
4.3. “Great in Steadfast Love and Faithfulness”
Now I turn to the expression HttXI ID n 'U ll ,  “great in steadfast love and 
faithfulness.” In this subsection, (1) I will first consider the general meaning of the terms 
n o n  and nOX. (2) Then I will turn to Genesis 24 where this pair of terms first appears in 
the canon. (3) I will come back to the Exodus text and draw some conclusions about the 
greatness of lO n  and DOX,
Brueggemann rightly says, drawing from the studies of Nelson Glueck, Katherine 
Doob Sakenfeld, and Gordon Clark,^^ that the term 1011 is “related to tenacious fidelity in 
a relationship, readiness and resolve to continue to be loyal to those to whom one is 
bound.” The term 1011 is thus often translated as “steadfast love.” Jacob Milgrom 
stresses, “it refers to God’s fidelity to His commitments, that is, to His covenant. In fact, 
n o n  can actually be a synonym of berit, ‘covenant’ (e.g., Deut 7:9,12; 2 Sam. 7:15;
95 Sama 1991:216.
See Glueck 1968; Sakenfeld, 1985,1978; Clark 1993.
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1 Kings 3:6; Pss. 86:5; 89:25,50).”^^  Thus, I will use the translation “steadfast covenant 
love” or simply “covenant love.”
Of the term HQX, Brueggemann rightly says that it points to “complete 
trustworthiness and reliability, which then becomes the term t r u e / t r u t h . T h e  term flOX 
is thus translated into “faithfulness.”
The word-pair HOXI 1011 first appears without the qualifying 01  in Genesis 24 in 
the context of the L ord showing steadfast covenant love and faithfulness to Abraham by 
providing a wife for Isaac (Gen 24:12,14,27,49).^^ Such provision is made in order that the 
L o rd’s promises to Abraham—innumerable descendants, the gift of the land, and the 
blessing of the nations (12:Iff)—may continue to be fulfilled. In this way, the L o rd’s 
steadfast covenant love and faithfulness can be seen as intricately related to the L o rd’s 
covenant with Abraham.
That I p n  and flDX are closely related to God’s commitment to the Abrahamic 
covenant is not explicitly stated in the formula of Ex 34. But the narrative of 32-34 
assumes such a relationship. The issue of the L o rd’s faithfulness to the covenant that he 
swore to Abraham is mentioned twice in the narrative: once by Moses (32:13) and once by 
God (33:1).
The present generation of Israel broke the covenant with the Lord.^^® The crucial 
question is whether the L ord will confirm that rupture or heal that rupture by showing
^ Milgrom (1990: 396) adds, “Thus, if from the long list o f God’s attributes, Moses asks Him to operate 
according to His hesed, he is imploring God to continue to maintain His covenantai relationship with His 
people.”
Brueggemann (1997: 217) goes on to say, “The words hesed and emeth become a characteristic and much- 
used word pair in the Old Testament, together marking Yahweh as utterly reliable and trustworthy.”
In this narrative, Abraham’s steward Eliezer is sent on a mission to find a wife for Isaac. The steward 
repeatedly uses this special pair of terms in his prayers to the L ord  to show covenant love and faithfulness to 
Abraham by providing a wife for Isaac (Gen 24:12,14,27,49). Abraham’s steward rightly understood that the 
L o r d ’s provision of a wife for Isaac is inextricably related to the L o r d ’s fulfilment of his promise. The word 
pair also appears in Gen 32:11 and 47:29.
Some argue that the covenant broken here is the Mosaic covenant, based on the understanding that the 
Abrahamic covenant is unconditional and unbreakable. See Sarna’s comment on Gen 15:9-17 (1989: 114).
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incomparable steadfast love and faithfulness to this generation of Israel in view of its hate 
and disloyalty. Moses will argue for the latter.
In 32:13, faced with a brazen sin that calls for the destruction of Israel, Moses 
invokes God’s oath to the patriarchs concerning descendants and the land:
Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, your servants, to whom you swore by 
yourself, and you spoke to them, “I will multiply your descendants as the 
stars of the heavens, and all this land which I have spoken of, I will give to 
your descendants, and they will possess it forever.”
Moses also raises the issue of the L ord’s reputation among the nations (32:11-12), which is 
an indirect appeal to the L ord’s commitment to bless the nations through Abraham’s 
descendants. Moses’ logic seems to be this: if the L ord destroys Israel, not only the means 
of blessing the nations will be destroyed, but also the L ord’s name will be belittled and 
scorned among the nations. If so, the nations will not turn to the Lord and so will not be 
blessed through Israel’s witness. In sum, Moses’ intercession appeals to the L ord’s oath to 
Abraham in Gen 12:1-3, calling upon the L ord to continue to fulfil his promise. The 
L ord’s attribute H O X l 1 p n “3 1 ‘l with emphasis on 3 1  becomes all-important at this 
juncture.
The Lord is under no obligation to fulfil the Abrahamic covenant to the present 
descendants of Abraham who have deviated from the L ord’s way. The fulfilment of his 
promise to Abraham is contingent upon the continued faithfulness of Abraham’s 
descendants, the beneficiaries of the covenant (Gen 18:19). The L ord initiates the 
covenant, but the covenant relationship requires and is maintained by the faithfulness of 
each party. The L ord would still be faithful to his covenant sworn to Abraham even if he 
destroyed the present rebellious generation of Israel and started a new Israel with Moses 
(Abraham’s descendant).
With that in the background, I now turn to Ex 34:6, where DOXI 1 p n " 31 *| is 
proclaimed as part of the divine character. It is noticeable that in the phrase
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n p x i  lp n -3 1 1 , the term 31 (“great [in]”) is added to the word pair n»X1 1 0 1 . This 
adds emphasis and probably signals that IDX) 1 0 1  here is greater and stronger than 
nQXI io n  shown to Abraham. Indeed, the context shows that the term 31 indicates the 
incomparability of 10X1 1 0 1  shown to rebellious Israel from that shown to faithful and 
righteous Abraham because the L ord’s steadfast covenant love and faithfulness overcome 
the crisis of Israel’s rebellion against the L o rd . Since the Israelites failed to keep their side 
of the covenant, only an entirely free and unmerited work o f God* s grace and compassion 
is able to bring reconciliation between God and Israel and allow the covenant relationship 
to be maintained. God’s grace is the primary basis of God’s reconciliation. This implies 
that the merits of the patriarchs are secondary to God’s grace and subsumed under God’s 
grace that goes beyond the call of duty. The magnanimity of the L ord’s covenant love and 
faithfulness to the undeserving Israel is expressed in 13X1 10 n “311 (with the emphasis 
on 31). God’s 13X1 10n"311 is indeed an expression of God’s being entirely and freely 
gracious and compassionate. God chooses to maintain the covenant not only with a faithful 
covenant partner (such as Abraham) but also with a radically unfaithful covenant partner 
(such as Israel in Ex 32).
4.4. “Maintaining Steadfast Love (101) to Thousands”
Israel indeed receives incomparable generosity from the L ord, because he is great 
in steadfast covenant love and faithfulness. This is here confirmed by the phrase 
D '^S^Xy Ip n  1253 (“maintaining love to thousands” of Ex 34:7). The expressions 
13X1 1pn~311 and D*’D^X^ 1p1 1253 are closely related; the latter flows out of the 
former. Because the L ord is “great in steadfast covenant love and faithfulness” the L ord 
will “maintain love to thousands.” Keeping in mind the above discussion of the term 1p1  
in the expression 13X1 1p 1“311,1 will now examine the meaning and function of 
D*’3*pX*^  Ip n  1^3 in Ex 32-34. I begin by turning to Ex 20:5f where a similar phrase 
“showing steadfast love to thousands” appears.
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4.4.1. A Similar Expression in the Decalogue
A similar expression first appears at the end of the second commandment of the 
Decalogue (Ex 20:6): ’niSQ nob*?) ID Il H&Wl (“showing
steadfast covenant love to thousands of generations of those who love me and obey my 
commandments”) (1 0 3 -phrase henceforth). The Decalogue has 1 0 3  (literally “making’ 
or “carrying out”), instead of 1^3, and the qualifying clause ’’11253 *’13t2îbl *’31X ^.
One striking interpretative factor is that in the Decalogue the 103-phrase, along with the 
IpS-phrase,^®^ explains what the L orD is “the jealous God” (X 3p  ^ X ,  Ex 2 0 :5 ) means.
That God is “jealous” (X3p) means he demands absolute loyalty and faithfulness, 
even as the L ord is absolutely loyal and faithful to his people. The jealous God is one 
who hates those who hate him and loves those who love him. T h u s, th e  ‘f e a lo u s  G o d ” is  
o n e  w h o  b o th  “v is i ts  s i n ” to  th e  th ir d  a n d  f o u r th  g e n e r a t io n s  o f  th o s e  w h o  h a te  h im  a n d  
s h o w s  k in d n e ss  to  th o u sa n d s  o f  g e n e r a tio n s  o f  th o s e  w h o  lo v e  h im  (Ex 20:5-6). The term 
X3p “finds expression either in judgment or k indness ,depending  on the human 
response to divine covenant love and faithfulness. Divine X3p has to do with God’s 
supreme love for his people, and this X3p love expresses itself in constant, enduring, 
overwhelming k in d n e ss  and in restricted, momentary p u n is h m e n t.  In this subsection, I will 
focus on the kindness of the jealous God.
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Ex 20:5 reads: nl2R IpB .
Freedman (1960:155) rightly recognises that divine “zeal”(K3j?) “finds expression either in judgment or 
kindness (cf. Ex 20:5-60).” By contrast, Brueggemann interprets divine jealousy as a “savage propensity” to 
respond in “destructive fury” to anyone who offends “Yahweh’s prerogative, privilege, ascendancy, or 
sovereignty” (1997: 293-294). Such divine jealousy and rage can turn against Israel or against Israel’s 
enemies. In relation to Israel, then, Brueggemann sees divine jealousy as potentially both negative and 
positive, but it cannot be seen as compatible with kindness.
The term in this form occurs only five times in the Old Testament, all in the Pentateuch, and all used 
of God (Ex 20:5; 34:14. Deut 4:24; 5:9; 6:15). Freedman (1960: 155) points out that the term K3jp signifies 
“the exclusive relationship between Yahweh and Israel.” He also points out the fact that “it is parallel to 
‘love’ in Cant 8:6.” He suggests the translation “zeal, zealous,” because “jealousy” “is a misleading 
translation, especially when the term is used of God,” “because of its modem connotations.” J.M.P. Smith 
(1912: 288) comments that the L ord in those passages is “presented as the originator and guardian of the law 
of righteousness, who regards every violation of that law as an offence against himself which must be fitly 
punished.”
Freedman 1960: 155.
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In the context of the Decalogue, the recipient of the jealous L o rd’s kindness is 
identified as follows: ’’11^3 *’13t2jSl In this expression, the phrase
’’ni!S3 *’3 n x b  {“to those who love me and obey my commandments”) modifies
{“to thousands”). This lends itself to the interpretation that the L ord will show 
steadfast love to each of the thousands of generations that loves and obeys his 
commandments. If so, this means that the L ord’s covenant love shown (101  1031) is 
contingent upon human love and obedience. This interpretation of Ex 20:6 seems 
consistent with what the L ord says to Israel immediately before the giving of the law in 
Ex 19:5: “Now i/(DX 1131) you obey me fully and keep my covenant, you will be my 
treasured possession” (italics mine). The L ord will show covenant love (101  1031) if 
Israel obeys the L ord and keeps his covenant.
Sama gives another plausible interpretation in which divine acts of love 
(101 1031) are not contingent upon each generation’s obedience but determined by one 
faithful, meritorious generation. Thus Sama says, “The merit for the hesed that people 
perform endures beyond their own generation.” This interpretation of the divine 1 0 1  as 
collective, transgenerational, unchanging, and enduring in nature finds its support in the 
Abrahamic covenant of Genesis 22. Abraham “jealously” loved God (Gen 22). Thus, the 
L ord swears by himself that he will bless Abraham’s descendants and all nations through 
them, twice emphasizing the fact that the L ord will do this because Abraham obeyed the 
L ord and did not withhold his son (Gen 22:16,18). Because Abraham “jealously” loved 
God, the L ord will “jealously” love Abraham and his descendants.
The question is which of these two interpretations is correct. It seems that these 
interpretations do not present alternative, but rather complementary ways of understanding 
the expression in question. That is, it seems that the L o rd’s revealed intention is to fulfil
Sarna 1991: 216. This sort of interpretation may reflect a lack of appreciation for the unmerited aspect of |
God’s grace. At the least, it is unmerited grace when God “applies” the righteousness of an earlier generation J
to a later. God does not have to do that according to strict justice. j
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his enduring and unchanging 1DH to Abraham and to thousands of generations after him 
through their own obedient walk with God (Gen 18:19). Any particular generation that 
rebels against the Lord can forfeit the L ord’s 1 0 1 , but overall commitment to Abraham 
and his descendents would remain constant.
If this analysis of 1 0 1  1^31-phrase of 20:7 is correct, then what 1 0 1  1%3-phrase 
of 34:7 conveys is quite striking.
4.4.2. The Expression D’S*?»*? non  133 in Exodus 34:7A. V V
What happens to 1 0 1  1031-phrase of Ex 20:7 in 34:7 is as follows. First the 
qualifying clause “to those who love me and obey my commandments” is dropped here. 
This may point to the Lord’s freedom to be gracious and compassionate, which manifests 
itself in his steadfast love even to those who are faithless. God’s commitment to show 
covenantai love now extends not only to a faithful generation, but also to the present 
rebellious Israel. It seems that divine 1 0 1  is now being revealed as being independent of 
human merit. In addition, the focus is shifted from the specific divine acts of love 
(101  1031) to enduring maintenance of it (1 0 1  1^3). Such divine commitment and 
tenacity is captured in the term 1253 which replaces 1 0 3  of 20:7. Secondly, the 
1 0 1  1253-phrase is declared as part of the divine character.
The etymology of the root 1253 is illustrated in the Assyrian nasâru “watch over, 
protect” and Old Aramaic 1253 “protect.” The term 1^3 conveys the ideas of keep 
watching, guarding, protecting, and preserving with fidelity. In the context of 32-34, the 
term 1%3 may convey God’s incomparable resolution to continue to bestow his steadfast 
love to the Israelites to thousands of generations even if they prove unworthy of divine 
“acts of steadfast love” (Ex 20:6). In the attribute 13X1 1 0 1 “311, the L ord shows that 
the Lord brings reconciliation and renewal o f the covenant based on an entirely free and 
unmerited work of God’s grace and compassion. In the attribute D*’p ^ x b  1 0 1  1253, the
Brown, Driver, and Briggs 1979: 665.
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L ord  shows that the L ord  is the one who u n c o n d it io n a lly  m a in ta in s , p r e s e r v e s ,  a n d  
p r o te c t s  th e  c o v e n a n t  lo v e  to  th o u sa n d s  based on an entirely free and unmerited work of 
God’s grace and compassion. The L ord ’s 1 0 1  is indeed boundless—boundless in the 
sense that ultimately it does not depend on human love and obedience and boundless in the 
sense that it extends to innumerable generations.
This meaning of 1011 1253 needs not be contradicting or nullifying of
what is said of the L ord’s enduring, unchanging love to Abraham. This is so especially in 
light of the fact that the L ord’s covenant love for Abraham decisively changed the Lord’s 
mind from destroying Israel in Ex 32. What is changed here is this: Instead of showing 
(1031) steadfast covenant love 1 0 1  on the basis of human response in love and obedience 
to the L ord (Ex 20:7; cf. Gen 18:19), the Lord will now preserve and protect his enduring 
and unchanging 1 0 1  even to and through this rebellious generation, even for thousands of 
generations after them. What is shown here is the divine prerogative to confirm 1 0 1  to a 
rebellious generation and their descendants solely based on divine compassion and 
graciousness.
The question is: Wherein lies the compatibility of divine covenant love (101) and 
divine punishment (IpO ) in the formula of 34:6-7?^®  ^ The answer is not easy or 
straightforward. I will answer this question after my discussion of the I p 53-phrase below. 
But I can suggest here that within the Lord’s overall freedom to show compassion and 
grace to the whole of Israel, the Lord still reserves the right to judge and reward human 
actions according to human demerit or merit in relation to the covenant stipulations and 
sanctions.
4.5. “Bearing/Forgiving Iniquity, Rebellion, and Sin”
While the L ord’s work of grace and compassion is unmerited by the sinner, it is not 
without cost to the L ord himself. The L ord himself carries the burden of sin and
In the Decalogue, the unity and harmony between divine love and punishment may be found in the fact 
that they are both expressions of the divine attribute of “jealousy.”
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punishment. The phrase 1X311 3031 ]i3  X03 in Ex 34:7 expresses this idea. The 
expression in 34:7 is usually translated as “to forgive iniquity, rebellion, and sin.” ®^^ While 
this translation is appropriate for this context, it does not fully convey the proper 
significance of this theologically rich expression. As Jacob Milgrom rightly pointed outs, 
“to remove or forgive iniquity” is only the resultant meaning of the expression ]13 X03 
(and a similar point can be made with respect to 3 0 3  or 1X 31) rather than a more literal 
meaning of the expression. I will explain what I mean based on the etymological 
observations Jewish scholars such as Levine, Milgrom, and Sama, make on the expression. 
I begin with the following observations: (1) The terms for offences or sin ]13 (“iniquity”), 
3 0 3  (“rebellion”), and 1X 31 (“sin”) are also standard terms for guilt and punishment in 
the Old Testament. Indeed, iniquity, rebellion, or sin results in guilt and punishment.
(2) The term X03 variously means to “lift,” “carry,” or “bear.” Thus the expression 
*[13 X03 (and a similar point can be made with respect to 3 0 3  or 1X 31) used of God 
means “to lift, carry away iniquity” and punishment from sinners, or as Sama puts it, “to 
bear iniquity, that is, incur responsibility.” *^  ^ In other words, as Jacob Milgrom writes, the 
idiom means “‘literally carry (the consequences of) sin,’ that is, suffer punishment.” 
Milgrom further points out that this meaning is shared by “its Akkadian equivalent zabalu 
ama The resultant meaning of God carrying away iniquity from the sinner,
bearing sin, incurring responsibility, and suffering punishment is “to remove or forgive 
iniquity.”**^  Thus, the expression simultaneously shows that God forgives and how God 
forgives. That is, the L ord removes iniquity from the sinner or forgives iniquity by himself
The term used in this sense is also in Lev 10:17 (of priests); Num 14:18; Hos 14:3; Mic 7:18;
Pss 32:5; 85:3.' '
Guilt and/or punishment for Gen 4:13; Lev 5:1-17; 19:8; 20:17; Ezek 4:4; for Dan 8:12,13; 
9:24; Ps 59:4; Ezek 33:10; Is 24:20; for HKOn: Lev 19:17; 20:20; Deut 15:9; Ezek 23:49.
Levine 1993: 367.
Sarna 1991: 184.
Milgrom 1990: 115.
Levine 1993: 367.
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carrying the sin and incurring the penalty for that sin.**"* The L ord unburdens a sinner or a 
sinful nation of their “offences and of their consequent punishments” by himself bearing 
them.**  ^ As such, God’s forgiveness for Israel would come at a personal cost to God. In 
this way, the divine freedom to be merciful and compassionate to the rebellious (as in 
Ex 33:19) is exercised within the divine requirement for justice. With the foregoing 
discussion in mind, I will use as my working translation: “to bear/forgive iniquity, rebellion 
and sin.”
The question is: What does it mean that God bears or forgives human sin and its 
consequences in the context of Ex 32-34? The following three points can be observed:
(1) The content of divine forgiveness, in the context of 32-34, is in the affirmation 
of Israel’s ongoing existence and in the mitigation of punishment of Israel. God bears or 
carries the brunt of Israel’s sin and its consequences so that Israel might have a continued 
life with the L ord. The L ord bears the consequences of sin that Israel itself cannot bear 
without being utterly destroyed. Israel thus escapes destruction. Yet, this does not mean 
that the L ord entirely removes or eliminates the punishment due Israel. Rather, the L ord’s 
work in 1X3111 3031 "|i3 X03 mitigates the punishment.**^ Thus the L ord still holds 
the sinful people responsible for their sin, partially (though still severely) punishing them. 
In other words, Israel as a nation still bears some of its own sin, guilt, and punishment. 
Thus some Israelites were killed by the Levites at the L o rd’s command (32:27ff) and 
untold number of people became ill or died in the plague from the L ord (32:35).**  ^ This 
affirms that within the L ord’s bearing Israel’s sin and its consequences, the L ord has the 
freedom to mete out punishment as the L ord sees appropriate. It is the L ord’s way o f  
partially purging out from Israel sin and sinners alike for the L ord intends Israel to be holy.
Cf. Ashley 1993: 258.
115 Levine 1993: 367.
Thus the Lord’s atoning or reconciling work in nXBni may be spoken of in terms of
limited vicariousness, which also implies limited punishment of sinners.
Fretheim (1991: 290) points out that the L o r d ’s decision to punish some is “not a reversal of the divine 
action of 32:14, which simply entailed that the people would not be destroyed.”
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It is also the L o rd’s way of showing the ultimate destiny of those who hate God, which 
ought to serve as a strong warning that inspires true repentance on the part of the offenders.
(2) Another aspect of divine “forgiveness” or “sin-bearing” is the postponement of 
punishment. That God carries Israel’s sin and its consequences (thus only partially 
punishing Israel) holds the possibility of further and fuller punishment in the future. God 
bears human sin and defers punishment in his forbearance.*** This interpretation finds 
support in the dialogue between Moses and the L ord in Ex 32:31-34. The morning after 
God’s punishment through the Levites’ zeal, Moses sees that it has not atoned for Israel’s 
great sin,**^  and there is no sign of God’s forgiveness of sins. Moses therefore tries to 
make atonement for Israel’s sin himself: “Now I will go up to the L ord; perhaps I can make 
atonement for your sins” (031X311 1 3 0  1133X , 32:30). With such an intention, 
Moses goes back to the L ord and says, “If you will forgive their sin (31X 31 X01),*^® if 
not, blot me out of the book you have written” (32:32). Moses’ first proposal is that the 
L ord simply bears and suffers the wrong done by the Israelites and grant the atonement 
Moses is seeking. Moses’ second proposal, in case the first is refused, is that the L ord 
takes his life as atonement for Israel’s sin.*^ * The L ord responds by rejecting Moses’ offer 
of his life and threatening further punishment of those who have sinned. It appears that 
while the L ord is in some sense agreeing to bear Israel’s sin (31X 31 X 01) so that Israel 
has a continued life, the L ord will not completely remove or atone for Israel’s sin. Rather
Freedman 1986: 29-36.
The Levites’ zeal for the L o r d  and the L o r d ’s covenant of a priesthood of Levites parallel Phinehas’ zeal 
for the L ord  and the L o r d ’s covenant of a lasting priesthood of his descendants (Num 25). A contrasting 
element is that Phinehas’ voluntary act is recognised as having an atoning effect for Israel whereas the 
Levites’ act of obedience is not.
The expression DnXOIl K to  has the same meaning as the expression nXOIl... of 34:7. Hyatt (1971: 
311) points out, “the apodosis is missing in the Hebrew text; LXX, Samaritan text, and Targum of Jonathan 
have the imperative, ‘forgive!’ This is to be understood, even if it was not expressed.”
Noth 1962: 251. Also, Fretheim 1991: 290. Hyatt (1971: 311) too, draws attention to Num 11:15, where 
“in a similar situation, Moses says, ‘kill me at once.’” But Gowan (1994: 227) is of a different opinion. He 
says, “[I]t is more appropriate to understand him saying if Israel must die, he wants to die with them.” I 
suggest that since Moses’ stated reason for the ascent to Mt Sinai is to make atonement for Israel, what he 
says to the L ord  is best understood as a means to accomplish just that.
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the L ord will “pay it back” on Israel in the future: “When the time comes for me to punish, 
I will punish them for their sin” (32:34).'“  Thus, the L ord’s nXISni JJISS) "|i:y Xtoi is 
manifested in terms of mitigation and postponement of punishment rather than complete 
removal or atonement of sin. The temporary mitigation and deferment of the punishment 
inherently holds the possibility of future and further punishment when provoked by 
persistence in r e b e l l i o n . I t  appears, therefore, that the issue of the atonement for Israel’s 
apostasy of Ex 32 remains unresolved in Ex 32-34. Thus, this leads me to the next point.
(3) Lastly, an important expression of 1X311 3031 ]13 X0i is found in God 
literally carrying (the consequences of) sin and suffering punishment. While this basic 
meaning of the expression or image of God suffering punishment for human sin is not 
made explicit in the context of Ex 32-34, one could argue that it is latent in the expression. 
This is supported by the logical implications of the theological concepts found in Ex 32-34. 
That is, if God is not granting Israel (complete) atonement or removal of sin in Ex 32-34 
(and is granting only mitigation and postponement of punishment), then the L o rd ’s 
carrying Israel’s sin holds at least two potentials: (a) The L ord may fully “visit” Israel’s 
sin upon itself, which implies destruction of Israel; or, (b) The L ord will not fully “visit” 
Israel’s sin upon itself, which implies that some of the punishment will be suffered by God. 
The L ord’s covenant with Israel (in Abraham) precludes option a (as already demonstrated 
in Ex 32). Thus, we are left with option b, although what God’s suffering punishment 
means exactly is not clarified in the context of Ex 32-34.*^ "*
In sum, the phrase 1X311 3031 ]13 X03 in the context of Ex 32-34 has the 
explicit meaning of God carrying human sin and the accompanying consequences and of
Fretheim (1991: 290) says, “The divine response is not easy to fathom.” Yet what is clear is that the L o r d  
rejects Moses’ offer of his life as atonement. Even the most righteous of Israel cannot make atonement for 
Israel’s sin; it is not the L o r d ’s way (cf. 33:13 and discussion above).
Kselman 1992: 832.
One could say that Moses’ plea for atonement for Israel’s sin is answered by the divine revelation of 
nKtSni which finds its ultimate expression in the suffering of God and of the Suffering
Servant as found in several Isaianic passages. (See Chapter 4). See Fretheim (1984) for the theme of divine 
suffering in the Old Testament, including narrative’s like Exodus.
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God deferring to punish. It may also have the latent meaning of God suffering punishment 
to affect and grant atonement. It is important to recognise that any aspect of the L ord’s 
forgiveness is not a matter of overlooking the offense committed, but the L o r d ’s sovereign 
choice to suffer in varying ways the consequences of human sin so as to affirm human life.
4.6. Holding the Sinner Accountable and Punishing
I have said that divine punishment is part of divine goodness, that is, divine mercy 
and compassion shown in freedom. I will now explain this further by considering the last 
two phrases of the formula, which are specifically about divine judgment. In the context of 
32-34, the two phrases are often taken either as being contrary to divine mercy or else as 
being subsumed under divine mercy so as not to be emphasized at all. I will start with the 
interpretation of the meaning of the two phrases, and then turn to the issue of their 
compatibility to divine mercy.
4.6.1. Meanings of the Ip ]- and IpD-Phrases
An expression similar to I p y  I p ]  (now on HjpO-phrase) appears in the 
Decalogue, which is the expression I p y  X^ (“not clearing,” 20:7). The expression 
n p r  X^ appears in close proximity to the 1p3-phrase in the Decalogue (20:5):
"'XOb  ^ HlnX Î 3  Ip S .  These two expressionsy * * . . « • • • •  » y  — T P  “ i l * *
mutually interpret each other and function together as one thought, a thought having to do 
with God’s “jealousy” (X3p).*^  ^ That God “does not altogether clear the guilty”
(np3-phrase) means that “God will visit* the sins of the fathers upon the children to the 
third and fourth generations of those who hate him” (IpS-phrase) or vice versa (Ex 34:7b;
Fretheim (1991: 302) states, “[DJivine jealousy is missing from the formulation.” But, as I show here, the 
n^3- and IpB-phrases in 34:7 basically stand for the divine attribute “jealousy.”
JPS renders the phrase, “not completely acquitting” or “not remitting all punishment.” Childs (1974) 
renders the phrase, “he does not remit all punishment” which reflects the sense of forgiveness. Likewise, 
Fretheim (1991, 302) suggests that since the phrase occurs “in the context of forgiveness,” it means “but not 
neglecting just judgment.”
Tj?B has many usages: “number,” “reckon,” “visit,” “punish,” “appoint,” “miss,” etc. While it is 
translated into “visit,” in contexts of God’s dealing with sin, it is appropriate to render Ip B  “punish” (e.g.. 
Ex 32:34; Lev 18:25; Isa 26:21; Jer 25:12; 36:31; Hos 8:13; Am 3:14). Levine (1993: 366-367) suggests, 
“The idiompaqad *al connotes punishment. The basic sense of paqad is ‘to hand over, deliver, assign,’
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cf. 20:5).*^* These clauses together express the punitive side of the divine attribute 
“jealousy” (X3p) in both the Decalogue and in the formula of Ex 34:6-7.
The jealous God is one who hates idolatry (Ex 20:5 and 34:14), and his response to 
idolaters is “burning anger” (^ X  ] i i n ,  32:12). Thus in 34:14, the L ord warns, “Do not 
worship other gods, for the L ord, whose name is jealous, is a jealous God”
( X in  X3p ^ X  130 X3p n ir f ] ,  34:14).*^^ In other words, the jealous L ord will hold an 
idolater responsible and mete out severe punishment. God will not altogether clear the 
guilty but punish them. As Gowan aptly says, “God does not declare the guilty innocent or 
the innocent guilty, or say it really doesn’t matter.”*^®
Accordingly, God’s initial response to the idolatrous Israel of the golden calf is his 
readiness to unleash his “burning anger”C^ X *[111; 32:12)*^* which, when poured out, 
would utterly consume the object of his wrath (Ex 32:10).*^^ Thus, God tells Moses that he 
intends to destroy Israel for breaking his covenant. But Moses boldly intercedes for Israel, 
making an appeal to God’s own oath to the Patriarchs (Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob). As a 
consequence, God “repents” (DHPI, 32:14),*^^ turns from “burning anger,” and withholds
hence ‘to turn one’s thoughts, attention to’ another person or concern.. . .  It is not entirely clearly how paqad 
'al came to mean ‘punish.’ Either paqad ‘al means ‘to count against, hold accountable,’ or it means ‘to turn 
one’s attention to’—for the purpose of punishing.”
I have already noted that these companion phrases first appear in close proximity in the second and third 
commandments of the Decalogue respectively. There, these two phrases together promise the surety of the 
L o r d ’s righteous judgment and vengeance on idolaters and abusers of the divine name. To some extent, the 
mutual explication between the two is already present in the Decalogue, but it is even clearer in 34:7b where 
they are directly juxtaposed, functioning as one thought.
This can be seen as a summary statement of Ex 20:5-7.
Gowan 1994: 237 (after, Freedman 1955: 14)
Maimonides (1948: 50-52) points out that the expressions “burning anger,” “provocation,” and “jealousy” 
are applied to God only in reference to idolatry. He cites Deut 6:15; 7:10; 11:16; 16:22; 31:29; 32:19,21;
Jer 8:19.
The L o r d  had promised love to those who love him and punishment to the third and fourth generation of 
those who hate him. In the case of the golden calf, the entire nation appears to fall into the latter category. It 
is possible that the Levites did not sin directly (see 32: 26ff), but the text does not clarify this. In any case, 
they are included in the collective guilt that falls on the nation and still subject to some degree of punishment.
Hyatt (1971: 307) points out that “repent” DPtJ nifal here means, “change one’s mind or purpose.” Hyatt 
continues, “Not infrequently in the OT Yahweh is said to repent.. . .  The bases of Yahweh’s repenting are 
three: (i) intercession, as here and in Am. 7:1-6; (ii) repentance of the people (Jer. 18:3ff.; Jon. 3:9f); and 
(iii) Yahweh’s compassionate nature (Jg. 2:18; Dt. 32:36; 2 Sam. 24:16).”
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from destroying them. Thus, the L ord’s great steadfast love and faithfulness to the 
Patriarchs and their descendants are demonstrated. Nevertheless, the narrative testifies that 
many were executed. God “visited” ( I p 3) upon them their sin and its consequences.
As mentioned above (4.4), the I p S  *^ "*-phrase first appears in the Old Testament in 
the Decalogue. The I p S  -phrase, along with the 1 0 1  n031-phrase explains what it 
means that the L orD is “the jealous God” in 2 0 :6 -7 . The jealous God shows both constant, 
enduring, overwhelming kindness to those who love him and restricted, momentary 
punishment to those who hate him. As Sama points out, in the Decalogue, the phrase “who 
hate me” C’X30^) “may modify ‘parents’ or ‘children’ or both.” This may mean that, “The 
verdict applies only when subsequent generations perpetuate the evils of their parents.”
The perplexing factor in Ex 3 4 :7  is that the qualifying expression “who hate me” 
(^X30^) is dropped and “to children’s children” (D*’33 ’’33“^ 3 ‘|) is added. Thus, 3 4 :7  has 
n'ran-yri D’n  n'ias ;ig npe. in  the face o f
this, “to th e  th ird  a n d  fo u r th  g e n e ra tio n ”  (D ’Ç a ”!” *?;?') in  3 4 :7  seems
problematic. The expression “third and fourth” is elsewhere used “in a context of 
longevity as a divine reward for righteousness” (Gen 5 0 :2 3 ; 2  Kings 10 :30 ; Job 42:16).*^^ 
But here it appears to describe “the enduring, baneful effects of evil.”*^  ^ It seems to imply 
that the L o rd’s punishment will also follow into many of the succeeding generations.*^* 
Taken at face value, there is “the implied injustice of making subsequent generations pay
Dentan (1963: 47) points out the fact that the kal active participle Ip B  occurs only in Ex 34:6-7 and its 
echoes and in Jeremiah (11:22; 23:2,29:32; 44:29; 46:25; 50:18), “in all instances God being the subject.” 
Sarna (1991: 111) draws this insight from Rabbinic exegesis (Berakhot. 7a, Sanhédrin 27b, Mekhilta de-R. 
Ishmael, at Ex 20:5 are cited by Sarna) that “seized on the ambiguity to soften the apparent harshness of the 
statement.”
Sarna 1991: 111.
Sarna 1991: 111.
Deut 24:16 explicitly forbids human vicarious punishment in Israel’s legal system. Some see Ezek 18:1- 
20; Jer 31:29-30 as a revision of this punitive statement of 20:5 (Ex 34:7) in the face of “intensification of the 
problem of ev i l . . .  for it was perceived as engendering or deepening a pervasive feeling of hopelessness and 
apathy in an era of acute national crisis” (Sama 1991: 110).
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for the sins of their a n c e s t o r s . T h e  absence of a qualifying phrase “who reject me” 
would seem to underwrite injustice.*"*® It would seem that declaring the unqualified 
'l'Ç>^-phrase as part of constant divine character and enduring divine way almost 
guarantees the misinterpretation of divine punishment as sometimes “undisciplined and 
well beyond the enactment of sanctions” (271). While the issue is difficult to solve 
completely, the following considerations remove much of the tension.
(1) Rashi’s suggestion may be helpful. Rashi holds that the elimination of the 
qualifying expression “who reject me” (from Ex 20) is inconsequential.*"** It is declared 
once in the Decalogue and is now assumed in “the third and fourth” of the formula of 34:6- 
7. Thus, Sama’s interpretation of the I p 3 -phrase still may apply here: “The verdict 
applies only when subsequent generations perpetuate the evils of their parents,”*"*^ both in 
the Decalogue and in the formula. Even if this view is not satisfactory, there are other 
factors that remove the issue of apparent injustice involved in the I p 3 -phrase in 34:7.
(2) The golden calf episode shows the restricted, momentary nature of divine 
punishment. While Israel as a whole is indicted and found guilty in God’s eyes, only part 
of Israel receives punishment in 32. The partial punishment meted out greatly falls short of 
the deserved punishment. This is evidence that the LoRo’s punishment is not only well 
disciplined and well within the enactment of pre-stated sanctions, but it is also merciful. In 
this contextual understanding of the 1p3-phrase of 32:6-7, the removal of the qualifying 
terms “who reject me” is in effect made inconsequential (as with view 1).*"*^
Levine 1993; 367.
Milgrom (1990: 111) suggests that the meaning of the IpB-pAmfe is attenuation of the “punishment by 
distributing it over a number of generations.” He then suggests that the collective retribution allowed in 
Ex 34:7 is corrected in Deut 5:9-10; 7:9. He says, “Deuteronomy reinterprets this attribute to mean that God 
will punish (or bless) succeeding generations only if they follow in the ways of the fathers.” But it seems that 
those passages in Deuteronomy are simply recapitulating what is found in the Decalogue in Ex 20, rather than 
reinterpreting Ex 34:6-7.
Rashi on Ex 34:7.
Sarna 1991: 111.
Again, I am assuming the canonical order and relationship of texts in my interpretation of them.
i l l
(3) Another way to interpret the IpS-phrase is to understand the “third and fourth” 
as a reference to the entire household, which in the ancient world would comprise three or 
four generations.*"*"* In such a setting, there is inevitably mutuality and corporality in 
conduct, responsibility, and consequences.*"*  ^ This may be related to the contaminating and 
disseminating effects of sin that bring guilt not only upon the one committing sin but to the 
whole community.*"*® In a context in which the entire Israel is found guilty before God, the 
qualifying terms “who reject me” would be irrelevant. Sama’s comment on this dual 
aspect of “third and fourth” is helpful;
The Israelite conception of itself as a community bound to God by a covenant 
has dual implications. Society is collectively responsible for its actions, and 
the individual too is accountable for behavior that affects the life of the 
community. There is thus forged a mutuality of responsibility and 
consequences. It is further recognized that contemporary conduct inevitably 
has an impact upon succeeding generations. These historical effects are 
perceived in terms of God ‘visiting the sins’ of one faithless generation upon 
the next or of His ‘showing kindness,’ that is, rewarding fidelity, far into the 
future.*"*^
Thus in the case of the exodus community, the entire nation of Israel incurs guilt 
(although the text seems to point out that not everyone actively participated in the idolatry, 
such as the three thousand Levites). Accordingly, the L ord responds to Israel collectively, 
threatening to destroy Israel collectively. Only, in the narrative of 32-34, the L ord in his 
grace and compassion punished only part rather than the whole (in the plague and the 
slaughter by the Levites). This however does not necessarily negate that the L ord punishes 
collectively (see Chapters 3-5). But the fact that the L ord only punished part in Ex 32-34 
when the whole is found guilty points to the fact that divine punishment, even if collective, 
is tempered by mercy. God’s lenient punishment is related to divine sin-bearing. In this
See Jer 23:34 and the punishment of Achan and his household in Num 7:24-25.
Sarna 1991: 110. See Trible 1978: 1-2 on “the corporate personality o f a household that bound all 
members in the solidarity of transgression.”
See Milgrom 1990: 446 for the contaminating effect of sin on the sanctuary.
Sarna 1991: 110.
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particular context of 32-34, the L ord  bears the brunt of sin and punishment so as not to 
punish Israel harshly.
(4) There is yet another kind of “collectiveness” in Israel’s understanding of its 
identity. That is, Israel as God’s covenant people and partner is conceptualised as an entity 
in its relationship with God from the time of the exodus through the exile and onto the 
restoration. Thus, Israel is conceived as a mere child at the time of the exodus who 
matures into “womanhood” and “marries” God, only to be “divorced” by God at the time 
of the exile (Deut 32:18; Isa 54:6; Hos 3:1; 11:1). The punishment of sin is deferred until 
the “adulthood” of the nation. When idolatry and corruption worsen and the repentance of 
Israel and the love of God are not forthcoming (despite the many disciplinary and purifying 
punishments along the way), the adulterous “adult” Israel is held accountable and punished. 
Understood in this way, “visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the children and their 
children to the third and fourth generation,” although possible, does not necessarily mean 
that the L ord punishes the exiled community for all the sins ever committed and 
unpunished from the time of the exodus.*"** But it can be understood as conveying the 
deferment of punishment until the appropriate or ripe time; ripe both in terms of the 
maturity of the nation and the “maturity” of sin. In this way, the 1j?3-phrase can be 
understood as also expressing postponement of punishment, to which now I turn.
(5) Levine suggests, “There is currency to the notion that God does not always 
bring the evil in the lifetime of the perpetrator, but defers it as a concession.”*"*^ The 
following shows how “deferral of punishment and its visitation on the second, third, or 
fourth generation” *®® can be perceived as a merciful act:
God’s kindness lasts a thousand generations, whereas deferral of punishment
has a statute of limitations, we might say. If God can be persuaded to extend
T h e  fa c t  that the L ord  p u n ish e d  o n ly  p a r tia lly  an d  g r a d u a lly  m a y  p o in t  to  th e  p o s s ib il i t y  th a t th e  e x i l ic  
c o m m u n ity  d o e s  r e c e iv e  sto red  up  p u n ish m e n t for  s o m e  a n c ie n t  s in s  a n d  c o n ta m in a tio n  ( s e e  a b o v e ) . 
‘^‘^ Levine 1993: 367.
'^Levine 1993: 381.
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his grace beyond the fourth generation, Israel will not be punished for ancient 
sins!*^*
This interpretation suggests that the deferral of punishment voiced in 32:34: “When the 
time comes for me to punish, I will punish them for their sin,” may be an act of divine 
kindness.*®  ^ It allows the life of Israel to continue and also the opportunity for Israel to 
repent Q 10) and possibly not be punished at all.*®^  Such postponement to punish can be 
seen as an aspect of what it means that the L ord is a compassionate and gracious God.
It is noteworthy that in the announcement of the deferment of punishment in 32:34, 
there is no oath formula (cf. Num 14:21,28), confirming that it is a postponement of 
punishment rather than an irrevocable decision. The sad truth is, as Num 14 shows, that 
Israel continues to rebel against the L ord and does bring upon itself the deferred 
punishment. Israel incurs punishment in Num 14 not because of the enduring nature of 
divine punishment (because with repentance and faithfulness, the L ord can be persuaded 
not to punish). Israel is punished because of its repetitive, repulsive, and unrepentant sin. 
What is striking in Num 14 is that in his mercy God allows “the conquest of Canaan to 
proceed, albeit with some delay.”*®"* By extending the period of punishment, the L ord 
allows for the emergence of a new Israel that can conquer the promised land (see 
Chapter 3).
(6) Finally, certain changes in theological emphasis are evident in the removal of 
the qualifying phrases from the 1 0 1 -  and I P  3-phrases and in the relocation of the 1011-,
Levine 1993: 381. This seems to imply that if the subsequent generations continue and exacerbate ancient 
sins and fail to repent, then they might be punished for their own and their ancestors.
Levine 1993:381.
Milgrom (1990: 393) points out, ‘The prophets taught that repentance (shuv) not only averts punishment 
(see Jer 18:7-11; Joel 2:13-14; Jon 3:10) but eradicates sin (note the verbs: mahah, ‘erase,’ in Isa 43:25;
44:22; Jer 18:23; hilbin, ‘whiten,’ in Isa 1:18; rafa\ ‘heal,’ in Isa 6:10; Hos 14:5; hishlikh, ‘cast [into the 
sea],’ in Mic 7:19). Therefore, the person who has truly repented need not fear that he will ever face divine 
retribution for his sin . . .  since his sin no longer exists.” However, this seems to be the case only when 
repentance follows divine warning (as in Jonah) or when divine punishment has already been sufficiently 
meted out (as in Hos 14:4[5] or Isa 43:25). In the case where there is an indictment of unpunished sin, even if 
a genuine repentance follows, it does not guarantee aversion of all divine punishment, especially when divine 
punishment is part of the divine means of eradicating or atoning for the sin indicted (as in 2 Sam 12:13-14).
Levine 1993: 381.
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njp3-, and IpS-phrases from Ex 20 to Ex 34. The 101-phrase and the punitive IjpD- and 
1 |13  -phrases are detached from the context of the laws (despite 34:10ff) and are declared 
to be aspects of the divine attributes. Having been removed from the strictly legal or 
“contractual” context of the Decalogue, the terms are put in the context of God’s 
compassion and grace shown in freedom. This does not imply that the contractual dealings 
are entirely irrelevant. Divine 101 and 1p3 (and 1p3) are still expressions of the jealous 
God who will reward and punish according to human deeds. But the new context implies 
that the divine freedom to show compassion and grace will now take precedence over the 
contractual. The compassionate and gracious God is also a jealous God, but the rewarding 
and punitive expressions of that jealousy will be now tempered by the L ord’ s 
compassionate and gracious nature. Otherwise, Israel will be destroyed immediately (33:5) 
and never experience divine love. The abiding validity of the contractual expression of 
divine 1 0 1  and Ip S ,  but now within the new context of compassion, is seen in the fact 
that the L ord strongly emphasizes the divine name jealousy in the renewed covenant that 
immediately follows the declaration of the divine attributes (34:14).*®® That is, in the 
context of the L ord’s decision to grant mercy, the L ord still insists on the necessity of 
obedience and faithfulness on the part of his covenant people. Those who continue in their 
evil ways and take for granted the L ord’s compassion and grace will ultimately be 
destroyed, which is what Num 13-14 shows (see Chapter 3).
These many ways of interpreting the I p 3 -phrase in 34:6-7 may point to the 
theological richness of the expression. If so, insisting on a univocal interpretation of the 
phrase may lead to unnecessary misinterpretations of it here and elsewhere in the Old 
Testament.
Margaliot (1994:49) sees “the lack of balance—between the two series of divine attributes in 34:6-7 ... if 
only for the reason that the first series only is often quoted.” He continues: “Having read these attributes, the 
Israelite might conclude that the L o r d  is altogether far more a compassionate God than one who metes out 
punishment—and thereupon would act accordingly, always expecting, in spite of his transgressions, the L ord  
to react leniently.” He (50) therefore sees X3jp in v .l4  as “a necessary theological complement to his 
predominant attributes of mercy in v.6-7.”
115
Leaving behind the issue of the meaning of the IpS-phrase, now I turn to the issue 
of the compatibility of divine mercy and judgment/punishment in the IpS-phrase in 
relation to the rest of the formula.
4.6.2. The Compatibility of the np3- and IpS-Phrases and Divine Mercy 
There are several ways in which the compatibility between divine 
judgment/punishment and mercy/forgiveness can be found in the formula in its context.
4.6 2.1. In the Contrast between “Third and Fourth” and “Thousands” 
Whatever meaning is applied, a clear contrast is made between “third and fourth” 
and “thousands,” that is, between “God’s boundless beneficence and the limited extent of 
His punishment,”*®® between divine pleasure in giving blessing and divine reluctance to 
punish. When divine punishment to the “third and fourth” generations is placed side by 
side with the boundless covenant love, which extends to thousands of generations (34:7), 
divine mercy is remarkably stressed.*®  ^ The emphasis, therefore, should be placed on the 
incomparability and unlimited character of God’s loving kindness that extends collectively 
to thousands or to an unlimited number of future generations, rather than on the fact that 
God sometimes punishes collectively, especially when that collective punishment is 
entirely just. This point is further emphasized by the fact that the punitive companion- 
phrases ( Ip ]  and 1 p 3 )  are now set in a new noncontractual context of divine prerogative 
and freedom to be compassionate and gracious. The new emphasis is also indicated by the 
order in which the phrases now occur—steadfast covenant love (1 0 1 ) first and punishment 
second (1p3- and IpS-phrases). As Sama remarks, “As opposed to the order in the 
Decalogue (20:5-6), emphasis and priority here are given to God’s magnanimous qualities 
rather than to His judgmental actions.”*®* Part of what this means is that God will not
Sarna (1991: III)  credits certain rabbis for this insight (see Mekhilta de-R. Ishmael, at Ex 20:6).
This point is seen especially in the fact that the punishment was mitigated largely due to the L o r d ’s own 
“bearing” (X(Di) of the sins, iniquities, and transgression o f the sinful nation. This is accompanied by some 
form of holding the sinner responsible (Hjpr X*7 H^D), i.e. avenging (lj?B) them within the merciful bounds 
of the set limit o f third and fourth generations.
Sarna 1991:216.
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necessarily punish to the third and forth generation for God has the freedom not to do so. 
The fullness of what this means has already been mentioned above in the discussion of 
God’s freedom to be merciful (and also in the discussion on the deferred punishment).
This leads to my next point.
4.6.2.2. In the Moderation of Divine Punishment by Divine Mercy 
The two phrases Hjp] and HpB, then, together express the idea that God is a jealous 
God and that God holds the guilty responsible for sin committed by punishing the sinner 
mercifully within a set limit, that is, upon a maximum of three or four generations. Again, 
the cause for this mitigated form of punishment is largely due to the L o r d ’s  own “bearing” 
(X^i) of the iniquity, rebellion and sin, and the punishment for the nation. In this, divine 
mercy (in sin “bearing” and forgiving) and divine judgment (in punishment of sinners) 
function together in a manner in which they are inseparable and indivisible. Divine 
judgment/punishment is tempered by divine mercy/forgiveness.
This interpretation that vengeance is moderated by mercy stands in contrast to those 
of other theological interpreters, both contemporary and from the past. A passage from 
Brueggemann constitutes his objection to this interpretation. He says:
Yahweh takes affront (as in the case of Aaron in Exodus 32) very seriously, so 
seriously as to affect the relationship for as many as four generations... It is 
"iniquity" that is visited on subsequent generations, the very same iniquity that 
is pardoned.. . .  It alerts Israel to the reality that Yahweh's full character is not 
subsumed under Yahweh’s commitment to Israel in solidarity.
This, however, does not point to a contradiction in God’s character and actions as 
Brueggemann thinks it does. God punishes Israel precisely because God is committed to 
purifying Israel in covenant love. As I have already shown, God has the freedom to judge 
and punish the very same iniquity that he bears and forgives. This is especially clear when 
judgment takes the form of partial punishments or disciplinary chastisements.
Brueggemann 1997: 217; italics mine.
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4.6.2.3. In the Disciplinary Nature of Divine Punishment
The disciplinary nature of divine punishment is another way in which the 
compatibility of divine judgment and mercy can be seen. Disciplinary punishment serves a 
crucial function of purifying the Israelites so that the Holy One of Israel may continue to 
dwell among them without utterly destroying thern.*^ ®
Against my view, John Calvin argues that the punishment phrases of Ex 34:7b refer 
to severe judgment for “the reprobate and obstinate,” whereas mercy is only for the 
repentant “regenerate.”^^ ‘ This would rule out the idea that God’s punishment might take 
the form of instructional “discipline” of sinners, either before or after the forgiveness of 
sins.^^  ^ Calvin’s perspective may apply better on the individual level rather than on the 
corporate level that is dominant in Ex 32-34. From the perspective of the individual within 
the sinful nation who is struck down (as by the Levites in 32:27ff or by the plague in 
32:35), the L o rd’s avenging would seem retributive and final rather than disciplinary. But 
from the corporate or national perspective, partial punishment serves a disciplinary and 
purifying purpose.
Divine discipline is essential for the continued presence of God among the people 
of Israel. In fact, partial punishment would serve as a representative demonstration not 
only of God’s righteousness that judges and avenges the sin, but also of God’s unmatched 
mercy that forgives and even blesses the sinful majority (34: lOff). Thus, God’s merciful 
punishment confirms God’s incomparable steadfast love and faithfulness 
(nüXl lOrCDm) that is bestowed on sinful Israel and will continue to be bestowed on its^ v: ••• V -  r
descendants.
When the people are made holy by punishment, God can continue to show his faithfulness by being with 
them as their God.
His reading does not pay sufficient attention to the way the meaning of the phrase is illuminated by its 
context in 32-34.
Calvin 1950 {Moses vol. 3): 387-388.
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God’s purpose in discipline is further displayed in the context of renewal of the 
covenant with Israel in 34:9ff. The fact that God chooses to renew the covenant after 
Israel’s ultimate rebellion shows that God in unmatched mercy forgives and even blesses 
sinful Israel (34:10ff). But such forgiveness is not without a demand for Israel’s 
responsible action. God emphatically warns Israel not to repeat the same sin of idolatry for 
the L o r d  will punish it (34:14).^^  ^ The covenant with God (34.T0ff.) is to preclude and 
override any covenant with the inhabitants of the land or with their gods.^ "^^  If Israel were 
to become idolatrous like the foreign nations, then Israel will also be punished. Therefore, 
the L o r d  gives strict admonitions “regarding the incursions of foreign cults into the religion 
oflsrael.”'^ ^
God’s jealousy warns Israel against future apostasy in view of the past apostasy of 
the golden calf. If the Israelites would now recall the partial punishment they had already 
experienced, it would serve as a negative incentive not to sin again. As such, God’s patient 
discipline in the past would mercifully help Israel to avoid further and potentially more 
serious sin and punishment in the future. God’s merciful judgment is therefore meant to 
inspire holy obedience in Israel as an important part of its future relationship with God.
The call to holiness is intricately related to divine holiness, to which now I turn.
4.6.2.4. In the Divine Attribute of Holiness and 
in Israel’s Call to Holiness and Mission
In Exodus, the L ord reveals himself to be holy. Because the L ord is holy, those 
who are set apart to God become holy: “I am the L ord who makes you holy” (Ex 31:13). 
God “separated Israel to himself as a holy people and sanctified them.”^^  ^ Being set apart 
as holy by the virtue of election and covenant with God, Israel is then called to maintain its 
identity as a holy people: “You will be to me a holy people” (Ex 22:31).
The threat is implicit in the declaration; “for the L ord  whose name is jealous is a jealous God.” The term 
“jealous” directs the attention to Ex 20:5, where the “jealous” God promises punishment for idolatry.
Davies 1967: 247.
Sarna 1991: 217.
Childs 1979: 185.
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The pursuit of holiness is inextricably associated with Israel’s God-given mission to 
be “a kingdom of priests and a holy nation” 19:6) to other
nations/^^ Sama points out:
[T]he priest’s place and function within society must serve as the ideal model 
for Israel’s self-understanding of its role among the nations. The priest is set 
apart by a distinctive way of life consecrated to the service of God and 
dedicated to ministering to the needs of the people.
Accordingly, Israel as a kingdom of priests is called to minister to the cultic needs of the 
nations. As Brueggemann correctly states, Israel is to be a “mediator and intercessor for 
the well-being of the other nations of the world.”
The question is: How should Israel pursue holiness and fulfil its mission to the 
nations? Israel can only do so by keeping the covenant and having the presence of the holy 
God in its midst. It is telling that one of the clearest statements about Israel’s identity and 
mission is prefaced by the conditional clause: “Now z/(DX n n ^ l)  you obey me and keep 
my covenant, you will be to me a treasured possession among all the nations” (Ex 19:5; 
italics mine). In addition, the instruction for and building of the tabernacle immediately 
follows the covenant-making. By keeping the covenant and worshipping the holy God, 
Israel reflects the holiness of the God who is in its midst.
The fact that the golden calf episode (Ex 32-34) interrupts the tabernacle material is 
theologically significant. The crisis of apostasy demonstrates the fundamental 
incompatibility between a holy God and an unholy people. Following this idolatry, the 
divine presence is moved away from Israel’s camp and the project of the tabernacle is 
postponed until the problem of Israel’s unholiness is resolved. A holy God will not dwell 
among an unholy people.
Sarna 1991: 104.
Sarna 1991: 104.
Brueggemann 1997:431.
Sarna (1991: 104) rightly points out, “Holiness is to be achieved by human imitation of God’s attributes.’ 
Part of Israel’s imitation of God’s attributes involves Israel’s separation from all that is unholy, including 
idolatry, and embrace of a righteous lifestyle as delineated in the covenant law.
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The golden calf event also underscores the fact the holy God who delivered Israel 
out of Egypt with “an outstretched arm and with mighty judgments” (Ex 6:6) will turn the 
same “arm” and “judgment” against his own people if and when they break the covenant 
and become u n h o l y T h a t  a holy God dwells among Israel and that Israel has embraced 
this God can have destructive consequences for Israel. When Israel falls into apostasy and 
stands in opposition to the Holy One of Israel, Israel can expect certain purifying actions 
from the LoR o. This purifying presence of God is related to the description of God as 
“fire.”
The image of “fire” (0X) is frequently used in Exodus to describe the manifestation 
of God’s presence (Ex 13:21; 19:18; 24:17). The fact that the holy God has come to dwell 
among an otherwise unholy nation may explain this particular manifestation of the L o rd’s 
presence (see Ex 19:9-25; 20:18-21). In the case of apostasy, such as in Ex 32, the holiness 
of God can consume the apostate (Ex 32:10-12).
Some clarifications need to be made. (1) Although the L ord comes as “fire,” this 
does not necessarily imply that God always imposes the process of purification. By 
choosing to embrace the holy God and his holy ways, God’s people can live in peace with 
God and without the fear of God unleashing his consuming fire. With election come 
privileges and responsibilities. Depending on how the elect respond, these privileges and 
responsibilities can bring either blessings or c u r s e s . T h i s  point is apparent in other 
passages examined in this thesis. (2 )  Although the L ord has the right to fully unleash his 
consuming fire against the unholy people, the L ord also has the freedom to temper justice 
with mercy. That is, where sin demands full retribution, the L ord has the prerogative to 
choose to show compassion and mercy, delimiting the extent of punishment. This point is
Childs (1979: 185) rightly states, “Israel does not achieve a state of holiness by performing duties. 
Holiness is not a process to be won. . . .  However, holiness can be forfeited by contamination with the 
profane. By keeping the divine commandments Israel responds obediently to her status as an elect, holy 
nation.”
Gowan (1994:221) draws attention to Amos 3:2, “You only have 1 known of all the families of the earth: 
therefore 1 will visit upon you all your iniquities.”
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related to the ultimate purpose of divine punishment, God judges and punishes ultimately 
for the purpose of salvation/^^ As Brueggemann rightly states, “creation is under curse for 
disobedience, and Yahweh insistently wills that the world should be brought to 
blessing.” Through grace and blessing, and judgment and punishment, the holy God 
establishes a righteous people of God among whom he dwells.
5. Concluding Remarks
The contextual, theological interpretation of the formula shows that God’s acts are 
consistent with the truth-claims about God made in Ex 34:6-7. This is because the formula 
and the context have a mutually interpretative relationship. They provide each other with 
crucial interpretive keys that delimit the possibilities of meaning for the text and its 
context.
There is a mutually interpretative relation between the formula (or its echoes) and 
its context. The formula interprets the context, giving understanding of how divine actions 
are determined by particular attributes of God. Conversely, the context sheds light on how 
the generalisations about God in the formula are specifically worked out or demonstrated in 
divine action.
In this chapter, I have shown the following through my contextual interpretation of 
the formula. The Israelites demonstrate that from the birth of the nation the inclination of 
their heart was evil. In this context, God reveals most powerfully the divine “way” of 
overcoming the problem of human sins through the L ord’s own compassionate and 
gracious nature. In the context of 32-34, all of the attributes are powerfully declared as 
expressions and applications of divine goodness. Ultimately, one should not speak of 
positive and negative sides of God because all aspects of God are positive manifestations of
God makes Israel holy through chastisement, punishment, and purification. By making Israel holy, the 
holy God can continue to dwell among and bless Israel and let Israel fulfil its mission to the nations. 
Brueggemann 1997: 432.
Fretheim 1991: 24.
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God’s goodness and glory. The nature of divine compassion and grace is divine freedom; 
divine freedom specifically talked about as God’s prerogative to be compassionate and 
merciful to those who deserve destruction.
Divine freedom to be compassionate and merciful is first expressed in divine 
patience, steadfast covenant love, and divine sin-bearing. In God’s freedom to show 
compassion and mercy to those that deserve death, the L ord reconciles Israel. But within 
that decision to maintain covenant love and faithfulness to Israel, the L ord brings 
disciplinary punishments upon Israel. God is committed to Israel in all that God is, which 
includes righteous judgment. The L ord judges and punishes Israel to discipline and purify 
Israel, and to spur obedience and holiness.
This means, judgment is an expression of God’s compassion and grace for his 
covenant people. Divine judgment and punishment are not alternatives to divine patience, 
faithfulness, truth, and forgiveness. Rather, they all function together as integral parts of 
God’s goodness, compassion, and grace. Divine discipline or temperate judgment and 
punishment are integral parts of that goodness of God that is all for God’s people. God’s 
merciful punishment therefore does not undercut or contradict God’s mercy and 
forgiveness, but rather sustains them.*^  ^ It sustains them because God’s intention is for 
Israel to be a holy people standing in a righteous relationship with God.^^  ^ To this end, all 
of God’s attributes will remain constant and united in all of God’s dealings with his people. 
The portrayal of God in this important portion of Exodus is not self-contradictory and 
dualistic but united and self-consistent.
Childs 1992: 373. 
Childs 1992: 373.
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Chapter 3: 
The Echoes In
N umbers 14:18
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Now, then, let the power of my Lord be great as you have 
declared, saying:
The L o r d  is slow to anger/ 
great in covenant love, 
bearing/forgiving iniquity and rebellion.
Yet, not altogether clearing the guilty, 
he visits the iniquity of the fathers 
upon the children and the children’s children 
to the third and the fourth generation.
Please forgive the iniquity of this people according to your great 
covenant love, just as you have borne/forgiven this people from 
Egypt until now.
Words in regular boldface type represent quotations from Exodus 34:6-7, while words in italics boldface 
type represent allusions. For textual and translational notes, see Chapter 2 and the exegetical section of this 
chapter.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Overview of the Chapter and Its Argument
In this chapter, I turn to a discussion of Numbers 14:18, again interacting critically 
with Walter Brueggemann’s comments on this passage. In canonical order, Num 14:18 is 
the first echo of the formula found in Ex 34:6-7. Despite Brueggemann’s claim that 
Num 14:18 is a complete echo or quotation, it is a significant but partial echo (falling into 
the sub-category of an incomplete quotation). Aided by an atomistic (non-contextual) 
methodology, Brueggemann makes several unsubstantiated claims about the passage and 
about the character of God that need to be corrected. Brueggemann’s claims and my 
critical response to them are similar to what is found in the last chapter with regard to 
Ex 34:6-7. But there are also some new issues that are specific to the echo in Num 14:18 
and Brueggemann’s interpretation of it.
In section 1 ,1 will start out by briefly summarising Brueggemann’s comments on 
Num 14. In section 2 ,1 will clarify the nature and extent of the strong echo in Num 14:18 
and of the weak echoes in 14:19. In section 3 ,1 will then turn to the literary and 
theological context of Num 14, highlighting Israel’s sin as a theological theme the literary 
context of Num 14 emphasizes.
In section 4 ,1 will turn to the “centre” of the chapter, the contextual-theological 
exegesis of the passage in which the echo in Num 14:18 is found. Moving from Moses’ 
intercession (subsection 4.1) to God’s response to Moses (subsection 4.2), I will clarify the 
functions of the echo in Num 14:18. In the course of this discussion, I will seek to correct 
Bmeggemann’s misleading claims about both Moses’ intercession and God’s response.
I will also critique Brueggemann’s underlying presupposition that mercy/solidarity and 
judgment/sovereignty are, at least after Num 14:21, separated and mutually exclusive (see 
more below). In respect to these topics, I will seek to demonstrate how a close reading of 
the text does not lead to the conclusion that God is inconsistent in dealing with human
1 2 6
demands, contrary to Brueggemann’s claims. In fact, from a canonical perspective, divine 
punishment in Num 14 can be seen as disciplinary and purifying in character, thereby 
underscoring the constant and harmonious nature of the divine character.
Finally, in section 5 ,1 will conclude the chapter by giving a brief summary of the 
main theological insights I gained in this chapter. I will state the important similarities 
between the affirmations of Ex 32-34 and those of Num 14. I will also highlight a few 
specific contributions that Num 14 makes to an understanding of divine mercy and 
judgment, which are not emphasized in Ex 32-34.
1.2. The Problem Stated: Brueggemann on Numbers 14:18
In this subsection I will show that Brueggemann’s overall treatment of Num 14:18 
involves the problematic conjunction of two alternate interpretations of God’s solidarity 
(associated with God’s positive mercy) and sovereignty (associated with God’s negative 
judgment). In his view, (a) solidarity and sovereignty converge or coexist to some extent 
in the earlier part of this passage and then, after 14:21, (b) they part company and have 
nothing to do with each other. The question is whether these two interpretations are found 
in the text or whether Brueggemann is misreading the text so as to find them in the text.
As mentioned above, Brueggemann starts out his discussion with an inaccurate 
assessment on the extent of the echo of Num 14:18. He makes the observation that 
“Num 14:18 is the recital of Exod 34:6-7 quoted in its entirety (270; italics mine)^ when in 
fact Num 14:18 is a partial quotation. Elsewhere he refers to Num 14:18 as “a direct and 
complete quotation of Exod 34:6-7” (219; italics mine). This mistake could be overlooked 
if there were not more problems that emerge in relation to it.
Brueggemann goes on to paint the following theological portrait of Num 14:18 and 
its immediate context. To begin with Brueggemann says that “Yahweh’s patience with 
Israel is exhausted” after Israel’s rebellion (219). God now threatens to destroy Israel,
 ^Here and in all other parenthetical citations in this chapter will be Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old 
Testament (1997).
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“proposing to disregard” his “self-commitment to Israel made at Sinai” (219).
Brueggemann says that God is now only capable of acting in “self-regard” or on his own 
behalf (219). In response, Moses “shames” the L ord by quoting the formula back to the 
L ord (v .1 8 ). Moses thus urges the Lord back to the baseline of his relationship with Israel, 
that is, his “self-commitment to Israel” (220). According to Brueggemann, although Moses 
quotes the formula “in its entirety” (including its negative second half), Moses’ true 
intention “is to appeal to Yahweh’s faithful solidarity with Israel (that is, to the first half of 
the formula)” (270). Moses’ intention is expressed in “the imperative petition, ‘forgive the 
iniquity of this people”’ (270), in which Moses chooses not to stress divine punishment 
(220).
Brueggemann claims that, against Moses’ intentions, “Yahweh will make 
intentional use of the entire quote from Exod 34:6-7 that Moses has reiterated” (271; italics 
mine). The L ord will act fully in Num 14 on both “solidarity/self-commitment to Israel” 
and “sovereignty/self-regard for God-self.” As such, Brueggemann sees the initial 
encounter between God and Moses in Num 14 as “perhaps an exception to the use made of 
the paradigmatic characterization of Yahweh” (271).^ In a sense, Brueggemann rightly 
seems to be suggesting that this passage testifies to a kind of convergence of 
righteousness/sovereignty and love/solidarity in God’s relationship to Israel. That is, in 
Num 14:18, Brueggemann sees both solidarity and sovereignty, both of the “two 
inclinations of Yahweh” (227), to be simultaneously at work. Sovereignty and solidarity 
converge here—even if they are not harmonious. Therefore, the intense “ambiguity in 
Yahweh's life” (227) is at least resolved here in Num 14 in the sense that the L ord does not 
simply choose one alternative over the other in his response to Israel. Thus, Brueggemann 
explains that, in Num 14:
 ^According to Brueggemann, the predominant reuse o f the formula either celebrates or appeals to divine 
mercy or solidarity (220f).
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Yahweh acts in faithful solidarity, as asked by Moses. But Yahweh also 
acts in fierce sovereignty, befitting the claim of Exod 34:7b. Except in the 
case of Caleb, the generation for which Moses intercedes receives nothing 
of Yahweh’s generous solidarity (271; italics mine).
The above quotation shows that the convergence of solidarity and sovereignty in this 
passage does not remove the sharpness of the contradiction that Brueggemann sees 
between the two. In other words, Brueggemann finds in Num 14 both a convergence of 
solidarity and sovereignty and a tension between them. The divine forgiveness declared in 
V.20 is extended only to the younger generation, and not to the older generation. He says, 
“Yahweh’s fierce sovereignty has won over Yahweh’s compassionate solidarity” (2 7 1 ). In 
a sense, the simultaneous activation of both divine solidarity and sovereignty only sharpens 
the contradiction Brueggemann sees as inherently present in Yahweh. In his view, if God 
acted in different ways in different contexts, then those different contexts might be able to 
explain God’s different ways of acting."  ^ But if God acts in two different ways in the same 
context, then we really have a substantial contradiction in Israel’s rendering of God.
Therefore, when Brueggemann returns to Num 14:18 in another part of his volume,^ 
he stresses the contradiction in the Lord’s character to such a degree that he removes 
altogether the element of convergence between solidarity and sovereignty. This second 
more extreme interpretation of the same passage occurs in the section entitled “The 
Tension of Sovereignty and Loyalty” (307-311) and represents God’s overarching 
character (especially in Israel’s core testimony) in his Theology. In other words, the second 
interpretation reinforces and intensifies the sense of contradiction in Yahweh that 
Brueggemann began to assert in his first interpretation.®
In this second interpretation of the passage, Brueggemann says that until the events 
narrated in v.20, the Lord’s righteousness and covenantal loyalty do converge (307). The
As such, it could be seen as a “contextual contradiction” (see Goldingay 1987; 19ff and my comments in 
Chapter 1, section 4).
 ^Still part of “Israel’s core testimony” in which his first interpretation o f Num 14 is given.
® See my comments on Brueggemann’s “tacking” method in Chapter 1, section 3 and again below.
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convergence in v.20 does not imply the harmonisation of divine characteristics, but rather 
two different kinds of action in the same situation. However, from v.21, “Yahweh’s 
righteous will parts company from Yahweh’s steadfast love” because “there is no spillover 
of graciousness outside of [the] embrace of Yahweh’s righteous will” (307). “In this text 
there is not an ounce of room for steadfast love outside of adherence to Yahweh’s 
commanding authority” (307). According to Brueggemann, where the Lord’s punishment 
begins is where the Lord’s “long-suffering fidelity” ends (307).
Such claims about Num 14:18 support the view that Brueggemann stated earlier 
with respect to the older generation of Israelites.
Yahweh’s fierce sovereignty has won over Yahweh’s compassionate 
solidarity.. . .  Yahweh, as uttered by Israel and confronted by Moses in this 
text, has as an inclination toward Israel a set of seemingly irreconcilable 
options. It is these options that give substance to the disjunction in the 
center of Israel’s life and in the center of Yahweh’s character (271).
How may I respond to Brueggemann’s interpretation? To be sure, God’s 
simultaneous response of “forgiveness” (H^O) and long-lasting punishment makes 
Brueggemann’s claim look convincing. Yet a closer look at the passage shows that it is 
not. To begin with, Bmeggemann’s claim that Num 14:18 is a complete quotation of the 
formula (a view I contest) appears to be significant to his theological interpretation, as I 
will show below. One wonders in what direction he would have taken his discussion had 
he realised that many key theological terms are indeed omitted in Moses’ quotation of the 
formula, giving it a particular theological emphasis.
Furthermore, Bmeggemann shows almost no appreciation of the role of sin in the 
passage. The omission seems hard to justify in light of the immediate context, Num 13-14, 
which deals prominently with sin and the theologically indispensable role of sin in the 
understanding of divine mercy and punishment. Only in passing does he comment:
To be sure, the formulations of Exod 34:7 and Num 14:18 indicate that 
Yahweh’s potential enactment in rage is in response to and correlated with
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‘^iniquity. " Thus there is something rational and disciplined about the fierce 
sovereignty (271; italics mine).
Brueggemann, however, does not integrate these observations into the rest of his 
discussion. Thus, the reality of human sin, specifically the sins of Israel in the context of 
this echo, is not adequately recognised or discussed. Without giving adequate 
consideration to sin, Brueggemann, not surprisingly, develops an exaggerated view of the 
“negative” side of God’s nature, even seeing God act in an “unruly” manner in passages 
such as Nahum 1-2. Immediately proceeding the above quoted comments, Brueggemann 
says:
Israel knows, however, in its various utterances about Yahweh, as in Nahum 
1-2, that “visiting iniquity” seems sometimes to be undisciplined and well 
beyond the enactment of sanctions. This second half of the formulation 
bears witness to something potentially wild, unruly and dangerous in 
Yahweh’s life (271).
As the above quotation shows, Brueggemann reads his radically negative reading of 
passages like Nah 1:3 into the interpretation of Ex 34:7b (and consequently Num 14:18). 
At least in part, then, Brueggemann improperly lets his interpretation of Nah 1:3 determine 
his interpretation of Ex 34:7b and Num 14:18 without due consideration of their respective 
literary and theological contexts.
Much more problematic in Brueggemann’s interpretative practice is the simple 
equation he sees between Israel’s specific experiences and the L ord’s character. In 
Brueggemann’s interpretation, the observation that the older generation supposedly 
experiences no mercy in a particular circumstance entails the assertion that mercy and 
judgment are irreconcilable and that this contradiction is at the centre of who God is. He 
makes a huge leap in reasoning by moving from a particular human experience to a 
statement about God’s nature (apparently an ontological rather than strictly rhetorical 
statement). He does so without giving sufficient attention to the overall context of a 
particular divine response and a particular human experience.
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Such an interpretative practice is related to Brueggemann’s conviction that a 
biblical theology moves from the “particular” to the “general” (see Chapter 1, section 3). 
That is, Brueggemann takes the “particulars” of a text and builds theologies upon them, all 
the while keeping each particular separate from the other particulars. Since the particulars 
of Num 14 are forgiveness and punishment, when each of these is developed (in isolation 
from the other) into a full-blown theology, a contradictory or dualistic theology naturally 
results. Thus, Brueggemann’s interpretative method leads to theological conclusions that 
cannot be contextually supported.
As noted in Chapter 1, from the outset Brueggemann is committed to a dualistic and 
deconstructive interpretation of a given text. Both of his interpretations of Num 14 (the 
moderate and more extreme ones noted above) are designed to deconstruct a view of God 
that emphasizes divine mercy more than divine judgment. Therefore, Brueggemann can 
assert that up to Num 14:20 divine mercy and judgment equally coexist in contradiction, 
but starting from v.21 one excludes the other still in contradiction. As a sailboat’s tacking 
movement, both the first and second interpretations of Num 14 (going in somewhat 
different directions) contribute to his overall deconstructive aim (and thus ultimately move 
Brueggemann’s interpretation in the same direction). Therefore, his two interpretations 
together emphasize the irreconcilable and contradictory nature of God’s character.
The force of Brueggemann’s argument relies heavily on the assumption that the text 
presents conflicting theologies. However, even if there are multiple sources behind a text, 
it is not necessary to assume that either the sources or the final form of the text contains 
irreconcilable views. A text should be tested carefully to see if it presents a coherent 
testimony about Israel and its God. In Brueggemann’s interpretation, a text is quickly 
forced into his bipolar dialectic model, which he believes to be the key to his programme of 
deconstructing “traditional, hegemonic” views of God and the Bible. The main problem is
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that, in his interpretation of Num 14:18, Brueggemann has again failed to give sufficient 
consideration to the theological relationship between a text and its context.
2. The Nature and Extent of the Echoes in Numbers 14:18-19
In the theological exegesis in section 4 ,1 will discuss the function of the echo of 
Num 14:18 in its immediate context. One of the aims of this discussion is to test whether 
Moses’ reuse of the formula has any continuity with the function of the formula in 
Exodus,^ However, to accomplish this aim, I must establish the extent of the echoes and 
comment on the nature of the echoes. In speaking of the echoes, I refer to the literary or 
thematic features (phrases, terms, or motifs) in the formula that are repeated in Num 14:18- 
19. I will begin with a brief comment on the weak echoes found in Num 14:19, then turn 
to a more extended discussion of the strong echo in Num 14:18.
In Num 14:19, there are three weak, contextual echoes. X3“n ^ p  “please 
forgive the iniquity” is an echo of in Ex 34:9, and ID Il ^13 “great
covenant love” and X(D3 “bear/forgive” are the echoes of the terms in Ex 34:6-7. These 
contextual echoes are closely related to the meaning and function of the term n b o , which 
in turn illuminates the function of the strong echo in Num 14:18 and the theological 
relationship between mercy and judgment in Num 14.
Numbers 14:18 as a whole constitutes a strong echo, a repetition of much of the 
formula. Since the strong echo in Num 14:18 repeats most of the formula, it will be more 
efficient to discuss what is omitted. There are five obvious omissions of phrases or terms 
in Moses’ quotation of the formula in Num 14:18: (1) Din*! “a God 
compassionate and gracious,” (2) nQX) “faithfulness,” (3) D’’S*7X*7 *1011 “1^ 3 “keeping 
steadfast-love to thousands,” (4) HXpill “and sin,” (5) and “upon children
of children.”
 ^This aim corresponds to the second aspect of the thesis-statement I aim to defend in this thesis.
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In the light of these omissions, it is remarkable that Brueggemann can claim that Ex 
34:6-7 is “quoted in its entirety” in Num 14:18 (270). Brueggemann also says that Moses’ 
intention in making a “complete quotation of Exod 34:6-7” is actually to appeal to divine 
mercy, glossing over the judgment “side” (270). Yet this reading of Brueggemann runs 
against the evidence that is provided by a correct understanding of the extent of the echo. 
The problem for Brueggemann’s reading is that many terms that Brueggemann regards as 
belonging to the “mercy side” of the formula have been left out. Since much of the 
“positive side” is omitted, the natural conclusion (against Brueggemann) would be that 
Moses is trying to reduce, rather than accentuate, the formula’s overall emphasis on mercy. 
One might even say that the length of the “positive side” is reduced to a size comparable to 
the “negative side,” bringing more “balance” between divine mercy and judgment.
Yet as I have shown already in Chapter 2, a strictly dichotomous division of divine 
attributes into either mercy or judgment can be misleading. The divine self-revelation in 
Ex 34-6-7 is best understood in its context as a unit that reveals different aspects of divine 
goodness, each intricately related to the other. It was also shown that the terms associated 
only with mercy often assume divine wrath (e.g. patience presupposes wrath) and the terms 
of judgment presuppose mercy (e.g. “third and fourth” speaks of mercy that tempers 
judgment). In the exegesis that follows in the next section, I will show continuity between 
the perspective on the divine character in the echo in Num 14:18 and the theological 
perspective of Ex 34:6-7. However, I will now turn to the nature of the echo in 
Num 14:18.
The question of the nature of the strong echo can be addressed verbally and 
thematically. This corresponds to my definition of an echo in Chapter 1. On the verbal 
level, the echo in Num 14:18 is a quotation, a (probably intentional) repetition of key 
terminological and syntactical elements exactly or almost exactly as they are found in the
134
formula. There are omissions and other elements that could be regarded as “additions.”
Yet these factors do not vitiate against the echo being a quotation, the strongest possible 
echo on the level of verbal correspondence to the formula.
On the thematic level, this echo involves a strong degree of thematic or theological 
correspondence to the formula, a point that much of my discussion below in section 4 is 
intended to defend. The text of Num 14:18 uses the same terms and syntax as the formula. 
This inclines me to reject the notion that Num 14:18 has a completely different meaning, 
theme, theological idea, or commitment than the formula. My position does not, however, 
rule out the possibility that Num 14:18 can bring the echoed terms into relationship with 
new themes. The old themes can have a new emphasis in a new context, and the old 
meaning can be further unveiled in a new context. Yet these changes in the “situation” of 
the echoed terms take place in the context of a basic continuity of theological themes with 
the formula.
3. Literary and Theological Context of the Echo in Numbers 14:18
3.1. Canonical Context of the Pentateuch
As stated in Chapter 1, both the larger canonical context and the immediate context 
of a text are crucial for discerning the theological meaning of a given text. In the case of 
Num 14:18, the Pentateuch is the larger canonical context and Num 13-14 the immediate 
interpretative (literary and theological) context. First I will briefly discuss a few relevant 
issues from the larger context of Pentateuch. Then in the next subsection I will turn to 
Num 13-14.
In The Death o f the Old and the Birth o f the New (1985), Dennis Olson has shown 
that the entire Pentateuch provides a proper interpretative literary backdrop for the book of 
Numbers and for the narratives within it.  ^ The narrative of “the spy story” in Num 13-14 is
® See the discussion below of the introductory phrase “let the power of the Lord be great” in 14:17. 
 ^For independence of the books in the Pentateuch, see Gray 1927: xxiv.
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viewed against the backdrop of “wilderness-wandering” stories in the Pentateuch. As 
Simon J. De Vries points out, the wilderness stories form a bridge between the stories of 
deliverance from Egypt on the one side and the stories of possession of the land on the 
other. These stories illustrate the purpose of the L ord to test and purify (see Deut 8) the 
people of Israel that they may be “a kingdom of priests and a holy nation” (Ex 19:6).
Of special relevance within the wilderness stories is the so-called “murmuring 
tradition” or “rebellion stories.”  ^^  A series of rebellion narratives picture Israel as 
repeatedly and defiantly rebelling against the L ord, beginning decisively with “Israel’s fall 
story” in Ex 32-34. These narratives present the Israelites as utterly rebellious and God 
as overcoming their rebellion through reconciliation.*^ As Andrew Tun yogi rightly states, 
such a motif is “at the heart of Israel’s religion.”*'* Therefore, the concept of sin, rebellion, 
or murmuring is an indispensable part of the Pentateuchal literary context. As such, 
rebellion and sin is the proper background against which our narrative of the rebellion of 
Israel must be studied.*^
Reading Num 14 in the larger context of the “murmuring tradition” is especially 
important because the text (Num 14) makes it clear that the L ord’s punishment on Israel is 
not just for the one-time episode of rebellion of which Num 14 provides an account. 
Rather, it is for “testing” the Lord “ten times” (Num 14:22) which may be understood as a 
conventional way of saying “many times”*® or continually and repeatedly.*^ Israel is 
receiving deferred punishment for many accumulated sins, rather than being punished for 
one rebellious act. If so, Israel’s sin is the rightful theological framework for the proper
De Vries 1968: 51. Engnell (1970: 207) identifies Rameses (Ex 12:37) as the point of departure for the 
wilderness wandering.
" See the extensive treatments by Coats (1968) and Tunyogi (1962 and 1969).
‘^ Fretheim, 1991:279.
Tunyogi 1962: 385.
Tunyogi 1962: 385.
Tunyogi 1962: 385.
*®Milgrom 1990: 110.
Levine (1993: 368) takes “ten times” (□’’Q^S HT) as an idiomatic expression, expressing persistence 
and repetition. Ashley 1993: 260; “over and over.” Cf. Budd 1984: 158; Sturdy 1976; 103.
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understanding of divine jealousy or judgment and mercy in Num 14. Any theological 
framework for Num 14 that neglects the reality of sin will only lead to an impoverished and 
distorted understanding of God’s mercy and judgment. I submit that this point is 
sufficiently illustrated by Brueggemann’s work. Only a serious grappling with the nature 
of Israel’s sins will lead to the rightful understanding of divine justice and mercy.
3.2. Structural Analysis of Numbers 13-14
A. Exploration the land of Canaan by twelve spies (13:1-25)
B. Mixed report on the land (13:26-33)
1. The factual report on the land (13:26-29)
2. Caleb’s confidence to conquer the land (13:30)
3. Others’ distorted report of the land (13:31-33)
C. The people’s rebellion (14:1-10)
1. Israel’s “grumbling” against th e  L ord (14:1-4)
2. Joshua and Caleb’s intervention (14:5-9)
3. Israel’s readiness to stone the leaders (14:10)
D. The L ord’s initial response to Israel (14:11-12)
E. Moses’ intercession (14:13-19)
F. The L ord’s final verdict in response to Moses’ intercession (14:20-38)
1. Forgiveness (n*pO) granted (14:20)
2. Older generations to perish in the wilderness (14:21-30)
3. Younger generation made to suffer for forty years (14:31-35)
4. Death of the ten spies (14:36-38)
G. Israel’s rebellion and defeat (14:39-45)
3.3. The Immediate Narrative Context of Numbers 13-14
Many scholars have studied the “spy story” of Num 13-14 as a composite of 
sources*^ or as layers of history of tradition.^® Brueggemann on the other hand appears to 
read the narrative as a composite of two or more irreconcilable theological testimonies 
(even though he does not attempt to identify any historical sources or traditions behind the 
story). In contrast, I will read the final form of the text as theologically coherent and 
meaningful, without assuming or proposing any particular scheme of tradition history or
Tunyogi (1962: 385) comments that the narratives about the sinfulness of Israel illustrate “not the divine 
justice, but . . .  the divine grace.” I suggest that both divine justice and grace are equally seen in these 
passages, with justice functioning within grace.
Van Seters 1994; Noth 1968; Gray 1927.
Noth 1972: 130.
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redaction history/* In other words I view the final form as providing a coherent and stable 
theological witness to who God is and what God is like. I will also show that this text’s 
theological witness is consistent with the identity and character of God revealed in 
Ex 34:6-7 and its context.^^
The story of Israel’s rebellion in Num 13-14 begins with the scouts’ exploration of 
Canaan and their reports. Initially, the spies give a factual r e p o r t . T h e  land is indeed 
extremely fertile, “flowing with milk and honey” (13:27), and the people are powerful and 
the cities very large and fortified (v.28). Caleb then proclaims his confidence that the 
Israelites can indeed possess the land in an attempt to persuade the people to proceed with 
occupying the land (v.30). However, the ten spies make the people of Israel fearful with 
their “evil report” that is self-contradicting,^^ exaggerated, and frightening
(v.31-33).
Choosing to believe the distortion, the entire community of Israel “as one person” 
(inX  14:15) responds in panic and bitter anger toward Moses and God. “All
Israel” (v. 1,2,10; cf. v.5,7) rally against Moses and Aaron and cry out: “O that we had died 
in the land of Egypt! Or in this wilderness, o that we had died!” (v.2). The Israelites accuse 
God of intending evil for Israel (v.3). Israel then intends to return to Egypt (v.4): “Let us 
head back for Egypt” (IPS).
Moses and other leaders plead with Israel not to rebel against the L o rd . Joshua and 
Caleb especially speak out:
Gray (1927: 156) thought the text to be corrupt and unintelligible. See Newing 1987 for internal cohesion 
and integration of the narrative. Cf. Buis 1978.
See the two aspects of the thesis 1 am defending (Chapter 1, subsection 1.2). For a fuller account of my 
methodological approach vis-à-vis Brueggemann’s approach, see Chapter 1, subsections 3-5.
Milgrom 1990: 104.
Milgrom (1990: 106) points out that ''Dibbah from the root d-b-b, ‘to utter,’ is a neutral term and originally 
had to be qualified by the adjective ra‘ah, ‘evil,’ to indicate calumny (cf. Num 14:37; Gen 37:2). However, it 
eventually developed this negative connotation even when used without qualification (e.g. Num 14:36).”
As Milgrom (1990: 104) says, “[T]hey unequivocally affirmed the land’s fertility and abundant population 
(v.27-28).”
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Num 14:7-9 The land . . .  is an exceedingly good land. If the L ord  is 
pleased with us, he will bring us into that land and give it to us, a land which 
is flowing with milk and honey. Only, do not rebel against the L o r d . D o 
not be afraid of the people of the land because they are our bread. Their 
protection^® is gone, and the L ord is with us.
Joshua and Caleb reassert the factual conditions of the land and of the L o r d ’s presence with 
Israel. Yet Israel is unable to hear the truth and threatens to stone the leaders (v.lO).^  ^
However, the L ord appears in his glory and intervenes (v.lO).
The L ord’s response in Num 14 parallels his response following the golden calf 
episode; the L ord threatens the destruction of Israel. The L ord  says, ‘T will strike it with a 
plague and destroy it” (v.l2).^® As in Ex 32, the L ord’s threat represents just punishment 
for the crime committed. Or as Jacob Milgrom puts it, God will deal with Israel’s sin 
“measure for measure.”^^  Since “all Israel” sinned as one entity against the L ord, the 
L ord’s destruction of all Israel “as one person” would precisely fit the crime. God is not 
overbearing but just. This means that there is no room for questioning the L ord’s 
righteousness either in his threat or in his punishments.^®
As in Ex 32:10, the L ord also proposes to make Moses into “a nation greater and 
mightier than it” (Num 14:12). Yet Moses has no interest in becoming great 
(cf. Ex 32:1 iff.). Rather, he is concerned about the L ord’s reputation among the nations as 
being faithful and merciful in his dealing with Israel (Num 14:13-19; cf. Ex 32:1 Iff.).^*
Hebrew literally means “shade, shadow” perhaps “a metaphor for divine protection, attested 
elsewhere (e.g., Pss 91:1,121:5) and supported by the verb surme'al, ‘depart,’ used of divine withdrawal 
(e.g., 1 Sam 28:15; Judg 16:20)” (Milgrom 1990: 109). See also Ashley 1993: 250; Levine 1993: 364.
Perhaps Moses and Aaron, and Joshua and Caleb. Cf. Milgrom 1990: 109.
^  Milgrom (1990: 109) suggests the translation “Let me” instead of “I will.” He says, “The verb should be 
taken as cohortatives, equivalent to” what is found in Ex 32:10: “Let me be, that my anger may burn, etc.” If 
so, the L or d  here can be seen as “actually cuing Moses in his role as intercessor and intermediary,” just as in 
Ex 32:10 (Milgrom 1990: 109).
Milgrom (1990: 113) applies this expression not to the threat, but to the actual punishment pronounced and 
carried out against Israel (32:23ff.).
This assumes the corporate nature o f sin and punishment, so that even infants incur guilt and punishment 
by virtue of solidarity with sinning parents and by implication, contamination by their sin.
Newing (1987: 220-221) subdivides these two concerns that Moses has into five elements which he sees 
correspond to “the five major theological motifs of the Pentateuch: exodus, presence, promise, revelation, and 
protection. Some of the rabbis believe that this term is an allusion to the guardian angel appointed over each 
nation, a belief that has firm support in Scripture (e.g., Deut 32:30-31).”
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Consequently, Moses appeals to the greatness of God’s character as revealed on Mt Sinai 
(Ex 34:6-7) and requests divine reconciliation (Num 14:19; see the discussion of the term 
n ^ O  below). In response, the Lord “modifies his proposed judgment ,reinforcing it 
with an oath. The defiant and rebellious older generation who were counted in the census 
and refused to take up the battle will die in the desert (v.29) while wandering there for forty 
years (v.34). Their children, too, will suffer, but they will ultimately inherit the promised 
land from the L ord.
After the pronouncement of divine judgment, the men who are responsible for 
spreading evil reports are immediately struck down (14:37). In addition, a large number of 
the Israelites “fall by the sword” (v.43) as they try to conquer the land in presumption 
(v.44f). Their defeat marks the beginning of the death of the older generation in the 
wilderness. De Vries helpfully explores the theological significance of this defeat. “The 
defeat before the Amalekites and Canaanites was allowed to stand as a judgment upon the 
entire episode.”^^
De Vries concludes from the defeat of Israel by its enemies “on the verge of 
entering the promised land” that God must have been exceedingly angry with Israel and 
Israel’s sin must be interpreted as outright apostasy. Whatever the exact nature of Israel’s 
sin, it must be sufficiently taken into account in order to draw a fair interpretation of the 
Lord’s actions and character in this Chapter. I will now turn to the text’s description of 
Israel’s sin.
3.4. Israel’s Sin in Numbers 13-14
The narrative of Num 13-14 plainly and amply testifies to the gravity of Israel’s sin. 
Strong words are used to indict the Israelites for their manifold and grievous sins. I will 
highlight some of them here.
Newing 1987:221.
De Vries 1968: 57.
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(1) Israel is found guilty of The term "[1  ^occurs only in Ex 15-17, Num 14- 
17, Josh 9:18 and is usually translated as “murmur,” “grumble,” or “mutter.” However, 
these translations are not satisfactory in drawing out the theological significance of the 
term. In this narrative, six times the term is used-four times by the L o rd  in 
Num 14:27,29 and twice by the narrator in v.2,36—to describe Israel’s raising of its voices 
against the L ord in abusive accusation and bitter protest. The usual translations, “murmur” 
(Holladay), “grumbling” (NIV), “mutter” (IPS), and “complain” (NRSV), therefore, are 
not adequate for capturing the confrontational, condemnatory, and riotous nature of 
people’s p y  against the L ord, which is seen in the narrative (14:1-4).
In the narrative, Israel’s consists of (a) “banding together against the L ord” 
(14:35), (b) a death wish (v.2), (c) “attributing an evil motive to the L ord” '^* (v.3), and 
(d) a wish to return to Egypt (v.4). (a) That “all” (^3 , v.l3:26; 14:l,2[twice],5,7,10) Israel 
like a mob “banded together against [the L ord] ” D*’*7Çl3n, 14:35) to protest (p ^ ) 
against the L ord “as one person” is clearly stated in 14:2 and well depicted throughout the 
narrative, (b) As Timothy Ashley states, by “wishing to have died in Egypt or in their 
journey thus far” Israel “implicitly denied Yahweh’s salvation and providential care.”^^
(c) The Israelites’ grotesque accusation that God intends to kill them and enslave their 
wives and children shows Israel’s “fundamental misunderstanding of Yahweh’s 
character.” ®^ (d) Their intention to “appoint” (HJHi) a new “leader” (0X1)^^ and return to 
Egypt is anti-LoRD and “anti-Exodus” (v.4). Rashi points out that Rabbis understood the 
Israelites’ intention to go back to pagan Egypt as an indication that they intended to turn to
Ashley 1993: 245. 
Ashley 1993: 245.
36 Ashley 1993: 245.
The JPS translates this as “Let us head back for Egypt.” Alternatively, it can be rendered “We should 
choose a leader [i.e. a head]” (NIV). Milgrom (1990: 108) points out that “Hebrew natan ro'sh, literally ‘set 
the head,’ may be equivalent to natan lev, ‘set the heart’ or ‘set the mind, decide’ (cf. Ecc l:13,17;cf.
Neh 9:29). Alternatively, natan, in the sense of ‘appoint’ (e.g., Gen 41:41) would mean ‘appoint a leader,' 
implying insurrection, a complete break with Moses—and with God (cf. v.9). For the defecting militia to 
succeed, new leadership would be required.”
Levine 1993: 377.
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idolatry.^^ The “defecting militia” will need another leader if their return to Egypt is to 
succeed/^ Thus, whatever the exact English equivalence, the term y h  powerfully 
communicates bitter protestation, condemnation, and confrontation.
(2) The Israelites are indicted for “disbelieving 14:11) and “not
listening” v.22). They refuse to believe in the L orD’s power that the L orD
demonstrated through the signs and wonders in Egypt, in the wilderness, and at Sinai. 
Instead, they listen to the distortions of the ten spies (13:31-33; cf. 13:27-29). By not 
listening to the truth spoken by the two (13:30; 14:7-9), they end up disobeying 
(Wpi^ 14:22) the L orD’s commandment to fight.
Thus, gripped by fear, deception, and anger, the Israelites refuse to fight the holy 
war. Instead, they are ready to fight and stone the L o rD’s leaders (14:10). By refusing to 
fight as the L orD’s army, they in effect discharge themselves from the L orD ’s army. Thus, 
those who are twenty years old and older (14:29), who are of fighting age and counted in 
the first census (Num 1:3; cf. 14:29), are excluded from the promised land.
(3) In these various ways, the Israelites have “spumed,” “rejected with scorn,” 
(Holladay), or “despised” (RSV) (yX], 14:11, 23) the Lord.'^  ^ The term points to 
Israel’s utter rejection of the L orD . In rejecting the L o rD , the Israelites are in effect also 
rejecting the promised land, their identity as Abraham’s descendants and God’s treasured 
possession (Ex 19:6), and indeed their covenant relationship with the Lord."^  ^ Their sin of 
1^ X3 is rooted in the Israelites’ over-indulgence in an exaggerated sense of pettiness and in
Rashi (1930) on Num 14:4. Egypt, after all, was a land of idolatry, and their return there would amount to 
a rejection of Yahweh and his miraculous deliverance from Egypt. Alternatively, Levine ( 1993: 363) 
suggests “forming a column” for idol worship “because Hebrew rosh has this specialised meaning 
(Judg 7:16; 9:34, 43)."
Milgrora 1990: 108.
Sakenfeld (1975: 321) points outs that yX] in the piel (as in Num and in 12 other occurrences Num 16:30; 
Deut 31:20; 1 Sam 2:17; 2 Sam 12:14; Isa 1:4; 5:24; 60:14; Pss 10:3, 13; 74:10, 18; Jer 23:17) refers “without 
exception to the despising or spurning of God or o f something sacred to him.” Levine (1993: 364) concurs 
with Sakenfeld when he says that the verb “seems to be reserved for the human-divine encounter. One 
‘spurns’ God and his laws, just as God ‘spurns’ people in his wrath.”
Coats 1968: 146-48, points out that Israel here is refusing to be God’s people; see also Sakenfeld 1975,
329.
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their sudden forgetfulness of the unambiguous demonstrations of divine power and 
faithfulness. The L orD’s display of his invincible power accentuates Israel’s guilt of 
unbelief and contempt. Katharine Doob Sakenfeld points out from evidence elsewhere in 
the Old Testament that “despising” (’f  X3) the L orD “is not a casual sin for which expiation 
can be made (1 Sam 2) or for which repentance will automatically remit the consequences 
(2 Sam 12).”^^
(4) Israel is found guilty of “prostitution” (fllJT, 14:33).'" As Ashley points out, 
“The verb zana, ‘to engage in sexual relations outside of or apart from marriage,’ and its 
derivative nouns {zenunim, zenut, etc.) are common words to describe apostasy and 
idolatry.”"^  ^ Ashley adds that the present context however “emphasizes lack of 
commitment and loyalty to Yahweh rather than loyalty to other gods.”'^  ^ Their present 
idolatrous intention to go back to Egypt, a land of idolatry, might also be in view.
(5) Lastly, the L orD judges Israel not only for the present rebellion, but also for all 
the past rebellions. Thus, the L orD charges Israel for “putting (God) to the test”"^  ^(HD]) 
“ten times” 1 ^ ^ , 14:22), that is persistently and repeatedly ,or “over and over”
again.'^  ^ Ashley’s insightful comment on “putting to the test” (1103) is helpful here:
In Exod.l6 God ‘tests’ Israel by withholding food in the wilderness. By 
their dependence upon God (finally), Israel is proved to be faithful. Here, 
however, it is God who is ‘tested’ by Israel. God has already proved 
himself to be faithful and powerful many times by giving the divine 
presence (God’s glory) and by working miraculous acts (God’s signs) before 
Israel’s eyes. Yet, the Israelites continue to ‘test’ God by disbelieving that 
he can bring the people into Canaan.
Sakenfeld 1975: 322.
Levine (1993: 370) takes a view that: “The verb zanah [literally] means to commit a harlotrous or improper 
sexual act (Lev 21:14; Deut 23:19).”
Ashley 1993:266, drawing from Phyllis Bird.
Ashley 1993: 266.
Holladay 1988.
Levine 1993: 368.
Ashley 1993: 260.
Ashley 1993: 260.
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The wilderness wandering tradition testifies to the fact that Israel’s constant and repeated 
“testing” of the L orD involved all the sins delineated above: grumbling, complaining, 
protesting, accusing God of having evil motives, being abusive to God and leaders, rioting, 
rebelling, disbelieving, doubting, disobeying, despising, rejecting the L orD , and turning to 
idolatry. These are all the ways in which Israel tried and provoked the L ord “over and 
over.” Rightly, then, the L ord refers to Israel as the “evil or “wicked community”
( n rn n  n n ? ,  v.27,35).
As made plain in my discussion, Israel’s sins are manifold and indeed grievous.
The Israelites’ sins cut “at the root of their relationship to God” and require God’s 
righteous response.^' The Israelites’ continuous state of rebellion is the essential 
background to understanding the exchange between Moses and the L ord that occurs in 
Num 14:13ff.
4. A Contextual-Theological Exegesis of Numbers 14:18: The Theological 
Function of the Echoed Terms and the Question of Divine Constancy
With an understanding of the context, extent, and nature of the echo, I can now 
examine the function of the echo in Num 14:18 as quoted by Moses and acknowledged by 
the L ord in the narrative. In Ex 34:6-7, God revealed his attributes to Moses. In Num 
14:18, Moses quotes from that divine revelation as a ground for his intercession for Israel 
whom God has threatened to destroy. Three key questions are raised by this reuse and will 
be answered in the course of my contextual-theological reading of the passage. (1) Is 
Moses’ use of the formula in any way foreign or incompatible to its meaning and function 
as found in Ex 34:6-7? Specifically, does Moses’ use of the formula ignore the judgment 
“side” of the formula as Brueggemann claims? (2 ) Is the L o rd ’s implied use of the echo 
different from Moses’ use of the echo? Specifically, does the L ord ignore the mercy “side”
Sakenfeld 1975: 322.
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of the formula? Put differently, do the terms of patience, love, and forgiveness have any 
real function in the L orD’s dealing with Israel, particularly with the older generation?
(3) Is there any consistency in the L o rD ’s acts both in relation to Ex 34:6-7 and within 
Num 14? Most importantly, in the light of this passage, are God’s acts of forgiveness and 
punishment compatible with each other or contradictory?
These questions will be answered in the course of analysing Moses’ intercession 
and the L orD’s response to it. I will first treat Moses’ intercession which appeals to the 
greatness ( l i b )  of the L orD’s attributes revealed in Ex 34:6-7.
4.1. In Moses’ Intercession: The Function of the Echoed Terms
Moses’ intercession, of course, is precipitated by Israel’s sin and the L orD’s harsh 
but just response to the sins of Israel discussed above. As mentioned, Moses’ intercession 
rests first and foremost with his concern for the L o rD ’s reputation before the nations and 
especially before Egypt,^^ Israel’s former oppressor and the great power of the day (v.l3- 
15; cf. Ex 32:12). The concern for the L orD’s reputation in Egypt and among the nations 
did not originate with Moses but with the L orD himself. It was the L orD’s desire and 
purpose that the Egyptians will know that he is the L orD and that there is no one like the 
L orD, the God of Israel (Ex 6:2; 7:5,17; 8:22; 10:2; 12:12; 14:4,18). The L ord ’s purpose is 
to show his power so that his name will be proclaimed in all the earth. If the L ord destroys 
the people of Israel “as one person”^^  (or “all at one time” NRSV), then the nations who 
have heard about it will say, “Because the L ord is not able to bring this people into the land
Although Egypt is the only nation mentioned in Num 14:13-14 (as in Ex 32:12), v.l5 mentions “the nations 
who have heard about you.” This corresponds to the more universal concern for God’s reputation implied in 
Moses’ comment in Ex 33:16b.
The same idiom is used in Judg 6:16; 20:1, 8, 11; 1 Sam 11:7; 2 Sam 19:15; Ezra 3:1; Neh 8:1 (see Ashley 
1993: 257).
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he swore to give them, he has slain them in the wilderness” (14:16). '^  ^ In other words, the 
nations would charge the L orD with impotence and cruelty.^^
The nations stand to watch whether the L orD is indeed powerful enough to drive out 
the powerful residents in the land and give it to his people. Before the L orD can display to 
the nations his mighty deeds once again (by bringing his people to the land promised), the 
L orD must exert another kind of power— power to be patient, loving, forgiving, and 
disciplining.
Therefore, Moses makes his request:
Let the power of my Lord be great (*’3nX n b  X3"^'n3']) as you have 
declared,saying “The L orD is slow to anger, great in covenant love, 
bearing iniquity and rebellion. Yet, not altogether clearing the guilty, he 
visits the iniquity of the fathers upon the children and the children’s children 
to the third and the fourth generation.”
Moses requests that the L orD demonstrate his power (T fb) by no other way than revealing 
his merciful and just character^^ by (1) showing his patience, (2) steadfast love, (3) sin- 
bearing, and (4) merciful retribution.
However, the omission of such phrases as “a God compassionate and gracious,” 
“faithfulness,” “keeping steadfast-love to thousands” reduces the formula’s abundant 
emphasis on mercy in its context of Ex 32-34. As Milgrom rightly states, “Since the 
formula is curtailed even more drastically elsewhere . . .  it stands to reason that only those 
portions are quoted that are applicable to the situation.”^^  If so, the omissions “are due to 
the particular nature of Moses’ plea. He did not ask for the cancellation of punishment but 
only for its postponement.”^^  The text gives no clear indication that Moses is asking the
Rashi fills out a potential scenario: The Egyptians would tell the inhabitants of Canaan that God was unable 
to being his people into the land because “the inhabitants of the land are strong and mighty” (Rashi on 
Num 14:16).
Rashi on Num 14:14,20. See also Ashley 1993: 257; Levine 1993: 365.
As Sakenfeld (1975: 323) rightly recognises, the phrase “as you have said” “is clearly intended to refer to 
Ex 34:6-7.”
Cf. Ashley 1993: 257.
Milgrom 1990: 111.
Milgrom 1990: 111.
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L orD to clear all consequences of sin from Israel at all. Rather, the L orD is being asked to 
be great in power to effect justice by punishing Israel appropriately.
This point is buttressed by two further observations. First, Moses does not make an 
unqualified protest against divine threat in Num 14 as he did in Ex 32:12. In Num 14, 
Moses says only, "If you put this people to death as one person . . . ” (v.l5). This shows 
that Moses’ concern is probably not with the L orD’s intention to put the rebels to death but 
with the all-inclusive, immediate, and final nature of their destruction "as one person” or 
perhaps “all at once” (NIV). Second, Moses quotes most of the second half of the formula 
about God’s punishment (i.e. about not acquitting the guilty and visiting iniquity), which is 
the punitive side of the divine attribute “jealousy” (Num 14:18b; cf. Ex 34:7b).
Against Brueggemann, then, Moses’ quotation from the judgment or jealousy side 
of the formula should not be written off as irrelevant on account of the interpreter’s 
speculation about what Moses’ real intentions are. It is true that Moses follows his 
quotation of the formula with a request for forgiveness (H^D) and loyalty: “Please forgive 
(n^O) the iniquity of this people according to the greatness of your steadfast covenant love 
(‘lO rt), just as you have bome/forgiven (X 0 3 )  this people from Egypt even until now” 
(v.l9). This shows that Moses is concerned to ask for divine grace. Yet this does not 
necessarily mean that Moses regards divine jealousy and punishment as irrelevant or 
altogether excluded. As I already have shown in Chapter 2, divine mercy and jealousy are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather, within divine grace, there is room for the 
divine righteous will to punish the sinner, sometimes severely.
Thus, Moses’ request is that God would show divine strength according to the way 
delineated in the L orD’s self-revelation in the formula. This means all the divine attributes 
or characteristics mentioned in 14:18 —God’s patience, love, sin-bearing, and
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punishment—are expressions of the greatness of God’s power in this context.^^ Thus, 
while the formula’s great emphasis on mercy is somewhat reduced here in Num 14 (by way 
of omission of many terms), it is nevertheless powerfully present. Conversely, while v.l9 
appeals directly to the L orD’s loyalty and forgiveness, the L orD’s greatness in power to  
punish is equally accentuated.
I will now explain the four divine attributes in relation to the term n b .
(1) The L orD’s power is to be revealed specifically in restraining his punishing 
wrath, however justified that wrath may be. Hence, God’s sovereign power is most closely 
related to God’s patience (D')SX ^HX), the attribute with which the list of attributes 
opens.^  ^ Moses’ request then is that the L orD exercises his power of patience by 
restraining from the immediate and utter destruction of his people.^^ This will overcome 
the surrounding nations’ potential charge that the L orD destroyed Israel because the L orD 
lacked the power to deliver the promised land to Is ra e l .T h e  L orD has already shown 
patience in many ways in Ex 32-34, and here by allowing Moses a chance to intercede for 
Israel.
(2) In addition to patience, God’s sovereign power is to be displayed through God’s 
great covenant love lO n . Moses here does not appeal explicitly to the Abrahamic 
covenant as he did in Ex 32; nevertheless such an appeal is implicit in the use of the 
attribute ID n . As already mentioned, IDIl is closely tied to the L orD’s covenant oath to 
Abraham to bless his descendents, and through them, the nations (Gen 15, 17). This means
^  This stands against Fishbane and others in respect to “mighty in power” in Nah I. For Fishbane (1977:
280) “mighty in power” is a language of war, and for the majority of commentators, it refers to the severity of 
punishment.
Accordingly, the Jewish Publication Society’s Tanakh English version translates the phrase 
■'HK n S  as “Let the L or d ’s forbearance be great” (Italics mine). As Levine suggests (1993: 366),
n s  (“power”) also connotes “restraint” or “the strength to restrain the use of destructive power.” Levine 
explains, “This nuance is expressed in Nah 1:3: ‘YHWH is long tempered and of great forbearance {ugedo 
koah)' On this basis, yigdal-na koah YHWH could mean ‘let the forbearance of YHWH grow great!”’
(See Chapter 5 for the parallel phrase in Nahum 1:3.)
cf. Milgrom 1990: 109, who sees nb as “the strength to hold back from destroying Israel.”
® Levine (1993: 366) points out, “The logic of Moses’ argument, here and in Ex 34:6-7, is that God’s 
reputation as a compassionate divine being, as well as a powerful one, will suffer if Israel perishes.”
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even when Israel is faithless, the L o rd  will remain faithful to Israel. If the L o r d  were to 
destroy Israel “as one person,” the L o rd  will be proven to be unfaithful to his own covenant 
promises. Thus, the covenant love “Ipn is invoked again in v.20 to move God to reconcile 
(n^p) Israel once again, even as he has done all along since the time of Egypt.
(3) God’s sovereign power also is to be shown in divine sin/punishment-bearing
Xpi). If the L orD were to be long-suffering with Israel and affirm covenant 
love to Israel who has fundamentally rejected the L orD and his covenant, the L orD also 
needs to exert his great strength in sin-bearing. As pointed out already (in Chapter 2),
Xpi means to bear iniquity and rebellion and its consequences, that is, to suffer 
punishment. By patiently suffering the wrong done, the L orD would defer, limit, or remove 
the punishment. In this context, the term n b  and the expression D0S1 ]ii? together 
point to the L orD’s sovereign power to bear sin and suffer punishment so as not to pay it all 
back on the sinner. "^^  Without this, Israel would be “wiped out,” “destroyed” (HnO), or 
“cut off” (Dpp).^^ With this, Israel would receive the covenant love (1011) of God.
(4) Finally, the L orD’s sovereign power is to be displayed in the L o rD ’s holding 
sinners accountable for their sin ( I jp r  x b  njp]l) and “visiting the iniquity” upon them 
(D’S a i 'S s i  Q -'glW -yr n 'lax  The people’s sin is
exceedingly great and begs a divine just response. The L orD thus far has borne the brunt of 
Israel’s sin and punishment, but now is the time for “visiting the iniquity.” The l b  here 
stresses that the L orD would indeed severely punish those that are persistent in their 
defiance and contempt. The L orD’s powerful “visiting the iniquity” would result in the 
Israelites bearing the brunt of their own iniquity, rebellion, and punishment
Ashley (1993: 257) also understands it as connoting the strength to be merciful and forgiving to the wicked. 
Sakenfeld 1975: 327. See below discussion on the term and its theological importance in relation to 1*70.
^  Levine (1993: 366) suggests the translation “he reserves the punishment” for the expression h v  "IpB, which 
would place the emphasis on the postponement of the punishment.
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(D0D1 Xto3-V .3 4 ; cf. V.33). Since the L orD is also great in patience, covenant ID H , 
and sin/punishment-bearing, the covenant would be preserved and the manner and extent of 
punishment tempered by patience and mercy.*’^
In sum, the expression “make your power great” and the echoed terms of the 
formula function together to appeal comprehensively to God’s sovereign power in patience, 
steadfast covenantal love, sin-bearing, and punishment. There is a logical and harmonious 
relationship between the divine attributes: The L orD’s patient sin-bearing will allow the 
L orD to preserve his covenant relationship with Israel within which the L orD  will severely 
yet mercifully punish and discipline his people. Thus, the entire formula can be seen as “a 
plea to God’s mercy” in God’s just dealing with his people.^® Such dealings with Israel 
will result in the international recognition of the greatness of the divine character. The 
nations will come to know not only the L orD’s power to defeat the foe (such as Egypt), but 
also the L orD’s power to forgive the foe (such as Israel).
Thus far, Moses’ usage of the formula is shown to be compatible with the formula’s 
meaning and function in its context. More specifically, it is shown that Moses is not 
ignoring “the negative side” of the formula as Brueggemann claims. Rather, Moses 
emphasizes equally divine patience, steadfast covenant love, sin-bearing, and jealousy. As 
it was shown in Chapter 2, these characteristics of God are not only compatible with one 
another, but also function in unity and harmony with one another. The question now is 
whether this point can be affirmed in the L orD’s response to Moses’ intercession. 
Brueggemann thinks not. Yet the following analysis of the L orD’s response will show that 
divine attributes in fact function in unity and harmony, while emphasizing one attribute
This sense is conveyed by what Rashi on Num 14:18 says in regard to God’s being “slow to anger,” 
namely, that God exacts punishment “little by little” as opposed to “all at once” (v.l5).
The rabbinic interpretation is helpful in this regard. As Milgrom (1990: 393) says, “[T]he rabbis believed 
that the entire formula—even its conclusion of vertical retribution—is a plea to God’s mercy. Note this 
example: ‘R. Judah said: A covenant has been made with the thirteen attributes (Ex 34:6-7) that they [Israel] 
will not be turned away empty-handed [when they recite them], as it says, ‘Behold I make a covenant’ (Ex 
34:10)’ (RH 17b).”
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over another at certain times. God does vary his response not because he is unstable but 
because different situations call for different responses. Thus God adjusts his response 
sometimes emphasizing his patience other times his wrath, both of which are expressions 
of his goodness (Ex 33:19).
4.2. In the L ord’s Response: The Function of the Echoed Terms and 
the Compatibility of Divine Mercy and Justice
The question now is how does the L ord respond to Moses? Will the L ord indeed 
make his power great in terms of patience, love, sin-bearing, and retribution? Will the 
L ord show all the attributes Moses calls upon, particularly to the older generation? For the 
answers to these questions, I turn to 14:20ff.
In response to Moses’ request for “forgiveness” (Xyn^O and in X ÿ 3 , 14:19), the 
L ord does forgive v.20). Yet as Brueggemann correctly observes, the L ord adds
an important “nevertheless” (D^IXI; v.21) and pronounces severe punishment in v.22-37. 
God declares his intention to make the Israelites gradually pay for their own sins. God 
pronounces an extended period of punishment. God sentences those twenty years old and 
above to wander for forty years in the wilderness, a punishment that will not be completed 
until the older generation perishes in the wilderness (v.21ff).^^ Not only will the older 
generation die in the desert, but their children will also suffer for forty years due to their 
parents’ faithlessness and rebellion.
Such a juxtaposition of divine forgiveness (n*pD) in v.20 and divine punishment in 
v.21ff begs an explanation. The question is: How can God forgive the people and then 
punish them severely at the same time? Is this, as Brueggemann suggests, a theological 
contradiction in the text and in the character of the L ord? After reaching the 
“nevertheless” in v.21, one wonders whether God has really forgiven or taken back his
Sturdy (1976: 105) says that “forty years” is often used as a round number to indicate a fairly long period 
(the average period of human life), and is used here as the time needed for one generation of men to die off. 
Whatever the term “forty years” exactly signifies, within this period of time, the older generation will die off 
for their repeated rebellion against the L o r d .
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forgiveness. God’s forgiveness (H^D) appears to be “meaningless because punishment is 
announced almost in the same breath.” *^^ As Brueggemann says, it appears that the L o r d ’s 
steadfast love is shown to Israel up to v.21, but after that “Yahweh’s righteous will parts 
company from Yahweh’s steadfast love” (307). In v.21ff God only appears to mete out 
punishment, and God’s patience, steadfast covenant love, and sin-bearing seem to have no 
power or function whatsoever. Brueggemann states, “There is no spillover of graciousness 
outside of [the] embrace of Yahweh’s righteous will” (307).
Thus, punishment and forgiveness appear to be “seemingly irreconcilable options” 
(271). Indeed, Brueggemann’s interpretation shows that he regards them as actually (not 
just seemingly) irreconcilable options, saying that where the L ord’s act of punishment 
begins is where the L o rd’s patient fidelity ends.
However, a closer reading of the text does not support Brueggemann’s view that 
forgiveness and punishment are contradictory or that God’s forgiveness is 
meaningless from v.21 onwards. Rather, all of the divine attributes quoted by Moses do 
have a significant function in v.21ff. I agree with Brueggemann that both merciful 
forgiveness and punishing jealousy are clearly and inescapably present in the text.
Numbers 14 lays more or less equal emphasis on the two theological themes of God’s 
power to forgive (clearly the primary point in Exodus) and his power to punish Israel, even 
after forgiveness has been granted.^^ Therefore one cannot resolve the apparent theological 
contraction simply by subordinating one of the two themes to the other or by silencing one 
theme by the other.
The resolution to the apparent theological contradiction lies in the proper 
understanding of three interpretative issues: (1) the term H^D, (2) the function of the
™ Sakenfeld (1975: 317) recognises the possibility of such an interpretation and refutes it.
If anything, greater emphasis is placed on the latter, surely in terms of the proportion of verses treating this 
theological theme of punishment. A stronger emphasis on judgment is also felt by the fact that 
“compassionate and merciful” is left out in Numbers. This goes against Fishbane (1989: 347) that Num 14 
lays a decidedly stronger emphasis on mercy over judgment.
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contextual echo “glory” (1135, v.22), (3) and the subtle function of the echoed terms of 
divine patience, steadfast love, sin-bearing, and retribution in v.21ff. The third point will 
be explored in  relation to the three parties the L ord  addresses in the v.21ff.
4.2.1. In the Meaning of 1^ 0
An important aspect of the resolution of the seeming contradiction lies in a 
contextual interpretation of the term h S o , which is translated “to forgive” (14:19,20).^^ As 
Baruch A. Levine rightly points out, “The verb salah is always said of God, who retains the 
exclusive prerogative of forgiveness for offences against him, just as humans retain that 
prerogative for offences against one another.”^^  Several commentators have offered a 
plausible interpretation of the term that is supported by the context and that does not 
involve any contradiction between forgiveness and punishment.
For example, Timothy Ashley offers a helpful interpretation of the term H^D: “By 
forgiveness neither Moses (v.l9) nor Yahweh (v.20) means to indicate that Israel’s 
punishment will be avoided or cancelled, but only that the fundamental covenant 
relationship between Yahweh and Israel will be maintained from Yahweh’s side.” '^^  In 
addition, Milgrom suggests, “The problem can be resolved if the verb salah is understood 
as denoting reconciliation, not pardon.”^^  Similarly, Sakenfeld observes in a helpful article 
on the “Problem of Divine Forgiveness in Numbers 14”:
It is essential to recognise that the real content of God’s forgiveness here [in 
Num 14:20] is in the non-destruction of the people, in the very continuation 
of his relationship to the community as his community, in the decision not to 
create a new nation of Moses or of anyone else and not to disinherit the 
presently constituted conununity of God.^^
Levine (1993: 367) points out that although the term n*7D is “functionally translated ‘to forgive,’ [it] 
probably means ‘to wash, sprinkle,’ as we know from its cognates in Ugaritic and Akkadian... The notion of 
cleansing is extended to connote God’s forgiveness.”
Levine (1993: 367) points out that n*7D is used for offences that “cannot be ritually expiated,” that only can 
be “washed” or forgiven by God.
Ashley 1993: 259.
Milgrom (1990: 112) rightly says that “the revelation of God’s attributes in the original passage (Ex 34:6- 
7)” does not result in pardon, “yet the covenant is renewed (Ex 34:10).”
Sakenfeld 1975: 326.
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The interpretation of n^D as denoting reconciliation and preservation of the 
covenant rather than pardon and cancellation of punishment is worth exploring in more 
detail. Here, I will follow Sakenfeld’s detailed discussion. Sakenfeld notes that the verb 
n b o  may be translated in various ways, depending on the context. Most importantly, 
Sakenfeld notes that the verb “regularly has to do with the preservation of the 
fundamental covenant relationship, rather than simply with eliminating some particular act 
of punishment (e.g., Jer 5:1,7; 31:34; 50:20).”^^  Accordingly, Sakenfeld states, “In 
Dt 29:19 Israel is warned that God will cut off, not forgive (slh) an individual who 
worships other gods.” Deuteronomy 29:19 offers a clear example in which “cutting off’ 
(n n û l, cf. Ex 32:32) from covenant relationship is the opposite of Accordingly,
n^D  in a context like Num 14 is best interpreted as God’s free act of maintaining his 
covenant relationship with Israel in view of Israel’s covenant breaking. As long as such a 
sense is kept in mind, it could be translated as “forgive.”
Sakenfeld’s observations are helpful in comparing and contrasting Moses’ use of 
n*pO in Ex 34:9 and in Num 14:19 in their respective context. In each case, the request for 
n b o  is made immediately following the theological generalisation about divine character 
given in the formula or its quotation. In each case, Moses’ request for H^O is made with 
an appeal to divine covenant love 1DH. In the case of Ex 34, God’s response is covenant- 
renewal or covenant-preservation: “I am making a covenant” (34:10). In the case of 
Num 14, God grants H^O, preserving Israel, and the conquest of the land is assured 
although in the next generation.
The narrative context thus points to the fact that the preservation of God’s covenant 
relationship with his people is the real content of requested by Moses and granted by
See Sakenfeld (1975: 327) for other usages and translations of the term H*pO in other contexts. 
Sakenfeld 1975: 327.
Sakenfeld 1975: 327.
Sakenfeld 1975: 327. In Ex 32:32, a contrast is made between the L o r d ’s sin/punishment- 
bearing/removing (DnH£5n RtSri) and Moses’ being “cut o ff’ or “blotted out” C’^ np) from “the book.
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God in both Ex 34:9ff and Num 14:20ff. Yet there is a difference between the two texts.
In Ex 32-34, n ^ D  is granted after punishments and the withdrawal of the L ord’s presence 
from Israel’s camp (33:5ff.). After n*pO is granted, only the demand for obedience and 
exclusive worship of the L ord is issued and a threat of destruction for idolatry implied 
(Ex 34:14); there is no more punishment. In Num 14, there is a reversal of the order; 
appears first, and then the appropriate measure of punishment follows. This difference 
does not present a theological contradiction since the basic meaning of the term is 
sustained in both texts. It may be that in Ex 34 the punishments meted out before H^D are 
sufficient so that there is no need for further punishment after H^D is granted.^^ In 
Num 14, if the L ord were to require all appropriate measures of punishment to be meted 
out before granting reconciliation, the L o rd’s presence would have to leave Israel’s camp 
for forty long years. In Num 14, since God has already revealed his way of dealing with 
sin in Ex 34:6-7 and since Moses has made an appeal to it, God’s response of can be 
expected. God can be trusted to make his word good by granting according to his 
merciful nature (although the timing and the nature of the punishment cannot be predicted).
So then, the fact of severe divine punishment following in Num 14 is not a 
contradiction of divine nature or divine forgiveness. In fact, what can be asserted here is 
that the granting of divine Pl^D means divine retribution will be necessarily tempered by 
m ercy .T h is  interpretation of n b o  is consistent with the interpretation of X03, which 
appears in the echo of Num 14:18 and in its context in 14:19. This term includes the idea 
of divine atonement without excluding the possibility of divine punishment. Accordingly, 
it is appropriate for God to hold the Israelites accountable and to punish them for their sin 
in a limited measure in the context of covenant relationship (either broken or maintained); 
there is no contradiction here. When the context is allowed to determine the meaning and
This is consistent with the statement given in Ex 32:34: “When the time comes for me to punish, I will 
punish them for their sin.” When the L o r d  grants n*7D in Ex 34:9-28, the possibility of future punishment 
spoken in 32:34 is not necessarily or automatically repealed.
Cf. Milgrom, 1990: 396.
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nature of H*70 apart from a priori assumption that n*7D excludes punishment, the text 
allows for a more theologically coherent interpretation of the whole text. As seen in the 
diagram below, the content of 11*70 requested and granted is best seen not as a withdrawal 
of all punishment, but as preservation of the L o rd’s covenant life with Israel as a nation 
(note the chiasm). This is consistent with what is found in Ex 34.
Diagram of Num 14:13-45 and Its Interpretation;
Moses ’ Requests:
A. Moses requests the L ord not to destroy Israel all at once (v. 15) but to make divine 
power great in terms of divine patience, steadfast covenant love, sin-bearing, and 
jealousy (v.l8); this means Moses requests that the L ord punish his people only in a 
manner congruent with his strength in patience, covenant love, sin-bearing, and 
justice.
B. Moses requests that the L ord forgive/reconcile (11*70) according to the greatness of his 
covenantal love (v.l9)
The Lo rd’s response:
B’ The L ord forgives/reconciles (1*70) Israel as a whole. Accordingly, total and 
immediate destruction is withheld, so that covenant relationship can continue with 
Israel as a whole. In this context, punishments are meted out to various groupings of 
the community according to their culpability.
A’ (a) The older generation will eventually perish in wilderness and will not inherit the 
land, except for the righteous Caleb and Joshua (v.22-30, 32-35).
(b) The younger generation is preserved and receives the reconfirmation of the 
promise of the land but suffers on account of their parents’ sin (v.31,33).
(c) The spies who gave evil report are destroyed in a plague, except (again) Caleb and 
Joshua (v.36-38).
(d) The older generation goes to war in presumption and gets defeated (v.40-45).
In conclusion, then, within God’s n*7D “there is still room for punishment, for 
carrying forward God’s retribution in response to the community which ‘despised’ him.”^^  
One must steer clear from the “tendency to associate forgiveness of sin with deliverance 
from the human distress imposed by God.” "^* This tendency may be largely a contemporary 
Western one—an intuition that is foreign to the Old Testament. God’s grace in preserving 
sinful Israel “need not be precluded or even cheapened by punishment of the
Sakenfeld 1975: 326.
Sakenfeld 1975: 317.
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community.”^^  Rather, divine grace provides the context in which divine punishment is 
meted out for the purpose of making his people holy.
4.2.2. In the Glory of the Lord
Another key to the harmonious understanding of divine character and actions before 
and after “nevertheless” is found in the function of the term 1135 in 14:21.
It is noteworthy that the two oath statements immediately follow the strong 
adversative: “Nevertheless—as I live, and all the earth is filled with the glory o f the Lord"' 
(v.21), “As I live” C3X"'!!) typically begins an oath formula (also in v.28)^^ which 
indicates that the pronouncement that follows is irrevocable.^^ This is the L o rd’s final 
verdict. What is unusual and striking is the second oath formula, which appeals to the 
“glory” of the L ord that fills all the earth.
The term 1135 can be seen as a contextual echo of the same term in Ex 33:18: 
“Then Moses said, “Now show me your glory.” As I discussed in Chapter 2, divine 
“glory” (1135) in Ex 33:18 refers to all of God’s “goodness” (31CÛ) which is revealed to 
Moses in audible terms in Ex 34:6-7. The connection between the term “glory” in 
Num 14:21 and Ex 33:18 yields the interpretation that the “glory” here refers to the 
revelation of his character (just as it does in 33:18).^^ As already mentioned, divine glory 
includes his righteous will to discipline his people (Israel and nations alike) by punishing 
sins. If the earth is to be filled with the glory of the L ord, the earth is bound to experience 
and know divine judgment as well as all the other aspects of divine glory or goodness.
What is significant is the fact that the expression “the glory of the L ord fills all the 
earth” or very similar phrases occur four other times in the Old Testament in Ps 72:19,
Sakenfeld 1975: 327.
For the L o r d ’s oath taking by his own life, see Num 14:28; Deut 32:40; Isa 49:18; Ez 5:11; Zep 2:9, See 
Gen 22:16; Isa 45:23; 54:9; 62:8. For people taking an oath by the life of the L o r d , see Ru 3:13; Judg 8:19; 
1 Sam 14:39,45; 19:6; 25:26,34; 28:10; 2 Sam 15:21; Jer 4:2.
Cf. Milgrom 1990: 110.
^ See Gray 1927: 158. The “glory” as the L o r d ’s “visible presence”; see Levine 1993: 367.
For various interpretations of the oath statement, see Milgrom 1990: 112.
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Isa 6:3, Isa 40:5, and Hab 2:14. Each of these passages reveals both divine salvation for 
the righteous and judgment for the unrighteous. Where the glory of the L ord is revealed, 
divine judgment and salvation are revealed. If the whole earth is filled with divine glory, 
then by necessity there will be both judgment and salvation.
The divine oath formula that appeals to divine glory conveys the L o rd’s concern 
and purpose for his fame and reputation in all the earth. This is the concern that Moses 
raised in Num 14:13-16 and in Ex 32:12 as a basis for his intercession. If the above 
analysis is correct, the fame of the L o r d’s name depends not only on divine salvation, but 
also on divine judgment. Since the revelation of the name niîT] includes not only divine 
mercy, but also divine judgment (according to Ex 34:6-7), we have additional reason for 
thinking that both mercy and judgment are involved in the context of the echo in Num 14. 
Even as the L ord’s glory or goodness fills the earth, the L ord will act in accordance with 
who he is. In his freedom to be compassionate and gracious to those deserving destruction, 
the L ord chooses to affirm his covenant life with Israel. In the context of that mercy, the 
L ord decides to mete out the appropriate measure of punishment (which is severe in this 
case). Through the L o rd’s dealing with Israel, the rest of the world can come to know the 
powerful character and deeds—and thus glory—of the L ord.
The foregoing discussion is a response to Brueggemann’s claim that the divine 
decision to punish arises exclusively out of the L o r d ’s “self-regard.” God’s self-regard, 
presumably expressed in a concern for his international fame, allegedly excludes any kind 
of regard or concern for others, i.e. for Israel or humanity. According to Brueggemann, 
divine “self-regard” deactivates divine care for others. Such a view, of course, is related to 
his point that where punishment begins is where I p n  stops. Yet I have begun to show that 
the “fame” of the divine name is inseparably connected to the redemption of Israel and the 
nations. In other words, whatever “self-regard” God might have is inseparably connected 
to “other-regard” or I p n .  God’s concern for his name, therefore, is not selfish but
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self-giving.
I have begun to show the compatibility of divine forgiveness and punishment and 
the function of the echoed terms above. Now I will give a more detailed explanation of 
how the L ord’s patience, love, and sin-bearing are affirmed even in punishment of the 
various groups of Israel: the older generation, the younger generation, and the faithless 
spies (following the textual order in Num 14). Each is punished, not according to God’s 
arbitrary whim, but according to their degree of culpability.
4.2,3. In the Punishment of the Older Generation
In the L ord’s judgment upon Israel, the L ord said that no one in the older 
generation who was counted in the census for the battle and refused to fight for the land (in 
addition to all the other sins listed above) would see the land (14:29).^*  ^ As the older 
generation of Israel emphatically repudiated the L ord , the L ord repudiates them.^* Thus, 
Brueggemann claims, “In this text [14:21ff] there is not an ounce of room for steadfast love 
outside of adherence to Yahweh’s commanding authority” (307).
To be sure, the older generation does receive a rather severe punishment. The L ord 
emphatically declares that they will “bear their iniquity and punishment”
(D?*’nili5“nX IXton) for forty years, “until the last of their carcasses is down in the 
wilderness” (14:33-34). In Ex 34:7 and Num 14:18, the L ord is said to be “bearing” the 
brunt of “human iniquity and punishment,” but in the declaration of 14:34, this particular 
attribute seems irrelevant, ineffective, or inactive. In addition, the L ord seems to be 
determined to be present in Israel as a rather antagonistic, disagreeable, unpleasant God;
^  Milgrom (1990:113) identifies those who are exempt from God’s oath of punishment, in addition to Joshua 
and Caleb. They are Moses, Aaron and the Levites. He points out the fact that the Levites were not counted 
in the census or represented among the scouts. Milgrom also lists Eleazar, Aaron’s son and successor, who 
was “assuredly over twenty at the time of the census (cf. 3:32; 4:16) and yet is vouchsafed entrance into the 
land (e.g.. Josh 24:33).” However, it is probably best to attribute Eleazar’s safe passage to the fact that he is 
one of the many Levites who were exempt and/or that he belongs to Aaron who is exempt. That is, it is 
reasonable to assume that all the family members of Moses, Aaron, Caleb and Joshua were exempt by the 
principle of collective solidarity in both blessings and curses.
De Vries (1968: 54) says this of the entire people of Israel.
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God says, “for forty years . . .  you will know my frustration CnX13n"nX D n51’’1)” 
(14:34). As Milgrom points out (‘’1X131) literally means “my frustration” or “the 
annulment of My intention.”^^  The expression “my frustration” may refer to how the L ord 
frustrated the Israelites by thwarting their plan first to go back to Egypt and then to conquer 
the land and by ultimately letting them live in the wilderness for forty years. The L ord is 
annulling his earlier promises to this generation of Israel regarding the land. Thus, there 
really seems to be no evidence for divine mercy in the L ord’s harsh punishment of the 
older generation. Yet the following considerations will show elements of divine mercy 
(patience, steadfast covenant love, sin-bearing) even in God’s severe punishment.
(1) If, as Brueggemann claims, 1 0 1  were entirely absent from 14:21 or from the 
L ord’s judgment of the older generation, then Israel or the entire older generation would 
have been immediately destroyed, “cut off” from the covenant. The mere fact that life 
continued for Israel and for the older generation demonstrates the L ord’s great covenant 
love i o n .  Even a rebellious Israel cannot cause the L ord to rescind his covenant. Thus, 
the L ord permits the older generation to live a normal life span.
Milgrom rightly says, *'hesed stands for God’s constancy. His fidelity to His 
covenant with Israel.”^^  Covenant fidelity is not simply about maintaining a covenant 
relationship in some loose sense. Covenant fidelity involves the specific terms o f the 
covenant. One of the covenant terms is that the L ord will hold the sinner responsible for 
sin committed (Ex 20:5; 34:7b). Therefore, in the context of an affirmed covenant 
relationship, not only is there room for punishment, but the L ord has the obligation (a 
painful one) to punish and discipline the rebellious. The compatibility of divine 
punishment and mercy in God’s relationship to the older generation is found not only in the
Milgrom (1990: 115) points out, ‘The versions [Targum Onkelos and Targum Jonathan] recoil from such a 
bold statement and adopt euphemisms, ‘you murmured against Me.’” Levine (1993: 370) calls attention to the 
fact that the hiphil of the root K13 (from which the feminine noun Drives) “means ‘to negate, deny, 
treat as nothing’ (Num 32:7; Ps 141:3). This verb also occurs in legal contexts, connoting the annulment of 
vows (Num 30:6,9,12).” He then suggests the translation “the denial” for the term.
Milgrom 1990: xxxvii.
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fact that their life and covenant relationship with God is affirmed, but also in the fact that 
they are still largely held responsible for their sin.
(2) An additional support for the compatibility of divine punishment and mercy in 
God’s relationship to the older generation in Num 14 is found in the divine attribute of sin- 
bearing (Î?ÜD1 XtoD, v.lS). "^  ^ That is, during the forty years of life in the wilderness 
that the L ord now requires of Israel, the L ord continues to bear the weight of Israel’s sin 
and guilt. While the text in Num 14 does not spell this out, the fact that God continues to 
sustain the life of Israel, including the older generation for forty years, surely witnesses to 
such a reality. Without the L ord bearing in some sense Israel’s sin, guilt, and punishment, 
Israel would need to bear all. The consequence of the latter would likely be a total and 
immediate destruction of Israel.^  ^ Consistent with his divine attributes, the L ord will in 
some sense bear Israel’s iniquity and suffer its consequences X0Î) during the 
forty years of the older generation’s extended life. In this sense, the forty years of 
punishment is also a time of divine self-giving in the form of sin-bearing. Divine 
retribution is thus tempered by divine mercy.
(3) The L ord’s righteous dealing with Israel is also harmonious with divine 
patience (Q")SX TjlX) in Num 14. The L ord’s “long-suffering fidelity” does not end 
where divine punishment begins as Brueggemann suggests (307). Rather, the L ord’s 
“long-suffering fidelity” in sin/punishment bearing is the very context within which the 
L ord metes out the terrible consequences of sin. The L ord is simultaneously long- 
suffering (in affirming the life of Israel and bearing its sin) and punishing (in letting the 
older generation perish in the wilderness). The L ord  suffers long as he belabours, so to 
speak, under Israel’s sin and guilt for forty long years. The L ord suffers long also because 
his people remains hostile and rebellious to God all throughout their life in the wilderness
^  For a general treatment of this theological theme of God suffering because qf his people, see Fretheim 
1984: 107-126. Fretheim also considers God’s suffering under the motifs o f God suffering with and for his 
people (see 127-148).
Cf. perhaps the revolt of Korah and others narrated in Num 16.
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as the narratives following Num 14 testify. Letting the older generations live out their 
natural span of life is an act of mercy which comes at a cost to God himself. Understood 
from this perspective, the divine decision regarding the reconciliation and punishment of 
the older generation reflects something of “Yahweh’s generous solidarity,” contrary to 
what Brueggemann suggests (271).
(4) There is another element that testifies to what Brueggemann calls “Yahweh’s 
generous solidarity” even after the pronouncement of divine judgment and even during the 
forty years of life in the wilderness. First of all, after receiving the L ord’s verdict, instead 
of humbling themselves, the older generation immediately acts in defiance and obduracy. 
They now try to conquer the land. They do this against the L ord’s strong warning of their 
sure defeat and humiliation (Num 14:41; cf. Deut 1:42). What is significant is that the 
L ord’s warning expresses the Lord’s desire that they do not go to battle in presumption, 
that they do not experience humiliating defeat, and that they do not perish. Likewise, in 
Num 18:5, the L ord expresses his desire not to break out in anger and destroy Israel, thus 
providing a way to prevent his wrath from falling on the Israelites a g a i n . I t  stands to 
reason that the Lord gave the warning because the L ord did not want his people to perish 
prematurely.^^ Thus even during the forty years of wilderness wandering, the Lord’s 
earnest desire for Israel is life, not death. The fact that the L ord continued to provide 
faithfully for all the Israelites, old and young alike, during their life in the wilderness amply 
testifies to this (Deut 8).
(5) There is yet another evidence for the compatibility and harmony between divine 
mercy and retribution. It is in the content and nature of punishment. This will further 
deflate Brueggemann’s charge that the older generation receives nothing of divine lOH or 
generous graciousness (307). The content of the punishment of the older generation or the 
consequence of “bearing [their own] iniquity” is their exclusion from the promised land.
This is done in the context of just having destroyed Korah and his family for his rebellion (Num 16). 
This is in continuity with the L o r d ’s expressed desire not to have to destroy Israel found in Ex 3 3 :3 ff .
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The mercy in the punishment is found in the fact that they are allowed to live their normal 
life span—“forty years” which is the time that is required for the older generation, twenty 
years old and up, to die. In this sense, in Num 14 the L ord’s punishment of Israel takes the 
ironic form of letting Israel reap the fruit of their sinful words. The Israelites wished they 
had died in the wilderness. In mercy, the L ord spares them immediate destruction, and in 
justice tempered by mercy God lets them gradually pass away in the wilderness. This is 
divine mercy, even in the context of severe punishment.
(6) At this point, it is worth reiterating the fact that the older generation does 
receive severe punishment. As De Vries points out, the punishment in Num 14 stands out 
because the “element of divine punishment is not prominent in the murmuring stories.”®^ 
The punishment in Num 14 stands out also in contrast to Ex 32-34 where after the covenant 
renewal in Ex 34 no further punishment is carried out. This prompts the question of what 
accounts for the increased severity of the divine punishment in Num 14. The answer is 
twofold: the gravity of the present sin and the accumulation of sins over a period of time.
It is not a reflection of inner confusion or irreconcilable options within God.
In Exodus, Israel committed its first national idolatry—a single, one-time sin. In 
Num 14, Israel’s sin is greater in that it involves emphatic repudiation of the L ord, of the 
L ord’s promise, and of their inheritance. In addition, Num 14 is at the end of a period in 
which Israel’s sins had “accumulated” for an extended period without full punishment. In 
Ex 32:34 the L ord said that “the time would come for punishment,” and, in the narrative 
section of the Pentateuch, the punishment in Num 14 appears to be the first episode of 
comprehensive, corporate punishment that falls on Israel after the golden calf incident.^^ 
Such factors would show that in Num 14 Israel might well be getting punished for an 
accumulation of sins, including the golden calf incident itself—which was never really
DeVries 1968:54.
In earlier chapters in Numbers we find the L o r d ’s anger towards Israel being halted by intercession or 
perhaps deferred until later (e.g. 11 : Iff)-
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fully punished (Ex 3 2 :3 4 ). Further, the L orD’s claim that Israel had tested him “these ten 
times” (Num 14 :22 ) confirms that some sort of accumulation of sin is in view. Israel’s 
rebellion and guilt have reached an extreme measure that calls for the eventual death at 
least of the adult generations. As such, the narrative context of Num 14 (especially from 
Num 11) is a demonstration of the L orD’s patience with Israel. The L orD does not act or 
punish in sudden anger but defers punishment until an appropriate time.
Israel incurs punishment in Num 14, not because of the enduring nature of divine 
punishment (because with repentance and faithfulness, the L o r d  can be persuaded not to 
punish), nor because God’s mercy parts company with judgment, but because the enduring 
nature of Israel’s sin can no longer be tolerated. Yet even then, the punishment in Num 14 
allows “the conquest of Canaan to proceed, albeit with some delay.” By extenuating the 
period of punishment, the L o r d  allows for the emergence of a new Israel who can conquer 
the promised land (see below).
The L o r d ’s promise to mete out severe (although mitigated) punishment to the 
older generation in Num 14 is an important witness to the L o r d ’s righteous will to hold his 
people accountable for their sin. In his commentary to Numbers, Levine points out that the 
expression H p r X*7 np31 “emphasizes his punitive tendency . . .  Its usage in biblical 
Hebrew parallels that of similar terms in Aramaic and Akkadian, all expressing the notion 
of ‘cleansing’ or clearing away guilt, debt, and obligation.”*®* By punishing Israel or by 
making it bear its sin, guilt, and consequences, the L o r d  makes Israel in some sense atone 
for or clear away its own sin. The L o r d  will eventually punish those who continually rebel 
against and “test” the L o rd . The L o r d  will not confirm his promises to those who are 
rebellious.*®  ^ Yet, since this severe punishment meted out to the older generation occurs 
w ith in  th e  c o n te x t o f  r e c o n c il ia t io n  a n d  r e c o n f ir m e d  c o v e n a n t r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  th e  L ord ,
""Levine 1993: 381.
Levine 1993: 366.
See Gen 18:19 for the contingent nature of the divine fulfillment of his promise to Abraham upon the 
beneficiaries of the covenant.
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this punishment remains as an example of how God’s mercy and punishment are 
compatible. Thus, I have shown that the textual witness supports the harmonious nature of 
divine mercy and retribution/justice.
4.2.4. In the Punishment of the Younger Generation 
I now turn to a consideration of the punishment of the younger generation.
Although less severe, the punishment they receive is in some ways more difficult to 
reconcile with divine mercy. In the L o rd’s pronouncement of judgments, the L ord says 
that the children will enter and “know the land” (Num 14:31) but they will bear their 
parents’ unfaithfulness or “fornication” (DD‘’ni3T"DX 1Xt2?3V, v.33), that is, suffer the 
consequences of their parents’ sin. The fact that the seemingly innocent younger 
generation suffers along with their parents raises the question of whether God is acting 
justly.
4.2.4.1. “The Whole” versus “Parts within the Whole”
Before I consider the issue of justice directly, I want to point out a feature that 
Num 14 shares with Ex 32-34. What stands out in both narratives is a contrast between the 
L o rd’s initial response to Israel’s sin and the L o r d ’s later response following Moses’ 
intercession. The L ord initially indicts Israel as a single national entity, as a whole. The 
L ord’s corporate indictment of Israel is related to Israel’s collective understanding of its 
identity and relationship with God. It is helpful to recall Sama’s comment in this regard, 
which is quoted in Chapter 2:
The Israelite conception of itself as a community bound to God by a 
covenant has dual implications. Society is collectively responsible for its 
actions, and the individual too is accountable for behavior that affects the 
life of the community.
Thus, Israel receives blessing (or lOH) in collective solidarity down to the thousandth 
generation, and similarly and in contrast, Israel receives curses also in collective solidarity 
but only down to the third and fourth generations (Ex 20:5-6).
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In the case of Num 14 (just as in Ex 32), the collective solidarity of the Israelites 
implies that all have sinned and all are guilty. This is precisely the point the text itself 
emphasizes. The fact that all the people o f Israel were involved in the rebellion (either 
directly or in collective solidarity) is stressed by the repeated use of the term *75 “all”: “the 
whole community” (ni3Jn"*75,14:1a,2b), “all the Israelites” (*7X'lti?’’ •’33 *75, v.2a), “all 
the assembled congregation of the Israelites” (*7X1t?*) *’33 115 *7rij7“*75, v.5b), “the 
whole Israelite assembly” (*7X1t£}^ “*’33 115“*75, v.7a), “the whole assembly” 
(ni5n"*75, v.lOa). By the repeated use of comprehensive designations for Israel, the text 
amply emphasizes that all the people were guilty of rebellion.
Thus, in Num 14:12 (as in Ex 32:10), the L ord is ready to destroy “it,” and in v.l5, 
Moses pleads with the L ord not to destroy “this people . . .  as one person.” But the 
question is what is the exact referent of “it” in v.l2 or “this people” in v.l5. The answer is 
not stated explicitly, but the answer can be inferred through the following considerations. 
The text seems to make a rather clear distinction between the righteous leaders, Moses, 
Aaron, Caleb, and Joshua, and the rebellious “whole Israelite assembly.” The text does not 
make explicit whether the L ord is including Aaron, Caleb, and Joshua when the L ord 
threatens the destruction of “it” in v.l2. Yet, since these leaders stand in opposition to the 
rebellious assembly of the Israelites (13:26-14:10), and since the L ord’s glory appears to 
intervene for the righteous leaders who are about to be stoned by the angry mob of the 
Israelite assembly (14:10), it is reasonable to think that the L o rd’s reference to “it” in v.l2 
excludes Aaron, Caleb, and Joshua. Furthermore, the L ord’s desire to make Moses into a 
greater nation than “it” does not require the elimination of Aaron, Caleb, and Joshua.*®  ^
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the referent of the pronoun “it” in v.l2 and “this 
people as one person” in v.l5 is the entire assembly of the Israelites, excluding Moses,
In the case of Ex 3 2 , it is reasonable to conclude that Joshua, who was waiting for Moses at the foothill of 
Mt Sinai (3 2 :1 7 ) , is excluded from the L o r d ’s wrath. Moses being made into a great nation does not require 
the elimination of Joshua.
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Aaron, Caleb, and Joshua, and by the reason of collective solidarity, their extended 
families.
Assuming that my analysis so far is correct, I can now draw a contrast between the 
L ord’s initial threat to destroy the entire assembly of the Israelites who rebelled against the 
L ord and the L ord’s secondary response following Moses’ intercession. The general 
contrast drawn here is equally applicable to Ex 32 and Num 14. The L ord alters the course 
of action in response to Moses’ intercession for the rebellious Israelites. In the L ord’s 
initial threat, the L ord treats the whole rebellious assembly “as one person.” However, in 
the L ord’s later response, the L ord distinguishes between the parts within the whole, 
between those with greater guilt and those with less guilt (I4:20ff). In Exodus, the varying 
levels of culpability and punishment are not as clearly seen. Yet, all the sons of Levites 
distinguish themselves by responding to Moses’ call to rally around him and carry out the 
L ord’s retribution (Ex. 32:26ff). As a result, all the Levites receive the L ord’s blessing of 
priesthood (32:29), while others are punished in various ways. In Numbers, the different 
levels of guilt and punishment are much more clearly seen between the more culpable and 
the less culpable.
The ten scouts, who as “leaders of the Israelites” (13:3) “caused the whole 
community to grumble” against the L ord are put to death in a plague (14:36-37). The adult 
generation (who would have caused the children to rebel) will not see the land. However, 
the L ord will bring the children to the promised land although they will suffer for forty 
years along with their parents. The L ord’s varied response to different groups seems to 
reflect recognition of the various degrees of sin and guilt of various groups within the 
whole. Thus those who are less responsible, but incur guilt by collective solidarity rather 
than by active rebellion (such as infants), receive a lesser degree of punishment.
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4.2.4.2. Collective Retribution
At this point, I wish to raise the question of the extent to which “collective 
retribution” is at work in Num 14 and similar passages. It is true that commonly in the Old 
Testament, communal solidarity and corporate unity are taken for granted. In Ex 32-34, 
communal solidarity meant that even though some people (perhaps the Levites or the 
infants) may not have actively participated in idolatry, the sin of the majority of the people 
incurred guilt for the whole community. The sin of the majority affected even the 
righteous minority by virtue of solidarity. As Krasovec points out, underlying solidarity 
“implies . . .  communal responsibility (collective liability) and corporate guilt” and 
therefore “collective divine retribution.”’®"^
It is helpful to explain this collective responsibility and retribution by means of the 
cultic conception of contamination or pollution.’®^ The book of Numbers appears to 
presuppose such a conception at many points, including Num 14. If the whole community 
were polluted by the sin (despite some variation in culpability), the L ord  would be justified 
to destroy the whole people of Israel. Thus, according to this view of sin and its effects, 
the L ord is not acting capriciously when he threatens to destroy Israel, but according to 
justice. It follows that when the L ord decides not to destroy the whole community, the 
L ord is showing his mercy to the whole. In addition, the punishment of different groups in 
a mitigated way according to different levels of culpability is clearly to be interpreted as 
divine mercy.
More specifically then, the idea of communal solidarity and responsibility and 
“collective liability” may explain to a large extent the suffering of the children in Num 14. 
Even those children (such as infants) who are innocent of any unfaithful attitudes or actions
Kra§ovec (1999: 111) says this in relation to a clan or a family, but the principle applies to a nation (Israel) 
as well.
Milgrom’s discussion of the contaminating effects of the sinner upon the sanctuary may be applied to the 
whole nation (1990: 444ff.).
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tow ard  th e  L ord in cu r  g u ilt  an d  p u n ish m e n t w ith  th e ir  paren ts b y  v ir tu e  o f  c o m m u n a l or  
fa m ilia l so lid a r ity .
This is directly relevant to a contextual-theological interpretation of the echo in 
Numbers, because the concept of collective liability is a way of understanding the relevant 
clause: “He punishes the children for the sin of the fathers to the third and fourth 
generation” (v.l8b; cf. Ex 34:7b). According to this theological generalisation the Lord 
typically deals with a family, a community, or a nation as one entity, even if the levels of 
culpability are distinguishable and distinguished within that context. The narrative context 
of Num 14 stands in a harmonious relationship with this attribute and further illuminates its 
meaning.
The familial and national levels of corporeality in Num 14 correspond to the 
suffering of the younger generation. First, in the context of their families, the children are 
bound to suffer to some extent when their parents and grandparents are punished. One 
could say that the children’s suffering in the desert for forty years is a natural by-product of 
the parents being allowed to live their natural life in the wilderness. Secondly, the 
children’s suffering is an inevitable aspect of corporate “sowing and reaping” built into 
collective identity and existence. The suffering of a part is an inevitable part of the 
suffering of the whole. When a nation gets chastised for its national sins, all people 
belonging to that nation suffer. In this sense, the collective liability or retribution is part of 
the natural process of collective “sowing and reaping.”’®®
These points about familial and national corporate liability need to be qualified 
contextually. The specific forms of collective punishment are often situation-specific and 
person or group-specific. This allows for the differing levels of punishment within a 
nation. The varied punishment typically corresponds to varying degrees of culpability. It 
is, however, ultimately determined by the Lord’s freedom to be compassionate and
‘“ Krasovec 1999: 113.
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gracious to sinners (see Ex 33:19). The L ord’s decision will vary in different ways at 
different times according to his overall character, wisdom, timing, and purposes to redeem 
and restore all creation.
4.2.4.S. A New Generation Raised Up
There is another probable reason for the long duration of punishment that is implicit 
in the L ord’s actions. The L ord in his wisdom and mercy is allowing enough time for the 
numeric increase of new Israelite children, even as the older generation gradually and 
naturally dies in the wilderness.’®^ In addition, the new generations of Israelites will grow 
to the appropriate age and maturity for battle and conquest of the land. Furthermore, a 
slow and gradual death of the older generation prevents the younger generation from being 
made orphans in an instant, which would make their life unviable and the conquest of the 
land impossible. By allowing the parent generations to live their natural life in the 
wilderness, the children have the chance to grow into maturity. With the younger 
generations’ physical and numerical growth and spiritual purity and maturity,’®^ Israel will 
be able to conquer and inherit the land.’®®
In the larger canonical perspective, the book of Joshua is a telling testimony that the 
“new Israel” of the younger generations is different from the former Israel. The older 
generation perished in the wilderness and was purged out of Israel; the younger generation 
(and the children bom to them) evidently learned to obey the L o rd . Thus when it was their 
turn to take possession of the land under Joshua’s leadership, they demonstrated 
faithfulness and obedience to the L ord . They did everything as the L ord commanded 
them. Their faithfulness indicates that the younger generation’s harsh experience in the
However, the rest of the book of Numbers amply testifies that a good number o f the older generation died 
unnatural deaths as a result of continuing to provoke the L o r d ’s anger in the wilderness.
See below for punishment as cleansing and discipline.
Olson (1985) emphasizes that the structure and theology of the book of Numbers converge to offer a 
positive and hopeful perspective on the younger generation, on which the emphasis is placed from Num 26 
onwards (see 118ff, where he outlines the book’s structure). This stands in contrast to the negative portrayal 
of the older generation, treated in Num 1-25.
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wilderness must have cured them of any severely rebellious tendencies (“stiff-necked­
ness”) they might have learned from their parents. In this sense, divine punishment is 
disciplinary and is strongly positive. Krasovec rightly says, “The aim of punishment is to 
help develop their potential for faithfulness and service by providing a stronger 
motivation.”” ® This last point is also applicable to the L ord’s destruction of the ten spies, 
to which I now turn.
4.2.5. In the Destruction of the Ten Spies
To be sure, the L orD executes the ten spies who led Israel into decisive rebellion by 
rT lÿn“^ 3 “nX “causing the whole community to grumble against [the
L orD]” ’ ”  by spreading evil reports about the land.”  ^ This underlines the fact that 
sometimes the L ord will directly destroy sinners. This theme stands in parallel to Ex 32, 
where three thousand were killed by the Levites at the L ord’s command and an untold 
number were also killed by the plague from the L ord . In Ex 32 , those who are killed do 
not live to receive divine reconciliation with the rest of Israel. In Num 14, those spies who 
are killed do not live to see divine IDH or the reconciliation that is confirmed to Israel. 
They perish apart from (Ex 32) or within (Num 14) the reaffirmation of the L ord’s 
covenant love lO n . Either way, God deals a fatal blow because God fully “visits” their sin 
on them. To them, the L ord does not extend his covenant love. Therefore it is, here, that 
Brueggemann may suggest, “Yahweh’s righteous will parts company from Yahweh’s 
steadfast love” (3 0 7 ). But is such a judgment warranted?
The statement “Yahweh’s righteous will parts company from Yahweh’s steadfast 
love” (307) may work at the level of the human experience of those who are destroyed, 
since they do not live to receive in any sense the L ord’s covenantal faithfulness. Yet
Krasovec 1999:223.
Reading “caused (the whole community) to grumble. The Septuagint follows the Ketiv spelling
rendering “muttered against it (i.e. the land) to the community” (Milgrom 1990: 116).
Yet even they were not executed on the spot, or on the same day they began to lead Israel astray. They 
were executed after the L o r d  reconciled Israel to himself and pronounced his judgment upon the whole of 
Israel. This shows God does not rise in sudden fury as sinful humans do.
171
human experience of destruction is not evidence that the sovereignty and solidarity (or 
judgment and mercy) of the L ord have separated into two irreconcilable options within the 
divine character (as Brueggemann suggests). The L ord does destroy some within Israel. It 
is not, however, because the L ord’s steadfast love has parted company with the L o rd ’s 
righteous will. Rather, it is precisely because the L o rd’s steadfast love for Israel (and for 
the nations) is united harmoniously with the L o rd’s righteous will that the L ord destroys 
some sinners within Israel (or some nations among the nations). Let me explain this 
further.
The L o r d  has a purpose of blessing all nations through Israel. If Israel itself is 
corrupt, it obviously cannot bless other nations. Therefore, Israel first must be purified. In 
Num 14, the relatively immediate removal of the spies helps to purify the whole 
community of the worst elements of unbelief and rebellion against God. Their removal 
prevents them from inciting Israel further into more rebellion. Such an execution also 
would inspire repentant hearts and proper awe and fear of God in Israel. This would help 
them to choose what is right in God’s eyes thereafter. The concerns of punishing a 
criminal (by removal from the society) and deterring others from committing a similar 
crime are fundamental to even an imperfect human society with an imperfect and self- 
serving sense of justice, order, and peace. In his self-giving and righteous purpose to bless 
all the nations, God will purge sin and sinners out of his people Israel (and ultimately out of 
all creation). On the corporate level, God does maintain his steadfast love to thousands of 
generations of Israelites. Yet in the process of disciplining and purifying Israel, God will 
destroy some, especially those who are more responsible for sin (such as those who lead 
others into rebellion). Failure to establish justice in relation to sinners would actually 
constitute unfaithfulness to Israel and to creation at large. Therefore, even the severest 
punishment o f the L o r d  can be seen as inseparably and harmoniously united to the L o r d 's  
steadfast love, compassion, and mercy for both Israel and nations.
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The foregoing discussion brings me back to my first point. One may rightly speak 
of a phenomenological or experiential schism or contradiction within the human experience 
of divine mercy and judgment, since an individual may experience exclusively divine 
judgment (or exclusively mercy) at a given time. However, my point is that the 
phenomenological schism within human experience does not necessarily translate into an 
ontological schism within God’s character. As I have argued above, even the severest of 
divine judgment can be understood as in some sense proceeding out of divine steadfast 
love. In the language found in Ex 33:19ff and Ex 34:6-7, even divine “jealousy” or its 
expression in punishment is part of divine goodness. Put differently, even divine 
punishment proceeds out of divine compassion and grace shown in freedom, which, 
generally speaking, affirms the life of a people who deserve death. Admittedly, the 
assertion that “jealousy” and its punitive acts are part of divine goodness is a difficult 
concept. It certainly is not a concept readily accessible to a dualistic mindset. Yet the text 
bears witness to the mysterious reality of God’s goodness that includes “jealousy” and 
encourages the reader to look for ways of probing this mystery, which is what I try to do 
here.
4.2.6. In Divine Punishment as Discipline
Lastly, there is another important way to understand divine punishment in Num 14 
that is compatible with divine mercy and that emphasizes divine goodness. It has to do 
with a pattern of divine action into which Num 14 appears to fit. That is, that th e  L ord 
ty p ic a l ly  p u n is h e s  h is  p e o p le  to  c o r r e c t  o r  to  d is c ip l in e  th em . It is the L o r d ’s  way of 
teaching Israel (collectively) the righteous way in which they should go. The L o rd  had 
already shown to Abraham that Israel’s continued loyalty to the L o r d  is a condition upon 
which the L o r d  will bless Israel and the nations through it (e.g. Gen 17:9ff; see the 
discussion of the Abrahamic covenant in Chapter 1, section 5). The L o r d ’s discipline of 
the people of Israel as in Num 14 will help to purify rebellious Israel and make it into a
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holy nation (see Ex 19:6). Divine faithfulness to a sinful people necessarily means that 
God will bring a merciful and righteous measure o f discipline in order that the people 
might be holy and fulfil their holy destiny.
Other parts of the canon, especially Deuteronomy, pick up on this theme of Israel’s 
forty years of wandering in the wilderness. In particular, Deuteronomy 2 and 8 give further 
evidence that God’s retribution is harmonious and unified with divine mercy, for these 
passages see the forty years as a time not only of God’s discipline but also of God’s 
merciful provision:
Deut 2 : 7  The L ord your God has blessed you in all the work of your hands.
He has known your journey through this great wilderness. These forty years 
the L ord your God has been with you, and you have not lacked anything.
This passage asserts that during the forty years the L ord clearly cared for the entire 
nation of Israel. The L o rd’s continued faithfulness and compassion to Israel contrasts 
starkly with Israel’s continued rebellion and distrust as witnessed by the chapters following 
Num 14.
Deuteronomy 8 provides further commentary on the forty years:
Deut 8:2-7 You will remember all the ways in which the L ord your God led 
you these forty years in the wilderness, to humble you and test you to know 
what is in your heart, whether you will keep his commandments or not. ^He 
humbled you, he let you hunger, and he let you eat manna, which you and 
your parents did not know, in order to cause you know that not by bread 
alone do humans live, but by all that proceeds from the mouth of the L ord 
do humans live. "’Your clothes did not wear out on you and your feet did not 
swell these forty years. ^Know then in your heart that as a person 
disciplines his child, so the L ord your God disciplines you. ®Keep the 
commandments of the L ord your God by walking in his ways and by fearing 
him. ^For the L ord your God is bringing you into a good land.
In Moses’ words here, the forty years of wandering are recalled very positively. The L ord 
maintained his familial or covenant love both in provision to and in discipline of Israel. It 
is important to note that both provision and discipline are divine ways of self-giving.
Divine discipline by way of punishment is not for the benefit of the one disciplining 
(selfishness or self-regard) but for the one disciplined. Divine discipline is for the purpose
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of teaching what is right and prodding people to humility, purity, and maturity. The people 
who take the L ord’s discipline to heart are able to love, fear, and obey the L ord (even as 
Israel did under Joshua’s leadership). The L o rd’s discipline through punishment, when 
taken rightly, produces righteousness in God’s people.
Consideration of a quotation from Krasovec about the L o rd’s obligation to punish 
will help me to clarify my position further.
This obligation [to punish] does not proceed from the divine nature, for the 
only purpose of creation is salvation, and punishment is therefore a painful 
burden to the fundamental divine purpose.. . .  God is constrained, as a 
servant, to do something that contradicts the divine nature, being challenged 
by a people whose attitudes and intentions negate the very purpose of divine 
work.” ^
While I agree with the main thrust of Krasovec’s comment, it needs to be qualified in some 
of its details. I agree that the L ord in some sense acts as a servant to Israel in bearing the 
burden of their ongoing sin and rebellion to affirm their covenant life with God during the 
forty years in the desert. However, I insist, against Krasovec, that the divine obligation to 
punish does not cause God to do something that “contradicts the divine nature.” Rather the 
duty to punish proceeds from the divine nature of goodness (Ex 33:19; Ex 34:6-7). Divine 
goodness requires retribution and righteousness, and it thus metes out punishment in the 
face of sin. True, had not humankind been sinful, the L ord would not have the obligation 
to punish. Yet had not God been holy, powerful, just and righteous, God would not bother 
with the ominous task of judging humankind mercifully and justly to the end of redeeming 
and restoring them. In this sense, divine punishment flows out of his very nature that is 
holy and good. That said, God’s basically merciful nature prefers not to punish unless 
necessary for the purpose of redemption and restoration.
Even as God implores through Ezekiel, God’s fundamental intention for creation is 
life not death (18:23,32; 33:11):
Krasovec 1999: 491.
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Eze 33:11 As I live, declares the lord L ord , I take no pleasure in the death 
of the wicked, but in the turning of the wicked from their way and live.
Turn! Turn from your evil ways! Why will you die, O house of Israel?
The destruction of the wicked is not God’s preferred way with sinners.” "’ Even the L o rd’s 
warning against defeat and destruction in Num 14:41 and the L ord’s expressed desire not 
to have to punish in Num 18:5 demonstrate divine suffering in punishing and divine 
reluctance to punish. Yet, while God’s desire is not to have to punish, God will punish 
where and when it is necessary.
In view of human sin, divine punishment is a necessary component, fundamental to 
the divine purpose of redeeming and blessing all nations and all creation. Divine 
destruction of sin and sinners is part of what is involved in God’s establishment of a 
kingdom of righteousness and of justice on earth. In sum, however painful it is to the L ord 
to punish, the L ord’s good nature and his good purpose of redemption and restoration of 
basically sinful humans require divine punishment.
In Deuteronomy 2 and 8, then, there is evidence of a wider canonical theological 
testimony to the theological truths, themes, and patterns regarding divine mercy and 
judgment that we observed in Num 14 (and before that in Ex 34). This does not mean that 
the whole canon of the Old Testament is uniform in these matters, but the texts examined 
do point to a far wider degree of theological convergence than Brueggemann has conceded, 
both in terms of the coherence of individual passages such as Num 14 and in terms of their 
relationship with other passages, especially Num 14’s relationship to Ex 34.
5. Concluding Remarks
Here, I want to summarize the main theological insights I have gained in this 
chapter. In keeping with that aim, I want to consider briefly how the theological findings 
in this chapter relate to the findings in Chapter 2. I will first consider how these findings
In Gen 6 , too, the L o r d  expresses deep anguish and regret in having to destroy all living things along w ith ,  
and because of, sinful humankind (Harland 1996: 83f).
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are basically the same in both cases. Then, I will consider how Num 14, while not different 
on theological fundamentals, brings out new issues and emphases related to God’s mercy 
and judgment. Before I turn to this comparison, I will offer a very brief review of Chapter 
2 regarding the formula in Ex 34:6-7 and its context.
In Chapter 2 ,1 have shown that Brueggemann imposes a false division between 
mercy and vengeance, or, alternatively, between solidarity and sovereignty, upon the 
formula and its context. In contrast to this approach, I have shown that all of the various 
divine attributes, while being distinct, together express God’s goodness and God’s 
sovereign freedom to be gracious and compassionate (Ex 33:19). Even God’s 
intergenerational or collective punishment (Ex 34:7b) is compatible with, and in some 
sense governed by, God’s merciful and patient character.
Now the question is whether that which held true in Ex 34 also holds true in 
Num 14. I argue that it does, despite some new points of emphasis in Num 14. In his 
comments on Num 14, Brueggemann demonstrates a similar deficient theological 
understanding of divine mercy and punishment as expressions of God’s faithfulness 
(commitment to Israel) and of God’s sovereignty (commitment to himself) respectively, 
God’s commitment to God-self and commitment to Israel are one, unified divine 
commitment, namely, the promise which God swore to Abraham (Gen 15) and to the 
patriarchs and reaffirmed in Ex 34. As was the case in Ex 34, then, the background to 
understanding God’s character is the understanding that God has made one central 
commitment to raise up a nation that will be a holy people to God (cf. Ex 19:5f) through 
whom the Lord will bless the nations and thus be glorified in all nations (cf. Gen 12:12f). 
To this end, the L ord deals appropriately with Israel. When the nation is lacking holiness, 
such as when it commits idolatry or rejects and rebels against the L o rd , the L ord 
disciplines the nation. Although the L ord’s discipline is severe, this is what is necessary in 
order to make a holy nation out of “stiff-necked” people. Thus, as testified in Ex 34 and
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again in Num 14, the L ord’s discipline does not fall outside of the overall “meta-context” 
of divine grace and compassion and covenant not only for Israel but also for all nations 
(and even for all living things: Gen 8:21; 9:12ff.).
In Abraham, the L ord made a decision to bless Israel and the nations through Israel, 
and the L ord will abide by that decision. To that end, the L ord commits himself to Israel 
to be both merciful and vengeful in sovereignty and freedom. Both mercy and vengeance 
constitute the sovereign and faithful L ord’s righteous dealing with his people. Sovereignty 
is thus not exclusively or even primarily about judgment and vengeance. Sovereignty is 
more about the L ord’s power to bless all nations through Israel despite human rebellion. 
That the human agents are rebellious means that God has the burden to punish and 
discipline them. Yet the L ord punishes in a manner that is gracious, compassionate, just, 
and purposeful. For God to cease to be gracious and compassionate would mean ceasing to 
be the God that God revealed himself to be in Ex 34:6-7.
Divine discipline or temperate judgment and punishment are integral parts of the 
goodness of God that blesses God’s people for all nations. God’s punishing righteousness 
therefore does not undercut or contradict God’s mercy and forgiveness, but rather sustains 
them.”  ^ It sustains them because God’s intention is for Israel and ultimately the nations to 
be a holy people standing in a righteous relationship with God. To this end, all of God’s 
attributes will remain constant and united in all of God’s dealings with God’s people. The 
portrayal of God in these important portions of Exodus and Numbers (both of which record 
major crises in Israel’s life with God) is not self-contradictory and dualistic, but united and 
self-consistent.
Besides these rather general considerations (that Num 14:18 more or less shares 
with Ex 34:6-7), there are at least three more specific contributions that this passage in
Childs 1992: 373.
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Num 14 makes to an understanding of divine mercy and judgment which were not 
emphasized in Exodus.
(1) In Num 14 divine power or sovereignty (113) is explicitly related to various 
aspects of God’s merciful and just character (as depicted in the quoted portions of the 
formula). Moses calls upon the LoRo to exercise God’s sovereign power in patience, in 
love, in sin-bearing, and in punishment.
(2) In Num 14 the relationship between n b o  and punishment is made clearer. The 
real content of 11*10 is the continuance of covenant life and reconciliation, rather than 
removal of punishment. 11*10 does not exclude the L ord’s righteous will to hold the 
sinner accountable. Within his freedom to bear and remove human sin and affirm life is 
also his righteous will to “visit” the sin back upon the sinner and hold them accountable. 
The compatibility of divine punishment and mercy expressed in FI*10 is found in the fact 
that Israel’s life is affirmed and its covenant relationship with the L ord maintained. That 
God chooses to bind himself in a covenant relationship with a rebellious nation expresses 
God’s ""surprising faithfulness.”” ® Within divine *1011 the covenant relationship, however, 
there is not only “room for punishment,” ’ ”  but also a requirement for punishment and 
removal of sin and sinners to establish a righteous people of God (as revealed in Ex 34:6- 
7). Severe punishment is carried out to some within Israel precisely because of the 
righteous requirement of God’s covenant relationship with Israel and with all creation. 
Punishment is meted out within the context of divine “1011 and mercy. Put differently, it is 
because God is bound to Israel in 1011 that the L ord punishes Israel to the end of 
disciplining it.
(3) Another theological contribution of the echo of Num 14 is to emphasize the 
varying degrees of sin and the varying degrees of punishment. Israel’s sin is the rightful
Sakenfeld 1975: 329. 
Sakenfeld 1975: 326.
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theological framework for the proper understanding of divine jealousy and mercy. The 
degree of severity of divine punishment upon various groups within Israel varies according 
to the culpability of each.
Tunyogi (1962: 385) comments that the narratives about the sinfulness of Israel illustrate “not the divine 
justice, but . . .  the divine grace.” I suggest, rather, that at least in Num 14, both divine justice and grace are 
equally evident, although justice (as punishment) functions within the overall context of grace.
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Chapter 4:
The Echoes In
Isaiah  53:4-12 and 54:7-10
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Translation of the relevant verses from Isaiah 53:4-12
53:4
7a
Red
He bore’ our sicknesses and carried our pains.
And we considered him plagued, struck by God, and afflicted.
He was pierced^ for our rebellions; he was crushed for our iniquities.
The punishment for our peace was upon him; and by his wounds we are healed. 
We all went astray like sheep; each to one’s way—we have turned.
And the Lord laid on him the iniquity of us all.
He was oppressed, and he was humbled.
He was cut off from the land of the living.
Because of the rebellion of my people,^ he was stricken to death."’
The Lord purposed to crush him and to pierce him.^
If his life makes® a guilt offering,
he will see offspring, and he will prolong days,
and the Lord’s purpose will prosper in his hands.
’ ’ Out of the suffering of his life, he will see the light^ and be satisfied.
By his knowledge my righteous servant will justify the many, 
and he will carry their iniquities.
Therefore I will apportion to him the many^ and the strong® he will apportion as spoil, 
because he poured out his life unto death and was numbered with the rebellious; 
for he bore/forgave the sin of the many, and he interceded for their rebellions ®
Words in regular boldface type represent quotations from Exodus 34:6-7 (although in this case, the 
quotations are repetitions of single words), while words in italics boldface type represent allusions.
 ^ “p ie r c e d ,”  su p p o rted  b y  LXX (€tpau |i.aT L O 0r|), V (yulneratus est), and S (’^ DpHQ). lQIsa“ h as
and IQIsa’’ b6nQ, but “On ne peut savoir si la graphie pleine de IQ-a ou la graphie détective de IQ-b 
impliquent des pronunciations de ce participle en puai ou en polal” (Barthélémy 1982 [vol. 2]: 396),
 ^■'py “my people,” supported by LXX XaoO poo, and also by IQIsa**, V, S, and Tg.
IQIsa  ^ODÜ), “his people.”
(“punishment for him”; so Childs 2001: 417, “was there punishment for him.”). Barthélémy 
(1982 [vol. 2]: 397-398) suggests UM “he was stricken to death” (after BHS), suggesting that the “taw” 
of m a y  was probably accidentally dropped. This reading is attested to by LXX, which reads q%8r| elç 
Gavaxov. Cf. Barré (2000:4), who reads 3ms pual after lQIsa“(10’7 Î751D).
 ^MT *’’?nn “to make sick,” from the root rather than (cf. 53a). Barré (2000: 5) points out that 
IQIsa® reads a derivative of SSn (in ’^ bfT’l) and suggests the polel infinitive with the 3.m.s. suffix, to
“coordinate with the infinitive IRS'!, which immediately precedes *'’?nn.
 ^MT □‘’ton “if you make” (taking D*'ton as 2ms, “you” being the L o r d ) . Barthélémy (1982 [vol .2]: 403) 
suggests, “if she makes,” with as the subject of the verb, which is supported by IQIsa**. “His life” is 
both the offerer and the offered.
 ^m x  added, thus reading FIX HXT*, after IQIsa^ '’, 4QIsa^, LXX (Barthélémy 1982 [vol. 2]: 403).
® Motyer (1993: 442) suggests treating 3  as beth essentiae.
 ^Motyer (1993:442) suggests treating FIX “as marking a direct object.” His reason is that “‘to apportion’
usually governs a direct object in the Bible.”
“for the rebellious,” supported by Th, Aq, Sym, V, S, and Tg, but “the LXX as well as all ancient 
Hebrew witnesses (IQIsa®, IQIsa’’, and 4QIsa‘‘) read the abstract noun with the 3*^  ^masc. pi. suffix,” thus, 
“their transgressions” (Barré 2000: 5). Barré (2000: 5) suggests the text originally may have had 
“their transgression,” as suggested by BHS, the final mem of which “the scribal tradition understood 
as the 3*^  ^masc. pi. ending.”
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Translation of Isaiah 54:7-10
 ^ For a moment I have left you,
but with great c o m p a s s io n  I will gather you.
 ^ In brief’ ’ wrath I hid my face from you for a moment,
but with everlasting covenant love I will have compassion on you, 
—says the Lord your redeemer.
® For this is the waters’^  of Noah to me,
which I swore the waters of Noah will not again covering the earth. 
So I swear’  ^not to be angry with you or rebuke you.
’® For the mountains will depart and the hills be removed, 
but my covenant love will not depart from you, 
and the covenant of my peace will not be removed.
—says the L ord , who has c o m p a s s io n  on you.
“ is Si hapax-logomenon. LXX piKpw and V momen/o. JDW Watts (1987) suggests “overflowing,” to 
avoid redundancy with 1731.
12 literally, “for waters of.” LXXhasàiro x o û  ü ô a to ç  t o u  eirC “from the waters upon.” Present 
translation reflects the proposal of *'733 (RSV, Whybray 1975: 186).
“I swear” instead of “I have sworn” after Whybray 1975: 186.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Overview of the Chapter and Its Argument
Isaiah 53:4-12 and 54:7-10 contain several theologically significant intertextual 
echoes of Ex 34:6-7 and its context of Ex 32-34. The echoes in Isaiah may not have been 
intentional allusions to the formula of Ex 34:6-7 (see my definition of an “echo” in 
Chapter 1), but the theological parallels highlighted by these echoes are illuminating for a 
canonical, theological understanding of divine mercy, judgment, and atonement.
I will explore the theological function of the echoes of Ex 34:6-7 in Isa 53-54, 
raising my thesis question: Are divine mercy and judgment compatible? Do they function 
in unity in Isaiah as they did in Ex 34:6-7 (Chapter 2), or is there theological discontinuity 
between Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes in Isaiah? What contribution do the echoes in Isaiah 
make to the understanding of divine acts and character?
I will proceed in an order similar to that found in Chapters 2 and 3. In the 
remainder of the introduction (1.2), I will state the theological problems raised by 
Brueggemann’s treatment of certain echoes in Isa 54. In section 2 ,1 will explore the 
literary and theological background of my two echo-texts (Isa 53:4-12 and 54:7-10). In 
this section I will move from the larger units of context (the book as a whole) to 
progressively smaller units of context (Isa 40-66 and 52-54). In section 3 ,1 will discuss the 
extent and nature of the echoes of Ex 34:6-7 found in Isa 53-54. I will show that these 
echoes are not quotations of Ex 34:6-7 but are repetitions of important constellations of 
theological terminologies and concepts.
In section 4 ,1 will undertake an extensive theological exegesis of the echoes in Isa 
53 and 54. In Chapter 3 (on Num 14:18) and Chapter 5 (on Nah 1:2-3), the theological 
exegesis of the echoed phrases will be integrated into discussions regarding the 
compatibility of divine mercy and judgment. An extended explanation of these echoes is 
unnecessary, because in Num 14 and Nah 1 the echoed phrases are direct quotations from
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Ex 34:6-7. However, the echoed terms in Isa 53 are largely thematic echoes in which the 
characteristics of the L ord are applied to the Servant. Thus, the meaning and function of 
those thematic echoes in relation to the Servant must be unfolded before discussing the 
relationship between mercy and judgment in relation to the terms that are echoed in 
Isaiah.’"’
Finally, in section 5 ,1 will conclude the chapter by giving a brief summary of the 
main arguments of the chapter.
1.2. The Problem Stated: Brueggemann on Isaiah 54:7-10 
Brueggemann gives focused attention to two verses, 54:7 and 8, which contain what 
he calls God’s “admission” of the abandonment of Israel and God’s subsequent 
“comeback” (310-311).’® Brueggemann raises several questions about these verses:
Does Yahweh continue to honour covenant commitments to Israel and 
practice steadfast love toward Israel right through the exile? . . .  Or is the 
reality of exile evidence that Yahweh has now, whether in legitimate 
indignation or in uncontrolled pique, terminated the covenant, only to move 
subsequently to renew it or make a new covenant? . . .  Can Yahweh’s self- 
regard result in the complete exhaustion of Yahweh’s vows of solidarity?”
(310; italics mine)
Although the “or’ in this passage suggests two alternative theological descriptions of how 
one is to understand the L o rd’s action in the exile, Brueggemann manages to answer all of 
the above questions affirmatively—thus establishing mutually contradictory claims. Such 
an interpretative practice is part of what characterises Brueggemann’s post-modern 
discussion of Ex 34:6f and its echoes.
Brueggemann’s apparently contradictory answers to his own questions are 
consistent with his claims as regards the self-contradictory character of God in his 
discussion of Ex 34:6-7. Brueggemann’s basic perspective on God’s character inclines him
Since Brueggemann does not interact significantly with Isa 53 in his Theology o f  the Old Testament, other 
scholars will be my primary interlocutors in my discussion of divine mercy and judgment as they relate to 
Isa 53. However, my treatment of the echo of Ex 34:6 in Isa 54:7-10 will interact critically with 
Brueggemann’s comments on Isa 54 as they pertain to the relationship between divine mercy and judgment. 
As in earlier chapters, the parenthetical citations in this subsection refer to Brueggemann’s Theology.
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to present contradictory and irreconcilable interpretations of biblical texts. In circular 
fashion, his dualistic interpretations of such texts then serve to support his remaking of the 
character of God as contradictory and irreconcilable. In what follows, I will contest his 
claims by looking at Brueggemann’s two diametrically opposed interpretations of 
Isa 54:7-8.
Brueggemann’s first interpretation of Isa 54:7-8 describes God’s faithfulness as 
co-suffering with Israel. God’s solidarity was never exhausted; it only took on a different 
form during Israel’s exile. “Yahweh’s covenantal engagement was deepened and 
intensified in pathos, through the reality of the exile” (299),’® and this is the “reason for 
Yahweh’s refusal to execute a termination” (299). Thus, the reason for Israel’s survival “is 
not to be found in Israel” (299) but in God’s persistent covenant commitment to Israel. In 
sum, there were both continuity and constancy in the Lord’s covenantal commitment to 
Israel through the exile. His faithfulness toward and love for Israel were not exhausted 
even in what looked like abandonment. On the contrary, his love and faithfulness not only 
took on a form of co-suffering with Israel, but also intensified through co-suffering.
Brueggemann’s second interpretation of Isa 54:7-8 offers a contradictory, opposite 
view. The L ord did in fact terminate the covenant. Yahweh’s solidarity was completely 
exhausted due to “Yahweh’s self-regard.” Such self-regard “requires the abandonment of a 
partner who exploited Yahweh’s fidelity too much for too long” (310). According to 
Brueggemann, the references to abandonment in v.7 and wrath in v.8 show radical 
discontinuity in God’s covenantal commitment to Israel (310). God makes a kind of 
comeback after the abandonment, but this is no credit to God. Rather, it is by the strength 
of Israel that Israel is reconciled: “Israel hoped beyond the hope or intention even of 
Yahweh, who had no such hope or intention for Israel. That is, Israel’s courage and 
shrillness, its defiance of its present circumstances, talked Yahweh into something Yahweh
Brueggemann notes that the term passion refers to “strong feeling, the kind we have noticed in jealousy’ 
(299). “But,” he continues, “it also refers to a propensity to suffer” for and with Israel.
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had not yet entertained or imagined or intended” (439; italics his).”  Reconciliation 
therefore has nothing positive to say about God, except that God was willing to be 
convinced by Israel’s better plan. The fact of abandonment, however, speaks profusely 
about God’s self-regard.
According to Brueggemann’s second interpretation, God’s self-regard is what 
“sanctions harshness,” such as the “massive act of destroying Jerusalem” (384) or the 
abandonment of Israel to harsh exile (311). This abandonment “is not harshness in the 
service of any rehabilitation. It is simply a departure from solidarity for the sake of self- 
regard” (italics mine) (311). God the wronged lover is committed to nothing other than 
self-regard (essentially self-honour) and thus “determines to humiliate, and finally to 
destroy, the erstwhile object of love” (384) until his “fury is spent” and “irrevocable 
damage has been done” (384). God’s passion for Israel “is no casual, formal, or juridical 
commitment” (384), but “has within it the seeds of intolerance, culminating in violence.” 
God “goes wholly overboard in passion, to Israel’s great gain and then to Israel’s greatest 
loss.” God’s passion is a “violent love, which ‘always hurts the one it loves’” (384).
In other words, God is hot-tempered and has no self-control, his acts of punishment (or 
“violent love”) know no justice or righteousness, and his love is violent and destructive.
To summarize Brueggemann’s two interpretations, then, Isa 54:7-8 witnesses to 
God as self-giving to Israel on the one hand and God as self-serving and unjust and violent 
toward Israel on the other. Isaiah 54:7-8 testifies to God’s sustained fidelity toward Israel 
and also to God’s ready abandonment in support of self-regard. Interpreted in the best 
possible light, these statements are consistent with Brueggemann’s more moderate 
statement, namely that “Yahweh’s sovereignty does not everywhere and always converge 
with fidelity, even though fidelity is finally powerfully affirmed” (311). But even this
This particular remark is made in relation to Isa 55:12-13; 1er 31:10; Ezek 37:12-14. In relation to 54:7-8, 
Brueggemann says the text does not give the reason for Yahweh’s comeback (311). But since Isa 55 is 
closely linked to 54, the reason for Yahweh’s comeback that Brueggemann gives in relation to 55 may be 
applicable here.
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statement is problematic, as Brueggemann himself indicates: “this testimony places at the 
center o f Israel's life a massive Holy Problem.'" And that problem is none other than “the 
problematic character of Yahweh” (311). The question is whether Brueggemann’s 
contradictory interpretation of God’s character and acts is true to Isa 54:7-8 and its witness 
to the Lord.
As already noted in previous chapters, Brueggemann tends to move from the 
particular to the general, sometimes making sweeping claims based on a particular detail 
without consideration of other relevant issues. Thus, Brueggemann usually discusses 
judgment and reconciliation while virtually ignoring the issues of sin and atonement for 
sin—as if judgment and reconciliation can be discussed apart from sin and atonement!’  ^
His discussion of God’s judgment and reconciliation of Israel as seen in Isa 54:7-8 is no 
exception. He shows almost complete inattention to the larger narrative-theological 
context of the passage—except, of course, when the context serves his bipolar 
interpretation.
In my response to Brueggemann’s interpretation of Isa 54:7-8,1 will carry out a 
contextual theological exegesis of Isa 53:4-12 and 54:7-8, the two echo-texts. I will 
interpret the two texts keeping always in mind their indivisible literary and theological 
relationship (see subsections 3.2 and 3.4 below). Each passage provides the most 
immediate literary and theological context for the other, chapter 53 (the Fourth Servant 
Song) for chapter 54 and vice versa. In addition, I will interpret the two passages with due 
recognition that the book of Isaiah provides a proper literary and theological context for 
them. Furthermore, I will assume the methodological principle (see Chapter 1) that a 
proper recognition of the general features of the larger literary and theological context is 
crucial in a proper interpretation of a particular passage. Therefore, the general truths
This inevitably involves an impoverished and distorted understanding of judgment and reconciliation and 
how each relates to each other. For example, Brueggemann tends to discuss reconciliation merely according 
to its surface meaning of a peaceful reuniting of God and Israel after estrangement, without significant 
probing as to the nature of the divine work of atonement that makes such reconciliation possible.
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gleaned from the large contexts will influence and direct my interpretation of the particular 
passages in 53-54.’® I now turn to a consideration of the literary and theological 
background of 53-54.
2. The Nature and Extent of the Echoes of Exodus 34:6-7 
in Isaiah 53:5-12 and 54:7-10
The echoes treated in this chapter, especially the echoes identified in Isa 53, are 
somewhat different in nature than the echoes treated in my Chapters 3 and 5. First, the 
echo-terms and -texts addressed in this chapter are characterized more by the repetition of 
the theological themes or patterns of the formula and its context than by quotations from 
the formula and its context. That said, verbal correspondences are evident as well, 
allowing these echoes to qualify as “strong echoes” (see my definitions in Chapter 1). 
Secondly, the echoes in Isa 53 and 54 are diffuse, not found in a single verse (as in 
Num 14:18). The echoes in Isa 53 and 54 are spread out over a unit or pericope composed 
of several verses, sometimes with intervening verses that involve no obvious 
correspondences to Ex 32-34. Because of the dispersed and variegated nature of these 
echoes, one could refer to them as “echo-clusters”—collections of diverse terminological 
and thematic correspondences to the formula.
Isa 53:4-12 and 54:7-10 contain a number of theologically significant intertextual 
echoes of Ex 32-34 and especially of the formula in Ex 34:6-7. These echoes may not have 
been intentional allusions to Ex 32-34 (again, see Chapter 1), but the theological parallels 
highlighted by these echoes are illuminating for a theological understanding of divine 
mercy, judgment, and atonement. In the rest of this section, I will further define the nature 
and extent of each echo or echo-cluster, beginning with Isa 53 and then turning to Isa 54.
In this aspect of my method, I tend to move (unlike Brueggemann) from the general (analysis o f literary 
structure and theological content of larger units) to the particular (the unit to be exegeted) rather than the 
particular to the general.
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(1) Isaiah 53:4-12 uses several times the three standard terms for sin and 
punishment D0S, rtKC I^l) that are used in Ex 34:6-7 (Isa 53:5-6,8,11,12). In 
addition, a word rarely used of God, K03, which appears in Ex 34:7, occurs twice 
(53:4,12). Although the exact expression riKÇni D0D1 Kiÿî found in Ex 34:7 does 
not appear in Isa 53, the constellation of expressions of sin-bearing expresses the idea of 
the phrase.
(2) In addition to the above strong echoes, there are a few terms that can be viewed 
as thematic echoes in Isa 53. The term “to bear” (*73D, v.4,11) corresponds to its synonym 
KiDl The term D1IÎK in 53:10 encapsulates in one word the Servant’s identity as one who 
bears and removes sin, and brings peace and healing. In that sense, the term ÛÇK can be 
considered a thematic echo of the expression HK^n*) K0Î in Ex 34:7. 
Likewise, the term DZB (“to intervene,” v.6) sums up the whole of the Servant’s mission of 
sin-bearing and removing, and therefore can be considered another thematic echo of
T T -  ; -  V T I T
It is noteworthy that the Servant’s voluntary act of sin-bearing is inseparably related 
to the L ord ’s laying (D'SBH) of human sin on the Servant (v.6). This act of God placing 
sin on the Servant corresponds to the concept of the L ord  “visiting” (*lj?B) iniquity and 
punishment on his people in Ex 34:7. The vast difference between the two passages lies in 
the fact that the iniquity and punishment the L ord  “visits” upon the Servant is not his own, 
but of others (“us all” and “the many”). In any case, the term “laid” (D'aSH) thematically 
corresponds to the term “visiting” (IpS ). The expressions “plagued, struck, and afflicted” 
(1 33121  n ? a  3 133 , V.4) and the terms “pierced” (‘7*7112, v.5) and “crushed” (X31Ç, v.5) 
describe the real effects of bearing the iniquity that is “laid” or “visited” upon the Servant. 
The Servant is held responsible and punished (101Q, v.5) for sin that is “laid” (or 
“visited”) upon him.
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(3) Isaiah 54:7-12 uses various terms related to divine mercy, which constitute 
strong echoes of Ex 34:6-7. The term “compassion” (D^ITI) appears three times (v.7,8,10), 
and “steadfast love” (Ip ll)  appears twice (v.8,10).
(4) There are a few weak, contextual and thematic echoes related to divine mercy 
and judgment in Isa 54. The reference to covenant (n’’^ 3 , v.IO) could be seen as a 
“contextual” echo of in Ex 34:10 and a thematic echo of covenant establishment and 
renewal in Ex 34 as a whole. The term “peace” (D l^ü, v.9) points to the L ord’s 
reconciliation of sinners and constitutes a thematic echo of the L ord’s reconciliation 
granted to rebellious Israel in Ex 34.
In addition, the terms “anger” v.8,9) and “rebuke” (1^3 v.9) thematically 
and contextually correspond to similar terms and themes in Ex 32-34 (*^ K, v.IO;
V.12). However, the deeply felt reality of God’s past and present wrath and judgment in 
Isa 54  is only threatened or partly experienced in Ex 32 -3 4 .
3. The Literary and Theological Context and Background
I will briefly comment on different but related aspects of the literary and theological 
context of Isa 5 3 -5 4 , moving from the largest literary context to the smallest. First, I will 
comment on a few relevant theological themes from the larger context of the book of 
Isaiah, namely, the themes of sin, judgment, and reconciliation. Secondly, I will discuss 
the two texts’ literary and theological relationship in the context of what has come to be 
known as Deutero-Isaiah (chapters 4 0 -6 0 ). In the context of Deutero-Isaiah, I will discuss 
the relationship between the Fourth Servant Song and other servant songs. Thirdly, I will 
offer a literary-structural analysis of Isa 5 2 :1 -5 4 :1 7 , Lastly, I will give a brief theological, 
thematic overview of Isa 5 2 :1 -5 4 :1 7 .
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3.1. The Issues of Sin, Judgment, and Reconciliation in Isaiah
In this subsection, I will treat theological themes pertaining to Isaiah as a whole and 
as relevant to this thesis. In doing so, I will assume the literary and theological unity of the 
book, a conclusion for which scholars like Childs and Seitz have convincingly argued.^®
The book of Isaiah richly displays God’s judgment and salvation of Israel and the 
nations. Sin is portrayed as a universal condition that has thoroughly defiled all the nations 
of the earth, including Israel (6:5,9). The Holy One of Israel (1:4; 5:19; 31:1; 41:14; 43:14) 
will bring judgment and salvation to the ends of the earth. As in the days of the exodus, all 
contrary powers will be brought low and “the L ord alone will be exalted in that day 
(2:11,17).” '^
Much of Isa 1-48 depicts divine execution of punishment on Israel and the nations. 
Divine judgment demonstrates that the L ord, who alone reigns in heaven and on earth, will 
establish righteousness and justice among all nations. The destruction of Jerusalem, the 
exile of the people of Israel/Judah, and the severe punishment of the nations serve that 
ultimate purpose. The L ord will punish and discipline Israel and the nations, but the Lord
Childs (1979: 325-333) makes a strong case for a literary theological unity of the book of Isaiah. He does 
so against the emphasis on discontinuity present in the work of those who argue for the book’s dual 
authorship (fully developed by J.C. Doderlein and J.G. Eichhorn) or triple authorship (first posited by Duhm) 
( 316-323). For example, Childs comments in relation to the theological shaping of First Isaiah, “Second 
Isaiah begins in ch. 1 with a theological summary of the message of the entire Isaianic corpus by using 
material from several periods of Isaiah’s ministry” (331). In relation to the theological unity of the book of 
Isaiah, Childs states, “The schema of before and after, of prophecy and fulfilment, provides a major bracket 
which unites the witnesses. The proclamation of the forgiveness of God (40:1) is set against the background 
of his former anger (1.5ff; 3:lff; 42:25; 57:16). The theme of Jerusalem as the forsaken city (l:7ff) is picked 
up in 62:4 and contrasted with the new city of j o y . . . .  The pattern o f seeing the new heavens and earth as a 
fulfilment of an earlier promise is made explicit in 65:25 by the citation of 11:6,9.. . .  From the canonical 
perspective Second Isaiah’s message of God’s final and decisive redemption of Israel is not qualitatively 
different from the prophecies of First Isaiah” (330). Seitz (1988: 105) rightly states, “The intention of the 
final form of the Book of Isaiah need not be unavailable to those who have first seen the text ‘deconstructed’ 
through historical analysis.” Thus, he calls his approach to the book o f Isaiah “Canonical Critical.” Also see 
Seitz’s 1996 article.
Later, I will refer to this text as further support that the Servant must belong to the Lord’s identity, since he 
is exalted with no hint of this being inappropriate. Isaiah 2 says that no one is to be exalted but the L ord, yet 
the Servant Song o f Isa 52:13-53:12 states that the Servant will be exalted.
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will not destroy either Israel or the nations (collectively).^^ But with a partial (though 
severe) punishment of sinners, the L ord’s work of purging and delivering the world from 
sin remains incomplete. So long as sin rules Israel and the nations, divine judgment and 
wrath are called for. The fundamental problem of sin needs a resolution.
In Deutero-Isaiah, the work of atonement and redemption is attributed to the L ord’s 
own “arm” (50:2; 51:5; 52:10; 53:1; 59:16). In particular, the atoning work of the Lord’s 
arm is revealed through the Suffering Servant (53). As a result of the Suffering Servant’s 
atoning work, the Lord will show everlasting compassion and love to Israel and to the 
nations. Thus, the glory of Zion will be restored, and Zion’s “tent” will be stretched so 
wide as to encompass all nations (54). From the nations, people will come to Zion and be 
God’s servants, and the world will be filled with the knowledge, glory, and worship of God 
(2:2-4; 11:9; 27:13; 40:5, 56:6-7; 66:19-21).
3.2. The Literary and Theological Context in Deutero-Isaiah
I now turn to a brief treatment of the literary and theological context of these two 
chapters, the long unit extending from 40 to 66.
(1) The proper subdivision of 40-66 is significant for my interpretation of the 
passages under consideration. Although Isa 40-66 is sometimes divided into 40-55 
(Deutero-Isaiah) and 56-66 (Trito-Isaiah),^^ I adopt Seitz’s four-part division as more 
accurately reflecting the subunits within the larger literary unit of 40-66: (I) 40-48;
(II) 49:1-52:12; (III) 52:13-53:12; and (IV) 54-66. Seitz regards the four parts of the 
literary structure of 40-66 as sections that belong together, the third section (the Servant 
Song) being “transitional and not sharply independent.” "^* Specifically, he accurately sees
In a sense, even the severest kind punishment is disciplinary— obviously not for those that are destroyed, 
but for the larger national and historical groups that may turn from sin in response to the judgment that falls 
on others. The L o r d  has the whole world and all generations in view, not merely particular individuals or 
nations.
^ Muilenburg 1956, Knight 1965, Westermann 1969, and Spieckermann 2000.
Seitz 2001 (Isaiah 40-66): 323.
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54-66 as speaking of the “vindication of the Servant by God,”^^  The connection between 
chapters 53 and 54 in particular will be important to my argument.
In Deutero-Isaiah, a pattern emerges and leads up to the Fourth Servant Song in 
Isa 52:12-53:12 (hereafter simply referred to as chapter 53 or the Servant Song). In 
chapters 40:1-52:12, there is much anticipation of a coming salvation, the passing away of 
the old age, and the dawning of a new day.^  ^ The Servant Song in Isa 52:13-53:12 
effectively brings to a close an era of suffering and punishment.^^ Isaiah 54 marks the 
beginning of a new era of reconciliation and peace. The opening verses of Isa 40 proclaim 
that Israel’s “hard service” is over, and chapters 54-60 depict this reality. Thus in 54, there 
is the celebration of a perennial covenant of peace (54:10) that is extended to all nations 
(55).^  ^ Therefore, the placement o f the Servant Song in this literary context points to the 
decisive work o f the Servant in effecting the reconciliation between God and the people of 
Israel, as well as the dawning o f a new era?'^
The Servant Song marks the end of one era, and Isa 54 (and 55) marks the 
beginning of another that is ushered in by the Suffering Servant. While the old era of 
suffering and hope in 40-53 and the new era of salvation in 54-66 form distinct literary 
units, the Servant Song in Isa 53 and the Zion Song in Isa 54 are theologically 
inseparable.^® The Servant Song and the Zion Song can be regarded as “a theological 
climax” *^ for Isa 40-54 and as a theological springboard for the remainder of Isaiah. The 
shift between the two chapters is indicative of a momentous shift between the old order and
25 The quotation is the subtitle Seitz gives for the section consisting in Isa 54-66 (2001: 471).
“  Seitz 1990: 243; Seitz 2001:423ff.
Seitz 2001 (Isaiah 40-66): 423ff. See Childs’ able defence of Isaiah 52:13-53:12 as a unit (2001: 411).
28 Westermann 1969: 275.
Seitz 1990: 243; 2001 423ff; RE Watts 1997: 278; also, Oswalt 1998: 413. The suffering of 40-53 lacks 
“fruit” without 54, and the new world of 54-66 lacks theological grounding without 53.
The thematic variation between the two subunits within 40-66 and the theological bridging role of these 
two chapters may explain the dilemma felt in determining the correct division of 40-66.
Spieckermann (2000: 321) says this is true for Isa 40-55, which “theologically intensifies the relation of 
promising love and suffering” and which he sees as a prominent theme in Isa 40-55. Although I am not 
completely comfortable with Spieckermann’s division of Isa 40-66 into 40-55 and 56-66,1 do agree with his 
above stated point.
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the new order established by the work of the Servant, but this shift is still part of the same 
overall storyline.^^ Thus, the “break” between Isa 53 and Isa 54 in no way precludes the 
theological value of interpreting the Servant’s mission in light of its outcome and the nature 
of the outcome in light of its root in the Servant’s mission. While the theological questions 
that are raised by 53 initially appear to be quite separate from the issues of 54 (and 55), 
they are inseparably related.^^ In my interpretation of the echo passages in Isaiah, I will 
assume the correctness of the foregoing interpretation of the relationship between the 
Servant Song and 54ff.
(2) The Servant Song of 52:13-53:12 has a significant relationship to the previous 
three servant songs. '^* Childs, in his commentary on Isaiah, offers an explanation of the 
relationship between the four servant songs that is helpful for my own contextual- 
theological reflections.^^ The view advocated by Childs is that the servant songs provide a 
theological “thread” that links the theology of Deutero-Isaiah together.
Childs sees a very close intertextual, mutually interpretative relationship between 
the four servant songs. Their relationship is marked by the following ordered pattern:^®
Seitz 2001 (Isaiah 40-66): 47Iff.
As indicated above, I see both units as having significant literary and theological relation to the whole of 
Isaiah, and I will refer to relevant passages throughout Isaiah that support this. Following Duhm’s 
suggestion, many have interpreted the Servant Song in isolation from its context, including 54. This is 
symptomatic of the larger tendency to read Isaiah in three parts. But (among others) Childs (2001) and Seitz 
(1988,1996, and 2001) have shown literary and theological evidence for the continuity of the Second Isaiah 
with First Isaiah and of Second with Third Isaiah.
Duhm first isolated the so-called “servant songs” as follows: 42:1-4; 49: 1-6; 50:4-9; and 52:13-53:12 
(Childs 1979: 322).
Since Duhm isolated the “servant songs” in 1875, there has been a great deal of scholarship on these texts, 
not all of it equally helpful. One problem has been that the four “songs” have been studied apart from the text 
(Knight 1965: 12; cf. Childs 2001: 291). This phenomenon was a manifestation of how, after Hermann 
Gunkel, scholars tended to separate paragraphs into various Gattungen and therefore lose a sense of the unity 
of the book (Knight 1965: 11). Beginning in the 1950s, a significant change took place in scholarship, 
signalled by Muilenburg’s 1956 work on Deutero-Isaiah (40-66). The unity and literary craftsmanship of the 
book of Isaiah was re-emphasized. See the survey of relevant scholarship provided by Wiley (Wiley 1997: 
23ff). In my view this was a positive development with a view to theological interpretation (see my Chapter 
1) and it informs my work. In particular, I applaud the work on Isaiah of Seitz and Childs who, along with 
scholars such as Oswalt (1998), have taken the emphasis on the literary and theological unity and the 
significance o f the book of Isaiah to a higher level.
Childs 2001:412.
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First, in 42: Iff, the introduction and call of the servant are given. Secondly, in 49: Iff, “the 
office of the servant”^^  is transferred “from the nation Israel to the individual prophetic 
figure of 49:3.” ®^ Thus “the mission of the servant in chapter 49 is a continuation of that 
originally given to the servant Israel: to be a light to the nations, to open the eyes of the 
blind, and to release prisoners from darkness.”^^  Thirdly, in 50:4ff, the servant’s call is 
presented as involving torture and humiliation “by his oppressors, who are not from 
outside, but from within the nation of Israel itself.”"*® Finally, in 52:13ff, the nation of 
Israel, after understanding the servant’s role in salvation, now bears witness to the servant’s 
exaltation after humiliation."** The universal work of the servant as a special individual"*  ^is 
a significant background to my exegesis below.
”  Childs 2001: 385.
Childs 2001: 412. Also see Seitz 2001 (Figured): 172ff. In respect to the relationship between the first 
two servant songs, Childs (2001: 387) notes that “the citation of 42:6 in 49:8: T have. . .  appointed you a 
covenant for the people’ provides the crucial link with the ‘first’ servant song.” Wilcox and Paton-Williams 
(1988: 83) points out, “Outside the Servant Songs Jacob/Israel is explicitly identified as the servant of 
Yahweh no less than seven times: at 41.8; 44.1,2,21 (twice); 45.4; 48 . 20 . . . .  Notice that all seven references 
occur in chs. 40-48.”
Childs 2001: 387. The nation Israel has a calling and a destiny to be a servant in relation to the other 
nations, but Israel “has missed its calling and failed to fulfil the function of its servanthood” (Oswalt 1998: 
572; cf. Childs 2001: 385). It is in this light that Israel’s bitter admission in Isa 26:18 should be understood: 
“We were with child, we writhed in pain, but we gave birth to wind. We have not brought salvation to the 
earth; we have not given birth to people of the world.” What the nation of Israel fails to do, the righteous 
Servant accomplishes. Thus, the Servant brings the salvation of God not only to Israel, but also to the 
nations.
Having said that, I recognise with Childs that in Deutero-Isaiah and even in chapter 53 there is clearly “a 
fluidity within the scope of the office of servant.” Childs says that the Suffering Servant has not completely 
replaced the nation Israel, for “the servant in Second Isaiah remains inseparable from Israel” (2001: 385).
The Servant is inseparable from Israel in that he is “a faithful embodiment of the nation Israel who has not 
performed its chosen role (48:1-2)” (2001: 385).
Based on what the Servant has done (justification of Israel and the nations through his vicarious 
suffering), Israel and the nations can share in “the office of servant.” This means that while the language of 
the Servant Song best describes the Servant who “belongs to the identity of the unique God,” it is in a limited 
way applicable to other servants of the L o r d  in Zion (54:17) who share in the suffering of the Servant.
Childs 2001:412.
Childs 2001: 412.
Muilenburg 1956, Hooker 1959 and 1995, Snaith 1967, among others, have suggested that the Suffering 
Servant is the corporate Israel. See also Rembaum (1982) on this interpretation as part of Jewish exegetical 
tradition. There are major problems with their view. First of all, throughout the whole of Isaiah, Israel is 
characterised as a people who are thoroughly sinful, who are incapable of submission to God. Not only is 
Israel marked by the social evil of injustice, but also, more importantly, Israel has persisted in idolatry. The 
Servant, on the contrary, is portrayed as an innocent and righteous individual who is submissive to God and is 
able to justify others. It is worth noting that from the perspective of Leviticus, the animal for a guilt offering
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Related to the transfer of “the office of the servant” "*^ from the nation Israel to an 
individual in 49 is the “shift of emphasis away from ‘Israel’ and to ‘Zion.’”"*"* The 
reference to Zion may appear to narrow the focus of God’s salvation. However, when Zion 
is understood symbolically, this transfer actually expands the focus from the nation of 
Israel to the nations and thus implies a kind of universalism."*  ^ Such an expansion in focus 
points to the role that the salvation of Israel has in bringing salvation to the Gentiles. 
Whatever the precise interpretation or definition of Zion and its relation to Israel, it seems 
that the shift in terminology is related to a movement towards the reconstitution of the 
people of God so as to include the Gentile nations. The reconstitution of the people of God 
in 49ff is a result of the saving work of the Suffering Servant (Isa 52:10; 53:1).
3.3. Structural Analysis of Isaiah 52:1-54:17
The following chart represents the structural analysis that will be implicit in the 
remainder of the chapter.
had to be blameless. Even the most righteous in Israel is found guilty in God’s eyes (“all our righteous acts 
are like filthy rags” in Isa 63:6). If Israel is the Suffering Servant, it is difficult to imagine how such a sinful 
nation could have been a “guilt offering” (53:10) for the nations. Only a wholly righteous person or nation 
could have been the Suffering Servant, not Israel.
Secondly, the Servant Song makes a distinction between the Servant “he” and the announcers “we” for 
whom and for whose sins the Servant makes atonement. As Hugenberger has shown, the referent of “we” in 
53 is Israel (Hugenberger 1995: 110; also see Childs 2001: 413; Westermann 1969: 257). Israel is the “we” 
who confess that the Servant suffered for their guilt (Westermann 1969: 257). Israel is the “we” to whom the 
“arm of the L o r d ” has been revealed; Israel is not the “arm of the L o r d ” revealed in and through the Servant. 
See Seitz (2001: 464) for the interpretation of “we” as the “servants” of the L o r d  who report what they have 
heard and seen of the arm of the L o r d .
'‘^ Childs 2001:385.
Wilcox and Paton-Williams 1988: 84. Oswalt (1998: 415) makes the following helpful point: “It is 
probably not coincidental that while the term “Zion” occurs 8 times between 49:14 and 52:8, it does not occur 
again until 59:20. This suggests that the prophet is consciously resisting the limitation of the implications of 
God’s forgiving grace that would result from the use of “Zion” here. To be sure, the imagery is that which 
has been previously applied to Zion. But the absence of that term here when it had been used frequently 
immediately before suggests that, because of the work of the Servant, all who feel barren and dejected and 
alone as a result o f their sins now have reason to shout for joy. All, Gentiles and Jews alike, may become the 
blessed people of God.”
For examples of scholars who deny a universalistic message in Deutero-Isaiah, see Snaith and Orlinsky 
1967.
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A. The redemption of Zion (52:1-12)
B. The exaltation of the Servant (52:13)
C. The many nations witness the Servant’s suffering and are “sprinkled” 
by him (52:14-15)
D. The arm of the L ord revealed in and through the Servant (53:1)
E. Suffering in the early days (53:2-3)
F. The Servant’s vicarious suffering (53:4-6b)
D. The Lord laid our sin on the Servant (53:6c)
F. The Servant as the lamb to be slaughtered (53:7-8b)
E. Suffering unto death, although innocent (53:8c-9)
D. The Lord’s will to crush him and the Servant’s will to be the guilt 
offering (53:10a-b)
B. The vindication of the Servant (53:10c-1 lb)
C. The Servant will justify the many through his intercession (53:1 lc-12)
A. The glory of Zion (54:1-17)
3.4. A Thematic Overview of Isaiah 52:1-54:17
In the following thematic analysis of Isa 52:1-54:17,1 will briefly present the 
thematic content of the text in a narrative form. The subsequent examination is reflected in 
the theological exegesis of the echoed terms in section 4 below.
The holy city Zion was reduced to ashes (52:2), but “the L ord has bared his holy 
arm before the eyes of all the nations” (52:10). The L ord has returned to Zion to redeem 
and comfort its people (52:9). Thus, the messenger exhorts Zion to rise up and put on the 
garments of strength and joy (52:1,8), announcing good news of peace and salvation (52:7). 
The people in captivity are called back to the holy city (52:11-12). Even as they were “sold 
for nothing,” they are now redeemed “without money,” for the L ord has accomplished both 
without the use of money (52:3). The L ord reduced Zion to ashes, for his name was 
despised due to his people’s intoxication in sin. Now, however, the L ord has redeemed 
Zion, for his name was reviled also because his holy city lay in ruins (52:5). The Lord has 
redeemed Zion for his name’s sake, so that his people will know his name, that he is the 
L ord (52:6).
The messenger announces the good news, what he has heard and seen (53:1). The 
messenger announces how the “arm of the L ord” has been revealed to those in Zion
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(53:1)."*® The salvation of God is revealed most specifically through the Suffering Servant 
who has paid the price of redemption both for his people and for the nations (so that they 
are redeemed “without money”). From youth the Servant was despised and rejected, for he 
had no majesty or beauty, and his life was filled with suffering (53:2-3). The messenger 
bears witness that the Servant’s life was characterized by suffering because he was bearing 
the iniquity, rebellion, and sin “for us all” and for “the many” (53:5,12). He took upon 
himself all people’s infirmities and diseases and carried their sorrows and pain (v.4).
It was the L ord’s will to crush the Servant and cause him to suffer for us (53:10). It 
was the L ord who laid on him the iniquity of us all (53:6). The Servant was stricken, 
smitten, afflicted, and oppressed by God for our sins (53:4)."*^  It was also the Servant’s will 
to offer his own life as “a guilt offering” (53:10) to intercede for the rebellious (53:12), for 
“all” have gone astray (53:6). As a guilt offering, the Servant was pierced, stricken, 
crushed (53:4-5), and disfigured (52:14). He was oppressed and afflicted (53:7), and by 
oppression and judgment he was taken away (53:8). He was executed and buried with the 
wicked although he was innocent (53:9). He poured out his life unto death, bearing both 
“our” sin and the sin of the “many.” It is the Servant’s suffering and death that brought 
“us” redemption and reconciliation, peace and healing (53:6).
After his suffering, the Servant will see the light and be satisfied (53:11). The L ord 
will exalt (i.e. raise up or lift up) the Servant to the highest place (52:13). The L ord’s 
exaltation of the Servant will astonish the nations who were formerly astounded at the 
Servant’s humiliation, disfigurement, and death (52:14). The Servant will “sprinkle” and 
justify many nations (“the many,” 52:15). The L ord will prolong the exalted Servant’s 
days and give him “a portion” or “offspring” among “the many” (53:10,12). The Servant’s
The messenger uses the pronoun “we” apparently to speak for those who have witnessed the revelation of 
the “arm of the L o r d .” See Seitz 2001 (Isaiah 40-66): 465.
On the one hand, 53:4 expresses the people’s misunderstanding that the Servant was suffering for his own 
sins in God’s hands. On the other hand, the verse affirms that the Servant was suffering, though voluntarily 
and vicariously, in the hands of God.
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reward will be those whom the Servant will justify (53:11), i.e. the “servants” of the Lord 
(54:16; see below).
After delivering the announcement concerning the salvation of the L ord 
accomplished through the Suffering Servant (52:13-53:12), the messenger once again 
brings a message of comfort and hope to Zion (54:1-17). His message is full of promises: 
innumerable inhabitants (54:2), widened habitations (“tents”) that are able to include the 
nations (54:3), reconciliation with God (54:4-7), great expressions of divine compassion 
(54:7,8,10), everlasting covenant love and peace (54:8,10), unmatched beauty and glory 
(54:11-13), and established security (54:14-17). This is the heritage of the “servants” of 
the Lord (54:16) whom the Servant justifies, and a fuller expansion of the “good news” of 
peace and salvation that were earlier announced to Zion (see 52:7).
4. A Contextual, Theological Exegesis of Isaiah 53:5-12 and 54:7-10
As noted in subsection 1.2 above, Brueggemann has offered two alternative 
interpretations of Isa 54:7-10, both of which are intended to demonstrate the allegedly 
disjunctive and problematic character of God. I would argue that when Israel’s sin is fully 
recognised, the issue of God’s abandonment or severe punishment of Israel (in the exile) is 
not as great a problem for the divine character as Brueggemann claims. This point will 
become evident in my interpretation of the two passages. The following theological 
exegesis of Isa 53:4-12 will reflect the theological, thematic analysis of Isa 52:13-54 given 
above.
In this section, I will first turn to a theological exegesis of the echoed terms in Isa 
53:5-12 (subsection 4.1) and will later turn to the echoed terms in Isa 54 (subsection 4.2). I 
will treat the theological functions of the echoed terms and expressions roughly in the order 
they appear in the text (subsections 4.1.1-4.1.4). I will then turn to the issues of the
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righteousness of the divine act described in the Servant Song and the compatibility of 
divine mercy and judgment (subsections 4.1.5-4.1.7).
In subsection 4.1.8, before I turn to Isa 54 I will offer an excursus. I will raise 
objections to H. M. Orlinsky’s denial of the vicarious nature of the Servant’s suffering.
This discussion should serve to strengthen my overall argument regarding the nature of the 
Servant’s work as vicarious in nature and as an extension of the L ord’s atoning work as 
revealed in Ex 34:6-7.
4.1. A Contextual, Theological Exegesis of Isaiah 53:5-12; 
Divine Mercy and Judgment in the Suffering of the Servant
The compatibility and unity of divine mercy and judgment in the Servant Song are 
displayed in the following ways: The L ord resolves the problem of human sin and effects 
righteousness and salvation through the suffering of the Servant. The suffering of the 
Servant is characterized by vicarious sin-bearing and sin-removing. Through his vicarious 
sin-bearing, the Servant effects reconciliation between God and sinners. Thus, the 
Servant’s work of sin-bearing stands in continuity with the L ord’s own work of sin-bearing 
declared in Ex 34:6-7. Seen in the light of God’s atoning work through the Servant, God’s 
punishment of the Servant can be seen as an expression of God’s mercy on sinners. God’s 
justice (in requiring full payment for sin) and mercy (for sinners) are simultaneously and 
supremely expressed in the suffering work of the Servant.
4.1.1. The Echoed Terms of the Expression HXCSm D0S1 X0Î*  T T "  ; “  V T I T
In Isa 53:4-12, the three standard terms for sin and punishment (]1D, and
Xpn"*^ ) which appear in Ex 34:6-7 are used more than once: in v.5;
n r  in V.6; rWBO in v.8; OniiD in v .ll; and Xtûn in v.l2. These terms of sin,I . .  -  V ' T • :  * t :
guilt, and punishment are used in conjunction with the term XÇ3 or its synonym bnO to 
depict the Servant as the sin-bearer: D'’:nn”Xtpn (v.4), ^ 30' 0 1 1 %  (v.IO). The
n xgm  in Ex 34:6-7.
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terms of sin/guilt/punishment are also used with other terms to depict the terrible 
consequences the Servant suffers as a result of being a sin-bearer. Thus, the Servant is 
portrayed as “bearing our sicknesses” (Xtü3 v.4), “carrying our pains”
(D^Op v.4), “plagued, struck down by God, and afflicted”
(naan^l O-'n^X n?D  raaa, v.4), “pierced for our rebellions” o a ra fap  yyiip .v .S ), and 
“crushed for our iniquities” X p lÇ , v.5). Thus although the exact expression
n x p n i D dpl Xtpi as found in Ex 34:7 does not appear in Isa 53, the graphic 
depiction of it in relation to the Servant is strongly present.
As pointed out in Chapter 2, may mean both “bear sin and punishment”
and “remove or forgive sin.”"*® As I suggested earlier (in Chapter 2), there is a theological 
means-end relationship between these two legitimate interpretations. In Ex 34, the L ord 
reconciled Israel to himself by means of the L ord’s bearing of Israel’s offence. In the 
Servant Song, the Servant is the one who bears the sin and punishment, makes intercession 
for the transgressors (v.l2), and brings reconciliation (“peace” and “healing,” v.5). The 
Servant bears (XÔ]) human sins and suffers their punishment, even as the L ord carries 
human sin and responsibility in Ex 34:6-7. What is striking here in the Servant Song is that 
it is the L ord who lays upon the Servant the iniquity, rebellion, and sin of the world and 
who makes the Servant bear what the L ord otherwise bears. In this way, the Servant Song 
describes the Servant as doing what elsewhere is seen as something the L ord alone can do: 
namely, to bear and remove sin. This interpretation supports the idea that that the Servant 
“belongs to the identity of the unique God.”®® Accordingly, the various terms and 
expressions in relation to the Servant’s sin-bearing function indicate that the Servant’s 
suffering is an extension of the L o rd’s own suffering revealed in the expression “bearing 
iniquity, rebellion, and sin” in Ex 34:7a and echoed in Num 14:18.
Minn (1966: 22) acknowledges that “in the Heb awon the notions of guilt and punishment merge.’ 
JDW Watts (1987: 232) renders this phrase, “He forgives their wrongs.”
Bauckham 1998: 51.
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The benefits of the Servant’s suffering are healing and peace. The text declares, 
“the punishment for our peace was upon him; and by his wounds we are healed”
In n n n n i nO^?D,v.5). Claus westermann rightly states, “The
healing gained for the others (v.5) by his stripes includes as well the forgiveness of their 
sins and the removal of their punishment.”®* In other words, healing includes 
reconciliation with God. This is in fact what is stated in 53:11: “my righteous servant will 
justify the many.” If the Servant’s suffering brings reconciliation to sinners, then it is 
implicit that the Servant’s sin-bearing is vicarious, just as is the L ord’s suffering in 
Ex 32-34. In this vein, George A. Knight makes the helpful comment that the L ord, as 
Israel’s husband, becomes
the Suffering Servant that Israel was elected to be, for Israel could not fulfil 
her calling alone (43:22ff.).. . .  In his capacity as the Suffering Servant 
himself and by means of his union with his wife Israel, God subsumed her 
justified and penal suffering into his own vicarious bearing of the 
rebelliousness and iniquities (v.5) of the masses (v.l4)®  ^(italics mine).
The of the L ord in Ex 34:6 and in Num 14:18 and of the Servant in Isa 53
is vicarious in the specific sense that the Lord or the Servant bears that consequence or 
that punishment o f sin that Israel or the world cannot bear without being utterly destroyed. 
The X03 either of the L o r d  or of the Servant is vicarious not because the L o r d  or the 
Servant removes the consequence of sins, acquits the guilty, or lets the sinner go scot- 
free.®® Rather, it is vicarious because the L o r d  or the Servant substitutes himself as the 
bearer of the human sin/guilt/punishment in order that humans might have a continued life 
with the Lord.®"* In the face of a lack of a means of atonement for rebellion against the
Westermann 1969: 263. 
Knight 1965: 234-235.
53 This is how both Orlinsky (1967: 59) and Whybray (1978:66) would define vicariousness 
Whybray 1978: 51. At this point, Whybray would reject the interpretation that the idiom RÜ3 
expresses the concept of the L o r d  bearing the punishment o f his people. In his effort to deny that there is any 
evidence for vicariousness in the entire Old Testament, he dismisses the interpretation that in
Ezek 4:48 “symbolizes the suffering of God as much as it symbolizes the future suffering of the people.” 
Accordingly, in the seven cases (Ex 34:7; Num 14:18; Pss 32:5; 85:3; Isa 33:24; Hos 14:3; Mic 7:18) in 
which he identifies the L o r d  as the subject of the verb he translates the expression as “he ‘takes away’ 
human sin, that is, he forgives the sinner”(p.32). If Whybray did not have a priori conception that there is no
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L ord , the L ord makes atonement through the sin-bearing of the Servant, a sin-bearing 
which is in some sense the L ord’s own work. The L ord does so because ultimately only 
the L ord (or, specifically, the Servant who “belongs to the identity of the unique God”) can 
make atonement.
Consistent with the depiction of the L ord as a sin-bearer in Ex 34:6-7, Isa 43:24 
confirms that the L ord himself “serves” under the iniquity, rebellion, and sins of his 
people.
Isa 43:24 You have made me serve for your sins; made me weary with your
iniquity (‘^[•’n i i r n  •’3n^5in ’?[*’n ix b n 2  ''DniDrn). lam h e  who blots out your
rebellion, for my own sake, and remembers your sins no more.
Isaiah 43:24 does not express an entirely unique idea, but rather unfolds more 
directly the theological reality seen in God’s self-giving response of sin-bearing in passages 
like Ex 34:6-7, Num 14:18ff, and later in Isa 53.®® Within the context of the L ord binding 
himself to Israel in covenant love, Israel, the text says, has actually “forced” the L ord to 
“serve” for its sins. Instead of cutting his people off for their sins, the L ord , as a servant to 
them, absorbs and suffers the wrong done to him. This picture of the servant God of 
Isa 43:24 (and of Ex 34:6-7 and Num 14:18ff) anticipates the picture of the Suffering 
Servant who serves unto death to blot out sins and justify the sinner. The Suffering 
Servant’s servanthood is an extension of the L o r d ’s servanthood found in passages such as 
Isa 43:24, Ex 34:6-7, and Num 14:18.
4.1.2. M D H —A Thematic Echo of IjpSi
It is important to note the fact that the Servant’s voluntary act of sin-bearing is 
inseparably related to the L o rd’s “laying” ( ^ ’’3 S n )  of sin on the Servant (v.6): “the L ord
concept of God bearing punishment for human sins, he could have seen that in those seven cases
may legitimately be translated as “suffering punishment” and be interpreted as God vicariously suffering the 
consequences of human sins, through which process God effects atonement. Then he could have seen that 
the L ord  bearing the punishment of his people is not unique to Ezek 4:4-8 or foreign to the Old Testament.
Isaiah 4 3 :2 4  is a picture of God as a servant wearied by Israel’s sins. This picture clearly contrasts with 
4 3 :2 3 :  “I [the L ord] have not made you [Israel] to serve with an offering, and I have not made you weary 
with incense.” God has not burdened Israel.
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has laid on him the iniquity of us all.”®® That the L ord  lays sin upon the Servant means 
that the Servant suffers its consequences. This act of God’s laying sin and punishment on 
the Servant corresponds to the concept of the L ord “visiting” (IpB ) iniquity and 
punishment on the sinner in Ex 34:7.
One great difference between the two passages is the fact that the iniquity and 
punishment the L ord “visits” upon the Servant is not his own, but belongs to others (“us 
all” and/or “the many”). The end result of the L ord “laying” (^""SBH) the sin and 
punishment of the world on the Servant is that the Servant is “pierced for our rebellion” 
OirtÜBD v.5) and “crushed for our iniquity” Oll’n i i r p  X S ID . v.5). Just as the
L ord’s “visiting iniquity” (]1iJ HpS) upon sinners in Ex 32 and Num 14 resulted in the 
death of some Israelites, the L ord’s “laying” sin on the Servant results in the great 
suffering and death of the Servant (see below).
Another significant difference between the Servant’s suffering in Isa 53 and Israel’s 
suffering in Ex 32 lies in the fact that the Servant’s suffering is undeserved and voluntary 
whereas the Israel’s is deserved and obligatory. The Servant’s suffering for the 
transgressors involves both the L ord’s will and his own will, which are shown to be in 
complete harmony. The Servant voluntarily suffers for the rebellious by way of submitting 
to the will of the L ord who lays upon him sin and its consequences. This point is 
supported by the claim that the Servant offers himself lo be the “guilt offering” DÇX in 
53:10.
4.1.3. DWX—A Thematic Echo of nXCSm lii? X(üîT T T T “  V T  I T
The term of 53:10 encapsulates in one word the Servant’s identity as one who 
bears and removes iniquity and brings salvation, peace, and healing to the world. In that 
sense, the term D0X can be considered a thematic echo of the expression
The phrase HK la  may be rendered, ‘The L or d  caused punishment for us all to
fall upon him.” The phrase conveys the idea that the L or d  caused the sin and its deserved punishment to fall 
upon the Servant. See Hoiladay (1988: 288) for suggestions on the translation of the term D3B in the Hiphil.
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nxcûm lir xüii in ex 34:7.T T -  ; ~  V T  \ y
The Servant intervenes as DÇX, “a guilt offering” or “an offering for sin” (v.IO; 
NRSV). There has been some debate over the meaning of DtÜX in this passage. Scholars 
like H. M. Orlinsky dismiss the entire verse as “corrupt” and “of uncertain meaning.”®^
I regard such allegations of textual and semantic uncertainty as overstated. Such 
exaggeration may be partly due to an unwillingness on the part of some scholars to accept 
the theological implications of the Servant being the O0X. Payne rightly points out that 
“the first part of the verse is textually difficult,” but “there is neither doubt nor difficulty 
over the word , . . ashanv, the Hebrew is to that extent perfectly clear.”®®
Other parts of the passage clarify the theological meaning of verselO. The Servant 
is innocent (“he had done no violence, nor was any deceit in his mouth” in v.9) and 
righteous (“the righteous one, my Servant” in v .ll). These references support the idea that 
the righteous Servant suffers unto death not for his own sins but for the sins of others. He 
suffers, because it is the L ord’s will to lay on him “the iniquity of us all” (v.6), a will that 
the Servant voluntarily shares with the L ord.®® Therefore the Servant’s life is an effective 
D0X. The life of an involuntary and disobedient one would not provide an efficacious 
atonement. The Servant’s life as an DlJX is efficacious because it is in accordance with the 
L o rd’s plan and is accomplished by the Servant’s voluntary and obedient self-giving.®®
Orlinsky 1967; footnote 7. Also, the NRSV footnote on v.IO says “The meaning of Heb uncertain.”
Payne 1971: 142.
As Paul Hanson (1995: 18) points out, the situation in Isa 53 is not a picture of sadism or of the Servant as 
a mere scapegoat. There is an identification of the will of the Servant with the L o r d ’s will and his “divine 
redemptive purpose.” The identification of the will of the Servant and the will of the L ord  is seen in the 
phrase, ‘The L o r d  purposed to crush him and to pierce him. If his life makes a guilt offering (D Ü K )” (v . 10). 
That the Servant voluntarily and actively submits himself to suffering is also found in the following verses:
 ^He bore our sicknesses and carried our pains.
He poured out his own life unto death . . .
He bore/forgave the sin of the many, and he interceded for their rebellions.
Childs (2001:415) stresses, “What occurred was not some unfortunate tragedy of human history but 
actually formed the center of the divine plan for the redemption of this people and indeed of the world.” For 
Whybray’s objection to the Servant’s life as an efficacious and my response to it, see below.
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This sheds new light on the concept of substitutionary atonement, which, as J.D.W. Watts 
notes, “had long existed in the sacrificial cult (Lev 16).”®*
In his commentary on Leviticus, Baruch Levine points out that the Q0X, “usually 
translated into ‘guilt offering,’ was actually a penalty paid in the form of a sacrificial 
offering to God.”®^ The provision of D0X, however, did not apply to rebellion toward and 
outright rejection of the L ord. ®® The applied to inadvertent offences. Defiant or 
premeditated sins against God were “punishable by the penalty known as karet, the ‘cutting 
off’ of the offender from the community.”®"* Therefore, our text in Isa 53 is unusual. What 
sets apart the Ü0X in Isaiah from all the other occurrences of the term Ü0X in the Old 
Testament is twofold: the kind of sins it deals with and the kind of people to whom it 
applies. In Isaiah (both in light of the comprehensive sin-language in 53:5-6 and the larger 
context of the book), the Û0X is applied to outright rebellion, defiant acts, rejection of the 
L ord, and all forms of socio-political sins flowing out of spiritual degeneration. In 
addition, in Isaiah the atonement is applied not only to Israel, but also to all nations (“the 
many” in 53:12). ®® The Servant is giving his life as “the penalty paid in the form of 
a sacrificial offering,” the “guilt offering” for all the heinous sins of Israel and the 
nations.®® This is clearly an extraordinary achievement.
JDW Watts 1987: 231. 
Levine 1989: 18.
“  Levine 1989: 18.
Levine 1989: 18.
Although the term 0"'$'! is not explicitly defined in the text, “the fact that v .l2  parallelizes the many and 
the sinners seems to support the view that the many are regarded as a more numerous group” than Israel 
(Spieckermann 2000: 322). Knight (1965: 229, 234) interprets “we” and “the many” as synonyms, both 
referring to the “humanity at large” or ‘“virtually all’ men.”
At this point scholars like Whybray (1978: 65ff) would object to my interpretation of the Servant as an 
atoning sacrifice on the grounds that human sacrifice is an abomination to the L o r d  and no human sacrifice is 
efficacious. The fact that the L or d  rejected Moses’ offer of his life for the sins o f Israel would support 
Whybray’s objection. I agree with Whybray that human sacrifice is clearly forbidden for the reasons he 
gives. Human sacrifice is also fundamentally against the L o r d ’s mode of reconciliation, which is God’s own 
sin-bearing based on his sovereign freedom to show mercy to sinners. Human sacrifice defies God’s way and 
insists on human merit.
The Servant’s death, however, is not merely a human sacrifice or substitution. The Servant of Isa 53 
does not belong to the identity of sinful humans. The Servant as the QttiX and his self-sacrifice is different 
from all prohibited human sacrifices. The Servant’s self-sacrifice is acceptable to God and is efficacious to
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What is striking about the Servant is that his entire life can be described as being an 
From the moment of birth to the moment of death, the Servant bears and suffers 
for the sins, transgression, and iniquities (v.4-6,8,11-12) of the world and suffers their 
punishment.®® Thus scorn, rejection, suffering, infirmities, and diseases characterise the 
Servant’s life (v.2-4). The Servant is wounded, bruised, stricken, and punished for the 
iniquity, rebellions, and sin that he bears.
The Servant, as the Q0X, ultimately dies a sinner’s death despite his innocence. 
The Servant dies in identification with and in place o/the rebellious.
Isa 53;8c-9b He was cut off from the land of the living.
Because of the rebellion of my people, he was stricken to death.
He put his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death.
Bearing the sins of the world, the Servant is “cut off from the land of the living.” The 
Servant is punished by the legal requirement of 1115, or “cutting off,” in his death.®® The 
“cutting o ff’ of the innocent Servant starkly contrasts with the preservation of the 
rebellious Israel who deserves to be “cut o ff’ (48:8-9). The latter is made possible by the 
former.
The self-sacrificial, vicarious death of the Servant, however, is not the ultimate end 
of the Servant’s career; the Servant will be rewarded.
Isa 53:11 Out of the suffering of his life.
He will see the light and be satisfied.
bear and remove human sin. The reasons are as follows: First, the Servant is included in the identity of the 
L ord . Secondly, the text shows that it is the L o r d ’s own will that the Servant be the DÜK; it is none other 
than the L o r d  who lays on him “the iniquity of us all” (53:6) that “we” may have peace and healing. The 
L ord does so because the Servant is the “arm of the L ord” revealed.
Westermann 1969: 261.
Knight (1965: 234) suggests that the terms “rebellion” and “iniquities” of 53:5 may be “the type of all 
human rebellion.”
See Levine’s comments, cited above. On the death of the Servant, see, Anthony Ceresko 1994: 44ff and 
Westermann 1969: 264ff. Whybray (1978: 105-6) argues that the language with reference to the death of the 
Servant should be taken metaphorically and that the Servant is rewarded at the end shows that he did not 
suffer death.
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In accordance with the introductory verse (52:13) of the Servant Song, these verses 
speak of the exaltation of the Servant after his humiliation and suffering. New Testament 
scholar Richard Bauckham points out that there are important intertextual connections 
between Isa 52:13, 6:1,3, and 57:15 that illumine the meaning of the exaltation of the 
Servant in 52:13. These three passages all have a rare “combination of the two Hebrew 
roots rum (to be high, to be exalted) and nasa (to lift up).” ®^
Isa 52:13 Behold, my Servant will prosper;
he will be exalted (Q^T) and lifted up (XW]1) and be very high ( ix p  M^ai).
Isa 6:1,31 saw the L ord sitting on a throne, exalted (Dl) and lifted up (XW]")); 
and his train filled the temple.
And [the seraphs] were calling to one another,
“Holy, holy, holy is the L ord of hosts; 
the whole earth is full of his glory.”
Isa 57:15 For thus says the exalted (Dl) and lofty (XtilJ)),
One who inhabits eternity, holy is his name:
“I dwell in the high (DilQX) and holy place, 
and with the crushed and humble in spirit,
to revive the spirit of the humble and to revive the heart of the crushed.”
Isaiah 52:13 states that the Servant will be “exalted,” “lifted up,” and “be very high.” The 
repetition of these words of exaltation emphasizes that the Servant will be exalted to the 
highest place. The Servant’s exaltation to the highest place becomes clearer when 
Isa 52:13 is read in light of the other two passages where the combination of the words 
“exalted” and “lifted up” also occur.^* In Isa 6:1, the word combination introduces 
“Isaiah’s vision of God on his throne (where the throne is described as ‘exalted and lifted 
up>) ’»72 57:15, the words describe God, “dwelling in the heights of heaven, as
himself ‘exalted and lifted up.”’^® When Isa 53:12 is read with reference to 6:1 and 57:15,
™ Bauckham 1998; 50.
Thus, Bauckham (1998: 50) draws attention to “the Jewish exegetical principle of gezera sava, according 
to which passages in which the same words occur should be interpreted with reference to each other.” 
Bauckham 1998: 50.
Bauckham 1998: 50.
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one is compelled to see that “the meaning of Isaiah 52:13 is that the Servant is exalted to 
the heavenly throne of God . . .  from which God rules the universe.” "^*
The above line of evidence lends force to Bauckham’s conclusion: “The Servant, in 
both his humiliation and his exaltation, is therefore not merely a human figure 
distinguished from God, but, in both his humiliation and his exaltation, belongs to the 
identity o f the unique GodT^^ This statement is not only theologically striking but also 
exegetically compelling. Bauckham’s argument gains strength from Isa 2:12-18 in which 
the L ord makes an unambiguous statement that he tolerates no rival: “The L ord alone will 
be exalted in that day” (2:18). That the L ord will exalt the Servant to the throne of God 
means the Servant is someone who “belongs to the identity of the unique God.” ®^ The 
comments made by Peter Wilcox and David Paton-Williams reinforce Bauckham’s 
suggestion:
Throughout Isa. 1-66, the adjectives “exalted,” “lifted up” and “very high” are 
virtually technical terms, applied almost exclusively to Yahweh. Indeed, the 
particular thrust of Isa. 1-6 is that only Yahweh may be described in these 
terms . . .  there is an implication here that the servant’s work is Yahweh’s 
work, and the language used to make the point is daring, to say the least.^^
The interpretations given in Bauckham’s book and the article by Wilcox and Paton- 
Williams are not entirely surprising, since the echoes of Ex 34:6-7 in Isa 53:5-12 affirm the 
unique identity of the Servant as belonging to the L ord’s identity.
After the Servant exaltation, the Servant will justify "the many.”
Isa 53;llc-12 Out of the suffering of his soul, he will see the light and be satisfied; 
By his knowledge my righteous servant will justify the many^^ and he will carry 
their iniquities. Therefore I will apportion to him the many; and the strong he will
Bauckham 1998; 51.
Bauckham 1998: 51.
Bauckham 1998: 51.
Wilcox and Paton-Williams 1988: 95. But, unlike Bauckham, they state, “The implication is not 
necessarily that the servant is Yahweh, or even divine.”
Westermann (1969: 267-8), after Mowinckel, suggests the translation, “My Servant will show himself to be 
righteous [yasdiq, an internal causative] (and so stand) as righteous before the many,” and provides the 
explanation, “that is to say, my Servant will stand as righteous before the many because he bore their sins.
211
apportion as spoil, because he poured out his life to death, and was numbered with 
the rebellious.
The Servant will be able to justify “the many” as a result of his vicarious death for their 
sins. Just as a victorious warrior would take the spoils of a great victory, so the Servant 
will justify “the many” and “the strong” and claim them as his rewards from the Lord.
4.1.4. raS ^A nother Thematic Echo of nXtSni IIU Xt2?D-  T T T “  : •  V T I T ”
The last verse of the Servant Song closes the Song with a summary statement of 
the Servant’s mission of sin/punishment-bearing and removing before his exaltation:
“He bore the sin of the many; and he interceded for the rebellious”
@"'382 Xini,v.l2).^® The expressions “bearing sin”
(Xpn X03) and “interceding for sinners” (^’232 can be viewed as mutually
inclusive, parallel thoughts here. If so, the expression D''2p2 may be considered
as another thematic echo of the expression n x p n i  pÇ Xtüi. It is interesting to
note that the root U2Q is used with the L ord as the subject in v.6 with the meaning of “laid 
upon” (3 D’'2Sn). The same root is used in versel2 with the Servant as the subject: 
“he intervened for D"'2B2) the rebellious.” The two usages of the root D2B in Isa 53 may 
be interpreted as putting emphasis on the important theological idea that the Servant 
intervenes for the rebellious by bearing the sin and punishment that the L ord lays upon 
him.
In the golden calf incident in Ex 32-34, Israel goes astray, turning away from the 
L ord. Israel in the Servant Song confesses a similar state of sin: “We all went astray like 
sheep; each to one’s way—we have turned” (53:6).®® Israel in Isaiah is in a state of 
apostasy and is therefore unable to intercede either for itself or for the nations. In the 
exchange between Moses and the L ord in Ex 32-34, it is clear that only the L ord can
The words then express God’s justification o f the Servant previously condemned in shame, and his declaring 
of him as righteous. God rehabilitates the Servant and restores his honour.”
Westermann (1969: 269) correctly points out that “to intervene” “does not mean, as some editors imagine, 
that he made prayers of intercession for them. Rather, it means that with his life, his suffering and his death, 
he took their place and underwent their punishment in their stead.”
The “we” is taken as referring to Israel. See Hugenberger 1995: 110.
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intervene to make atonement for Israel’s rebellion and apostasy (see Chapter 2). This is 
also the case in Isaiah.
In the “arm of the Lord” songs of Isa 59:2-15 and 63, the Lord laments the fact that 
he looked for an “intercessor” but found no one. Israel, whose calling is to be “a kingdom 
of priests and a holy nation” (Ex 19:6), foments oppression, revolt, lies, violence, rebellion, 
injustice, and treachery (Isa 59:2-15). The expressions of quest, dismay, and resolution in 
59:15f are repeated in 63:3-5. The Lord says, “From the nations, no one was with me.” “I 
looked, but there was no one to help, and I was appalled that no one upheld me; so my own 
arm saved for me.” No intercessor is found from Israel or the nations. Thus, the Lord’s 
own “arm” intercedes for Israel and the nations. Thus, the work of “intervention” or 
“intercession” (I)’’aSQ; 59:16) that works salvation for the world is solely attributed to the 
“arm of the Lord” in these passages.®*
In a similar way, in Isa 51-53, it is the “arm of the Lord” that is expected to bring 
salvation to the world. Accordingly, there are several intertextual connections between 
Isa 53:1, 51:5-10, and 52:8 that manifest this motif.®^
Isa 51:5-10 My righteousness draws near speedily, my salvation is on the way.
And my arm will bring justice to the nations.
The islands will look to me and wait in hope for my arm . . .
® . . .  My righteousness will last forever, my salvation through all generations.
® Awake, Awake! Clothe yourself with strength, O arm o f the Lord . . .
*® Was it not you who dried up the sea . . .  so that the redeemed might cross over?
Isa 52:8-10 When the Lord returns to Zion . . .
*®The Lord will lay bare his holy arm in the sight of all the nations,
and all the ends of the earth will see the salvation o f our God.
Isa 53:1 Who can believe what we have heard.
To whom has the arm o f the Lord been revealed?
^He grew up before [the Lord] like a tender shoot..  .
The song also shows that the “intervention” by the L o r d ’s arm involves vengeance, which the text 
emphatically declares is sustained by righteousness. This righteous vengeance involves “repaying” Israel and 
the nations “their due” which will inspire the nations to fear and worship the L o r d  (salvation!). The L ord 
“repaid” Israel their due in forms of warfare and exile (27:8).
Similar connections could be noted with respect to the “arm of the L o r d” songs of Isa 59:2-15 and 63 
mentioned above.
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Significantly, in 51:5-10 and 52:8-10, the “arm of the Lx)rd” refers to the L ord  himself in 
action.®® In 51:5-10, the “arm of the L ord” is used more or less interchangeably with the 
L ord (the “me” of 51:5 and the “you” of v.IO). It should be recognised that, even as the 
“face” (D’’3S) of the L ord refers to the L ord himself in other contexts such as Ex 33,®"* the 
“arm” (iUllT) of the L ord in these passages refers to the L ord himself rather than simply to 
the “power of God.®® The “arm of the L ord” is a motif of the L ord’s activity of salvation.®® 
Thus, in 51:5-10 the “arm of the L ord” is evoked to describe the L ord acting now 
as the L ord had in the day of Moses. “Without the coming of Yahweh there can be no 
salvation.”®^ Again, in 52:8-10, expectation is “focused on the L ord himself, with the 
metaphor [“arm”] underlining that he is looked for in person and in power.”®® In 53:1, the 
“arm of the L ord” has already been revealed, and the “we” who witnessed the revelation of 
the “arm of the L ord” describe what they have heard and seen in 53:2ff. In other words, 
the statement “he [the Servant] grew up before him like a tender shoot” (v.2), which 
immediately follows the assertion that the “arm of the L ord” has been revealed, actually 
begins to describe how the “arm of the L ord” has been revealed. Verse 2 also begins to 
answer the question of why the message concerning the revelation of the “arm of the L ord”
Beginning in chapter 40, several passages speak of the salvific work the “arm of the L o r d ” (4 0 :9 -1 1 ;  51:4- 
10; 52:10; 53:2; 59:l,16ff; 63:Iff).
^  The anthropomorphic metaphors “face" (D’32) and “arm” (V"T\\) can be understood as instances of a kind 
of metonymy in which a noun for a part (here arm, or face) is used in place of a noun for a whole (the L ord  
himself). Again, the “arm” (iUllT) of the L ord  may be identified with the L o r d , just as in Ex 33 the “face” 
(D’3S) of the L o r d” is God-self rather than a separate human agent. The relationship between the “face” 
(D‘'3S) of the L o r d  and the L ord  as in Ex 3 3  serves as an instructive analogy for the relationship between the 
“arm” (r1"lT) of the L o r d  and the L or d  in Isaiah passages. If the “face” (D*’3B) of the L o r d  emphasizes the 
intimacy or perhaps guidance of the L o r d , the “arm” of the L ord  may be understood as laying 
emphasis on the power, righteousness, salvation, and justice of the L o r d .
For the direct association of the “arm” with the power, see Isa 50:2; 62:8; 63:11-12, but even in these 
passages the “arm” can be identified with the L o r d . Brueggemann sees 52:10 as rhetoric about God as a king 
(1997: 247) or a warrior, who “will fight against and defeat all the illicit claimants to public power,” (24). 
While the “arm” as a metaphor of God’s power is found in passages like Ex 6:6 and 15:16, Isa 52:10 is best 
interpreted in relation to the Servant of 53.
^ Motyer 1993: 404-405. North (1952: 120) notes, “The conception of Yahweh’s arm as the instrument of 
deliverance and judgment occurs frequently in Deuteronomy (cf. Deut. 4:34), usually when recalling the 
Exodus from Egypt, ‘with a mighty hand, and with an outstretched arm.’”
RE Watts 1997: 199; cf. 80.
Motyer 1993: 409
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is so unbelievable (v.l), namely, that it comes in the form of a “tender shoot” rather than an
obvious display of power.®® The structure of the early part of the Servant Song presents
53:2ff as explaining how the “arm of the L ord” is revealed through the Suffering Servant.
Accordingly, the same language used to describe the “arm of the L ord” in 51:5ff is
also used of the Servant of the L ord in another Servant Song in 42: Iff. ®®
Isa 51:5-10 My righteousness draws near speedily, my salvation is on the way.
And my arm will bring justice to the nations.
The islands will look to me and wait in hope for my arm . . .
®. . .  My righteousness will last forever, my salvation through all generations.
®Awake, Awake! Clothe yourself with strength, O arm of the L ord . . .
*®Was it not you who dried up the sea . . .  so that the redeemed might cross over?
Isa 42:1 Here is my Servant whom I uphold, my chosen one in whom I delight;
I will put my Spirit on him and he will bring justice to the nation . . .
®. . .  in faithfulness he will bring forth justice;
"*He will not falter or be discouraged till he establishes justice on earth.
In his law the islands will put their hope.
When 53:1-2 is read in the light of 42:1-4 and 51:5ff, the connection between the “arm of 
the Lord” and the Servant becomes clearer.®* The anticipated Servant of Isa 42 and the
The description of the Suffering Servant that immediately follows the question in 53:1 seems to be more 
occupied with answering the implicit question of “How” the “arm of the L o r d” is revealed. The answer to 
the explicit question ‘T o  whom?” is best found in the larger context. It is to those in Zion (52:8; “When the 
L ord  returns to Zion, they will see it with their own eyes.” These probably are the “we” of the Servant Song) 
and the nations (52:10; “The L ord  will lay bare his holy arm in the sight of all the nations, and all the ends of 
the earth will see the salvation of our God.”)
^There are several similarities between the accomplishments of the Servant in chapter 42 and the 
accomplishments of the L o r d  or the “arm of the L o r d”  in chapter 51. The “arm of the L o r d” will work o u t  
justice for the world “without fail” and his salvation will “last forever” “through all generations” (51:5). 
Likewise, the Servant will succeed in establishing justice on earth (42:4), which is emphatically stated three 
times. The L ord  will make the Servant to be “a covenant for the people” (42:6) even as the “arm of the 
L ord” will be “a light for the nations” (51:4). Such work and status of the Servant and the “arm of the L ord” 
will persist “wntfl justice is established on earth” (42:4: cf. 51:6,8). In all these ways, the Servant can be 
identified with the “arm of the L ord” . Indeed, only the “arm of the L o r d”  who is consistently mighty and 
who is consistently servant-like can establish justice on earth.
Westermann (1969: 258) rightly points out the intertextual references that inseparably connect 42:1-4 and 
52:13-53:12, the former as “the origin of the Servant's work” and the latter as “its culmination.” As 
Westermann points out, “the opening words” of the Suffering Servant Song “hark back to the designation of 
the servant in 42.1-4.” He continues, “This began, ‘behold my Servant, whom I uphold’; and 52.13 also 
begins, ‘behold my Servant’. There can be no doubt that this is deliberate. The two songs go together.” The 
opening words establish their mutual interpretative relationship. Childs (2001: 412) makes the observation 
that “this intertextual reference to 42:1 has been decisively affected by the subsequent call in 49: Iff., which
transferred the office of the servant from the nation Israel to the individual prophetic figure of 49:3------ Then
in 50:4ff, following the sequence of the prophetic narrative, the reception of his call as God’s servant is
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eagerly awaited “arm of the L ord” of Isa 51:5ff (and 52:8ff) converge in the Suffering 
Servant of the Servant Song, The “arm of the L ord” is revealed through the Servant’s 
intercession (3J3S), atonement, and justification. As the “arm of the L ord” revealed, the 
Servant completes the salvation plan of the L ord . The Servant “will be exalted and lifted 
up and be very high” (Isa 52:13) and all nations will come to “knowledge of the one light 
of Yahweh.”’^
If the Servant is the “arm of L ord” revealed, then it is fitting that the Servant bears 
and removes human sin even as the L ord does in Ex 34:7 and Num 14:18. What the 
Servant shows about the L ord is consistent with the attributes and acts of the L ord revealed 
in Ex 32-34 and Num 14. In Ex 32-34 and Num 14, the L ord is one who patiently serves 
his people, bearing and removing human sin, guilt, and its consequences. Isaiah 43:24 
portrays God as a “servant” who removes Israel’s sin by bearing it. The Servant Song 
portrays the Servant as one who, according to the will of the L ord and by his own will, is 
offered up as a sin offering to make atonement for Israel and the nations. In a sense, the 
“arm of the L ord” being revealed through the Servant to suffer for the sins of the world is 
not an entirely new concept; it is a natural outworking of the L ord’s identity as the sin- 
bearer/remover in Ex 34.
If the “arm of the L ord” (53:1) is revealed as the Suffering Servant, then the 
Servant can indirectly show what the L ord is like. Thus, in the following three subsections 
(4.1.5-4.1.7), I will raise a series of questions concerning the relationship between divine 
mercy and judgment that are relevant to the Servant Song and address those questions with 
reference to the theological ideas found in the echoed terms of Ex 34:6-7 in Isa 53:5-12.
related as he is tortured and humiliated by his oppressors, who are not from outside, but from within the 
nation of Israel itself.”
Seitz 2001 (Isaiah 40-66): 464.
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4.1.5. The Sovereignty of God as Self-Giving
Brueggemann has suggested that God’s sovereignty is at odds with his self-giving 
solidarity with his people. For Brueggemann, God’s sovereignty is basically an expression 
of self-commitment or self-regard (see 227ff; 27iff), and can be expressed in unfettered 
violence towards his people. God’s solidarity, by contrast, is at times expressed in his 
overindulgence of his people. Such a “disjunctive” perspective runs through 
Bmeggemann’s interpretation of Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes, including Isa 54. In this 
passage, God, whose “self” has been bruised by Israel, is portrayed as expressing his self- 
regard (or sovereignty) in uncontrolled violence against Israel, with no juridical 
commitment^^ and without any intention of restoring I s r a e l . I n  this way of imaging God, 
divine sovereignty serves no one but God, whose “self” is hurt and purposelessly vengeful. 
While Brueggemann does not present such a picture of God explicitly in relation to the 
Servant Song, since the Servant Song is intricately related to Isa 54 the Servant Song 
(along with Ex 34:6-7 and other echoes treated in the thesis) can provide an alternate way 
of understanding divine sovereignty that is not contradictory to divine solidarity in relation 
to Isa 54.
In Ex 32-34 and Num 14, the Lord absorbs and suffers the wrong done to him and 
affirms a continued life of Israel with the Lord. God exercises his sovereign freedom to 
bear sin and its consequences and to show mercy to those who deserve destruction. In so 
doing, the Lord reveals the unique divine identity (i.e. that he is unlike any other gods) to 
be one in whom sovereign freedom is expressed in compassionate and gracious self-giving.
Consistent with the Exodus and Numbers passages, Isa 53 also presents divine 
sovereignty as a form of “self-giving.” That is, the Lord reveals his “arm” in and through 
the Servant, who submits himself to suffering in order to bring reconciliation and 
righteousness to the sinner. The Servant is able to efficaciously suffer for the sinner and
^ Brueggemann 1997: 384. 
Brueggemann 1997: 439.
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reconcile the sinner to God because he “belongs to the identity of the unique God.” Thus 
the Servant’s suffering is consistent with and a natural outworking of the L ord’s identity as 
one who exercises his sovereign freedom to bear and remove sin in order to grant life to the 
sinner as found in Ex 32-34 and Num 14. In addition, if the Servant is the “arm of the 
L ord” revealed and belongs to the identity of God, then through the Servant’s suffering, 
God also suffers. If so, then the Servant’s suffering shows not only the Servant’s own self­
giving servanthood, but also that of the L ord (or the “arm of the L ord” ). As Bauckham 
rightly states, the L ord’s “self-giving in abasement and service” through the Servant 
“ensures that his sovereignty over all things is also a form of his self-giving.”^^  
Furthermore, “the career of the Servant of the L ord , his suffering, humiliation, death and 
exaltation, is the way in which the sovereignty of the one true God comes to be 
acknowledged by all the nations.”^^
The self-giving quality of God is an aspect of the L ord’s constant character found 
in Ex 32-34, Num 14, and now in Isa 53. And that self-giving quality is what consistently 
marks divine sovereignty in those passages. When God’s holiness and justice demand the 
destruction of the sinner, God exercises his sovereign freedom to reconcile the sinner to 
God by bearing sin and its consequences (in the case of Isaiah, this is manifested through 
the atoning sacrifice of the Servant who is the “arm of the L ord” revealed). Self-sacrifice 
should not in any way be set in opposition to divine sovereignty, as Brueggemann has 
done.
Bauckham 1998: 61. See also his related comment: “And when the nations acknowledge his unique deity 
and turn to him for salvation, it is the Servant, humiliated and now exalted to sovereignty on the divine 
throne, whom they acknowledge” (51).
^  Bauckham 1998: 59. Bauckham (1998: 61) continues, “But since the exalted [Servant] is first the 
humiliated [Servant], since indeed it is because of his self-abnegation that he is exalted, his humiliation 
belongs to the identity of God as truly as his exaltation does. The identity of God— who God is— is revealed 
as much in self-abasement and service as it is in exaltation and rule.”
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4.1.6. Compatibility between Divine Justice and the Servant’s Vicarious 
Suffering
Some scholars may raise theological objections to my interpretation that sinners are 
made righteous because of the innocent Servant who is punished for sinners. Put 
differently, some may fail to see how God’s punishment of the innocent Servant and God’s 
justification of sinners on the basis of the Servant’s suffering can be compatible with God’s 
justice. Such failure arises from seeing the Servant’s vicarious suffering as necessarily 
implying that “the sinful get off scot-free” at his expense.^^ R. N. Whybray makes the 
related point that the Old Testament does not provide for acquitting guilty persons, because 
to acquit the guilty would be a heinous crime.^^ In fact, in the context of God’s definitive 
self-revelation, God is called one who does not acquit the guilty (Ex 34:7; see Chapter 2). 
Holding the sinner accountable for sin is central to God’s righteous character. Thus, the 
Servant’s vicarious suffering appears to be at odds with the divine righteous character that 
would not acquit the guilty or punish the innocent. In my interpretation of Isa 53, the 
guilty seem to go unpunished, or, in Brueggemann’s terms, solidarity is shown apart from 
“sovereignty.” Further, the innocent seem to be unjustly punished; “sovereignty” is 
exercised beyond the bounds of justice. If this is so, then Isaiah 53 seems to posit a view of 
God that is different from that of Ex 34:6-7 as we have interpreted it.
However, the posited objections flow out of an a priori definition of vicariousness. 
Whybray associates vicariousness with “the crime of acquitting the guilty” in the passages 
that rightly indict dishonest judges who acquit the guilty (perhaps having been bribed by 
the rich).^  ^ A miscarriage of justice by a dishonest judge, however, does not fall in the 
same category as the merciful judge Yahweh who provides a way of atonement through a
Orlinsky (1967: 59) would object to ray view that the Servant’s suffering is vicarious. Orlinsky defines 
vicariousness as a situation of exchange in which “the sinful get off scot-free, at the expense” of another. He 
then proceeds to reject such a notion as unbiblical.
Whybray 1978: 66,57.
Whybray (1978: 57) rightly regards acquitting the guilty as “being especially heinous, being included in a 
serious of solemn ‘woes’ in Isa. 5:23 and described as ‘abomination to Yahweh’ (nin") n3DlM) in Prov. 
17:15.”
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unique vicarious suffering of the Servant of Isa 53. The human judicial institution is 
required by God to administer retributive justice in which the punishment fits the crime.
But God has the sovereign freedom and power to “absorb” (in himself or through the 
Servant) the wrong done him, suffer the consequence of human sin, and show mercy to the 
sinner. The Servant’s making “the many” righteous does not contradict divine justice or 
requirement for just punishment, since the justification of the sinner rests on the 
requirement for just punishment satisfied by God through the Servant. God’s Servant’s 
actions of bearing human sin and absorbing the consequent punishment do not in any way 
contradict justice. Rather, they uniquely define divine justice. That is, divine justice 
includes mercy or may be expressed in mercy. Conversely, divine mercy includes justice, 
so that mercy is not a matter of acquitting the guilty but of mitigating the punishment.
This point has already been demonstrated in Ex 34:6-7 and Num 14 in Chapters 2 
and 3. The L ord himself bears Israel’s sin and its consequences so as not to “cut off” Israel 
from God. Such divine sin-bearing does not exclude an appropriate measure of punishment 
for God’s people. The L ord’s sin-bearing mitigates rather than eliminates judgment or 
punishment. Likewise, the Servant’s sin-bearing (or the L ord’s punishment of the Servant) 
is not a matter of completely acquitting the guilty, but is rather taking the brunt of the 
punishment so as to affirm the continued existence of sinners and to reconcile them to God. 
The Servant’s sin-bearing, parallel to the L ord’s sin-bearing, brings mitigation of 
punishment rather than elimination of it.
There are ongoing disciplinary punishments even after the Servant vicariously 
suffers. People may continue to suffer many of the consequences of their sin even after 
atonement has been made. The Servant’s atoning work does not guarantee that everyone 
from Israel and the nations will be automatically saved from judgment. Only those who 
believe the “good news” announced by the messenger will enter the holy city of Zion and
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be saved. As Childs says, “The note had already been sounded in 50:10-11 that the 
response to the servant would divide the people of Israel into two groups, those who 
believe and those who oppose.”*^ ' An invitation to abundant life in Zion is given to all, but 
only those who hear and obey will be saved, and those who rebel against the L ord will be 
destroyed. Even after the Servant’s work, salvation comes only to those who choose to 
receive it and serve the L ord .
God’s work through the Servant upholds God’s righteous character as revealed in 
Ex 34:6-7. The L ord’s punishment of the Servant and his mercy for sinners do not 
compromise divine justice, but define it. The Servant is punished because of God’s 
compassion toward sinners, and sinners receive mercy because of the vicarious punishment 
of the Servant. Those who reject the Servant reject the L ord’s way of atoning sin and 
granting righteousness and are therefore ultimately destroyed. All of these divine acts flow 
out of and are united in the self-giving and serving character and work of the L ord .
4.1.7. Compatibility between the Punishment of the Servant and 
the Punishment of Israel and the Nations.
In the foregoing discussion, I have begun to suggest the compatibility between the 
vicarious suffering of the Servant and the punishment of the sinner. In this subsection, I 
will develop this idea further. It has been noted that in Isa 40:2 God declares that Israel’s 
“sin has been paid for; she has received from the L o rd’s hand double for all her sins.” 
Orlinsky points out that Israel had already been punished for her sins—“in the form of 
destruction at home and two generations of captivity abroad—and had thereby fully 
expiated her sinfulness (40:1-2; italics mine).”^^  ^ The text of 40:2 certainly would seem to
Thus, 54:17 speaks of those who responded to the “good news” and are in Zion and those who apparently 
rejected the “good news” and are against Zion.
Childs 2001: 414. There are those who reject and oppose the Servant and Zion, perhaps because what the 
L ord  did through the Servant is beyond belief and hard to accept. As Isaiah 53:1 says, “Who could have 
believed what we have heard?” The revelation of the “arm of the L ord” through the Servant and the 
Servant’s humiliation and exaltation are indeed “doubt-inspiring.”
Orlinsky 1967: 58. Hooker (1959:46) explains the “double” (D^ *?Slp) suffering of the nation of Israel by 
postulating that Israel suffers not only for its own sins, but also vicariously on behalf of all the nations (“the 
many”). The term (D^*pS3) occurs only in one other place in Job. The term is a dual form, derived
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support the idea of the “completeness” of Israel’s suffering; “her service is complete” and 
“her punishment is accepted [or her iniquity is paid for].” Thus, the L o rd’s punishment of 
the Servant for the sins of Israel appears to be at odds with Israel’s punishment in exile.'®  ^
Ultimately, God appears to be unjust.
The compatibility between the Servant’s suffering for “us” (Israel) and the 
punishment of Israel in exile can be seen in the following factors. In Deutero-Isaiah, the 
unmitigated punishment of Israel would be a total destruction of Israel. But what is 
counted as “full” punishment for Israel falls short of total destruction. The word “full” in 
40:2 then would mean the full amount of sin and punishment that the L ord chooses to 
“visit” (IpB ) upon Israel rather than the full amount deserved by Israel. The “full” 
amount is “all that God required her to pay,” ®^"^ rather than what Israel’s sin requires. Thus, 
in Isa 48:9 the L ord says that in divine patience the L ord holds back from cutting Israel off, 
from utterly destroying Israel. Also, Isa 27:7-9 speaks of Israel’s “exile” as “all the fruit of 
the removal of her sin” (iHKlSn nOil '’‘IB 'bS), which stands in contrast to the destruction 
meted out to some nations as the full punishment required to remove their sin. An 
important theological point is that while punishment purifies Israel and the nations to some 
degree (by removing the sin and sinners), it is insufficient to reconcile either Israel or the 
nations to God. God’s own sin-bearing/removing or divine atonement is what makes 
possible the continued life of Israel and the nations with the L ord . Full reconciliation with
from *733, which means “to double over" (Sama, Exodus, 168, 180) or “to fold double” (Ex. 26:9; 28:16; 
39:9; see, Motyer 1993: 299; cf. Holladay 1988: 163). Hooker clearly overplays the importance of this 
obscure term and of her chosen meaning for it. Gerhard von Rad and others have suggested a legitimate 
alternative meaning for the term namely, “equivalent” (Von Rad, as cited in Whybray 1978: 62). If
he is right, a similar usage is found in the related word nJtüD. In Deut 17:18 HDjUp means “copy” of the Law. 
In other places, HJtpp is translated into “double,” conveying the idea of “fullest measure” or “complete”
(Deut 21:17; 2 Kg 2:9; 61:7). Childs (2001: 297) correctly says, “The reference to ‘double for all her sins’ is 
not to suggest that Israel received more punishment than deserved.” He continues, “But rather the author 
makes use of a legal image already found in Ex. 22:3(4), which requires a guilty one to restore double for a 
crime.” If so, “double” (D*)*pp3) here would refer to what is legally appropriate.
Orlinsky 1967: 58.
Seitz 2001 {Isaiah 40-66): 334.
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the Holy One of Israel is achievable only as sinners atone for their own sins (by receiving 
due punishment) and the L ord atones through divine sin-bearing.
While the biblical texts do not quantify the “amount” of sin the L ord bears or 
“visits” back on sinners, they point to the mutually-inclusive nature of divine sin-bearing 
and atonement and sinners’ atonement by their own sin-bearing. The L ord requires some 
form of atonement by sinners, perhaps through some form of punishment. But since that is 
insufficient to fully justify and reconcile the sinner to God, the L ord ultimately provides 
the means of justification and reconciliation through divine atonement, which in Isa 53 is 
accomplished through the Servant’s work. Thus the reconciliation of Israel and the nations 
to God in Isa 54 should be viewed as the result of both the ultimate punishment (HHS) of 
the Servant and the mitigated (though severe) punishment of sinners who otherwise 
deserve destruction. The Servant’s suffering and Israel’s suffering are mutually inclusive, 
rather than exclusive, and both are consistent with the L ord’s just and merciful character as 
revealed in Ex 34:6-7.
4,1.8, Excursus: On the Grammar o f Vicariousness
I have stated above that scholars like Orlinsky would deny the vicarious nature of 
the Servant’s suffering.*®  ^ Orlinsky insists that the Servant’s suffering is identificational^®^ 
and merely an “occupational hazard” of the prophet .Or l insky believes that his view is 
confirmed by the grammatical details of the passage. I have argued in previous subsections 
for the presence of vicariousness in Isa 53 based on the function of the thematic echoes of
even claims that the concept of vicarious suffering (whether an individual or a nation) is foreign to the 
Old Testament, including Isaiah 53. Orlinsky (1967: 73-74) also asserts that intertestamental Judaism knew 
nothing of a suffering messiah and that Christians adapted it from Hellenism. His assertion seems to be 
called into question more and more by additional evidence from the Dead Sea Scrolls (Oswalt 1998: 381).
Orlinsky 1967; cf. Whybray 1983: 74-78.
Orlinsky believes that the Servant was a prophetic spokesman who simply shared in or identified with the 
suffering of his people like all the other prophetic spokespersons (1967: 56-57). Westermann (1969: 257, 
261), however, points out that unlike other suffering individuals in the Old Testament, the Servant’s entire 
life is stamped with suffering: “he grew up . . .  he was buried.” In addition, the Servant’s suffering is his 
intention and the L o r d ’s intention, which is quite different from an “occupational hazard.”
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Ex 34:6-7 in Isa 53, but in this excursus I will offer criticism of Orlinsky’s grammatical 
argument against the presence of vicariousness in Isa 53.
Referring to 53:5, Orlinsky says, “If the author of these verses had intended here 
something of vicariousness, he would probably have employed not 
orniia)» (Xsno W^B)P (b^iip Xinp but a . . .  a (the bet of exchange).” '"* 
Orlinsky then suggests that the D in verses 5 and 8 is likely causal.'""
I agree with Orlinsky that the Q in verses 5 and 8 is most likely causal. It is 
however unwise to try to deny the presence of vicariousness in 53 based on the usage of 
preposition Û instead of 3  in verses 5 and 8. Orlinsky’s suggestion that the author of 53:5 
would have used 3 . . .  3  (the beth pretii) in lieu of . . .  3  at first sounds appropriate, but 
a further examination shows that it is misleading.
(1) A simple substitution of the preposition 3 . . .  3 in lieu of 3  . . .  D itself would 
not guarantee vicariousness. The reason for this is that there are many cases where the 
preposition 3 is used in a causal sense (“because o f ’) with words like ]13, 3 0 3  and 
nXQn (respectively, Num 27:3; 1er 51;6/Neh 9:37; 1er 17:3/Isa 50:1; Mic 1:5). There is 
no clear evidence that using 3 . . .  3  in lieu of Û . . .  3  in Isa 53:5 would automatically 
have expressed vicariousness since both carry a causal sense. In other words, 53:5 either 
with 3  . . .  3  or D . . .  3  can be equally and legitimately translated as “he suffered because 
of our rebellion; he was crushed because of our iniquity.”
(2) In addition, the following evidence about the proper use of the beth pretii 
reveals that the author would not have used the beth pretii in lieu of 3 . . .  Q to express 
vicariousness as Orlinsky suggests. This is because the use of the beth pretii in lieu of 
3  . . .  3  would render the verse unintelligible, as I will now explain.
Orlinsky 1967: 57.
It should be noted that the beth pretii does not always require a second beth (so also with the mem). See 
Isa 7:23 below and also the text in Isa 53.
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Some good examples of the beth pretii, which Orlinsky argues is essential for true 
vicariousness, are found in the following passages:
Lev 27:10 “He must not exchange it or substitute 
3 Î3 3  3 1 3  3 l3
a good one for a bad, or a bad one for  a good; 
if he substitutes one animal for another animal”
Deut 19:21 r 3 3  T3 0333 033I • -  ; I * -  V V ;  • /  VLife/or life, eye for eye 
Isa 7:23
A thousand vines at a thousand silver
The beth pretii is used in between the two parties or objects of comparable kind (animal- 
animal, human-human) or value (good-bad, eye-eye, vines-silver). What are not expressed 
in these phrases are the causes (as the causal 3 -phrase does in 53:5) that express why an 
exchange is required (or forbidden). Thus, if 53:5 were to have an expression of exchange 
or substitution of one person, “he,” in place o/many sinful persons, “us,” the beth pretii 
should be used in between “he” and “us,” the two parties of comparable kind. The verse 
then would look something like this:
0133) V rn p  x in i  
IS’niiJJD 033) K3HD- j  •* T T % :He was pierced (m place o f us) because of our rebellion;
He was crushed {in place o f us) because of our iniquity.
This construction expresses the idea of exchange (3) between he and us (and the rationale 
[Q] for the exchange).
If Orlinsky insists on the beth pretii in lieu of 3 . . .  Q in 53:5, the phrase would 
read, “he suffered in place o f our sins; he was crushed in place o f our iniquity.” But, such a
sentence is absurd, since one cannot speak of a person substituting for a sin (they are not of
equal or comparable value). Rather, one speaks of a person substituting (3) for another 
person(s) because o f {2 or 3) sin. What Orlinsky thinks the author would have said in 
order to express vicariousness is mistaken.
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(3) There is an expression for human vicariousness, which is forbidden, found in 
Deut 24:16:
Deut 24:16 D''33'‘7V ni3N  inpVR*? 
n l3R "‘? r  o p s i
i n o r  1«tsn3 b ’R
Parents will not be put to death/or their children 
and children will not be put to death/or their parents.
Each person for his own sin will be put to death.
The first two phrases, the father being put to death in place of the son, or the son in place of 
the father, perfectly express vicariousness, which is forbidden here. The preposition used 
to express the idea of substitution here is ^3 . Therefore, the following would be a good 
suggestion for Isa 53:5:
■* T ! ‘ — r  y  J .
He suffered {in place of us) because of our rebellion;
He was crushed {in place o f us) because of our iniquity.
But Isa 53:5 does not have the preposition that expresses the idea of substitution. The 
expression in Isa 53:5 is comparable to the third phrase of Deut 24:16:
Deut24;16cinDV iKtûnS
Each will die because o f his own sin.
Isa 53:5 iJ’nbiaD X31D iirtSBD ‘r‘?na ximT \  I *• T : ■ T ; :He was pierced for our rebellions; he was crushed because of our iniquity.
In both Deut 24:16c and Isa 53:5, whether it is an other’s sin or one’s own sin, the sin 
stands in a causal relationship to the subject; the subject does not stand in a vicarious 
relationship to the sin. Father-son and son-father are in vicarious relationship in 
Deut 24:16. In Isa 53:5, the specific expression “in place of us” (either 13"’^ 3  or 333) is all 
but abbreviated. This, however, does not necessarily imply that the concept of 
vicariousness is not present in Isa 53. There are other expressions that point toward the 
vicarious nature of the Servant’s suffering in verses 6,10, and 12, which are discussed 
above.
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4.2. A Contextual, Theological Exegesis of Isaiah 54:7-10:
Benefits of the Servant’s Suffering and Exaltation
and the Compatibility of Exile and Everlasting Covenant of Peace
In my discussion of Isa 53 ,1 have addressed the issues of the constancy of divine 
character in Isa 53, the nature of divine sovereignty, and the compatibility of the suffering 
o f the Servant and the severe punishment o f sinners. Here, I will address further the 
compatibility of God’s severe punishment of Israel (and the nations) in the past and God’s 
everlasting covenant o f love and peace for Israel (and the nations) now being offered. I 
begin with a brief consideration of the affirmations of divine mercy and judgment found in 
Isa 54.
4.2.1. Everlasting Covenant of Peace Announced
The atoning work of the Suffering Servant of Isa 53 effects the dramatic change 
from severe divine punishment of Israel and the nations to the universal and everlasting 
covenant of peace for the servants of the L ord. Thus, the opening verses of Isa 54 issue a 
call to Zion to celebrate in songs and shouts of joy (54:1). The L ord had abandoned Zion 
for “a brief moment” “in a surge of anger” (v.7-8). But now the Lord will re-establish Zion 
in a “covenant of peace” (v.lO). Zion is called to enlarge her tent for the inclusion of the 
nations (v.3). Since the L ord is “the God of all the earth” (v.4), the nations are invited to 
join themselves to the L ord to serve him (56:6). The old era is gone; a new age of peace 
has dawned on Zion.
Various terms related to reconciliation are used in Isa 54:7-12 to stress this point. 
The expressions of the L ord’s merciful character seen in Ex 34:6 are used repeatedly here. 
The term “compassion” appears three times: “with great compassion” (□*’^ 12 D‘’pn'133, 
v.7b), “I will have compassion on you” (T]''Mpnn, v.8b), and “who has compassion on 
you” v.lO). The term “steadfast covenant love” appears twice: “everlasting
covenant love” (D*P33 *101133, v.8) and “my steadfast covenant love” (‘’’10113, v.lO). In 
addition, the expression “my covenant of peace” (*’01*^ 0 n"'133, v.lO) is used, of which
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“covenant” may be regarded as a contextual echo of the same term used in Ex 34:10, and 
“peace” as a thematic echo (of the peace the L ord granted Israel following the divine self­
revelation in 34:10ff). All these terms together strongly emphasize that divine wrath and 
anger are no more, and a new era of peace has dawned on Zion. The L ord swears never to 
be angry with or rebuke Zion again (v.9), for the L ord’s covenant love will not depart nor 
his covenant of peace be removed (v.lO).
The new covenant the L ord establishes with Zion is universal and abiding in 
n a t u r e . T h e  L ord’s likening the new covenant to the Noahic covenant brings out this 
po i n t .*By means of the flood, the L ord cleanses the earth of brazen sin and the resultant 
contamination. Then the L ord makes an irrevocable, eternal covenant with humankind and 
all living things.**  ^ The L ord will never again destroy all living things because of the 
sinfulness of humankind. The reasons are twofold: the fundamental sinfulness of 
humankind and the pleasing sacrifice of one righteous man Noah.**  ^ The L ord will deal 
with humankind more leniently, so as not to destroy all living things.*’"*
A similar pattern is discerned in Isa 54. As before the flood, all the nations are 
corrupt and devoid of justice and righteousness. Even the elect nation Israel is corrupt 
(48:8). Lord judges Israel and the nations with extreme severity, as he did with the flood. 
The Lord cleanses his people and the nations (within the bounds of the Noahic covenant). 
But the abiding truth that “the imagination of human hearts is evil from their youth”
The nations will be blessed through Zion (Isa 55:5; 56:3, 6 ,7).
Westermann 1969: 274.
Go wan's discussion is helpful here (1994:221). The flood was God’s way of destroying sin and sinners 
and “starting over” with one righteous man. However, destruction was ultimately not “God’s way of bringing 
about the cure for human sin.” God’s generalisation about the sinful state of humankind before the flood 
stands true even after the flood. After the flood, God only reminds himself of the sad fact that “the 
inclination of the human heart is evil from youth” (Gen 8:21). Human sinfulness is spoken of as an ongoing 
problem which will not be cured by massive destruction. God will have to deal with sin in some other way.
Spieckermann 2000: 323. As Spieckermann would insist, divine grace of course eclipses both human 
factors for divine decision (the sinfulness of human or the righteousness of Noah). My point is rather that 
human reasons do play a role in moving God to act.
Krasovec comments, “existential incompleteness is a decisive reason for God’s forbearance towards 
humankind” (1999: 40).
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(Gen 8:20-21) still stands true in Isaiah before and after the judgment. Solely based on 
divine goodness expressed in and through the righteous Servant’s life as the Q0X the L ord 
makes an everlasting, universal covenant of peace and love. One could say that the 
covenant mentioned in Isaiah takes the Noahic covenant to a higher level, as I will show.
What stands out as unique in Isaiah is the fact that the righteous Servant’s life as the 
D0K is the decisive factor in ushering in a new era of everlasting love and peace to the 
world. However, Hermann Spieckermann insists, “As Noah’s covenant is surpassed by the 
firm promise of merciful love, so the Servant’s intercession is implicitly rejected by God’s 
salvatory covenant. There are no mediators between God and Israel, either in the field of 
love or in that of sin.”*’^  I agree with Spieckermann that ultimately there is no mediator 
other than God himself. But God himself is in fact the mediator in this case because God is 
working through the Servant. Accordingly, the Servant’s intercession is explicitly 
appointed and accepted by the L ord.**^  In the Servant’s intercession is the ultimate 
expression of God’s own intercession for Israel and the world.
The Servant’s suffering is a necessary part of the L ord’s freedom and decision to 
grant an everlasting covenant. Because the Servant suffered in place of the rebellious, the 
L ord will never rebuke Zion again (54:9). Because the Servant was punished, Zion will 
have an unfailing love and everlasting covenant of peace. As such, the Servant is truly “the 
covenant to the people” (D3 rT’33*p, 42:6; 49:8), “the light to the nations”
(0 ']i2  4 2 :6 ; 4 9 :6 ) , an d  “ [th e L ord’s] sa lv a t io n  to  th e  en d s  o f  th e earth ”
(y n x n  ■’n330*;,49:6).
Spieckermann 2000: 323.
More specifically, our discussion of Isa 53 above has shown that: (1) the Servant is someone who “belongs 
to the identity of the unique God,” the “arm of the L o r d ”  revealed, (2 )  the L or d  himself willed the Servant’s 
intercession (Isa 53:10, etc.), and (3) the L ord  explicitly exalted the Servant to the highest place after his 
suffering (that is an unmistakable sign of approval!).
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The literary and theological relationship between the Servant Song and Isa 54, 
which I have already emphasized, is important for understanding the unity and harmony of 
divine justice and mercy, to which I now turn.
4.2.2. Severe Punishment Meted Out
The new era described in Isa 54, ushered in by the Suffering Servant, stands in a 
stark contrast to the era of exile. For scholars like Brueggemann, the contrast is so strong 
and the gap between the two eras so wide that they are perceived as representing two 
opposite, irreconcilable characteristics of God, expressed in extremes.**^ Thus, in one of 
his interpretations of Isa 54:7-10, Brueggemann paints a picture of a God whose patience 
and faithfulness run out at the time of the exile. During the time of punishment, God has 
no self-control, and his acts of punishment (or “violent love”) know no justice or 
righteousness. Only after the L ord’s fury is spent does God reluctantly come back into 
proper covenant relationship with Israel. Such an interpretation rests on and supports 
Brueggemann’s overall argument that God has a problematic character, in which mercy 
and judgment or faithfulness and sovereignty are contradictory and irreconcilable.
To be sure, Isa 54 has many terms and expressions that acknowledge the past harsh 
treatment of Zion. These terms and expression occur either in descriptive statements or in 
declarations o f the reversal o f the past judgment. They are: “O barren one, you did not 
bear” ( H i t ;  “did not give birth” (n ‘? n ‘X‘?), and “desolate one” (n»DilÜ)
in v.l; “fear” 0 ^ “]’^). “be ashamed” “be humiliated” CP*??:!!), “embarrassed”
{’"I’Snn), “shame of your youth” fllÜh), and “reproach of your widowhood”
('tl’nijp'px nsnnp in v.4; “forsaken and grieved in spirit,” (HIT nSMÿ)
Brueggemann, 1997: 225.
Brueggemann's alternate argument is that God suffers with Israel, and his love for Israel is intensified 
through suffering. In addition, through suffering the L o r d  finds love that he never had before, which now 
enables him to reconcile Israel to himself. The processes of love growing, deepening, and discovered through 
suffering certainly is present in human relationships, but the text does not necessarily suggest that this process 
is true of God’s love. Rather, as I have shown, tht -essD^sdffers for and with his people because of the perfect 
and enduring love he always has for his people, and throï%ir Jrat suffering the L o r d  reconciles his people (Ex 
34:6-7; Num 14:18, and now in Isa 53-54).
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and “rejected” (DXDO) in v.6; “for a brief moment I have left you”
(*^*'n3T3 3213) in v.7; “in a flood of anger, I hid my face briefly from you”
(‘Tjfâû 323 •’2S ‘’n n n o n  ^]%03) in v.8; “be angry with you”
(*?!']^ 3 and “rebuke you” (*^3“332Q3) in v.9; “my steadfast covenant love will
depart from you” (033^ *’*10173) and “my covenant peace will be shaken”
(D)Dn ’pl*?® nnai) in v.lO; and “afflicted” (n’îï), “lashed by storms” (nnPO), and 
“not comforted” (HpHJ X*7) in verse 11.
Although these terms are used with a negative particle to emphasize their reversal, 
they have the effect of emphasising the severity of the past punishment that the L ord meted 
out to Israel. In the face of the terms that point to the Lord’s past anger, rejection, 
affliction, rebuke, and scorn, it does appear quite impossible to affirm the constancy of 
divine character in terms of faithfulness and mercy or the compatibility between divine 
mercy and justice. But, the following considerations will show some harmony between 
divine mercy and judgment, between solidarity and sovereignty, and between forgiveness 
and punishment.
4.2.3. God’s Righteous Punishment of His Covenant People
Characteristic of Brueggemann’s interpretation of the Israel-God covenant 
relationship is the absence of the role of Israel’s sin. But God’s exile of Israel must be 
interpreted in view of Israel’s sin in the context of the covenant relationship with God.
The proper theological context in which to understand the exile is that of the 
covenant blessings and curses detailed in Lev 26 and Deut 28. Once God has displayed his 
glory to Israel and a covenant is made between them, God expects holiness from Israel. 
God expected Israel to fear, obey, and love God and live righteously in community. As 
Israel is expected to do its part, God will do his part. God’s covenant commitment to Israel 
includes not only blessings if Israel demonstrates obedience, but also curses if Israel turns 
to rebellion and apostasy. The texts of Lev 26 (v.30-39) and Deut 28 (v.49ff and 64ff; cf.
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4:27ff) speak of exile as the ultimate punishment or curse that would come after many 
cycles of warning, obduracy, punishment, and restoration. Indeed, before the exile, God 
amply warns Israel of the coming ultimate judgment.
Deutero-Isaiah attests that for centuries Israel lived a national life characterised by 
unfaithfulness, rebellion, and stubbornness. The prophet confesses Israel’s sinful state, 
“We all like sheep have gone astray; each of us has turned to his own way” (53:6). God 
laments that “the people are radically unfaithful” from the very start of the nation’s 
history.**  ^ “Hitherto your ears were not opened. Well I know how treacherous you are, 
that from birth you were called a rebel” (48:8).*^° Israel’s severe sin accounted for the 
extremely severe punishment of the exile.
Ex 34:6-7 and its echoes testify to the increasing severity of the punishments that 
the Israelites received throughout their history. The golden calf incident provides a 
paradigmatic example of Israel’s sin—“Israel’s fall story”—which is re-enacted by Israel 
in later history. But there is a difference between the nation’s first offense and the nation’s 
ongoing persistence in corruption and rebellion. The difference lies not in the gravity of 
sins, but in the accumulation of unrepentant and persistent sins. Consistent with the 
warnings of Lev 26 and Deut 28, Israel’s persistence in rebellion and apostasy similar to 
the sin of the golden calf brought upon Israel increasing punishments. Instead of repenting 
in light of God’s gracious response to the sin of the golden calf, Israel manifested a 
repeated pattern of rebellion that, by the time of the exile, had irreversibly defiled the 
whole people and the entire land of Israel. This deep entrenchment in sin called for the 
severest punishment, more severe than the punishment demanded by the golden calf. This 
means that at any time in Israel’s history “there is no basis for doubting the divine justice, 
even in a moment of supreme national desolation.”*^* The L ord’s punishments are
See Krasovec 1999:490. 
Childs’ translation (2001:368). 
Krasovec 1999: 490.
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measured and proportionate, even as the L ord says in Isa 28:17, “I will make justice the 
measuring line and righteousness the plumb line.” In the exile, what the L ord meted out to 
Israel was just. In judgment, God consistently acts within the bounds of “contractual” 
justice; God does not overstep the bounds of justice and treat Israel more harshly than she 
deserves.
In fact, although divine punishment is augmented in keeping with the augmenting 
of Israel’s sin, divine justice is still tempered by divine mercy. God’s proportionate 
manner of dealing with Israel stands within the general framework of divine mercy. In the 
next subsection, I will discuss how God in his freedom and mercy often treats Israel less 
harshly than she deserves. This is not contradictory to justice, because in such cases, God 
himself (or God’s Servant) bears Israel’s sin and its consequences.*^^
4.2.4. The Merciful Justice of God
The divine punishment alluded to in Isa 54 is not only just, but also merciful. The 
reality of God’s mercy in the context of God’s just punishment of Israel in the exile is seen 
in many ways.
(1) Divine patience is displayed as the L ord waits for centuries before exiling 
Israel. The L ord gave many cycles of warning and limited punishment to chastise Israel 
and to deter Israel from further sin. But Israel took advantage of divine patience and lived 
in complacency and obduracy for several centuries. The repeated warnings underscore 
Israel’s stubbornness on the one hand and divine righteousness and mercy on the other. 
Therefore there is no room for doubting divine mercy. Even the severest of divine 
judgment is not capricious but is tempered by centuries of long-suffering with Israel and 
covenant love for Israel.
(2) The exile itself fell short of the total destruction that Israel’s centuries of 
apostasy and injustice called for. The L ord did not cut off Israel. Even when the L ord was
See Brueggemann 1992: Chapters 1 and 2 for a related discussion and for his failure to show how the 
biblical text itself integrates contractual justice and gracious mercy.
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said to be “pouring out on them his burning anger, the violence of battle” (42:25), the Lord 
exercised his patience and mercy and spared Israel from utter destruction. Thus, the Lord 
says:
Isa 48:9 For the sake of my name I am slow to anger;
for the sake of my praise I hold it back from you, so as not to cut you off.
In divine patience and mercy, God restrains his anger and punishment so as not to destroy 
Israel. It is important to note that according to this verse the reason the L ord is merciful to 
Israel is for his name’s sake. As indicated in earlier chapters, the praise of his name is 
related to his reputation among the nations, which in turn is directly related to the salvation 
of the nations through the Lord.*^  ^ By preserving Israel and displaying his mercy in 
justice, the nations come to know and worship the compassionate and merciful God of 
Israel.
(3) The nature of the Lord’s commitment to Israel in Ex 34 (reflected also in 
Num 14) provides the proper theological context for understanding divine mercy in the 
exile. On Sinai the L ord decided not to utterly destroy Israel, but to renew and continue his 
covenant relationship with Israel despite Israel’s extreme rebellion and capriciousness 
(Ex 34:6-10).* '^* Accordingly, even in the context of announcing covenant curses, the Lord 
says, “I will not reject [the Israelites] or abhor them so as to consume them, breaking my 
covenant with them, for I am the Lord their God” (Lev 26:44). The fact that the L ord 
preserves Israel testifies to the L ord’s faithfulness to his covenant with Israel. An 
accusation of unfaithfulness would be justifiable only if the L ord had completely destroyed 
Israel. But, that, the L ord has not done.
Again, this stands against Brueggemann’s interpretation of texts about God’s concern for his name, 
reputation or glory among the nations. Brueggemann sees these texts as almost exclusively about God’s self- 
centred self-regard (see, for example, his comments on God’s “glory”; 1997: 283ff).
This decision is reflective of the parallel once-for-all decision in Gen 8-9 to deal leniently with humanity 
because of the undeniable human inclination towards sin. See the relevant comments of Fretheim 1998: 32f.
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4.2.5. God as Holy, the Everlasting Consuming Fire
The compatibility between divine mercy and justice can also be seen in the fact that 
mercy and justice proceed out of God’s holy character. In the book of Isaiah, the L ord is 
frequently referred to as “the Holy One of Israel.” Divine “love” and “justice” are 
fundamental expressions of God’s intrinsic holiness. Thus, the holy God calls Israel to 
become holy by embracing the holy God, living by his holy ways, and taking on his holy 
character. Where there is unholiness, the holy God manifests himself as “a consuming
fire” (n^DX
That a holy God who is a consuming fire dwells among Israel and that Israel has 
embraced this God have certain consequences. (1) On the one hand, God’s righteousness, 
justice, and salvation can be established through Israel among the nations. Israel can be an 
instrument of divine justice, purification, and restoration. As God’s instrument of holiness, 
Israel itself can become, in a derivative way, like a consuming fire that can purify and 
cleanse the nations. This is a way Israel can fulfil its destiny of being a kingdom of priests, 
a holy nation (Ex 19:6). The conquest and habitation of the promised land can be seen as 
the beginning of such a mission.
(2) On the other hand, when Israel falls into apostasy and injustice and stands in 
opposition to the Holy One of Israel, Israel can expect (and does receive) certain cleansing 
actions from the Lord. The L ord reveals his name to be “jealous” (X3p, Ex 34:14; cf.
Deut 4:24: “the L ord your God is a devouring fire, a jealous God”). A jealous God is one 
who is committed to the holiness of his people among whom he dwells. Thus, when there 
is persistent apostasy, corruption, rebellion, and obduracy, God who is holy consumes both 
sin and sinners.
The phrase “the Holy One of Israel” occurs about twenty-six times in Isaiah, twelve times in chapters 1-39 
and fourteen times in 40-66. It occurs only six times in the Old Testament outside o f Isaiah. This, as an 
aside, is significant evidence for the literary unity of the book of Isaiah.
Ex 24:17; Deut 4:24; 9:3; Isa 9:18; 10:17; Lam 2:3f.
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In Isaiah, various anthropomorphisms are used to describe the L ord who lets his 
holy “fire” (0X) bum against all that is unholy. The L ord is said to be coming in “burning 
anger. . .  his lips are full of wrath, and his tongue is like a consuming fire”
(n‘?DX BÎX3 iJiiüVl rnSO. . . iBX "laia, 30:27). Against the obstinate
apostate, the Lord’s “arm” (3i*lT) comes down “with raging anger and the flames of a 
consuming fire” (n^DiX tÜX an'?') >^ X *1^3, 30:30). The L ord’s fiery wrath comes 
not only against the nations but also against “the sinners in Zion” (33:14). A question is 
raised in 33:14: “Who of us can dwell with the consuming fire? Who of us can dwell with 
everlasting burning?” A sobering answer is offered: “Those who walk righteously and 
speak what is right, who reject gain from extortion and keeps their hand from accepting 
bribes, and who stop their ears from hearing of bloodshed and shut their eyes from looking 
at evil”(33:15). The answer given is not only sobering, calling Israel to repentance, but 
also hope-inspiring. The verse indicates that it is possible to dwell with “the consuming 
fire,” the “everlasting burning.” But it takes nothing less than a full embrace of “the 
consuming fire” in the sense of not tolerating iniquity, rebellion, and sin. Only those who 
are holy can live with the One who is holy.
In the theology evident in Isa 54 and its context, the covenant relationship with God 
is not to be taken for granted, for it comes with a call and a responsibility to be holy. The 
L ord is not someone to be treated lightly. The L ord is one who unleashes “anger”
(^25p, v.8,9). The L ord  is the consuming fire who “rebukes” (132, v.9) his people. In 
Ex 33:3ff, the L ord wishes to withdraw his presence from the Israelites so as not to 
consume them in his burning anger (see Chapter 2). In contrast, in Isaiah, the L orD is in 
their midst, letting his consuming fire bum against them until all sin is atoned for (see 
Isa 12:6). Divine “anger,” “rebuke,” and “fire” are manifestations of the L o rD ’s 
abandonment of (3T3, 54:7) Israel to violent war and exile. Thus the prophet laments:
Isa 42:24-25 Who handed Jacob over to the plunderer and Israel to the robbers?
Was it not the LORD against whom we have sinned?
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For they did not walk in his ways and they did not obey his law.
So he poured out on them his burning anger, the violence of battle.
It set them on fire all around, yet they did not understand; 
it burned them, but they did not take it to heart.
As Knight says: “God had made [Israel] taste the death of separation from him,/or a brief 
moment. This was essential if Israel was ever to learn that God Almighty was in earnest 
about her election.” Even as 42:25 implies, divine punishment of Israel is to bring 
understanding and repentance to them (though the verse also indicates that Israel did not 
get the point.).
In contrast to my interpretation, Brueggemann claimed that God’s judgment of 
Israel in exile “is not for instruction or chastening or improvement. It is simply judgment 
of a sovereign who will not be mocked.”*^ * But his view is questionable. In the covenant 
blessings and curses in Deut 28:49-50 and Lev 26, the Lord makes explicit the disciplinary 
and corrective nature of divine judgment. As John N. Oswalt puts it, divine judgment “is 
not a matter of a raging tyrant who demands violence on someone to satisfy his fury.”*^  ^
Divine judgment, however severe, has a righteous, just, and redeeming purpose. Thus, it 
purifies, teaches, and directs sinners in the way they should go.
Isa 48:10,17 See, I have refined you, but not like silver;
I have tested you in the furnace of affliction . . .
“I am the L ord your God who teaches you for your benefit, 
who leads you in the way you should go.”
This passage speaks expressly of the divine punishment of the exile in terms of God’s 
refinement or purification.*^** The L ord’s patient disciplinary dealing with Israel is for the 
purpose of teaching Israel what is best for Israel and directing Israel in the way Israel 
should go.
Knight 1965: 248. 
Brueggemann 1997: 439.
Oswalt 1998: 388.
Accordingly, Isa 27:9 (iHRBn “IDH n n  IBS'; nXtS p S )  speaks of the destruction
of Jerusalem and the temple and the exile of the people as the consequence of the divine act of purification or 
removal of sins from the nation that has been contaminated by centuries of rebellion and brazen sins.
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The L ord’s severe punishment is also restorative. After a severe testing and 
refining, the L ord restores Israel. In fact, severe testing and cleansing are part of the 
L ord’s restoring work. “I have swept away your rebellions like a cloud, your sins like the 
midst. Return to me, for I have redeemed you” (44:22). In view of Israel’s extreme sin, 
what is striking is not the fact that the Lord briefly exiles Israel but that the L ord brings 
Israel back at all.
In sum, being God’s treasured people is inextricably associated with the pursuit of 
holiness, and this in turn is inextricably related to Israel’s identity and mission.*^’ Thus 
when and where Israel fails to be holy, the L ord intervenes and disciplines. Divine 
punishment, such as exile, is to be understood as a means of chastisement and purification. 
That the L ord will keep Israel as his people means that the L ord is committed to purifying 
Israel. This is ultimately good news to Israel, though very painful. The fact of election 
comes with privileges and responsibilities, bringing either blessings or curses depending on 
how the elect responds to the privileges and responsibilities g i v e n . W h e n  being 
corrected (through punishment), it may feel nothing like mercy or compassion in human 
experience. But human feelings cannot alter the biblical witness that divine jealousy is part 
of God’s holy love for his people. Both divine blessings and curses flow out of God’s holy 
character. The Holy One of Israel who dwells in the midst of his people seeks to purify 
and establish a treasured holy people of God.*^^
Sarna 1991: 104.
In Deuteronomy, the L o r d ’s  preference and desire for Israel to choose holiness and life over against sin 
and death is clearly made (Deut 30:19-20). As Brueggemann correctly says of God’s holiness, “If Israel will 
be with Yahweh, Israel must be like Yahweh; that is, with Yahweh on Yahweh’s demanding terms” (1997: 
290).
The L or d  deals with the nations on the same basis as Israel. The L ord  deals with them with his 
compassion and grace shown in mercy. This means all o f the divine attributes: patience, covenant love 
(Noahic and Isa 54) and faithfulness, divine sin-bearing, and justice, are equally applicable to the nations to 
the end of producing righteous servants of God. See my mention of nations throughout the chapter.
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5. Concluding Remarks
The echoed terms show the similarity between the vicarious atoning work of the 
Lord in Exodus and the Suffering Servant in Isaiah. The shared vocabulary of Ex 34:6-7 
and Isa 53-54 and the context of Isa 53-54 show that the Servant is the “arm” of the L ord 
revealed to Israel and to the nations for the salvation of the world. Accordingly, the 
Exodus and Isaiah passages have important shared theological elements.
Both in Exodus and in Isaiah, the L ord or the Servant provides the forgiveness of 
sins. In both, the L ord has the prerogative not to punish the Israelites (and the nations) as 
their sins deserve. In both the Lord exercises divine freedom to remove human sin and 
punishment and offer reconciliation (through God’s own sin-bearing or the Servant’s sin- 
bearing). The vicarious atoning work of the L ord (by himself or through the Servant) 
tempers divine justice. In both, the Lord extends compassion and grace after the 
chastisement of the sinner and God’s own provision of atonement.
In both Ex 32-34 and Isa 53-54, a contrast is made between the brief and limited 
nature of divine wrath and the enduring nature of compassion and kindness. Both passages 
demonstrate that God will not altogether acquit the guilty but will ultimately punish the 
sinner. In Isaiah, the L ord severely punishes both Israel and the nations according to the 
measure of their sins. The Lord does this to the end of establishing a righteous people of 
God.
More specifically, in Isa 53-54, in the humiliation, suffering, exaltation, and 
ministry of the Servant, the nature of divine sovereignty is shown to be self-giving. The 
Lord’s sovereign power and freedom to remove human sin and extend everlasting covenant 
love are shown through the Servant’s voluntary suffering. The voluntary humiliation and 
vicarious suffering of the Servant, the exaltation of the Servant, and the Servant’s 
justification of the rebellious are the expressions of the compatibility of punishment and 
mercy, servanthood and sovereignty. Divine punishment of the Servant flows out of divine
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mercy for sinners, and divine servanthood (through the Servant) flows out of divine 
sovereignty.
The above continuities between Ex 32-34 and Isa 53-54 do not imply that there are 
not significant differences between them on the matter of the Lord’s work of sin-bearing 
and reconciliation. The following are some of distinct contributions Isa 53 makes toward 
an understanding of divine mercy and judgment. (1) I have noted that Exodus presents 
God as directly bearing human sin, whereas Isa 53 speaks of a distinguishable agent doing 
God’s work of sin-bearing. The larger literary context of Isa 53 also portrays the L ord as a 
servant who labours under Israel’s sin in order to remove it from Israel (Isa 43:24). (2) The 
L ord will extend divine mercy and compassion not only to Israel, but also to all nations. 
Redemption and restoration are extended to all nations through Zion. Isaiah 53-54 makes it 
explicit that the L ord deals with the nations in the way the L ord deals with Israel, that is, 
according to the revealed divine character. (3) The Servant Song presents sin-bearing as 
vicarious in nature, which does not exclude appropriate measure of punishment of the 
sinner. (4) While suffering resulting from the act of sin-bearing is hinted at in Ex 32-34, 
suffering is made the explicit, dominant aspect of sin-bearing in Isa 53. (5) Divine mercy 
and judgment, atonement and punishment are demonstrated simultaneously in the 
punishment of the Servant. In the Servant, divine mercy and judgment “kiss” each other 
and mercy (for the sinner) is affirmed by way of judgment (of the Servant). In Exodus, 
however, punishment of sin is explicitly meted out to sinners before the L ord reveals 
himself to be the sin and punishment bearer. (6) Based on the Servant’s vicarious 
suffering, an unconditional, unilateral everlasting covenant of peace and love is extended to 
the world. In Exodus, however, the covenant that is re-established is contractual 
(Ex 34:10ff).
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The similarities reinforce the compatibility between divine mercy and justice. The 
differences further illuminate the different ways in which the harmony between divine 
mercy and justice can be expressed in different situations in Israel’s history.
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Chapter 5:
The Echoes In
N ahum  1:3
Dpi nan bjJDi mn' Dpi mn’ Dpii xiap hi< 2r  T •• -  -  T  ; f“  T  : r*  : i -:vd'’n‘? xin "iDlJT rna*? mn'T : ; : t  t  : t  ;npr xy npn nb-ynai D'sx nnx nin’ 3I v  -  ; T ; . -  -  I ' /  V T :
 ^The Lord  ^ is a jealous^ and avenging God.
The L ord is an avenging^ and wrathful lord.'^
The Lord is avenging against his adversaries.
He keeps watch^ on his enemies.
 ^The LoRD is slow to anger^ and great^ in power, 
And does not altogether clear the guilty.
‘ As in earlier chapters, words in regular boldface type represent quotations, while words in italics 
boldface type represent allusions. In the past many scholars have freely emended the text mainly to 
“reconstruct” the supposed acrostic psalm in Chapter 1 (See below for those who emend the text for 
this very purpose). Against this view, Cathcart and others have argued for the accuracy of the Hebrew 
text (see below). This paper affirms the latter view, and abstains from unnecessary emendations of the 
text.
 ^KlUjp —“jealous God”; LXX has V æmulatorem. This combination also appears in
Ex 20:5; 34:14; Deut 4:24; 6:15.
 ^ Dpi is omitted in LXX probably through haplography.
 ^npn —LXX has |xexà GupoO. is omitted in LXX. HDn is variously rendered by
translators: “wrathful” (RSV); “filled with wrath” (JMP Smith 1912: 289); “lord of rage” (Nogalski 
1993: 38). Some postulate an unnecessary connection to Canaanite deity Baal, e.g., Cathcart 1973: 40; 
Roberts 1991: 43. SuD and as alternative, reconcilable designations of God of Israel, see Coggins 
1985: 21; Albright 1968: 199-200. Here is taken as “master” or “lord” of something that 
characterizes one’s manner, similar to “angry man” in Pr 22:24 (29:22).
 ^LXX has Kal V has et imscens. The term èÇaipwv is nowhere else used to render ID tl
but the Aramaic (“be lifted up”) as in Dan 7:4 (Smith, Ward, and Bewer 1912: 297). The main 
lexical meaning of the root 10] is “to keep watch” or “to guard” (Song of Songs 1:6; 8:11,12).
Aramaic 10] in Daniel 7:28 also has the basic same meaning, “to keep.” In its other uses (Lev 19:8;
Pss 94:1; 103:9; Jer 3:5; 3:12), 10 ] has the basic meaning of “to keep watch” but “with the idea of 
anger being supplied by the context” (Patterson 1991: 27). See below for further discussion on my 
translation.
 ^LXX, V, and S translate 3ab literally, paraphrased by Tg. NEB omits translations for 3ab as a 
copyist’s gloss. Verse 3ab conveys divine patience and justice tempered by mercy, which presents a 
contradiction to NEB’s (deficient) translation of IOI] as “quick to anger,” hence calling for the 
omission of 3ab. Blenkinsopp (1983: 171, note 25) also sees 1:3a as an “explanatory gloss” that 
contradicts the preceding verse. It is unlikely, however, that a copyist added what would be a glaring 
contradiction.
 ^Reading with a ketib^llM for the qeré*71]1.
® See the translation notes for Ex 34:6f in Chapter 2. “By no means clear the guilty” (by the majority of 
commentators); and “ne laissera pas le coupable impuni” (Bic 1968: 75). Several issues remain 
regarding the text of Nah 1:2-3 and its translation; they are discussed in the exegesis section.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Overview of the Chapter and Its Argument
The opening verses of Nahum quote from Ex 34:6-7, but the nature and 
function of the echo in Nah 1:3 have not been adequately studied or explained. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of cogent theological study on the nature of God as both 
avenging and merciful in Nahum’s echo of the formula (Ex 34:6-7). The comments 
by Walter Brueggemann on the echo in Nah 1:3 are good illustrations of these 
inadequacies. His tenuous conclusions and the general gap in the study of the echo of 
the formula in Nah 1:3 invite a new scholarly response.
This chapter will unfold as follows: In the remainder of the introduction, I will 
state the theological problems raised by Brueggemann’s treatment of the echo in 
Nah 1:3. In section 2 ,1 will briefly discuss the canonical, historical, and literary 
context of the echo in Nahum. In section 3 ,1 will categorise and define the scope of 
the echo in Nahum, critically examining those terms that have been incorrectly taken 
as echoes. In section 4 ,1 will turn to an exegetical discussion of the echo in Nah 1:3 
itself. Finally, in section 5 ,1 will conclude the chapter with a brief summary of my 
main points.
1.2. The Problems of the Echo in Nahum
There are two main problems as regards the echo in Nah 1:3. The first has to 
do with the apparent non-contextual use of the echo. The second is an inadequate 
theological reading of the echo due to a dualistic and polarised understanding of 
God’s mercy and vengeance.
1.2.1. Non-Contextual Use of the Echo in Nahum
The difficulties associated with Nahum’s echo have to do with the lack of an 
adequate contextual and theological reading. I will focus mainly on how 
Brueggemann and other scholars treat the phrase “slow to anger” in
Nah 1:3.
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One of the main problems regarding in Nah 1:3 is that the phrase
does not appear to fit its new context in Nahum, though it fits easily in Ex 32-34.
How can Nahum say that “the L ord is slow to anger” in the midst of announcing that 
the Lord’s wrath is about to be poured out? The immediately surrounding phrases 
also place strong emphasis on the Lord’s avenging wrath. In Ex 34:6, by contrast, the 
phrase is surrounded by terms of God’s compassion, mercy, and steadfast love.
Commentators have proposed various solutions to this problem. In his 
Theology o f the Old Testament, Brueggemann offers an interpretation of Nah 1:2-3 
that proceeds from his view of the portrayal of God in Ex 34:6-7. As can be seen by 
his comments on that passage (see Chapter 2), Brueggemann believes that God’s 
judgment and mercy are in profound contradiction to each other (227). “Slow to 
anger” belongs to the “positive” side of this irreconcilable contradiction. This implies 
that “slow to anger” does not fit well in Nahum, which Brueggemann regards as being 
exclusively about judgment. For him, the idiomatic phrase “plays no role in Nahum’s 
utterance, or serves only to indicate that Yahweh’s ‘slowness to anger’ is now 
exhausted and does not extend to Assyria” (270).
Michael Fishbane (1985) is in agreement with Brueggemann insofar as he 
states that Nahum “preaches wrath and doom, with no trace o f mitigating divine 
m ercy (italics mine).^ Fishbane, however, has a different solution to the problem of 
the presence of “slow to anger” in this seemingly inappropriate context. He argues 
that what were terms of compassion in Ex 34:6-7 are transformed into terms of war in 
Nah 1:3. Fishbane (1977) asserts that assuages anger’ (taking to be like the 
stem used in, e.g., Jer 30:17) becomes Hong of anger’” in Nahum’s reuse of the 
expression.After suggesting several other transformations of terms in Nah 1, 
Fishbane (1985) says the following about the echo in Nahum:
 ^Fishbane 1985: 347; my italics.
Fishbane 1977:280-281.
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[T]he prophet fulminates against the Assyrian army and envisages the 
imminence of divine vengeance portrayed through a series of vengefully 
reapplied references and allusions to Exod. 34:6-7. The older traditum 
is thus transformed by a traditio, which preaches wrath and doom, with 
no trace of mitigating divine mercy (italics mine, except for the Latin 
terms)."
For Fishbane, such a vengeful usage of the formula “is, to a degree, an exception; for 
it is the theme of divine mercy that is generally stressed in inner-biblical reuses of the 
divine attributes formulary, particularly liturgical petitions—be these from the 
Pentateuch (like Num. 14: 17-19) or from the Psalter.” ’^  Brueggemann would concur 
with this observation.*^
Both Brueggemann and Fishbane are in agreement that there is no trace of 
mercy in Nahum’s use of the echo*'* and that Nahum thus represents an exceptional 
case among the echoes of the formula. They are in effect saying that the idiom “slow 
to anger” is used non-contextually in Nahum. Such an affirmation reflects a failure to 
appreciate the continuity of the meaning and function of the idiom in Ex 34:6-7 and in 
Nahum. Indeed, the unity between judgment and mercy in Nah 1:2-3 is decisively 
confirmed by the use of the phrase “slow to anger”*^  in relation to God’s wrath.**^
“ Fishbane 1985; 347.
Fishbane 1985: 347.
As such, Brueggemann views Nah 1:3 as unique among the echoes of Ex 34:6-7 in the Hebrew 
Bible—the exception that proves the rule. See Brueggemann 1997: 270.
Similarly for Roberts (1991: 50), the phrase R*? njp]! completes Nahum’s portrayal of “an 
enraged God of harsh vengeance,” and there is no hint of God’s mercy in Nahum. Also Sweeney 
(2000: 428) rightly comments that Ex 34:6-7 “serves as a statement of YHWH’s mercy and justice.” 
Yet, of Nahum’s echoes he says, ‘The Nahum version of this statement is clearly shortened, and 
represents an attempt to interpret the statement in relation to the rhetorical needs of Nahum, i.e. it 
emphasizes YHWH’s power and capacity for justice against an enemy but it does not include the 
statements concerning YHWH’s mercy.”
The Hebrew idiom D'ËK can be translated as “slow to anger,” “longsuffering” or “patient”
(Ex 34:6; Num 14:18; Ps 86:15). The three translations are complementary, each drawing out slightly 
different aspects of the Hebrew idiom. For a detailed discussion on this idiom, see Chapter 2. Also, 
see below for its use in Nah 1:3.
Brueggemann regards the other echoed phrase “not altogether clearing the guilty” (njj?]*| R^ njp3) as 
fitting the context in Nah 1:3, but not in Ex 34:6-7. Thus, the situation is thought to be the reverse of 
the situation of Q")!BR ^pR. The attribute o f God “by no means clearing the guilty” is thought to be 
foreign to and inconsistent with the bulk of the formula (Ex 34:6-7a) and its context’s emphasis on 
forgiveness. This attribute o f God is thought to better serve Nahum’s vengeful purpose.
Brueggemann says, “when Israel wishes to issue a verbal assault against Assyria, the psalm in Nah 1:2-
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1.2.2. The Theological Problem
There is a theological problem closely related to the non-contextual reading of 
“slow to anger” and the related misinterpretation of the expression 
npr rijP31. Brueggemann in particular presents a view of God’s character as 
bipolar and unpredictable; “we cannot know ahead of time which extreme of Yahweh 
may be disclosed” (281; italics mine). In Nahum, the L ord  is seen to be clearly at the 
punitive end of the two extremes.
Accordingly, Brueggemann says that the poetry of Nahum presents Yahweh as 
a warrior “freighted with violence” who is “prepared to do massive, unrestrained 
violence against Nineveh” (274). Brueggemann entertains the thought that “this may 
indeed be a just response for the way in which the Assyrians have maltreated Israel 
over a long period” (274). However, Brueggemann dismisses any possibility of 
divine justice in the punishment of Nineveh:
The rhetoric itself, however, suggests a complete lack of restraint in 
which there is something like delight (Yahweh’s delight? Israel’s 
delight?) in the anticipation of an orgy of death, blood, and violence 
(cf. 2:9-10; 3:5-7). Israel’s resentment is fully taken over, embraced, 
and acted on by Yahweh (274-5).
In his typical dialectical interpretative mode, Brueggemann further offers a statement 
that seems to acknowledge the compatibility of divine mercy and justice and the 
purposeful nature of divine vengeance:*^
Much of this fierceness on the part of Yahweh (though not all of it) is in 
the service of Israel’s special status and privilege under the rule of 
Yahweh, so that the testimony itself is rather uncritical. Yahweh’s 
fierceness and violence cannot be separated from its positive effect on 
Israel, and therefore can often be construed as a negative counterpart to 
Yahweh’s intense loyalty to Israel. For example, in the extreme 
expression of fury from Nahum 1, the counterpoint in the text concerns
8 appeals precisely to the second half of the formula, ‘by no means clears the guilty’” (270). For 
Brueggemann, this phrase speaks of “the harsh sovereignty of Yahweh, who will move massively and 
destructively against Nineveh” (270).
Brueggemann does this while commenting on various passages (including Nahum) that deal with 
Yahweh’s fierce vengeance on Israel’s enemy nations.
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the well-being of Israel, made possible by the destruction of Assyria . . .
On the whole these texts assert that Yahweh’s enormous power is in the 
service of a sovereignty marked by both justice and fidelity (276).
Brueggemann makes this statement only to contradict any interpretation that renders 
divine acts of vengeance just and good. Bmeggemann deconstructs any positive 
assessment previously given by his final negative evaluation of divine character and 
acts:
But the ferocious rhetoric hinting at Yahweh’s delight in rage suggests 
that not all is contained in Yahweh’s graciousness and fidelity, nor 
even in Yahweh’s reasoned sovereignty . . .  Yahweh’s governance is a 
good and essential factor in the well-being of Israel but, in my 
judgment, Yahweh’s governance is not completely rationalized either 
in relation to Israel or in relation to a commitment to an ordered 
justice. Yahweh’s power is characteristically linked to Yahweh’s 
fidelity. . .  but not always (276).
In sum, for Brueggemann, divine vengeance in Nahum is ultimately hardly an 
expression of “the legitimate governance of Yahweh” but displays an “excessive self- 
regard on the part of Yahweh” (280). Divine vengeance is not consistently tempered 
by compassion (or “other-regard”), nor is it in the service of justice, redemption, or 
restoration. Divine vengeance has “no other function” than to confirm “an unfettered 
show of self-assertion” (276). In Nahum, God is not trustworthy, righteous, or 
faithful in the usual senses of those terms.
In light of the above claims, it might seem difficult to defend my thesis that 
Nah 1:2-3 stands in a relationship of significant continuity to Ex 34:6-7. In fact, 
Nahum omits most of the terms from Ex 34:6-7 normally associated with mercy: 
“compassionate and gracious,” “steadfast love and faithfulness,” “maintaining 
steadfast love to thousands,” and “forgiving sin, iniquity and transgression.” Such an 
omission (whether intentional or not) no doubt has the effect of lessening the stress on 
mercy in Nah 1. In addition, Nah 1:2-3 and the book as a whole place a strong 
emphasis on divine judgment and punishment. Such an emphasis, to speak in 
quantitative terms, appears discordant with most of the phrases in Ex 34:6-7 and with
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the majority of its echoes. In this very different setting in Nahum, then, one would 
expect “slow to anger” either to have a different meaning or to be discordant with the 
tenor of the passage as a w h o l e . I t  is therefore tempting to affirm what seems 
obvious and to discount what is difficult. But, once again, a careful analysis of the 
passage in its context will show that such conclusions are not sound. The task of the 
remainder of this chapter is to show that God’s patient mercy and punishing judgment 
are compatible and integrated in Nahum just as in Ex 32-34, as well as the related 
intertextual assertion that Nah 1:2-3 is a faithful application of Ex 34:6-7.
2. The Nature and Extent of the Echoes in Nahum 1:2-3
There are two phrases in Nah 1:3 that together constitute a strong echo of 
Ex 34:6-7. They are “slow to anger” and H p r  ikh “ does not
remit all punishment.” These phrases are quotations from Ex 34:6-7,^** plainly 
meeting both the literary (verbal and syntactical) and thematic criteria for an echo.^* 
These echo phrases will be the focus of our attention in the section 4.
In addition to these phrases, there are also several weak echoes in the passage. 
The term Qpi “avenging” in Nah 1:2 is a thematic echo since it is a word that is 
similar in meaning (the main aspect of thematic similarity) of the term Ip B  “visiting” 
or “avenging” that occurs in Ex 34:7. Contextual echoes in Nah 1 include
I have shown above that this was the case to a lesser extent in the difference between how God 
expressed his patience to Israel in the different occasions of Ex 32-34 and Num 14.
Scholars generally agree that these are quotations from Ex 34:6-7. e.g., Scharbert 1957; Dentan 
1963; Coggins and Re’emi 1985:22; Sarna 1991: 262 (n.7); Brueggemann 1997; Spronk 1997: 36; 
Sweeney 2000:428.
^  Again, in calling these phrases “quotations” of Ex 34:6-7,1 do not presuppose that Ex 34:6-7 must 
have been explicitly in the author’s mind. I refer only to the fact that these words exactly repeat the 
same phrases used in Exodus, whatever the explanation. This leaves open other possibilities; another 
text (perhaps itself an echo of Ex 34:6-7) may have been the immediate source of the “repetition,” or 
these phrases were a part of Israel’s oral tradition at the time o f Nahum.
See my definition of an echo in Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.
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n o n  “wrath” (v.2) and ]1nn “burning anger” (v.6; cf. p i n  “burning 
anger” Ex 32:12), Xl3|5 b x  “the Lord is a jealous God” (v.2; cf. X3j? "2X,
Ex 34:14), and n in ’ SlES “The L ord is good” (v.7; ef. “all m y goodness,”
Ex 33:19).
Besides these echoes, Fishbane claims that there are other expressions that 
allude to Ex 34:6-7:
In this reuse of the “attribute-formula” (Exod. 34:6-7) in Nah. 1:2-3 
terms of compassion are transformed into terms of war: “who maintains 
inôsër) kindness” becomes “who rages (jiôtër) against his enemies”’, 
'"assuages anger” (taking *erek to be like the stem used in, e.g., Jer 
30:17) becomes "long of anger”; and “great in... kindness” becomes 
“mighty in power?^
But there are no reasons sufficient to hold this view. (1) Elsewhere Fishbane 
comments, “In this setting nôtër ‘rage,’ in v.2 is a dialectical pun on nôsër in the 
attribute formulary.”^^  No further reason is given as to why one ought to regard 
as a “dialectical pun” on 1%]. The term 1013 rhymes with 1^3, but this is 
insufficient evidence to constitute a genuine literary correspondence between the two 
phrases. (2) As I will show below, the basic meaning of patience of is
supported by its context and, unlike what Fishbane claims, does include affirmations 
of divine mercy. (3) Fishbane does not give any explicit reasons for his suggestion 
that is a transformative reuse of There are, however, ample
arguments against his suggestion. There are many constructs throughout the Old
Fishbane 1977: 280-281. Roberts (1991: 50) has a similar view. He argues that “slow to anger” is 
usually expanded by 'IDII'3'11 or (in Ex 34:6-7 and its other echoes), but in Nahum it is
“replaced” by “great in power.” For a somewhat different view, see Gunkel (1893: 223-244) who 
regards nÎD"*?*13 as a textual corruption. That said, Gunkel believes strongly that it should have been an 
echo. That is, he changes “great in strength” to “great in mercy” to restore what he deems as original 
text in Nahum. Although Gunkel and Fishbane have different ways of dealing with “mighty in power,” 
they both in effect are agreeing that this phrase or its “original” is an echo of some kind of “great in 
kindness” from Ex 34:6.
^ Fishbane 1985: 347; also Spronk 1997: 36, after Fishbane.
The case of points in the direction that Fishbane’s overstated estimations of the extent of the
echo in Nah 1 is a result of his tendency to see aggadah or midrash in the passage (and throughout the 
Scriptures).
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Testament that occur with the terms 31 or ^112, ascribing to God his greatness in 
respect to many attributes. That God is “great in power” is a common idea in the Old 
Testament, so it is difficult to see why it must be interpreted as a specific 
transformation of another very common Old Testament idea (ID H 'D l).
My exegetical discussion (in section 4) will focus on the strong echo in 
Nah 1:3 as identified above. Weak echoes will be briefly discussed in relation to the 
strong echo, as they illuminate the meaning and function of the strong echo.
3. The Literary and Theological Context of the Echo in Nahum 1:3
Since the argument of this chapter depends in part on being sensitive to the 
context of the echo in Nah 1:3,1 will now make some relevant comments on its 
historical, literary, and theological context. I will begin with the larger literary 
context of the book of the Twelve. I will then treat the book of Nahum as providing a 
narrower context for the echo in Nah 1:3. I will include a discussion of the psalm or 
hymn in Nah 1:2-10 as the most immediate context of Nahum’s echo.
3.1. Literary and Theological Context of the Book of the Twelve
Reading the book of the Twelve (hereafter “the Twelve”) as a literary unit has 
significant ramifications for the interpretation of the portrayal of God in the book of 
Nahum. First of all, the Twelve begins with words about God’s judgment and 
restoration of Israel (Hosea 1-3), and this is significant for the interpretation of the 
Twelve. Childs observes that Hosea 1-3 “provides the exegetical key in the 
framework from which the entire book [of Hosea] is to be read.”^^  In addition, Paul 
R. House states that “[Hosea] sets the stage for the Twelve’s characterization of the 
LorD.” *^^ An implication of their observation is that the prophetic marriage between 
Hosea and Gomer provides a canonical interpretative framework for the Twelve.
Childs 1979: 381. 
House 2000: 131.
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Significantly, the Twelve also ends (Malachi 1-4) with words of the eschatological 
judgment and restoration of Israel, repeating the theme found in Hosea 1-3.
According to Malachi, the L ord will separate the righteous and wicked of Israel based 
on obedience to the divine law in the “day of the Lord.”^^  The Twelve is thus framed 
by words of eschatological judgment, restoration, and warning for Israel, a thematic 
inclusio.
The theme of eschatological judgment and restoration found in the opening 
and closing of the Twelve is repeated through out the Twelve in relation to God’s 
covenant people and the nations.^^ Such a literary and thematic arrangement 
emphasizes the close link between God’s dealings with Israel and God’s dealings with 
the nations. There is a strong universalising tendency in the Twelve when read as a 
whole.
More specifically, the following three related points can be observed in the 
relationship between God’s dealings with Israel and with the nations in the Twelve, as 
framed by Hosea 1-3 and Malachi. I will draw largely from Childs and House’s 
helpful canonical theological treatments of the Twelve, focusing on the theological 
ideas that are relevant to the interpretation of Nahum.
(1) The creator God reigns in the whole universe and has a rightful and loving 
claim on all the nations. The king of the whole earth is thus also the righteous judge 
of all the nations. Accordingly, God will judge and destroy all sinful kingdoms. God 
judges his unfaithful covenant people through the nations (Hos 10:10; Zech 14:1-2), 
and the nations in turn are judged for their cruelty and pride. Ultimately, on the final
Childs 1979: 497.
On judgment on God’s covenant people (Israel and/or Judah), see Joel 1:2-2:11; Amos 2:4-9:10; 
Micah 1:2-3:12; 6:1-16; Zeph 1:4-13. On restoration of God’s covenant people, see Joel 2:18-32; 3:17- 
21; Amos 9:11-15; Mic 4-5; 7:7-20; Zeph 3:14-20; Hag 2:6-9. On judgment of the nations, see 
Joel 2:6-11; 3:1-16; Amos l:3-2:3; Obadiah; Mic 5:15; Nahum; Hab 2:6-20; Zeph 2:1-15; Hag 2:20- 
22; Zech 9:1-8. On restoration of the nations, see Zeph 2:11; 3:9-11; Zee 2:11; 8:20-23; 9:10; 14:16ff; 
Mai 1:11,14; 3:12.
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day of the L ord’s judgment, all enemies of God will be judged and eradicated from 
the face of the earth. But God’s intention is not to destroy either Israel or the nations 
entirely. Even as Israel “will ultimately be considered ‘my people’ and ‘p i t i e d , t h e  
nations, too, will be “pitied” and considered “my people” (Zech 14:16). All those 
who seek and trust in the L ord will be saved (Mic 4:1-5; Nah 1:7; Zech 8:22). God’s 
coming rule will “restore a holy remnant” within Israel and all the nations “to its 
inheritance within God’s kingship” (see Amos 9:8-12; Zeph 2:7, 9; 3:6-20;
Zech 14:16).^"
(2 ) Divine judgment of all sinful kingdoms and salvation of the remnants of 
various nations proceed out of God’s holy love, his compassionate and jealous 
character.^* God expresses intense jealousy and compassion to consume all that is 
unholy and ungodly in the earth and to restore the earth to righteousness, justice, love, 
compassion, and faithfulness (Hosea 2 :16-23).^^  The God of holy love is continually 
and passionately loyal to his covenant people Israel “in the face of their flagrant and 
persistent di s loyal ty .Thus ,  after severely chastising his covenant people in his 
jealous wrath, the L orD in jealousy (Zech 1:14 ; 8 :2 )  and compassion (Hos 11:4 , 8;
Mic 7:19; Zech 1:16; 10:6) restores Zion to which the remnants of Israel and nations 
are gathered (Zee 2:11; 8:20-23). The God of holy love is also merciful and loving to 
the nations even in the face of their sin, arrogance, and pride. Thus, though severely 
punishing the nations in his jealous wrath (Zeph 3:8), the L ord also extends 
compassion to them (Joel 2:13).
Marvin A. Sweeney 1998:424.
Childs 1979: 409ff, 415.
For the L o r d ’s jealous character, see Nah 1:2; For the L o r d ’s compassionate nature, see Joel 2:13; 
Jon 4:2.
Childs (1979: 380-2) points out that the words of judgment and hope to Israel applies to Judah 
secondarily. House (2000: 128-9) makes a similar comment that the messages of warning, judgment 
and hope for Israel found in Hosea-Micah equally apply to Gentile nations.
Childs 1979: 382.
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(3) God’s “judgment and salvation are inextricably joined in the purpose of 
God.” '^* As House rightly states, “punishment is meted out in order to effect cleansing 
and restoration,”^^  This is true not only of God’s dealings with Israel, but also of his 
dealings with the nations (though in different ways). Destruction is not the ultimate 
purpose of punishment. Rather, punishment serves the ultimate purpose of salvation 
and restoration of the whole earth. The prophetic words of judgment intend to inspire 
the fear of the L ord and repentance.^^ God typically gives “a warning to change while 
change and forgiveness are yet possible.”^^  When the warning is followed by 
repentance, the L ord is eager to show kindness (as in Jonah). When no repentance is 
forthcoming, sure judgment is warned and carried out to eradicate evil and to create 
a repentant heart within the chastised (as in Hosea).^^ In either case, the warnings and 
acts of judgment ultimately serve the purpose of salvation. This is seen in Nahum in 
which God’s decisive judgment of an oppressive and cruel international superpower 
brings salvation to the oppressed nations, especially the people of God. The day of 
the L ord oracles most poignantly drive this point home; the Lord, who is the creator, 
judge, and king, will destroy all forces of evil and bring universal redemption to all 
creation, and the remnant from the earth will live in peace and blessing. As such, 
both divine warning and punishment can be seen as arising out of God’s merciful and 
compassionate character (which includes divine justice).'*®
Childs (1979: 380-381) makes this point in relation to Hosea, in which words of judgment and words 
of restoration are juxtaposed.
House 2000: 129.
For prophetic call to repentance, see Hos 12:6; 14:1; 14:2; Joel 2:13; Amos 5:4-6; Zech 1:3-4;
Mai 3:7.
House 2000: 136. If so, this means divine “judgment is not and never will be inevitable” (137). 
Amos laments over unrepentant Israel in 4:6-11, which is sandwiched between stern warnings of a 
sure judgment.
See Hos 2:7; 3:5.
This point is especially found in Jonah, in which the compassionate nature of God, revealed in 
Ex 34:6-7, is echoed in the mouth of both the pagan king and the prophet Jonah.
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3.2. Literary and Theological Context in the Book of Nahum
3.2.1. Setting
My analysis of the echo in Nah 1 presumes that the final form of the book of 
Nahum is literarily and theologically meaningful, without finding it necessary to 
determine the dating and history of the composition of the book of Nahum/* That 
said, the book in its final form reflects a pre-exilic historical setting (though it could 
have been composed later), which is helpful in understanding its theological meaning. 
Nahum’s message concerns the L ord’s decisive response to Assyria’s oppression of 
Judah and other nations.'*  ^ The book reflects a time after the Assyrian destruction of 
Samaria (722 EC) and after Assyria had made Judah a vassal state. The book portrays 
the Assyrians as a people of extreme wickedness and brutality (3:1-3). Indeed, the 
prophet says, “All who hears the reports of you claps their hand over you, for who has 
not felt your endless cruelty?” (3:19). In this time of Assyrian oppression, the prophet 
speaks of the fall of Nineveh and the deliverance of Judah by a powerful intervention 
of the L ord.'*^
3.2.2. Literary Unity of the Book of Nahum
This study will assume that, whatever its compositional history, the book of 
Nahum is a literary unit comprising various prophecies of Nahum, albeit in varying
In my view, the time of Nahum’s prophetic speeches (regardless of its history of composition) can 
reasonably be dated between 663 and 612 BC. For support for such pre-exilic dating o f the book, see 
Christensen 1975: 17-30; RL Smith 1984: 63-65; Maier 1980; Richards 1993: 1391; and Sweeney 
2000: 421-425.
On exilic setting, and composition by one o f the northern exiles, see van der Woude 1977: 108- 
126, Van der Woude argues that the book was written “in order to encourage the depressed branch of 
the L o r d’s people still dwelling in the Promised Land” (124).
On post-exilic dating, see Gunkel 1893; Schulz 1973.
RL Smith 1984: 63.
RL Smith 1984: 63. Nah 3:8-10 speaks of the fall of No-Amon (Thebes), which was carried out by 
the Assyrian king Ashurbanipal in 663 BC. The prophet seems to speak of the fall o f Nineveh as 
imminent (2:1; 3:14,19), and Nineveh fell to a coalition of Babylonians, Medes, and Scythians in 612 
BC.
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literary forms/'* Several scholars have challenged this unity and, specifically, have 
regarded the psalm of 1:2-10 as an interpolation/^ But, as Childs suggests, the psalm 
in its final canonical placement has a special function in the interpretation of Nahum’s 
prophecy. Childs rightly states, “The psalm offers a theological interpretation of how 
to understand the oracles of judgment which constitute the main portion of the 
book.”'*® Specifically, “the implications of the divine claims voiced in the psalm are 
spelled out in the second half of the chapter in the direct addressing of the two 
historical entities, Assyria and Judah.”'*^ Accordingly, I regard Nahum as a literary 
unit that is structurally, thematically, and theologically coherent. Accordingly, I will 
study the psalm of 1:2-10 as an integral part of the first chapter, and the first chapter 
in turn as an integral part of the whole book.
3.2.3. Structural Analysis of the Book of Nahum
A. Superscription (1:1)
B. Introductory psalm concerning the character and power of God (1:2-10)
C. Alternating application of the psalm to Judah and Nineveh (1:11-2:2)
D. Prophetic invectives and divine judgment against Nineveh (2:3-3:19)
3.2.4. A Brief Overview of Nahum and Interpretative Implications
My analysis of Nahum’s echo passage will assume the above general outline 
of the book. In the following subsections 1-4,1 will briefly comment on the relevant 
elements in each section (A-D) of the outline.
(1) The meaning of the prophet’s name DlflD is intriguing for the 
interpretation of the message of the book. The name DinJ comes from the root DriD,
See Patterson and Travers (1988: 48-50) for their discussion of the structural and thematic unity of 
the book. Patterson (1991: 12) points to Car! E. Armerding’s discussion of the unity of the book based 
on recurring words and literary motifs throughout the book. See Spronk (1997: 3-5) for Nahum as a 
well-structured unity.
Gunkel argued that Chapter 1 is a later interpolation made to serve as an introduction to the whole 
(Gunkel 1893: 223-244). Others who deny the unity of the book are Bewer 1962: 147; Smith, Ward, 
and Bewer 1912; 268-269; Blenkinsopp 1983: 147.
Childs 1979: 443.
Childs 1979: 443.
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which means “comfort, have compassion.”'*^ As J.J.M. Roberts points out, “The name
may be analysed on the analogy of such names as hannun or rahum as meaning
‘comfort,’ or it may be analysed as a shortened form of nhmyh (Nehemiah), ‘Yahweh
has comforted.’”'*® Patterson draws attention to H. Hummel’s insight on the
significance of the prophet’s name:
It may be accidental (some critics think it deliberately artificial), but the 
name “Nahum” superbly summarizes the book’s message. God’s justice 
means judgment on the enemy, but “comfort” to the faithful.^®
Hummel adds that this does not mean that God’s people do not experience judgment. 
Rather, the book is not just about divine judgment but is also about divine comfort 
that comes by way of divine vengeance on wicked and cruel people.
(2) Nahum’s introductory psalm,®* which extends from v.2 to v.IO, is the most 
immediate literary context in which the echo in Nah 1:3 occur. It has been widely 
argued that the section comprising v.2-10 is a partial acrostic psalm.®  ^ The 
reconstruction of the acrostic form, however, requires several unwarranted textual 
emendations and reordering of words. In my study, I assume the poetic nature of v.2- 
10, setting aside the question of the extent of its acrostic form. I also assume the
Sweeney 2000: 420.
Roberts 1991:41; Noth 1928: 175. Roberts however thinks that the connection between the meaning 
of the name o f the prophet and the prophet’s message of comfort “is probably coincidental” (so also 
Cathcart 1973: 37-38).
Hummel 1979: 342, cited by Patterson 1991: 21.
Nahum 1:2-10 (some 1:2-8) is widely accepted as a psalm or a hymn of praise. On 1:2-10 as an 
acrostic psalm-unit, see Christensen 1987. He proposes 1:1-10 as a literary unit based on a theory of 
metrical analysis. With a handful of emendations, he achieves “a perfectly symmetrical metrical 
structure which extends through ten verses of text (Nah 1,1-10).” Floyd (1994: 432-433) also proposes 
1:2-10 to be a unit based on a structural pattern he discerns. Floyd (1994:436) argues that 1:2-10 is not 
a hymn but a “prophetic interrogation” that provokes the audience to self-examination.
For untenable claims of a complete acrostic in the emended text of 1:1-2:3, see Gunkel 1893: 223- 
244.
The more moderate view that the first few verses of the first chapter (usually 1:2-8/10) form a 
partial acrostic gained wide acceptance. On this view, see Christensen 1975 and 1987; Bic 1968: 76; 
JDW Watts 1975; 103; De Vries 1966: 476-481; and Roberts 1991: 42-55.
Floyd (1977: 421-437) argues against the acrostic reconstruction of the psalm.
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adequacy of Kevin J. Cathcart’s conclusion about the general accuracy of the Hebrew 
text.®®
The following is a structural analysis of the psalm.
A. A declaration of divine character and power (1:2-3)
1. The L ord’s jealousy and vengeance against his enemies (1:2)
2. The L ord’s great power to be patient and to execute justice (1:3)
B. The cataclysmic effects of the L ord’s advent (1:4-6)
C. A declaration of divine character as good and its implication (1:7-8)
1. Salvation for those who trust in the L ord (1:7)
2. Destruction of his adversaries (1:8)
The psalm declares the L ord as the supreme, universal judge, who is jealous, 
powerful, long-suffering, and good. When the divine judge moves in his supreme 
judgment against his foes, even the earth recoils in his presence. Even as the earth 
itself trembles and mountains melt away in the L ord’s presence, absolutely no one can 
escape the powerful judgment of God. While the powerful judge of the earth deals 
severely with his foes, he also tenderly cares for those who trust in him.
The key theological question revolves around the nature of divine judgment in 
this text. Is it just and righteous? Is there any sign of divine mercy in the psalm’s 
description of the awesome and terrifying wrath and judgment of the L ord? My 
answer is affirmative, and my discussion of the echoed terms below will show how 
the text itself warrants this answer.
The declarations that the psalm makes about the L ord’s character and acts are 
universalistic in scope, in keeping with the Twelve’s emphasis on the L ord as the 
judge of the earth. The psalm makes general truth-claims about the nature of the 
Lord, who is the powerful and supreme ruler and judge of the world. The psalm is 
placed at the head of the book of Nahum as a kind of interpretative window through 
which to look at the rest of the book. The psalm asserts a certain perspective on
See Cathcart (1973: 12-14) for the remarkable accuracy of the MT based on “the Pesher of Nahum 
(4QpNah) found at Qumran; the Hebrew scroll of the Minor Prophets from Wadi Murabba‘at, and 
fragments of a Greek text of the Minor Prophets from Nahal Hever.” See also, Haidar 1947: 15-33; 
RL Smith 1984: 67; Spronk 1997:2-3. This chapter affirms the general adequacy of this view.
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God’s character and acts that uses many of the “keywords” that are found in 
Ex 32-34, including the two echoed phrases that are direct quotations from Ex 34:6-7 
'Tj'lK and Hjpr v h  njP31). The strong intertextual relationship between 
Nah 1:2-10 and Ex 32-34 raises the question of whether there is not some form of 
continuity in the way the terms function and in the understanding of God’s character.
(3) The section (T.9-2:2) that immediately follows the psalm is equally
important for an accurate interpretation of the strong and weak echoes. The particular
perspective on God’s character and acts given in the psalm is here specifically applied
to Nineveh and Judah in a series of speeches that alternate between messages for
Judah and for the foes of the Lord.
a The final nature of divine judgment against his foes (1:9-10)
b Words of hope to Judah (1:12-13)
a' Divine decree against his foes (1:14)
b' The good news of deliverance for Judah (1:15)
a" Sarcastic call to his foes to muster their strength (2:1)
b" Words of restoration of Judah (2:2)
The dual perspective of the psalm is thus repeated in the form and content of the 
section that follows it: destmction of the L ord’s foes and comfort for those who trust 
in the L ord. This twofold message is applied specifically to God’s promise to inflict 
vengeance on his enemies (specifically Nineveh) and God’s promise to end God’s 
own affliction of Judah (which itself is the result of his just vengeance) (1:12). Both 
the destruction of Assyria and the deliverance of Judah and other nations derive from 
divine character.®'*
(4) The last part of the book includes oracles concerning the demise of 
Nineveh (2:3-3:19). This section reinforces the surety of the coming deliverance of 
Judah and the coming destruction of Nineveh. It begins with a description of the 
L ord’s army that will attack Nineveh (2:3-12). As the Lord is invincible, the Lord’s 
army is described as a powerful force before which proud Nineveh melts away. Next
Childs (1979:443) concurs with this interpretation.
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Nineveh’s bloodguüt and degeneracy is described (3:1-4). Nineveh’s failings are 
inimical to the divine character, which is the reason why the L ord is concerned to  
judge Nineveh. The book ends with further description of the utter destruction of 
Nineveh and the corresponding celebration of the nations previously oppressed by 
Nineveh.
The features I have identified in the literary context provided by the whole 
book have further implications for a proper interpretation of the psalm and the echoes 
within it. First, it is vitally important not to interpret the whole of the psalm as being 
entirely about divine vengeance, because vengeance is consistently grouped with the 
Lord’s comfort for those who were oppressed and who trust in the L ord. The 
message of hope and the message of doom are inextricably intertwined in the book of 
Nahum. Secondly, it is equally crucial not to distinguish sharply between the 
“addressees” of the message of vengeance (“does not remit all punishment”) and the 
“addressees” of the message of mercy (“slow to anger”), applying the first exclusively 
to Nineveh and the second exclusively to Judah. This is so because the L ord’s 
character and acts in the psalm is a collection of general declarations about what God 
is like and what God does. Such broad claims about God can be applied equally to 
Nineveh and to Judah. With these in mind, I now turn to a contextual, theological 
exegesis of the echo in Nah 1:3.
4. A Contextual, Theological Exegesis of Nahum 1:3:
The Compatibility of Patience and Vengeance
The task of this section is to show that divine patience and vengeance are 
compatible and integrated in Nahum as in Ex 32-34 and therefore that God’s mercy is 
present even in Nahum’s apparently merciless context. I will also show that Nahum’s 
reuse of the terms from Ex 34:6-7 is contextual, that is, the echoed terms are
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appropriate for Nahum’s context. The diversity present in the function of Nah 1:3 
does not contradict the general witness of Ex 34:6-7 on divine character. Rather, the 
kind of diversity and flexibility of God found in Nah 1:3 in relation to Ex 34:6-7 
affirms the constancy of the divine character in different circumstances.
In the following subsection (4.1), I will examine Nahum’s perspective on 
God’s character and acts as presented in the opening psalm. I will do so by 
examining in detail how the echoed terms (both “strong” and “weak”) function in this 
context. I will pay attention to contextual echoes (as defined in Chapter 1) from 
Ex 32-34, such as “jealous,” “avenging,” “wrathful,” “mighty in power,” and “good.” 
Then in the second subsection (4.2), I will show how the psalm’s perspective on God 
can be and is applied to the two nations that the psalm “targets.” I will loosely call 
these nations Nahum’s “addressees,” which together constitute his “audience.” I will 
begin my interpretation of the psalm and its echoed terms in relation to Nineveh, since 
Nineveh is the primary target of the prophecy as a whole. I will then turn to the 
psalms’ application to Judah, to whom the message of Nahum was entrusted.
4.1. God’s Character and Acts in the Psalm
The psalm of Nah 1:2-10 starts with a strong declaration:
Nah 1:2-3 The L ord is a jealous and avenging God.
The L ord is an avenging and wrathful lord.
The Lord is avenging against his adversaries.
He keeps watch on his enemies.
® The LoRD is slow to anger and great in power,
And does not altogether clear the guilty.
As Marvin A. Sweeney rightly states, “The Nahum version of [Ex 34:6-7] is clearly 
shortened, and represents an attempt to interpret the statement in relation to the 
rhetorical needs of Nahum, i.e. it emphasizes YHWH’s power and capacity for justice 
against an enemy.”®® Indeed, the psalm highlights the jealous God’s wrath (HQn, 
v.2) that has cataclysmic effects on all creation (v.4-6), as in the day of the L ord (Joel
Sweeney 2000: 428.
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2:1-11; Zeph 1:14-18). This presents a stark contrast to Ex 34:6-7, which begins with 
the declaration that the L ord is “a compassionate and gracious God”
(]13n*] ^ X ) .  This contrast may appear to present, as Brueggemann and others
suggest, a strong discontinuity or contradiction between the two texts. But a closer 
examination of the declarations of divine character in Nah 1:2-3 reveals that the two 
passages are indeed compatible, though each has a contrasting emphasis. I will start 
with the term Xl3p.
4.1.1. Jealousy of the L o r d
The psalm of Nah 1:2-8 starts with a strong pronouncement: “A jealous 
(X l3 p ) and avenging God is the L ord!” (v.2a). Brueggemann offers a general 
interpretation of the term XÎ3p in which the term always refers to God’s extreme 
violent passion.®® Brueggemann claims the term “refers to “Yahweh’s strong 
emotional response to any affront against Yahweh’s prerogative, privilege, 
ascendancy, or sovereignty. Thus the term assumes Yahweh’s singular preoccupation 
with self’ (293). ®^ “The extremity of Yahweh’s passion will be turned against any 
who affront Yahweh, and Yahweh will act without restraint or discipline” (294). 
Yahweh’s violent passion may turn against Israel or against Israel’s foes, which 
action may have a positive side effect for Israel. Brueggemann adds, “This savage 
propensity belongs to the core claims of Yahweh” (293).
Such a description of divine jealousy may appear to be justified by Nahum’s 
context, which does stand in stark contrast to Ex 34:6-7. The formula of Ex 34:6-7 
starts with the declaration that the L ord is “a compassionate and gracious God.” 
Nahum’s psalm, on the other hand, associates divine jealousy with divine vengeance 
(Dpi, v.2) and wrath (HQIl, v.2) that will have cataclysmic effects (v.4-6). This
Brueggemann cites Zeph 1:18; 3:8; Isa 42:13; Ezek 36:22-32; 39:25-29 to support his point. 
Brueggemann (1997: 294) adds, “Yahweh will characteristically choose self-regard, even if to do so 
requires destructiveness toward Israel.”
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contrast may appear to present, as Brueggemann and others suggest, a discontinuity 
between the two texts. But a closer examination of these declarations of God’s 
jealous character reveals that they are indeed compatible, though their emphases are 
contrasting.
As I have shown in my discussion of Ex 20:5-7 in Chapter 2, divine 
“jealousy” has dual aspects. That is, divine jealousy includes divine will both to hold 
accountable and punish those who hate God to the “third and fourth generations” (as 
expressed in the np3- and I p 5)-phrases) and to love those who love God to 
“thousands of generations” (as expressed in the *TOn H - p h r a s e ) .  I also have 
shown that the L o rd’s compassionate and gracious character includes, without 
replacing, the strictly legal or contractual dealing of the L ord expressed in “jealousy.” 
I have said that therefore the declaration “The L ord whose name is jealous (X3p) is a 
jealous (X3p) God” in Ex 34:14 does not contradict the divine attributes declared in 
34:6-7. Rather, 34:14 re-emphasizes the L ord’s righteous will to punish evil and 
evildoers already expressed in 34:6-7.
In Nahum, the declaration that God is a “a jealous (Kl3p) God” does not 
necessarily deny the L ord’s merciful nature but instead calls attention to the L ord’s 
righteous will to punish the idolaters and the enemies of God. While the main 
emphasis is not divine mercy, the terms of divine patience and justice in v.3 point to 
the disciplined and just nature of God’s wrathful and vengeful expressions of jealousy 
(see below for further discussion regarding the terms of divine patience and justice). 
The main difference in Nahum is that God’s jealous nature is not directly applied to 
God’s covenant relationship with Israel. Rather, it is declared as a theological 
generalisation about who God is and then explicitly applied to the whole earth (which 
would include Judah and all the nations). Divine jealousy in Ex 34 (Ex 34:7b; 34:14) 
is also a theological generalization about who God is, but in the Exodus context
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divine jealousy is specifically applied to Israel as a warning against further apostasy. 
Such a difference is significant in properly understanding the function of the term 
Xi3p in relation to Nineveh, Judah, and the nations in Nahum’s context.
Consistent with what was discussed in my Chapter 2, in Nahum the term Xi3p 
emphasizes “the supremacy and incomparability” of the L ord God.®^  The “jealous” 
God abhors and punishes sin and idolatry. The “jealous” God does not tolerate but 
punishes false rivals who claim supremacy or worshippers of such false gods.®® Lest 
God’s enemies and God’s people think that God is impotent to punish the wicked, the 
language of jealousy is invoked with the powerful language of the cosmos itself 
melting away at the blast of his nostrils. The L ord will indeed destroy all his “foes” 
and “enemies” (Nah 1:2); the L ord will put an end to them (v.9). The punitive and 
avenging aspect of divine jealousy is what is stressed in Nahum. But also mentioned 
in Nahum is the “rewarding” side of the L ord’s jealousy. The jealous L ord delivers 
those who trust in him; the Lord is their protection in the day of trouble (Nah 1:7). 
Such a theological generalisation of the psalm is applicable to Judah and all the 
nations of the earth alike. Whoever trusts in the L ord is protected, and whoever plots 
against the L ord will be destroyed. As such, divine jealousy is strongly other-centred. 
At the centre of divine jealousy is the righteous judge’s concern for justice, 
righteousness, and salvation in the world. It is a term that connotes God’s passionate 
and redeeming relationship to the whole earth, involving both destructive punishment 
of his enemies and salvation of God’s people. On this point, Nahum is also consistent 
with the Twelve’s presentation of God’s burning jealousy that both punishes his foes 
(whether that be Israel or the nations) and saves his people (starting with the remnant 
of Israel and then those of the nations).
Coggins and Re’emi 1985: 20.
RL Smith 1984: 73.
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I must clarify one point. As shown above, Brueggemann incorrectly interprets 
divine jealousy as God’s “savage propensity” toward unjustified and undisciplined 
violence, rising out of God’s obsessive self-regard. Brueggemann further claims that 
such a “savage propensity” directed against the nations has a positive by-product of 
“the well-being for Israel” (294-5), which Brueggemann says is the case in Nahum 
(294). Brueggemann is correct in noting that divine jealousy can bring destruction of 
God’s enemies (powerful nations that oppose Israel) and that this can bring a positive 
result of well-being for Israel. Certainly, books like Joel and Obadiah show that God 
judges the nations that threaten Israel and delivers Israel from the schemes of 
destruction. The problem with Brueggemann’s interpretation lies in perceiving divine 
jealousy as “Yahweh’s singular preoccupation with self” (293), which sometimes and 
merely coincidentally has a positive by-product for Israel. While in Brueggemann’s 
interpretation the well-being of Israel (or Judah in Nahum) does not constitute God’s 
primary concern, Nahum’s psalm seems to insist on a different view.
Whatever its application within the larger context of Nahum, the theological 
generalisation that the L ord “protects those who take refuge in him” (which is an 
aspect of another theological generalisation, namely, that God is jealous) is not 
presented as merely a side effect of God’s destmction of his foes. Nahum’s psalm 
presents both the protection of his people and the destmction of his enemies as God’s 
core concerns and as products of God’s attributes of jealousy and goodness.
Although this is not the case in Nahum, there may be times when some people 
are rescued from the hands of God’s enemies as a by-product of God’s elimination his 
enemies. But such well being gained as a by-product rather than as a result of 
repentance and righteous living can be lost. Ultimately, only those who tmst in the 
L ord will be protected and saved. Such a salvation is probably best understood not as
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an a c c id e n ta l b y -p ro d u c t o f  so m e th in g  e ls e  b u t a s  th e o u tc o m e  o f  th e L o r d’s 
c o m m itm e n t to  a ll th o se  w h o  trust in  the L ord .
4 .1 .2 .  Vengeance o f  the L ord
The “jealousy” of God is inseparable from the vengeance of God. It is telling 
that the term referring to God’s vengeance Dpi is used three times immediately 
following the term for “jealousy” Xl3p in Nah 1:2.
In Ex 32-34, divine “jealousy” and punishment O p b )  are also directly related 
to the fact that the L orD does not acquit the guilty altogether or remit all punishment, 
as expressed in H py np31. In Ex 34:7b (and in Ex 20:5-7), 
n p r  n h  n p ll  means that God will “visit ( Ip b )  the iniquity of the fathers on the 
children to the third and forth generations.” In continuity with Ex 34:7b, Nahum’s 
psalm reuses the expression H p ^  n p 3 1 , which emphasizes that the L orD will 
indeed hold the guilty accountable for wrong done. The repeated use of the term Dpi 
in Nahum further emphasizes the certainty of divine vengeance on those who are 
found guilty. Perhaps for the purpose of stressing the sure and imminent nature of 
divine vengeance on his foes, Nahum’s psalm uses the term Dpi rather than the 
Ipb-phrase used in Ex 34:7b, suggesting the possibility of deferment of punishment.
In Ex 34:7b, the expression “third and fourth” in the Ipb-phrase  sets a limit 
on the “just amount” of God’s vengeance ( Ip b ) . In Nahum, although the explicit 
limitation of vengeance to the “third and fourth” is not found, the basically equivalent 
meaning of a disciplined legal appropriateness is present. Most commentators 
recognise that the term Dpi refers to a legal or juridical transaction in Nahum.®® 
“Avenging and vengeance arise from a legal sense of justifiable vindication and not 
rancorous retaliation.”®* “The L ord’s vengeance will bring i n . . .  just compensation
“  Bic 1968: 77; Coggins and Re’emi 1985: 20; Richards 1993: 1392; Roberts 1991: 49. 
Richards 1993: 1392. SeePs 94.
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for wrong done, and no more.”^^  Klaas Spronk rightly states that this divine attribute 
“is not to be compared with human spontaneous outbursts of anger,” for it is a 
“continuing quality or characteristic (virtually a ‘function’) of He adds,
“The primary accent should not be on the violence, but on vengeance making an end 
to evil . . . .  Just as jealousy can be regarded as an aspect of love, vengeance is related 
tojustice.” "^^ In short, both Dpi and n j? r  Hjp]") in Nahum point to divine 
righteous dealings with sinners.
While both passages in Exodus and Nahum convey the divine will to hold the 
guilty accountable and punish the sinner, there is one major difference in the 
application of divine just vengeance. In Ex 32-34, God did not clear guilty Israel but 
meted out appropriate punishment and deferred much of its punishment in order to 
affirm Israel’s continued life with God. In Nahum, the L ord “will not overlook 
evil”^^  and will not remit all punishment, but will carry out his righteous vengeance 
against his foes in order that life be made viable for the people of God. As William P. 
Brown states, “God does not allow human injustice to have the final say.”^^  All 
enemies of God will ultimately be punished and the people of God vindicated. Lest 
anyone doubt God’s power to overcome evil and bring about justice, Nahum’s psalm 
paints “a graphic picture of God’s unsurpassable power.”^^  “Divine power is likened 
to fire,” *^ and the whole earth is depicted as languishing in the L o r d ’s burning wrath. 
“God will not let injustice prevail. With all of nature at God’s behest, no one can
Coggins and Re’emi 1985: 20. 
Spronk 1997: 34.
^  Spronk 1997: 34.
JDW Watts 1975: 104.
^  Brown 1996: 71.
Brown 1996: 71.
Coggins and Re’emi 1985: 25.
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withstand God’s fierce p o w e r . N a h u m ’s psalm praises this God, whose vengeance 
and “avenging” is powerful, effective, and good.^°
4.1.3. W rath of the Lord
Nahum’s psalm depicts the L ord as pouring out like fire his “burning anger” 
(pjK V .6) on the day of vengeance. As with God’s “burning anger” in Exodus,
the term here is related to the “jealousy” of God. ]1nn is a “jealous”
God’s holy response to sin; it is “the attitude of God toward sin and impenitent and 
persistent s i n n e r s . A t  the time of vengeance, the “jealous God” unleashes powerful 
and just wrath against his enemies. Thus Nahum’s psalm says,
Nah 1:6 Who can stand before his indignation?
Who can abide in his burning anger?
His wrath pours out like fire, 
and rocks are shattered by him.
When the lord of wrath rises in vengeance, even the “cosmic entities...collapse and 
languish in his p r e s e n c e . S u c h  a powerful and fearful image of God is indeed bad 
news for his enemies.
The L o r d ’s fierce and all-consuming wrath, however, is not uncontrolled or 
utterly separated from divine patience. This point is supported by lexical evidence 
found in two related phrases: HDn and T y X ^  XIH “iplÜT. Nahum’s psalm 
calls God “a lord of wrath” (HQll h^'2, v.2b), who “reserves wrath for his enemies” 
(ryk"? Kin ncplll, v.2d). I win comment on nm “piJa first.
Some commentators like Richard J. Coggins and S. Paul Re’emi see 
“association with the Canaanite gods El and Baal” in the phrase HQIl
Brown 1996:71.
™ Coggins and Re’emi (1985: 20) say that divine vengeance is “indeed strongly positive” and that the 
negative connotation present in English “vengeance” is not even implicitly present in the Hebrew.
Patterson (1991: 16) suggests that the prophet maybe sharing such a divine attitude in his prophetic 
“wish” for the destruction of Nineveh.
Christensen 1975: 23.
E.g. Coggins and Re’emi 1985: 21; Spronk 1997, 35. See 2 Sam 5:20; 11:21; 1 Chr 8:33; IChr 14:7; 
Prov 22:24 for other uses of to refer to the L o r d .
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Coggins and Re’emi also point out the fact that “the word baal in Hebrew means 
simply ‘master’ or ‘lord.’” '^^  They add, “so that the phrase here represents a Hebrew 
idiom which is perfectly properly translated ‘wrathful,’ as in the RSV.” However, 
they do not explain why or how being a “lord” or “master” of wrath “perfectly 
properly” translates into “wrathful.” It would seem that “wrathful” suggests that God 
is enflamed and overcome by wrath. Thus, my inclination is to render HÇn 
simply as “the lord of anger,” that is, one who has complete control over his wrath.
A Midrash records a similar understanding:
“Rabbi said: A human being is mastered by his anger, but the Holy 
One, blessed be He, masters anger, as it says, The L o r d  avengeth and 
mastereth wrath. Rabbi Jonathan said: A human being is mastered by 
his jealousy, but the Holy One, blessed be He, masters his jealousy, as 
it says. The L o r d  is God over jealousy and vengeance'’ (Midrash Rabba 
Gen. 49:8).™
If this analysis is correct and may be brought to bear upon the interpretation of 
n ç n  the Hebrew phrase may be understood as pointing to the disciplined
nature of divine anger. Vengeance without “mastery” over wrath would be 
“unrestrained” and “beyond sanction” (Brueggemann) or have “no trace of mitigating 
divine mercy” (Fishbane). However, the expression H D ll affirms that the L ord 
has mastery over wrath.
I now turn to the phrase XIH nCpiOl. The main lexical meaning of
the root is “to keep watch” or “to guard” (Song of Songs 1:6; 8; 11,12). In its 
other uses (Lev 19:8; Pss 94:1; 103:9; Jer 3:5; 3:12), ICO] has the basic meaning of “to 
keep watch” but “with the idea of anger being supplied by the context.”^^  Such
Coggins and Re’emi 1985: 21. 
Coggins and Re’emi 1985: 21.
76 Cited by Spronk 1997: 21. This commentary, although not made specific to the phrase in question in 
Nahum, is an insightful one.
Patterson 1991: 27. For the phraseTTR*? Kin the translation “and he rages” (Cathcartl973:
43; RL Smith 1984: 72) and “and he directs his wrath” (JDW Watts 1975: 102) have been suggested. 
Patterson (1991:26) points out that such translations are based on the postulation of “a second root 
that signifies ‘rage,’ ‘be in fury.’” The postulated root "ItDJ is taken to be a stative verb, where as the
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appears to be Nahum’s usage of the term J.M.P. Smith, W.H. Ward, and J.A. 
Bewer point out, “the root "103 may be traced to an Arabic verb ‘see’ and rendered 
‘observeth with an angry eye.’”^^  The Hebrew root in the context of Nahum also 
seems to mean “to watch or observe with an angry eye.” If so, the phrase
Kin may be rendered “he watches his enemies” with an angry eye.
The reason for such an observation would be to hold the enemies accountable for their 
sin. A God who does not vigilantly watch his enemies cannot adequately hold them 
responsible for wrong done. Thus, implicit in “watching” is the idea that the L ord’s 
punishment will be in proportion to the crime committed and observed. Also implicit 
in the notion of God “observing his enemies” is the idea that the L ord “reserves” his 
wrath so as not to hastily punish his foes.^^ The L ord “watches” his enemies and 
reserves his wrath in order to justly punish his foes at an appropriate time.^°
The two phrases HDIl and Xlil point to the fact that the
L ord is patient even with his foes, that is, until the day of vengeance when they will 
be destroyed. By the same token, these two phrases strongly suggest that the L ord is  
capable of wrath and vengeance that no one can withstand or endure (cf. v.6). In this 
sense, these two phrases meaningfully relate not only to the expression of vengeance
first root ID ] is transitive (“guard” or “keep”). Based on such a postulation, ICO] is variously translated 
as “bear a grudge” (Lev 16:18), “keep anger” (Ps 103:9), and “be angry” (Jer 3:5,12). In Nahum’s 
context, the translation “he rages” for '1ÎÛ3 would parallel the translation “wrathful” for Hûn and 
thus appear to be perfectly proper. However, Patterson (1991: 27) draws attention to Walter A. Maier’s 
conclusion that “all of the suggested instances where [ID]] seem[s] to be stative are simply cases of 
elliptical constructions (i.e. the verb [itself] meaning ‘maintain/reserve,’ with the idea of anger being 
supplied by the context).” Patterson further comments (after Maier 1980: 52-62) that this 
understanding of the term ID ] “does not need to posit a conjectured root that has undergone phonetic 
change, and it has the advantage of being contextually more sound in that the traditional meaning 
anticipates the sentiment of the next verse.”
Smith, Ward, and Bewer 1912: 297.
Stonehouse (1929:103) suggests, “he reserveth wrath.”
In Lev 19:18, God commands Israel not to take a vengeance (Qj?i) and not to “observe” or “keep an 
angry eye” (103) on a fellow Israelite. Such a command presupposes that the vengeance belongs to the 
L ord (Psa 94:1), the L o r d  has a day of vengeance (Isa 34:8; 61:2), and the L o r d ’s  vengeance will be 
just (Jer 11:20).
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n irri Dpb) that is sandwiched between the two, but also to the expression of 
patience (O')SX *^ *1X) that immediately follows them.
4.1.4. Patience of the Lord
I have already discussed in Chapter 2 that the literal (etymological) meaning 
of the construct form D"]SX 'Tj'lX is “long of nostrils,” conveying the idea that divine 
anger is held for a long time before it is expressed. The L ord will not react in sudden 
anger at human provocation. The L ord “suffers long” with sinners in his patience.
For Nahum’s context, however, Fishbane suggests the translation "'long of 
anger,” implying that the L ord’s anger lasts long in his war against Nineveh.^^ 
Fishbane suggests that such a strong revision and adaptation is made to emphasize 
God’s vengeance in his “war” against Nineveh. I would assert, however, that while 
the book’s emphasis is on the L o rd ’s vengeance against his foes, this does not 
necessarily mean that the book completely ignores or glosses over the L o rd ’s patient 
and merciful character. Changing the translation of D"]BX *^ '1X in this manner 
creates the impression that the idiom of patience is "vengefiilly reapplied’ here, and 
the prophet is indeed preaching “wrath and doom, with no trace o f mitigating divine 
mercy” (italics mine).^^ But if an interpreter is not a priori committed to the notion 
that God only shows wrath and vengeance to his enemies (or like Brueggemann, 
convinced that burning wrath and severe punishment are incompatible with divine 
mercy and patience), there is no need to give an unusual translation to the idiom.
As I noted above, Brueggemann holds that the expression of patience 
D^SX ‘^ 'IX in Nahum’s context has no function other than to point out that the L ord 
has run out of his patience. Divine mercy is seen to be absent in Nahum’s theological
Fishbane 1977: 280.
Fishbane 1985: 347. D'^ SK TjlK is an “idiom” or “stock phrase” which has stable meaning in all of 
its occurrences. The term appears fifteen times in the Old Testament, always in construct form. 
Thirteen times it occurs in construct to the term D'JSK, and then once to the term nnZK (“wing”) and 
once to (“wind, breath, spirit”). But Fishbane treats the construct in isolation from its 
complement term and suggests varying translations for the two texts.
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generalisation about divine character. Whether Brueggemann’s interpretation is 
correct is determined largely by whether the usual meaning of patience for
fits Nahum’s context well, as its other occurrences do in their contexts.
If it does, there is no need for a varying translation of the idiom or for dismissing it as 
having a minimal function in the context.
If one retains the meaning of “patience” for "TjlX in Nah 1:3, it yields
the interpretation that when God is refraining from destructive and final vengeance on 
his foes, “it is out of merciful forbearance, not out of weakness.”^^  If God is indeed 
patient and forbearing with his enemies, when God does finally destroy his enemies 
no one can question the appropriateness of his actions. Such functions of the idiom
'Tj'lX with the translation “patience” underline God’s merciful nature and the 
justice of his vengeance.
There is other textual evidence that insists on keeping the usual meaning 
“patience” for D']BX * '^1X. As already mentioned above, the phrases HDn and 
TO^Xy Xin 10131 in v.2 hint at the L ord’s patience with his enemies. If so, the 
expressions D’SK "ijlK, HDn and I’T k S  KIH npiai are mutually 
inclusive affirmations about God. These three expressions function together to 
explain that God will not “act upon the impulse of sudden outbursts of w r a t h . T h e  
“lord of wrath” is “slow to anger” and in forbearance “observes his enemies,” until 
the day of vengeance. When the L ord punishes, he directs his wrath upon his enemies 
in a purposeful and just manner (however violent or destructive the punishment might 
be).
4.1.5. Power of the Lord
That God’s wrath and vengeance are controlled is affirmed also in the 
expression nÎD”^13. This phrase immediately follows “slow to anger” and
Brown 1996:71.
Smith, Ward, and Bewer 1912: 289
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immediately precedes “does not altogether clear the guilty” in v.3. The term 
points to the incomparability of God’s power even as everything about God is 
incomparable to anything human. As applied to God, may then be
interpreted as “of supreme power.” The expression is placed in between the
two echoed terms of divine vengeance and divine patience in a meaningful way that is 
contradictory to neither and illuminating to both.^^ The placement of nÎD"blîl 
emphasizes the surety of divine mercy and vengeance on his enemies .There  are 
several other scriptural passages that use an equivalent phrase or idea in a similar 
manner . Indeed,  in the echo in Num 14:17f, the greatness of divine power is evoked 
to emphasize both divine patience and justice; "Let the power of the Lord be great 
COIX n b  according to your promise, saying ‘The L ord is slow to anger
(D'^ BX ‘^ I X ) . . .  not altogether acquitting the guilty.’”®^
The striking and surprising juxtaposition of God’s great power and patience 
yields the interpretation that the L ord is supremely patient even with his enemies.
The L o rd’s incomparable patience is highlighted in the Jewish Publication Society’s 
Tanakh translation of in Nah 1:3, “The L ord is slow to anger and of great
Against this view. Smith, Ward, and Bewer (1912: 289) argue that God’s being H b 'y ia  is not 
exclusively or even primarily moral strength in this context, but mainly his sovereignty over all of his 
creation as Nah 1:3-6 depicts.
Calvin 1950 (Minor Prophets vol. 3): 421-422.
The construct occurs only here in Nah 1:3, but one can find virtually equivalent expressions
used of God in other passages, e.g., T rcnK  (Ex 14:31), 113 (Ex 32:11), and
*7*ian InÎD (Deut 4:37). These speak of God who with mighty power delivered Israel out of its 
oppressor Egypt. Also in Ps 147:5, the construct nS'Zll is used in the exact way as is the construct 
n3"*7*ia: “Great is our L o r d  and mighty in power." To God is attributed mighty power for his mercy 
on his people and judgment of the wicked. In Job 23:6, God’s great power (nS'Zfl) is related to God 
carrying out judging or pressing charge.
Both passages also omit the opening two terms of the formula, “merciful and compassionate” 
beginning their citation of it with “slow to anger.” Such similarities might be said to establish an 
intertextual link between Nah 1:2-3 and Num 14:18. Indeed, Nah 1:2-3 could legitimately be called an 
echo passage of Num 14:17-18, in addition to being an echo passage of Ex 34:6. The thematic 
correspondences are obvious (see below), and the literary correspondences are seen in that both use 
same terms (in different forms).
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forbearance, but does not remit all p u n i s hm en t . Th e  Lord’s great forbearance 
allows his enemies a chance to repent and calls them to trust in the L ord and be saved 
on the great day of vengeance of the L ord (Nah 1:7). The greatness of divine patience 
(that is, self-control) guarantees that the L ord will not rise in sudden rage, and when 
God does punish, his punishment will not be uncontrolled but will be deserved and 
just.
The juxtaposition of God’s great power and justice assures that God will 
indeed hold the guilty accountable with his immense might. God is supremely 
powerful to judge and punish even the most powerful or wicked. God’s power to 
bring about justice “gives profound assurance” to God’s people in the face of terrible 
evil in the world.^® Indeed, as John D.W. Watts says, the combination of the phrases 
and n p y  x b  rtjpDI assures God’s people that God lacks no power to 
produce justice.^^ God’s power to affect justice would also function to strongly warn 
his enemies of the coming destruction and call them to repentance.
Thus, God’s power is related to God’s supreme moral strength to be patient 
even with his enemies and be just in his vengeance. God’s power is also related to 
God’s supreme power over the world to eradicate evil and restore peace and order.
4.1.6. Goodness of the Lord
The term 3 Î0  in Nah 1:7 is instructive in interpreting the string of affirmations 
of God in Nahum’s psalm. The term can be regarded as a thematic echo of the 
similarly comprehensive term “goodness” (3lCû) from Ex 33:19 discussed in Chapter 
2. I have shown there that divine goodness comprehends all the attributes and 
affirmations that God revealed in the formula in 34:6-7, including divine jealousy and
Similarly Milgrom (1990: 111) comments that nS"*?"!] that follows “slow to anger” “emphasizes 
divine forbearance. ‘Who is mighty? He who conquers his passion’ (Mish. Avot 4:1).”
^  Richards 1993: 1391, says this in relation to Assyria.
JDW Watts 1975: 104.
The points made in this paragraph work against Brueggemann’s assertion that the phrase “great in 
power” (nb"*?!]) “intrudes” upon the usual pattern of the echoes of Ex 34:6-7. (1997: 226).
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retribution. Similarly, “the L ord is good” here may be viewed as a comparable 
“nutshell” declaration of God’s character. That God is jealous, avenging, the lord of 
wrath, observer of his enemies, patient, powerful, just, and punishing may be seen as 
part of what it means that “the L ord is good.”
If so, just as the nutshell expression “all my goodness” (Ex 33:19) includes all 
the divine attributes of Ex 34:6-7, the declaration “The L ord  is good” (H in’' BltD) in 
Nah 1:7 may include all the divine attributes listed in Nahum’s psalm. As such, the 
declaration “The L ord is good” may affirm the mutually-inclusive and “mutually- 
interpretative” nature of God’s attributes in Nahum, just as “all my goodness” implies 
mutuality of all the divine attributes of Ex 34:6-7.
It is no surprise then that immediately following the declaration that “the L ord 
is good” comes the dual message of protection of those who trust in the L ord and 
destruction of those who plot against the L o rd . The basic meaning of the attributes 
found in Ex 34:6-7 applies here—both divine mercy and judgment are altogether 
good. One major difference in Nahum is that Nahum’s psalm puts emphasis on the 
avenging aspect of God’s goodness. This is because the psalm is intended for a 
particular application, which calls for divine vengeance to predominate.
The reference to God’s goodness as simultaneously delivering and avenging 
(1:7-8) confirms that one expression of the nature of God does not exclude or cancel 
out another expression. Neither do God’s attributes change depending on the 
situation. Rather, the constancy of God’s character means that divine actions change 
in just and righteous correspondence to the actions of the nations or people in view.
In Nahum’s psalm, the constancy of God’s character as good requires that he judge 
and punish severely his “enemies” or “foes” (v.2) and even the whole earth (v.4-6). 
By conquering all evil, God will establish all peoples within his kingdom of
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righteousness.^^ To this end, God’s goodness will remain constant in all his dealings 
with his people and the nations.
I have shown how the echoed terms from Ex 32-34 are integrated to bear 
witness to the constancy of divine character as good (avenging, just, powerful, and 
patient) in Nahum’s psalm. I also have shown that the echo of Ex 34:6-7 is indeed 
fitting in the context of Nahum’s psalm. I have shown that Nahum’s emphasis on 
divine vengeance does not contradict but affirms the general witness of Ex 34:6-7. In 
fact, it is the flexibility of God’s action according to his attributes (or according to his 
compassion and mercy shown in freedom) and consistent with varying human actions 
that powerfully affirms God’s constant character good. In the context of God’s 
“enemies” and “foes” who must be punished severely in order for God’s justice, 
righteousness, and salvation to be established, total “uniformity” in God’s action 
(i.e. God doing the same thing he did in the different situation of Ex 32-34) would 
actually be what would deny God’s goodness or the constancy of his character. That 
God is constantly and consistently good means God’s actions will be flexible in 
accordance with the varying situations that goodness comes up against.
The remaining task, then, is to perceive how these more general theological 
affirmations of divine character, especially patience and vengeance, are applied to 
Nineveh and Judah respectively. The general claims made thus far in this chapter will 
hold up specifically in relation to Nineveh and Judah. I will first turn to Nineveh and 
then secondly to Judah.
Childs (1992: 373) says. “The divine intent for Israel is not a people at rest unless it is within a city 
of righteousness.”
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4.2. Application to Nineveh
4.2.1. Powerful Vengeance on Nineveh
“A jealous God” (Xl3jp ^X) or an “avenging God” does not tolerate rivals. In 
Nahum, the false rivals are not only the “gods” of Nineveh (1:14; 3:4)—but also, 
more significantly, Nineveh itself. Nineveh had risen to the height of international 
power, and is decidedly set against the L ord (Nah 1:11). Nineveh makes arrogant 
claims about its “divine” sovereignty and supremacy (Zeph 2:15; Isa 47:10). '^^ The 
jealous God, therefore, will avenge Assyria for standing against God’s sovereignty 
and righteous ways.^^ Zephaniah 2:13-15 concurs with Nahum that Assyria will be 
utterly destroyed.
Not only is Nineveh arrogant; it is also oppressive and domineering. Nineveh 
abuses its power to oppress Judah and the nations. Nineveh wrongs them in 
arrogance, cruelty, oppression, treachery, violence, idolatry, and greed (Nah 3). 
Nineveh is indeed God’s “enemy” and “foe” (1:2), among those who “oppose” and 
“plot against the L ord” (1:9) and his righteous purposes for Israel and the nations.
God is therefore “jealous” for his own people and the nations. The expression 
n p y  X^ emphasizes that “Yahweh, as a God of justice . . .  will not let 
injustice and oppression go unpunished.”^^  Unlike mortal rulers who overlook 
injustice and “fail to redress the wrongs done to the helpless,” God is neither 
indifferent nor impotent.^^ The jealous God is indeed the divine king who is bent on
^  Assyria claims supremacy which belongs to God alone (Deut 32:39; Isa 43:11; 45:5-6,18,21-22) 
The treatment of Assyria in Isa 1-39 displays a parallel pattern to what is found in Nahum, Assyria 
is chosen by God as a “rod of anger” (Isa 10:5) to be used in God’s judgment of Judah, but its 
arrogance and self-will leads it into a position in which Assyria itself will need to be judged by God 
(Isa 10:13-14; 37:24ff). In Nahum, God has been using Assyria to judge Judah (see 1:12-3, discussed 
below), and now Assyria’s day of judgment has come.
Roberts 1991: 39.
Eaton 1961:57.
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securing righteousness, not only for Judah but also for the nations.^^ God will bring 
justice for the oppressed by avenging the city of Nineveh.
Thus, the L ord will rise against his enemy Nineveh in “wrath” (HQIl). God’s 
righteous “burning anger” (^X pHQ) and “fury” (HDn) will be “poured out like fire” 
(0X3 n3M3) (v.6). Again, the L ord’s mercy does not imply that he “remits all 
punishment” (Nah 1:3). He will carry out his vengeance within disciplined legal 
appropriateness and with awesome power. His vengeance will be complete and will 
not fail.
Here I must make a crucial observation. In Nahum’s day, the just 
compensation for over a century of as-yet-unpunished, unrestrained sins (Nah 3:1-4, 
19) looks different than the just compensation for the idolatry of Israel in Exodus, as 
grave a sin as that was. Assyria had probably persisted in idolatry and cruel 
oppression of Judah and other nations for over a century (Nah 3:1-4, 19),^  ^and its 
arrogance had grown accordingly. God therefore requires that the city of Nineveh fall 
under complete destruction. Nineveh’s injury is fatal: “There is no healing for your 
fracture, your wound is fatal” (Nah 3:19). “Nineveh’s idolatry, rapacity, inordinate 
pride, and endless cruelty were so great that they called for divine intervention (1:11, 
14: 2:11-13; 3:4-7,19)”'^° that would put an end to it all. Whatever they plot against 
the L ord, he in his awesome power “will make an end (of it); trouble will not arise a 
second time” (1:9).^ ®^  The harsh words of Nahum’s psalm alert Nineveh to the 
urgency and seriousness of the situation. God has been patient with Nineveh, but the 
day of punishment is now imminent. Just as God did not clear guilty Israel but
Eaton 1961: 58.
Israel had gone into Assyrian exile in 722 and Judah had long felt the effects of Assyrian oppression 
as a vassal state. See above.
Patterson 1991:16.
Patterson 1991: 16.
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brought an appropriate punishment for its sin (Ex 32-34; Num 14), Nineveh must, in 
an appropriate way, be held accountable.
In its application to Nineveh, the expression Hjpr is used in a way
that is consistent with its meaning in the formula of Ex 34:6-7. The phrase functions 
within the same range of meaning already suggested by the formula and its context in 
Exodus. The expression of God’s jealous wrath and vengeance is not uncontrolled or 
“undisciplined and well beyond the enactment of sanctions” as Brueggemann 
proposes .Rather ,  the presentation of God’s relationship to human sin in Nahum 
fits into a consistent pattern evident in God’s vengeance in Exodus, and, indeed, in 
other biblical passages. A nation commits a serious sin such as idolatry. The L ord 
declares them guilty. The jealous God is aroused to righteous wrath, which he intends 
to pour out on such an enemy. When he executes his judgment, he does so with 
power, justice, and patience.
4.2.2. Traces of Mercy to Nineveh
In relation to Nineveh, the proclamation that God is “slow to anger”
(D^SX *^ "1X) functions to explain why God has not yet punished Nineveh. The L ord 
is patient and therefore has been deferring the punishment against Nineveh. Fishbane 
claimed that "assuages anger” of Ex 34:6 becomes "long of anger” Nah 1:3.
Fishbane suggests varying translations in his apparent effort to have the idiom fit the 
emphases on mercy in Ex 34:6 and vengeance in Nah 1:3 without undue tension.
But as my discussion begins to show, there is no tension between the context of 
Nahum and the basic meaning of patience in the idiom 0']BX "TjriX.
I have shown in Ex 32-34 that God does not act in sudden anger. The L ord in 
his patience defers due punishment and gives an opportunity for human intervention
Brueggemann 1997: 271. Roberts’ similar comment that “[God] has a violent temper” is also 
unwarranted by the text (1991: 49).
See footnote 50.
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or intercession, and ultimately for repentance. Likewise, God’s patience applies to 
Assyria, for all nations belong to the L ord. A s Patterson aptly comments,
[Nahum 1:2-3] is important for understanding the process of God’s 
vengeance: His judicial wrath is not always immediate. At times He 
holds in reserve His wrath against His foes until the proper occasion.
God’s government, including His judicial processes, is on schedule, 
even though to an awaiting mankind His timing may seem to lag.‘®"^
God’s self-control, patience, and righteousness are demonstrated even in the fact that 
God gives advance warning through the prophet Nahum. The ultimate intention of 
prophetic announcements of judgment is very often to warn of destruction and invite 
the repentance of a wicked nation. This is so because the L ord does not delight in the 
destruction of the wicked {pace Brueggemann; cf. Ezekiel 33:11). Divine reluctance 
to punish is illustrated in Zephaniah in which the judgment oracles against the nations, 
including Assyria (Zeph 2:4-15), are sandwiched between a call to repentance 
(Zeph 2:1-3) and a condemnation for refusal to repent (Zeph 3:1-8). Although 
destruction is imminent, each nation is called to humble itself (as Assyria does in 
Jonah) and seek righteousness before the day of the L ord’s wrath and fiery jealousy 
(Zeph 2:1-3).
In addition, the expression points to the greatness of
divine patience. The expression K'*? along with D’SN "I]"IK
points to the controlled manner in which God carries out his vengeance. God’s wrath 
(HQn) that will be poured upon Nineveh will be controlled, timely, purposeful, and 
just. This ensures that even the severest expression of divine wrath is never outside 
the merciful and righteous limits that God himself has set. A total destruction of 
Assyria is within the bounds of God’s righteousness. Brueggemann’s idea that God’s 
wrath in Nahum is “unrestrained” is therefore out of place. God is “the lord of wrath”
Patterson (1991: 25) makes this comment on Nah 1:2. 
Eaton 1961:54.
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who in his “slowness to anger” will ensure that his wrath is “governed by infinite 
patience and purpose.” ®^*^
4.3. Application to Judah
The “address” or application of the psalm of Nah 1:2-10, including the echo in 
1:3, is rather subtle and implicit. Therefore, in order to understand how the psalm 
should be best applied to Judah, it must be read in close connection to the alternating 
direct addresses to Assyria and Judah in the verses that follow it (l:9-2:2).
4.3.1. Traces of Vengeance on Judah
Most importantly, I must briefly consider the L ord’s words: “Though I have 
afflicted you, O Judah, I will afflict you no more” (1:12). Scholars rightly have 
pointed out that there is no explicit mention of the sin of Judah in the entire book of 
Nahum. Some scholars, however, mistake this as an indication that in Nahum there is 
no recognition of, or concern for, Judah’s sin at all.^^  ^ This is clearly an over­
generalisation. The reference to how God has “afflicted” Judah is a reference to 
God’s punishment for Judah’s sins, albeit sins of the past. Indeed, when the words “I 
have afflicted you, Judah” are read in the light of Nahum’s psalm, the words convey 
that Judah itself has been experiencing the reality of divine jealousy, wrath, and 
vengeance (cf. 1:2-3). In addition, the words “I have afflicted you, Judah” point to 
judgment oracles against Judah found in the Twelve, such as Hos 5:5-14; Am 2:4-5; 
Ob 1:12; Mic 1:3-3:12. These passages make plain that Judah has undergone a severe 
punishment for its idolatry, pride, injustice, and oppression.
Clearly, the declaration of divine jealousy and vengeance in Nahum’s psalm 
can therefore be meaningfully applied to Judah. This is especially so since the 
revelation of divine jealousy is first and foremost revealed to the people of God
106 Eaton 1961: 58.
Like Smith, Ward, and Bewer 1912: 280f and others after them.
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(Ex 20:5; 34:14). That the L ord is a “jealous God” in relation to Judah points to their 
covenant relationship, which is often described by means of the metaphor of marriage. 
Judah (or Israel) is “the object of God’s eternal love.”*®^ Parts of the Old Testament 
make it explicit that Israel (inclusive of Judah) is intended to be holy to the L ord . 
When Israel is unfaithful, the jealous L ord chastises Israel. Israel/Judah is portrayed 
as a wayward wife (Jer 2:4ff; Hos 1-3), given over to a brazen harlotry 
(Eze 16:15,43), rejected by God (Isa 54:4ff), and thus incurring severe chastisement 
(Eze 16:53ff).*^ Although the book of Nahum paints no such picture of Judah 
directly, it can be inferred from the statement that the “jealous” God (Nah 1:2) has 
been afflicting Judah (1:12).
In this larger canonical context, the citation of Hjpr x b  np31 from the 
formula, especially with its associations with the aftermath of the golden calf in 
Ex 32-34, functions to remind Judah of, and confront Judah with, its own past and 
present sins, especially its sins of idolatry. Stonehouse rightly comments that 
njpy x b  njp3*| hints at the fact that the distress Judah was experiencing was not 
altogether undeserved. In addition, as Coggins and Re’emi have shown, the terms 
“enemies” and “foes” do apply not only to God’s enemies like Nineveh, but also to 
Judah in unfaithfulness.*^^ As such, Judah has become God’s enemy and the holy and 
righteous God has punished Judah. The reason the people are afflicted is because 
they have greatly offended the jealous, avenging God.
A closely related point is that H p r  X^ HjpD*], together with other contextual 
echoes from Ex 32-34, functions as a warning to Judah regarding the deserved 
consequences of its sins. Just as this phrase declares to Nineveh that his righteous 
wrath will be poured down on Nineveh, it also warns Judah against audaciously
Patterson 1991: 22.108
For more detailed discussion of these passages, see Patterson 1991: 22-23. 
Stonehouse 1929: 103.
Coggins and Re’emi (1985) 21.
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presuming upon God’s mercy.**  ^ Judah could fall under God’s punishment—as
indeed it already had, and as it surely would in the coming exile. The expression
n p r  x b  np31 in the context of the “awesome terror of God’s avenging power’
depicted in the psalm functions to inspire fear in Judah. As Roberts put it, God’s
avenging power is “frightening, because it is a reminder that Yahweh is a God with
whom one cannot trifle.”**"* God’s righteous intention is “not to remit all
punishment,” but to continue to hold his people accountable. Patterson quotes
H. Hummel’s apt comment.
The book thus exemplifies the role which “Gentile oracles” play in all 
the prophets. The point is not that God’s people go scot-free, but 
precisely the reverse: if God so judges those whom He employs 
temporarily as instruments of His judgment upon His unfaithful people, 
how much more fearful the judgment upon His own people if they 
finally miss the message.**^
4,3.2. Divine Mercy on Judah
The main function of D^BX ’^ 'IX for Judah in Nahum is probably to explain 
why God had not brought vengeance and destruction on Nineveh earlier. Under 
Nineveh’s unbearable and cruel oppression, Judah possibly could doubt God’s 
faithfulness and power.**  ^ “Slow to anger” functions to assure Judah (and the nations) 
that “God has his own timetable for justice.”**^
Despite the opportunity being given to Nineveh (as shown in the forgoing 
paragraphs), Nahum’s main emphasis is that of testifying to how the tables have now 
turned in Judah’s favour. As Roberts puts it, Nahum’s primary task “is not to call 
Judah to account for sin, but to reassure Judah that Yahweh has seen his people’s
Calvin 1950 (Moses vol. 3): 388.
"^Roberts 1991:39 
“‘‘ Roberts 1991:39.
Hummel 1979: 342, cited by Patterson 1991: 21.
Brown (1996:71) suggests, “Nahum’s audience evidently doubted whether God was up to the task 
of executing judgment and changing the current state of injustice.”
JDW Watts 1975: 103.
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affliction and that he is about to take vengeance on Judah’s cruel and unjust 
oppressor.”**^  The righteous character of God and his awesome power to execute his 
righteousness affirm that “the oppressor will not have the last word. Deliverance will 
come, for soon Yahweh will repay the oppressor in full for his evil deeds.”*
Nineveh is now the enemy of God whom God will punish in the near future, and 
Judah is the past enemy of God whom God now pardons. Hence, God’s vengeance 
on Nineveh is simultaneously the termination of divine vengeance on Judah.*^ ** This 
point is related to the ultimate, merciful purpose that divine wrath and vengeance 
serves. Elmer B. Smick’s comment is appropriate:
God’s vengeance must never be viewed apart from his purpose to show 
mercy. He is not only the God of wrath, but must be the God of wrath 
in order for his mercy to have meaning.*^*
God’s vengeance has gracious limits. Judah has “served its term” for the 
present time. Therefore, terms of vengeance serve to emphasize the surety of the 
coming execution of God’s enemies and the advent of divine comfort, peace, and 
restoration (1:7,12-13,15; 2:2) of Judah and other nations. In this sense, 
n jp r x b  np31 also functions to assure Judah that God’s present vengeance on it 
will not last forever. In the Decalogue and again in Ex 34:7, the L ord declared that 
divine vengeance is limited “to three and four generations.” Such a gracious limit is 
expressed in God’s assuring words to Judah, “I will afflict you no more” (1:12).
A point about God’s deliverance of Judah can be added here. The restoration 
of Judah, which comes by way of the L ord’s destruction of its oppressor, is best 
understood as an act of God’s free grace. In Ex 32-34 and in Isa 54, divine 
forgiveness and promise of blessings and protection from enemies are unreservedly
Roberts 1991:39.
“ ’ Roberts 1991:39.
Sweeney ( 2 0 0 0 : 4 2 8 )  comments that the book of Nahum intends to make a point about the L o r d ’s 
faithfulness to Israel “and that fidelity is expressed through YHWH’s punishment of Nineveh” 
following the L o r d ’s punishment of Judah through Nineveh (Isa 5 -1 2 ) .
Patterson 1991: 26.
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given; the benefits are in no way based on Israel’s repentance or making a full 
restitution. They are based on divine freedom to show mercy and compassion on 
whomever he will (see 33:19). Likewise in Nahum, the promise of gracious 
deliverance and peace (in 1:8-15 and elsewhere) is given not based on any merit on 
Judah’s part, but based on God’s goodness (1:7) and other aspects of who God is.
While Judah now receives divine grace and deliverance, this does not imply 
Judah therefore has immunity from divine justice and punishment. The declaration, 
“The L ord is good . . .  He cares for those who trust in him . . .  he will make an end of 
[his foes]” (1:7-8) warns Judah that ultimately only those who trust in the L ord will 
be saved. The example of the older generations of Israel who once received divine 
grace and peace flowing out of divine freedom to be gracious and compassionate 
(Ex 32-34) later to be destroyed for their persistent rebellion (Num 14) serves as a 
strong warning to Judah in the book of Nahum. Divine vengeance on the “enemy” 
and deliverance of “those who trust in him” flow out of God’s identity as good. This 
would function to call Israel to true repentance and covenant loyalty. For those who 
trust in the L ord will the L ord restore “the splendour of Jacob” (2:2).
4.4. Divine Constancy
I will address two issues related to divine constancy. One issue is whether my 
interpretation of Nahum underestimates the differences between God’s messages to 
Judah and God’s message to Nineveh. The other is whether Nahum portrays God as 
uncharacteristically enjoying the act of destroying Nineveh.
(1) One might object that I have misinterpreted the message of Nahum by not 
adequately stressing the differences between God’s responses to Judah and Nineveh. 
One might argue that because of the election of Judah, God’s patience only applies to 
Judah and God’s vengeance only to Nineveh. For example, Stonehouse draws a facile 
division between wrath to God’s enemies and patience and readiness to manifest
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power on Judah’s behalf.*^  ^ Of course, there is a distinction between Israel or Judah 
and the enemy nations presupposed by prophecies like Nahum’s, but the alleged 
significance of this contrast in Nahum (according to scholars like Stonehouse) is 
overstated and implausible, as I will now explain.
I have already shown that in Nahum vengeance for Assyria (represented by 
Nineveh) is simultaneously mercy and deliverance for Israel. This conclusion does 
not in any way support the idea that the two nations experience exclusively one 
reality, whether it is vengeance or mercy. I have already shown that both patience 
and vengeance are first revealed and applied to Israel in Ex 34:6-7 (cf. Num 14). The 
character of God as “slow to anger” does not change radically depending on the 
nation with which God is angry. God retains a consistent disposition of righteousness 
to all.
This is related to the way in which the message of vengeance on Nineveh 
indirectly serves as a warning to Israel, lest they too fall under God’s punishment. 
Again, Coggins and Re’emi properly state that although the message of vengeance is 
directed against God’s “adversaries, that expression may include not only Israel’s 
enemies but also, in the frequent times of its falling-away, Israel itself.” While God 
does not utterly destroy Israel, due to his covenant with it, God by no means spares 
Israel from severe punishment.
Conversely, the rather general message of hope and deliverance in the psalm 
in 1:2-10 is applicable to anyone (in Nineveh or Judah) who would “seek refuge in 
[the L ord] ” ( v .7 ). Again, as God’s vengeance can serve as a warning to Judah, so also 
God’s gracious goodness (Nah 1:71) can serve as a message of hope, even to sinful 
Gentile cities and nations. As such, Nahum is theologically compatible with the book
Stonehouse 1929: 103. See Chapter 2 for a similar interpretation given by Calvin in relation to 
“vengeance” or judgment” in Ex 34:7.
Coggins and Re’emi 1985:21.
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of Jonah, especially in Jonah’s echo of the formula (Jon 4:2). Jonah states explicitly 
what is implicit in Nahum: that the L ord who is “slow to anger” will entirely relent 
from bringing calamity upon sincere repentance—even for the wicked city of 
Nineveh. The God who cares for, warns, and saves Nineveh in Jonah is the God who 
warns Nineveh of the impending judgment in Nahum. While Nahum puts emphasis 
on the Lx)rd’ s awesome power to destroy cruel oppressors such as Nineveh, Jonah 
calls attention to the L ord’s powerful patience and mercy that warns and saves even 
the ungodly people who at another time is known for their “endless cruelty” against 
the nations and defiance against the L ord. This testifies to God as a righteous judge 
whose patience has left room for repentance and forgiveness along the way 
(cf. Jer 18:7f)*^ "* and whose desire for all nations is redemption and restoration 
(cf. Isa 54). The holy God will deal with all humankind according to the way his 
merciful justice dictates. The L ord will chastise, suffer long, threaten, relent, avenge, 
defend, rescue, redeem, and restore “according to the demands of His holiness” and 
goodness.
The consistency in God’s dealing with all humankind according to God’s 
constant character is what is strongly affirmed in the Twelve. Nahum is not creating a 
new vision of God but is presenting a view of God that is consistent with the Twelve’s 
presentation of the L ord . The creator God cares for and rules over the whole earth.
All those who are proud will be judged. By producing proper repentance, judgment 
makes a way for redemption and restoration (Jon 3:4-10; Zech 3:9). From the 
perspective of the nation that is utterly destroyed, divine redemption and restoration 
are irrelevant. However, from the perspective of all the nations as a whole, God’s
Yet the “tendency” of Nahum’s testimony (in some contrast to the case in Jonah) is that the 
Ninevites of his day would not repent even if they were given the chance. They are impenitent and 
defiant. Of such people, Calvin (1950 [Minor Prophets vol. 3]: 422-23) rightly says “those who think 
they will escape the hand of God, they will surely be punished.”
Patterson 1991: 24.
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destruction of the nation that threatens the life of the whole is indeed what paves way 
for the redemption and restoration of the whole. A similar dynamic, the destruction of 
a few within the whole to make life viable for the whole, was noted in my discussion 
of Ex 34:6-7. The theology of Nahum concerning divine goodness, expressed both in 
terms of vengeance on his foes and salvation of the repentant, is consistent with the 
divine character as revealed in Ex 34:6-7 and in the Twelve.
(2) Brueggemann erroneously claims that the rhetoric of Nahum suggests 
“something like delight (Yahweh’s delight? Israel’s delight?) in the anticipation of an 
orgy of death, blood, and violence (cf. 2:9-10; 3:5-7). Israel’s resentment is fully 
taken over, embraced, and acted on by Yahweh” (274-275). I have already stated that 
the L ord provides an opportunity for repentance even for his foes, because the L ord 
does not delight in the destruction of the wicked (cf. Ezekiel 33:11). Through the use 
of various word pictures, metaphors, and similes, the text makes plain the awesome, 
complete, and final nature of divine judgment against Nineveh. But the language 
does not necessarily imply that God therefore enjoys its destruction or the acts of 
violence that will befall it. Yes, the text does hint at the fact that the people who had 
been cruelly oppressed will rejoice at the fall of Nineveh (3:19). But “rejoicing” is a 
description of Judah’s natural response to the defeat of its enemies, rather than a 
description of divine sentiment over the destruction of the wicked. What oppressed 
nation would not rejoice at the fall of their cmel oppressor?
In Exodus, divine punishment comes as God’s gracious discipline for his 
people. In that context, divine patience mercifully delimits the extent of punishment 
and defers deserved punishment, allowing time for repentance and possibly pardon.
In Nahum, divine patience is shown to God’s enemy Nineveh in the gracious 
deferment of punishment (and in the giving of a prophetic warning about the coming 
destruction). Such divine patience even with the most cruel, as Nineveh clearly was,
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potentially rouses doubt in divine power, faithfulness, and justice. If God is patient 
with a powerful and cruel enemy to the extent of risking his reputation, being 
perceived as impotent, indifferent, or unjust, God's longsuffering is indeed great. 
Divine patience shows divine reluctance to punish the sinner, rather than delight as 
Brueggemann has erroneously suggested. There is no room to question divine justice 
and righteousness in divine vengeance.
5. Concluding Remarks
Both of the echoed phrases in Nah 1:2-3 function within the same range of 
meaning already suggested by the formula and its context in Exodus. The aspects that 
are new in Nahum when compared with Exodus display a different application of the 
same fundamental meaning of each echoed phrase or term.*^  ^ What requires the 
application to be different is the different level or stage of sinfulness that a patient 
God deals with in Exodus (along with most of the other echo-passages) as opposed to 
in Nahum. The two nations are simply at different points in their “history of sin.” 
Therefore, God’s patience and vengeance are expressed in different degrees and ways. 
Despite the different emphasis and function of the phrases in Nahum vis-à-vis Ex 34, 
the two passages present a view of God that is cons i s t en t .Nahum is not creating a 
radically different portrayal of God’s character.
Brueggemann states, more generally, that God’s mercy and vengeance are in 
profound contradiction within God’s character, and his comments on Nahum reflect
In effect, Fishbane and Brueggemann tie the meaning o f “slow to anger” in Nah 1 too tightly to only 
one of its many possible functions, applications, or “significances.” In hermeneutical terms, their 
shared false assumption amounts to the collapsing of the proper distinction between “meaning” and 
“significance.” The term “significance” corresponds to and includes what I have referred to as 
“function,” “application,” or “emphasis” (each with different but complementary connotations).
In this connection, one could say that insofar as the psalm of Nah 1 has to do with the character of 
God (as it clearly does in vols. 2-3) it has a universalistic message that applies to Assyria and Judah 
alike. One could argue that theologically the whole prophetic reflection of Nahum ought to be 
interpreted as applying to both Judah and Nineveh, apart from the question of the original recipient.
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this theological view. As I have shown, the unity between vengeance (an expression 
of God’s righteous will) and mercy in Nahum is strongly confirmed by the phrase 
“slow to anger” (1:3) quoted from the formula as a qualification on God’s wrath. This 
is the quotation that Brueggemann mistakenly regards as “insignificant” or marginal 
for Nahum.
The compatibility between divine mercy and vengeance in Nahum is first seen 
in the fact that in divine patience, the L ord defers divine vengeance on his foes. 
Furthermore, in divine patience and mercy, God gives his enemies a warning, giving 
them a chance to repent. In light of the larger canonical context, an implied message 
of hope is given to Nineveh even within Nahum. The passage “the L ord is good and 
is a refuge on a day of distress” (1:7) in Nahum’s psalm is a message that applies not 
only to Judah, but also to Nineveh. God redeems those who seek refuge in him 
regardless of their national origin. God’s ultimate desire for Nineveh is not utter 
destruction; repentance could change God’s attitude and intended action towards 
Nineveh (as in Jonah). When Nineveh does not repent, God must judge. When he 
judges, he judges in disciplined appropriateness. In the case of Nineveh with its 
extreme sins, “disciplined appropriateness,” means nothing less than total destruction. 
Divine patience also assures that any expression of divine wrath on his enemies is just 
and timely. The L ord has mastery over his wrath and does not act in sudden anger.
Secondly, the compatibility between divine mercy and vengeance is shown in 
the fact that in the application of Nahum’s psalm specifically to Nineveh and Judah, 
the vengeance of Nineveh and the merciful deliverance of Judah co inc ide .Div ine  
wrath and divine mercy are two sides of a coin. As Brown aptly puts it, “God’s
Moberly (1983: 87) offers a fine discussion of the relationship between vengeance and mercy for 
Israel. He is probably correct when he suggests, “it is His mercy which is ultimately predominant in 
His dealings with His people" (italics mine). See Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion.
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protection is impregnable (Psalm 46:1) and it is squarely rooted in the assurance of 
God’s judgment.”*^ ^
Another evidence for the compatibility and even unity of divine vengeance 
and mercy is found in the declaration that “The L ord is good” (1:7). Both divine 
vengeance and divine patience are dimensions of divine goodness. Not only patience 
and mercy, but also “judgment issues from the well of goodness.”*^** The divine 
attributes of Ex 34:6-7 make explicit the essential facets of divine goodness, which 
are compassion, grace, patience, supreme steadfast love and faithfulness, forgiveness 
of sins, justice, and vengeance. Nahum’s psalm does not emphasize all of these 
features of divine goodness, but simply affirms, “The L ord is good” (1:7). That 
divine goodness has all these aspects means that God’s goodness has built-in 
“elasticity,” to use Karl Barth’s term.*^* This “elasticity” or flexibility allows God to 
act in different ways (according to the many divine attributes of Ex 34:6-7) at 
different times (according to human conduct). God does not change arbitrarily, but in 
conformity with constant patterns of relating to human action, whether positive or 
negative. According to God’s consistent moral nature, God consistently responds to 
human obedience and rebellion. Ultimately, the Lord, who is good, will save all 
those who trust in the L ord but “consume” all sin and sinners (and even the earth 
contaminated by sin) and “reign in righteousness over all the earth.”*^ ^
Brown 1996: 71. 
Brown 1996:71. 
Barth 1957:496. 
Patterson 1991: 16.
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C h apter  6:
C o n c l u sio n
1. General Summary
In this dissertation, I have demonstrated the two parts of my thesis statement (as 
stated in Chapter 1):
(1) The two halves of the formula in Ex 34:6-7 do not stand in 
contradiction to each other, nor are they theologically separable from each 
other. Rather, the L ord’s mercy is integrated with the L ord’s judgment 
(acts of punishment) and vice versa.
(2) The basic theological content of the formula that speaks of God’s 
mercy and judgment remains continuous throughout its varied applications 
in several selected echoes. The L o rd’s mercy and judgment remain 
integrated in these echoes. Some echoes emphasize the “mercy-side” of the 
formula more (e.g., Isa 54:7-10), while others emphasize the “judgment- 
side” more, (e.g., Nah 1:3), but the echoes do not set up divine mercy as 
either contradictory to, or separate from, judgment.
In the remainder of this section, I will offer a few comments that will illuminate the 
nature of these two claims. In section 2 ,1 will briefly summarise the main argument of this 
thesis, which supports these two claims. Lastly, in section 3 ,1 will state one possible 
biblical-theological implication of my conclusions.
What do I mean when I say that the two halves (the mercy-side and the judgment- 
side) of the formula “do not stand in contradiction to each other”? In the texts I have 
examined, I have shown that there are none of what John Goldingay calls “fundamental 
contradictions” or “substantial contradictions” regarding the L ord’s character.* This is true 
both intratextually (within the formula or any given echo) and intertextually (between the 
formula and its echoes). On the intratextual level, some of the texts examined involve a 
juxtaposition of mercy and judgment that at first is difficult to see as coherent (e.g.,
Num 14). On the intertextual level, there are also significant differences between the 
emphases or outlooks of the various biblical texts we examined, perhaps bringing into play 
what Goldingay calls “contextual contradictions.” However, when these texts are carefully 
examined in their literary contexts, they present—both individually and together—a 
coherent view of the character of God in which divine mercy and judgment are compatible
‘ See Goldingay 1987:21-25; see also Chapter 1, subsection 4.2.4.
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and unified. I have thus shown the compatibility between divine mercy and judgment even 
when one or other of these aspects of divine character is being emphasized in a particular 
context.
My perspective on the question of "theological contradictions” obviously stands in 
contrast to the viewpoint of Walter Brueggemann in his Theology o f the Old Testament 
(1997). His thesis of a disjunctive or contradictory rendering of Yahweh implies that there 
are substantial contradictions at work in the formula and in its echoes (intratextual) and 
even between passages (intertextual). Brueggemann supports this thesis largely by means 
of his atomistic or non-contextual interpretation of Ex 34:6-7 and several of its echoes— 
especially the ones I treated in this thesis. Lacking adequate sensitivity to the context in 
which these passages are found, Brueggemann repeatedly mistakes “contextual 
contradictions” for “substantial contradictions.” Brueggemann fails to see the ways in 
which the context presents various aspects of divine attributes as integrated. Brueggemann 
also seems unable to see that the reasons why a given text or phrase emphasizes one aspect 
of Yahweh’s character (either mercy/solidarity or judgment/sovereignty) more than another 
has to do with the specific contextual setting or situation in which that passage or phrase is 
found, not with the affirmation of substantially differing views of Yahweh.
In addition to showing that the theological testimonies to divine mercy and 
judgment in the four selected texts are not contradictory, I have shown that they are 
unified, integrated, or not separated. In these texts, the meaning of divine mercy and 
judgment (or justice) presuppose and require each other. If one takes away the L ord’s 
mercy, then one loses a proper understanding of the L o rd’s judgment, and vice versa.
A contextual-theological exegesis of the four passages consistently shows the mutual 
inclusiveness of divine mercy and judgment. This also implies a critique of 
Brueggemann’s non-contextual way of speaking of divine mercy and judgment, which 
typically refers to one as if it were independent of the other.
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2. A Summary of the Argument in Relation to Each of the Four Passages
The treatment of Ex 34:6-7 in its context is critical because the “formula” in 
Ex 34:6-7 is, from a canonical perspective, the base text of the echo texts. Chapter 2 
allowed me to make an initial case for the harmony of divine mercy and judgment and to 
offer a detailed exposition of the key terms used for the divine character in the formula. 
(Most of these terms are found in the three echo-passages treated but none of them quote 
the whole formula).
For Chapters 3-5 on the echoes, I will summarise the main claims of these chapters 
by means of a two-fold pattern of organisation. First, I will treat the ways in which the 
echo-passage examined in the chapter is marked by discontinuity in its relationship to the 
formula in Ex 34:6-7. Then, I will speak of its continuity in relationship to the formula.
2.1. The “Base-Text”: Exodus 34:6-7 in Its Context
The main points of the argument of Chapter 2  are as follows: Virtually from the 
time of the exodus, the nation of Israel demonstrates its disposition to rebel against the 
L ord. This is revealed most clearly and decisively in the golden calf incident in Ex 3 2 . In 
this context, God reveals that the divine “way” (see Ex 3 3 :1 3 )  of overcoming the problem 
of Israel’s sin is found in the L ord’s own compassionate and gracious character. The 
literary flow and arrangement of the formula’s context shows that all of the divine 
attributes revealed in the formula are expressions and applications of divine goodness and 
glory. In other words, it is ultimately inappropriate to speak of positive and negative sides 
of God in the formula. In addition, divine freedom or sovereignty is specifically linked 
with the divine prerogative to be compassionate and merciful to those who deserve 
destruction. All of these points provide a case against Brueggemann’s attempt to derive a 
disjunctive reading of the L ord from Ex 3 4 :6 -7 .
In the first part of the formula in Ex 34:6-7a, divine freedom to be compassionate 
and merciful is expressed in divine patience, steadfast covenant love, and divine sin-
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bearing. The L ord expresses these attributes by making reconciliation with Israel (see 
34:8fO, even though the nation deserves total destruction.
Yet within this decision to preserve Israel, and thus to maintain covenant love and 
faithfulness to Israel, the L ord brings disciplinary punishments upon Israel. This is in 
accordance with Ex 34:7b, which points to the L o rd ’s justice and capacity for vengeance 
and righteous judgment. Ex 32-34 and other related passages show that the L ord judges 
and punishes in order to discipline, chasten, and purify Israel, as well as to spur his people 
on to responses of greater obedience and holiness.
It is appropriate to conclude that judgment is itself an expression of God’s 
compassion and grace for his covenant people. Divine judgment is indeed an expression of 
divine goodness. Divine judgment and temperate punishment are not alternatives to divine 
patience, faithfulness, truth, and forgiveness. Rather, all the aspects of God’s character 
attested to in the formula function together as integral parts of God’s goodness, 
compassion, and grace. God’s mercy and patience temper and mitigate the full expression 
of God’s wrath and judgments. Conversely, God’s merciful punishment does not undercut 
or contradict God’s mercy and forgiveness, but rather sustains them.^ It sustains them 
because God’s intention is for Israel to be a holy people standing in a righteous relationship 
with God. The portrayal of God in this important portion of Exodus is not self­
contradictory or dualistic, but united and self-consistent.
2.2. Numbers 14:18 in Its Context
2.2.1. Discontinuity with Exodus 34:6-7
There are at least three specific contributions that Num 14:18 in its context of 
Num 13-14 uniquely makes to an understanding of divine mercy and judgment, 
contributions that are not emphasized in Exodus.
^Childs 1992: 373.
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(1) In Num 14 divine power or sovereignty (113) are explicitly related to various 
aspects of God’s merciful and just character as depicted in the quoted portions of the 
formula. Moses calls upon the L ord to exercise God’s sovereign power in the following 
ways: in patience, in love, in sin-bearing, and in punishment.
(2) Num 14 emphasizes varying degrees of sin and varying degrees of punishment. 
Israel’s sin is the rightful theological framework for a proper understanding of divine 
jealousy and mercy.^ The divine punishment upon various groups within Israel varies 
according to the culpability of each (e.g., the younger generation versus the older 
generation and the ten spies who instigated Israel’s rebellion).
(3) Most importantly, in Num 14 the relationship between n^O  “forgiveness” and 
punishment is made clearer than in Ex 34. The real content of n*pO is the continuance of 
covenant life and reconciliation rather than the removal of punishment. Therefore, n*pO 
does not exclude the L o rd’s righteous will to hold the sinner accountable. That is, within 
God’s freedom to bear and remove human sin and affirm life is also his righteous will to 
“visit” the sin back upon the sinner. In “surprising faithfulness,”"* God affirms Israel’s life 
and maintains covenant relationship with them. Yet within divine 1011 the covenant 
relationship, there is not only “room for punishment,”  ^but also a requirement for 
punishment and removal of sin and sinners in order to establish a “kingdom of priests and a 
holy nation” (Ex 19:6; see 2.2.2 below). Severe punishment is carried out to some within 
Israel precisely because of the righteous requirement of God’s covenant relationship with 
Israel and with all creation. Seen from this angle, punishment is meted out within the 
context of divine lOH and mercy. Put differently, it is because God is bound to the
 ^Tunyogi 1962: 385, comments that the narratives about the sinfulness of Israel illustrate “not the divine 
justice, but.. .the divine grace.” I suggest, rather, that at least in Num 14, both divine justice and grace are 
equally evident, although justice (as punishment) functions within the overall context of grace.
" Sakenfeld 1975: 329.
5 Sakenfeld 1975: 326.
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Israelites in HDIl that the L ord punishes them for this punishment serves the merciful 
purpose of disciplining and purifying them.
2.2.2. Continuity with Exodus 34:6-7
The basic claims about the relationship between divine mercy and judgment, which 
held true in Ex 34 also hold true in Num 14. This is so despite the new points of emphasis 
in Num 14. And thus I can develop further my critique of Brueggemann in relation to his 
comments on Num 14,
In his treatment of Num 14, Brueggemann asserts a polarized understanding of 
divine mercy and punishment, fundamentally the same misleading conclusion that he made 
in relation to Ex 34:6-7. He understands divine mercy and punishment as, respectively, 
separate expressions of God’s faithfulness to Israel and of God’s sovereign self-regard. 
However, I have demonstrated in Chapter 3 that God’s commitment to God-self and 
commitment to Israel are one. God’s unified commitment is to the promise that God swore 
to Abraham (Gen 15-22) and includes the blessing of Israel and all nations through Israel.
A proper background to a proper interpretation of the divine character (whether in Ex 34:6- 
7 or in Num 14:18) is the understanding that God has made one central commitment to 
raise up a nation that will be a holy people to God (cf. Ex 19:5f) through whom the L ord 
will bless the nations and thus be glorified in all nations (cf. Gen 12:12f). To this end, the 
L ord deals appropriately with Israel.
The L ord’s discipline of Israel in Num 14 is extremely severe because this is what 
is necessary in order to make a holy nation out of a “stiff-necked” people. Because human 
agents are rebellious, God has the burden of punishing and disciplining them. When a 
nation is lacking holiness, whether through idolatry, rebellion against God, or the rejection 
of God and his covenant, the L ord severely disciplines that nation. Thus, as testified in 
Ex 34 and again in Num 14, divine punishment does not fall outside the overall context of 
divine covenant grace and mercy—for all the nations (and even for all living things:
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Gen 8:21; 9:12ff.) as well as for Israel. Divine punishment, whether in Ex 32-33 or in 
Num 14, serves the L ord’s merciful and good purposes. This implies that, contrary to 
Brueggemann’s assertions, God’s sovereignty is not exclusively or even primarily about 
judgment and vengeance. Sovereignty is far more about the L ord’s power to bless all 
nations through Israel despite human rebellion. For God to cease to be gracious and 
compassionate would mean ceasing to be the God revealed in Ex 34:6-7. Again, the 
portrayal of God in these important portions of Exodus and Numbers (both of which record 
major crises in Israel’s life with God) displays a God who is not disjunctive or self­
contradictory, but integrated and constant in character.
2.3. Isaiah 53: 4-12 and 54:7-10
2.3.1. Discontinuity with Exodus 34:6-7
In Chapter 4 ,1 have shown that the echoed terms of Ex 34:6-7 in Isa 53 and 54 
make several distinct contributions towards an understanding of divine mercy and 
judgment.
I begin by recalling some observations made about the echoed terms in Isa 53.
First, instead of directly presenting God as a sin-bearer (as Ex 32-34 does), Isa 53 speaks of 
a distinguishable human agent (the servant) who does God’s work of sin-bearing. That 
said, I have shown that the larger literary context of Isa 53 portrays the L ord  as a servant 
who labours under Israel’s sin in order to remove it from Israel as portrayed in Isa 43:24. 
Secondly, in the Servant Song, sin-bearing is presented explicitly as a work of suffering 
and as marked by a certain kind of vicariousness—a vicariousness that does not exclude 
appropriate punishment of the sinner. In Exodus, while divine suffering is hinted at in the 
expressions nXOni X0Î in 34:7 and OnXün in 32:32, it is nowhere
explicitly related to a picture of vicarious suffering. Thirdly, and related to the second 
point, divine mercy and judgment, or atonement and punishment are demonstrated 
simultaneously in the punishment of the Servant in Isa 53. In Ex 32-34, however.
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punishment of sin and mercy are expressed at different times; punishment is meted out to 
the sinners (in Ex 32) and then the L ord reveals himself to be the sin- and punishment- 
bearer who forgives Israel’s sin (34:6ff). Fourthly, what is implicit in Ex 34:6-7 is made 
explicit in Isa 53. The nature of Ex 34:6-7 as a divine self-revelation of divine attributes 
implies that the divine revelation is applicable to both Israel and all nations and even 
creation. However, in the context of Ex 32-34, divine sin-bearing is applied only to Israel 
(since this passage is a narrative about Israel). In Isa 53, through the atoning work of the 
Suffering Servant, who is the “arm of the L ord” revealed, the L o rd’s works of self-giving 
and sin-bearing are directly applied to all nations.
I have also made some observations on the echoed terms in Isa 54, which again 
show a perspective on divine mercy and judgment that was not obvious in Ex 34. First,
Isa 54 attests to a new covenant (established as a result of the Suffering Servant’s life and 
work)—an everlasting “covenant of peace” that is unilateral, unconditional, and universal 
in character (54:10; cf. 55:3). Such a covenant is likened to another unilateral, 
unconditional, universal covenant made at the time of Noah. By comparison, the covenant 
that is re-established with Israel in Ex 34:10ff is more “contractual” in character, similar in 
form to the initial Sinai covenant of Ex 20. This is so even though the new covenant of 
Ex 34: lOff is re-established as solely based on divine compassion and mercy shown in 
divine freedom. Secondly, the explicit expectation of Second Isaiah which is plain in 
Isa 54 (implicit in 53) is that the L ord will extend divine mercy and compassion not only to 
Israel (as in Ex 34 or Numbers), but also to all nations. Redemption and restoration are 
ultimately extended to all nations (and even all creation) through Zion. Taken together and 
in their shared context, the echoes in Isa 53-54 indicate that the L ord deals with the nations 
on the same basis as Israel, that is, according to the revealed divine character.
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The differences between the formula in Exodus and the echo-texts in Isaiah 
illuminate specific aspects of divine attributes. The similarities between the two passages 
tend to reinforce the compatibility between divine mercy and justice.
2.3.2. Continuity with Exodus 34:6-7
The terms from the formula echoed in Isaiah demonstrate the similarity between the 
atoning work of the L ord in Exodus and that of the Suffering Servant in Isaiah. In 
Chapter 4 ,1 observed how the shared vocabulary of Ex 34:6-7 and Isa 53-54 and its context 
reinforced my argument that the Servant does the work of the L ord in Israel fo r  the 
salvation of the world. Accordingly, Ex 34 and Isa 53-54 have important shared 
theological elements.
Both in Exodus and in Isaiah, the L ord , or the L ord revealed as the Servant, effects 
the forgiveness of sins. In both, the L ord has the prerogative and the freedom not to punish 
Israel (and the nations) as their sins deserve. Yet in both cases, the L o rd , acting alone or 
through the actions of his Servant, exercises divine freedom to bear and remove human 
sin/punishment, so as not to destroy sinners, but to affirm life. Such vicarious atoning 
work of the L ord and his Servant tempers divine justice or punishment. The LoRo/Servant 
extends compassion and grace following a time of divine chastisement.
In Isa 54:8, a contrast is made between the brief and limited nature of divine wrath 
and enduring nature of compassion and kindness. This contrast stands in continuity with 
the contrast in Ex 34:6-7 which is between the enduring nature of divine love (expressed in 
“thousands”) and the extremely limited nature of divine vengeance (expressed in “three to 
four”). Both passages demonstrate that God will hold the sinner responsible for any sin 
committed. God will not altogether acquit the guilty but will ultimately punish the sinner. 
Thus in Isaiah, the L ord punishes both Israel and the nations severely according to the 
measure of their sins. Again, the L ord does this to the end of establishing a righteous 
people of God in the world.
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2.4. Nahum 1:3 and Its Context
2.4.1. Discontinuity with Exodus 34:6-7
In Chapter 5 ,1 have shown that the divine attributes of patience and justice echoed 
in Nah 1:3 underscore divine power not only to control divine wrath, but also to effect 
justice. However the whole of Nahum’s psalm, in which the echo appears, lays a stronger 
emphasis on divine power to punish the enemies of God than on the L o rd’s faithfulness to 
those who trust in the L ord. When the psalm is applied to Nineveh and Judah, divine 
retribution and vengeance predominate. All of these points stand in contrast to Ex 34:6-7 
and its context of Ex 32-34 which are marked by an overall emphasis on divine mercy. 
Thus, the relationship between Exodus and Nahum presents what Goldingay calls a 
“contextual contradiction.” However, Brueggemann claims that divine judgment in 
Nahum is unjust and oppositional to mercy and posits a “substantial contradiction” 
between Ex 34:6-7 and Nah 1:3. Yet, understood contextually his point is not warranted by 
the passage.
The explicit object of God’s wrath and vengeance in Nahum is not Israel, but the 
city of Nineveh and the nation of Assyria. The book of Nahum focuses on how the L ord 
will bring decisive judgment on Nineveh for its cruel oppression of Israel and other 
nations. These differences between Exodus and Nahum lead Brueggemann to argue that 
the attributes of divine mercy are entirely absent in the context of Nahum, despite the fact 
that the echo in Nah 1:3 includes the phrase about the L ord being “slow to anger.”
2.4.2. Continuity with Exodus 34:6-7
In Chapter 5 ,1 have shown that there are important continuities between the 
formula and its echo in Nahum. Most importantly, even in the context of serious and 
profound judgment, Nahum still includes the affirmation that the L ord is “slow to anger”
( 1 :3). This is confirmed by the fact that the L ord has not brought immediate judgment on 
Nineveh, but has patiently waited and, implicitly, provided opportunities for repentance.
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In addition, Nahum declares that the “L ord is good” (Nah 1:8), Both divine 
vengeance and divine patience are expressions of divine goodness as is the case in 
Ex 33:19 and 34:6-7. For such reasons, the L ord’s mercy and goodness remain very much 
integrated in Nahum, against the arguments of Brueggemann.
3. Implications: Avoiding Neo-Marcionism in Christian Biblical Theology
In this concluding section, I wish to reflect on how Brueggemann’s dualistic 
understanding of God shares some important features with the second-century heretic 
Marcion. Insofar as this is true, Brueggemann could be called a “neo-Marcionite.”  ^
Marcion set up a dichotomy between the “God of the Old Testament” (of wrath, caprice, 
and harsh justice) and the “God of the Gospel” (of unconditional love without wrath and 
judgment). This understanding of God distorts the biblical witness to God in both 
testaments and leads to an impoverished (and often anti-Semitic) understanding of God.
To begin, I must point out that Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology is 
anri-Marcionite in many ways. He wishes to uphold the diversity, this-worldliness, and 
“Jewishness” of the Old Testament, all of which Marcion rejected.^ In addition, 
Brueggemann sees the Old Testament God as both loving and vengeful, both faithful and 
capricious. However, the vengeful and capricious nature of God is emphasized in 
Brueggemann to the extent that love and faithfulness become meaningless. Whereas 
Marcion embraced “a God of love,” Brueggemann embraces and advocates a God of 
unrestrained wrath and vengeance. Furthermore, Brueggemann is clearly not opposed to 
the Old Testament or to its God. Indeed, Brueggemann favours and emphasizes precisely 
the “capricious” God of the Old Testament that Marcion rejects. Specifically, 
Brueggemann wishes to remedy the modem neo-Marcionism of the Liberal Protestants
* See Francis Watson 1997: 127f, It should be noted that Watson merely used the term without making 
reference to Brueggemann.
’ See Brueggemann 1997: 730.
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with their “propensity to insist that Yahweh’s gracious fidelity has surely, decisively 
overridden Yahweh’s harsh propensity to sovereignty, so that we hope for a God of love.”  ^
For Brueggemann, the God who is marked by “downright capricious irascibility” proves 
useful for his advocacy of justice.^ He believes this God can achieve the destabilising 
effects that “a God of love” or of simple “retributive justice” cannot.***
However, Brueggemann is like Marcion in positing a kind of “theological dualism,” 
a contradiction and separation of divine mercy and divine judgment. According to his 
opponent Tertullian, “Marcion’s special and principal work” was “the separation of the law 
and the gospel.”** The “good God” of the New Testament gospel “could not visit 
judgment or grow wrathful or take vengeance. He was characterised by ‘serenity and 
mildness.’”*^  Jaroslav Pelikan states instructively, “Marcion resolved the tensions within 
the Christian doctrine of God by a radical separation, which purchased the doctrine of 
salvation at the cost of the doctrine of the unity of God.”*^  By comparison, I could say that 
Brueggemann maintains and intensifies (rather than resolves) the tensions within the 
Jewish and Christian doctrine of God by the same radical separation, since he places that 
separation within the identity of one God. He does so in order to purchase, not the doctrine 
of salvation by grace, but the absolute doctrine of socio-political justice, which requires the 
reinforcement of a capricious and unstable (and thus destabilising) deity. Yet like Marcion,
® Brueggemann 1997: 272; see Watson 1997: 127-176 on the neo-Marcionism of Schleiermacher, Harnack, 
and Bultmann.
 ^Brueggemann 1997: 740. Elsewhere he says that the tension between the two sides of Yahweh was 
allegedly pushed “theologically and rhetorically, until [Israel] had pushed it into the very life, character, and 
person of Yahweh” and created a view of God in which “Yahweh's future life in the world and with Israel is 
characteristically ominous” (272).
Brueggemann says that part of the problem with “a God of love” is the insistence “that we live in a morally 
reliable, morally symmetrical world in which moral sanctions are inalienably linked to conduct. This 
insistence, which tends to be held selectively, wants to allow for no slippage for solidarity and fidelity in the 
face of harsh demand” (272), that is, in the face of the demand and “obligation to practice distributive justice” 
(737). He believes “a capricious God” who is not answerable to righteousness and who will punish beyond 
moral sanctions can scare people into the practice of “distributive justice.”
" Against Marcion 1.19.1, as cited by Jaroslav Pelikan 1971: 72.
Pelikan 1971: 74, paraphrasing Tertullian, Against Marcion, 5.4.12 and 4.29.10.
Pelikan 1971:75.
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Brueggemann also purchases his desired doctrine “at the cost of the doctrine of the unity of 
God.” Brueggemann does not literally posit two separate gods as Marcion did, but creates 
the same effect by positing one “schizophrenic” God with two contradictory sides, who is 
usually stable, but not always.
A key question in Brueggemann then is how one should understand God as a judge 
and how this relates to promoting justice through Old Testament interpretation and 
theology. Brueggemann is correct in seeing that overemphasis on divine love has led much 
of Modem Western Christianity to a state of complacency and indulgence, and this needs 
to be corrected. Brueggemann says that “a God of love” is particularly problematic “in the 
face of twentieth-century barbarism, and we wonder if such bmtalities are without moral 
significance in a world of love, leaving the brutality unanswered and unrequited.”*"* Thus, 
Brueggemann can be seen as providing a helpful reaction to the “cheap grace” of Modem 
Liberal Protestantism, which tends to ignore the judging aspects of God’s relationship to 
his people and the world at large.
However, in his deconstruction of “a God of love,” Bmeggemann constructs a view 
of God, which swings to the other extreme of “abusive power” or “unjust judgment.” As I 
stated above, Brueggemann has a strong motivation for exaggerating the tension between 
love and retribution or for pushing an abusive view of God—namely, the purpose it plays 
in his advocacy for justice. Bmeggemann’s God with his ominous, destmctive, and 
relentless power can establish “concrete, socio-political justice in a world of massive power 
organized against justice.”*^  In addition, Brueggemann hopes for a God who is not 
answerable to anything but “distributive justice” and who will move destmctively against
Brueggemann 1997: 272.
Brueggemann 1997: 736. This God makes the “harsh demand” that the powerful distribute their wealth to 
the poor (737). “Yahweh is a harsh, demanding, uncompromising God” (747), and just as “Yahweh is 
prepared to do massive, unrestrained violence against Nineveh” (274), so will he “act abrasively to maintain 
sovereignty against any who challenge or disregard that sovereignty” (270).
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anyone who does not subscribe to his “distributive justice.” A God who punishes beyond 
legal sanctions and who scares people into the practice of “distributive justice” is what is 
desired.
The question of whether or not Brueggemann’s God can effectively establish any 
kind of justice is a topic of its own and cannot be adequately addressed here. I can 
conclude, however, by stating that neither the God of overindulgence nor the God of 
merciless judgment adequately represents the biblical God. Both only reinforce the 
unbiblical dualism between the God of “fire and brimstone” and the God of sacrificial love 
(whether such dualism is located in God’s identity or in between the Old and New 
testaments). In downplaying the latter, Brueggemann in effect opts for the former. What is 
needed is not reinforcing or reiterating in different terms the old dualism and polarisation 
between punishment and forgiveness, or between judgment and grace.*^ Instead of either 
the Scylla of judgment without mercy and the Charybdis of mercy without judgment, the 
Old Testament offers a more holistic and integrated understanding of who God is and of 
God’s relationship to his people. This is precisely what I have shown in this thesis.
In conclusion, I wish to clarify that my anti-Marcionite understanding of the God of the Old Testament (as 
possessing a unified, non-contradictory, and basically merciful character) should not be understood as the 
introduction of a New Testament theology into the Old Testament. Rather, it is a response to the Old 
Testament made in the belief that the text itself “pressures” its readers to make such a formulation. (See 
Childs 1997: 17, where he makes a similar point about the early church’s formulation of the doctrine of the 
Trinity; the church thus does not introduce “a foreign component of Greek speculation into the Hebrew 
tradition.”) The various Jewish interpretations of the Old Testament that prioritise mercy over judgment or 
that harmonize the two (e.g., Rashi in the Medieval period and Jacob Milgrom in the contemporary academy) 
would testify to this fact. Such Jewish scholars reach a position very similar to my own, and no one would 
accuse them of reading the New Testament into their Old Testament interpretation.
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